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Brazilian Communism, 1935-1945

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Repression during World Upheaval

by John W. F. Dulles

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Preface

Leôncio Basbaum, reviewing the years that followed the Communist-inspired uprisings of 1935 in Brazil, wrote in 1962 that “the reaction that was unleashed has no parallel in our history, not even in the appalling times of the state of siege of Artur Bernardes. It was a period of black terror that lasted until 1941, during which the police savagery respected neither social nor political position, neither age nor sex.”¹ Following the dismantlement of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) in Rio de Janeiro in 1940 and in São Paulo in 1941, the repression continued severe for three more years and the nation’s press continued to be censored.

In an effort to recount episodes which involved the PCB and Brazilian Trotskyism from 1935 to 1945, I have been assisted by the large collection of papers loaned me by Hermínio Sacchetta, who headed the PCB in São Paulo before he became involved in the “Sacchetta schism” of 1937–1938 and organized the Trotskyite Partido Socialista Revolucionário. Other Communist documents are to be found, together with police reports and the declarations of prisoners, in the Brazilian National Archives, and in that connection I am grateful to Daphne F. Rodger for consulting the archives in Rio de Janeiro and Brasília, thus adding to information that I had previously collected. Mention should also be made of the papers in the files of *O Estado de S. Paulo*, in the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) in Rio de Janeiro, and in the Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, of the University of Campinas.

Much help was furnished by researcher Pedro Rodrigues, who taught me a great deal about the participation of Brazilians in the Spanish Civil War, and by some victims of the Brazilian repression (and contributors to it), who recalled their experiences when I interviewed them. It was good to have the cooperation of veteran militants, such as Apolônio Pinto de Carvalho, fighter for the Spanish Republic and French Resistance, and Sebastião Francisco, who

headed, at different times, the PCB movements in São Paulo and the city of Rio de Janeiro. João Batista Barreto Leite Filho, distinguished journalist and student of revolutionary theory, furnished invaluable assistance by going over my pages and making innumerable corrections and suggestions. I am deeply grateful also to Virginia Daily for her help, much of it in the form of typing several drafts of the manuscript.

Hermínio Sacchetta pointed out, during one of our conversations, that the passage of decades has dimmed memories; and Eduardo Maffei, preparing his book *A Morte do Sapateiro*, has been struck by serious discrepancies in testimonies. Stanley Hilton, dealing with documents of a different nature but of roughly the same time period, explains in *Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945* (p. 6) that "there were many instances in which the data were incomplete or inconsistent; in such cases, logic and plausibility were the only guides."

Certainly the judgments which I was forced to make have not resulted in an account whose every detail will satisfy every reader. It is to be hoped, however, that the pages which follow provide a generally correct picture of the Brazilian Communist movement during a phase that was difficult for it. The picture could hardly have been drawn without references to many issues of *A Classe Operária*, *A Luta de Classe*, and their successors of the early 1940's. They reveal the positions assumed by Brazilian Stalinists and Trotskyites in the face of important world events, among them the signing of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943.

The Vargas regime, which dominated Brazil during the years covered by this study, came to power with a revolution made in 1930 by dissatisfied political and military groups. The revolution ended the existing constitution and Congress and placed the administrations of the states in the hands of *interventores*, responsible to the new central government.

Getúlio Vargas, who had been an affable, calm, and progressive governor of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, showed political skill in handling the disputes between those who had made the 1930 revolution. At the same time, his regime issued decrees that were intended to improve the situation of workers, and it set up arrangements for a network of labor unions in which the newly formed Labor Ministry would have considerable control.


In 1932 the Vargas regime subdued an uprising begun in the once politically powerful state of São Paulo, where the local leaders

feared that Vargas might remain in office indefinitely. Although the Paulistas suffered defeats on the battlefields, their demand for a constitution for Brazil was realized in 1934. But the constitutional assembly chose Vargas to serve as president of Brazil until 1938, and he enjoyed a majority in the Congress elected under the new constitution.

In displaying enmity toward the illegal Communist Party of Brazil, the Vargas regime emulated its predecessors. The enmity was natural because the PCB, born in 1922 as a section of the Comintern, took its orders from Moscow and made it clear from the start that it would like to overturn whatever bourgeois government was in office. As the PCB membership usually varied between several hundred and several thousand, this objective could not be achieved without allies, and the PCB sought them during the intervals when Moscow's policy was not sectarian. Thus in 1927 the PCB's Astrojildo Pereira went to Bolivia to give Communist literature to the exiled Luís Carlos Prestes, young military hero of the opposition to pre-Vargas administrations.

Prestes, in Buenos Aires in 1930, revealed Communist ideas, but by then sectarianism prevailed in Comintern circles and the PCB denounced him as a "petty bourgeois" maker of "barracks coups." Although Prestes himself adopted a Far Left stance, issuing manifestos that attacked his "bourgeois" revolutionary companions of the 1920's, the PCB continued to criticize him in 1931. The Comintern, showing more interest than the PCB in Prestes, took him that year to the Soviet Union. He was working for the Comintern in Moscow in 1934 when he gained admittance to the PCB in absentia.

By late 1934 the Comintern was again in a mood for allies. Hoping to stem the advance of fascism, it adopted a "popular front" policy. As Prestes' revolutionary exploits in the 1920's had gained him a vast following in Brazil, he returned there in 1935, after an absence of eight years, to give impetus to the new Brazilian popular front, the anti-imperialist Aliança Nacional Libertadora, and to seek allies for an armed insurrection against the Vargas regime.



Left: Structure of the Partido Comunista do Brasil (based on Elpidio Reali, "Relatório," São Paulo, June 4, 1941). *Right:* Structure of the Party's São Paulo Regional Committee (based on Elpidio Reali, "Relatório," São Paulo, June 4, 1941).

I. A State of Siege in Brazil (November 1935–March 1936)

1. Reaction to the 1935 Revolt

Plans for an insurrection in Brazil were reached in Moscow in 1934 at meetings attended by a few Brazilian Communists and leaders of the Comintern (Third International). When the outbreaks at length occurred in the Brazilian northeast and the Rio de Janeiro area late in November 1935, the participants pictured the movement as a struggle for popular liberties and the nationalist aspirations of the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), the popular front that Brazilian Communists had encouraged and assisted.

However, by November 1935 the ANL had lost most of its members, for it had been declared illegal four months earlier by the government of Getúlio Vargas. Most of those who admired the aims of the ANL had nothing to do with the revolts, which were carried out chiefly by discontented military men. Commencing in Rio Grande do Norte in an uncoordinated way that surprised even the Communist plotters, the rebellion was crushed in a few days by the Vargas government, with both sides suffering fatalities. Dozens of civilians were killed during shootings in the streets of Recife, Pernambuco.

In quelling the uprisings, the military legalists made prisoners of their rebellious brothers-in-arms. Those arrested in the Rio de Janeiro area included Captains Agildo Barata and Álvaro Francisco de Souza, leaders of the uprising at the Third Infantry Regiment, and Captain Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo and Second Lieutenant Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, important participants in the revolt at the School of Military Aviation. Early in December the press reported that forty-seven military officers had been arrested in the Rio area.¹

Police organizations, supported by the one-month "state of siege" that Congress authorized on November 25, set to work rounding up everyone they suspected of having favored the outbreaks. The jails were filled with many hundreds of civilians who had been completely surprised by the violent turn of events. The arrested Com-

munists included individuals whose only role had been to oppose insurrection.

In rounding up suspects, the police were aided by old records, compiled during years of combat against the "red peril." They were assisted also by a polarization that reflected world developments. Partisans of the Left seldom hid their hatred of imperialism and fascism. They condemned Ação Integralista Brasileira, the growing political party whose members, parading in green shirts, were praised for their anti-Communism by German Nazis and Italian fascists. Such was the polarization that Brazil was flooded with publications representing one view or the other. Among students and professors it had become difficult to find neutrals.²

Now, late in November 1935, arrests were made of the more outspoken "Marxist" professors at the Rio de Janeiro Law School: Leônidas de Rezende, Hermes Lima, Edgardo Castro Rebello, and Luís Frederico Sauerbrun Carpenter. They and other professors found themselves in cells with journalists, lawyers, medical doctors, and students. Their days were lightened by the irreverent remarks of arrested journalist Aparício Torelli. Torelli, a humorist who used the pen name of Aporelli and called himself the "Barão de Itararé," referred to prominent anti-Communist General Góes Monteiro as "Gás Morteiro" (Deadly Fumes).

So crowded was the Casa de Detenção (detention prison) in Rio that the Lloyd Brasileiro's *Pedro I*, a ship seized from the Germans in World War I, was converted into a prison, as it had been during an unsuccessful anti-Vargas political rebellion in 1932. Anchored in front of the docks in Rio's Glória district, with a destroyer nearby to prevent escapes, the *Pedro I* was occupied by a detachment of the Federal District Military Police, placed in the ship's stern, and by arrested intellectuals and military officers. The weather was hot, and, as more and more prisoners arrived, the conditions aboard became uncomfortable for prisoners. One of the few good cabins was assigned to the arrested ANL president, Herculino Cascardo, a navy officer said to be suffering from claustrophobia. By the time arrested workers were sent to the ship the only place that could be found for them was in the hold.³ After the winds and waves suggested a different location for the *Pedro I*, it was moved, along with the destroyer, into Guanabara Bay, near the Ilha do Governador (Governor's Island).

Judge Frederico de Barros Barreto was given the task of questioning the prisoners. During one of his trips to the *Pedro I*, the busy judge told reporters that he had already taken testimony from about four hundred prisoners on the prison ship and in the Casa de Deten-

ção.⁴ For the moment his work did not take him to the Casa de Correção (penitentiary) near the Casa de Detenção on Frei Caneca Street, because it was occupied by 230 convicts, sentenced in the past. But, to make room for new prisoners, the convicts were transported by ship in mid-December to Ilha Grande, the island between Rio and São Paulo.⁵ There, at the Dois Rios Correctional Colony, they (and arrested leftists, shipped later from Rio) were forced to labor under the supervision of Lieutenant Vitório Canepa.

While President Vargas was deluged with messages of support, the press carried reports of "extremist documents" seized by the police along with individuals. The reports emphasized that the seditious movement had been "more serious" than originally thought, with plans to wipe out the lives of loyal political leaders and unit commanders. Besides, the press told of "new Communist plans," such as one uncovered in December 1935 "to massacre the authorities and people in a church in Curitiba." When the body of José Augusto de Medeiros, a captain in the army reserve and ANL member, was found in Vista Chinesa, between Rio's Gávea and Tijuca districts, with twenty-three bullet wounds, the police said that his fellow extremists had probably killed him. Before being released from jail, the police pointed out, the captain had given information leading to the arrest of army Captain Nemo Canabarro Lucas and others.⁶

Congress, before recessing late in December, authorized a ninety-day extension of the state of siege and enacted constitutional amendments to allow the president to declare "a state of war" and dismiss subversive government personnel, civilian and military. Vargas extended the state of siege and reserved the right to declare a state of war.⁷

During the following weeks, lists of dismissed personnel, mostly army officers, were made public. Among the civilians affected was Francisco Mangabeira, a 25-year-old ANL founder who was dismissed from his post of lawyer of the Caixa Econômica. Francisco, son and nephew of oppositionist Congressmen João and Otávio Mangabeira, was locked up, and therefore the habeas corpus petitions that João Mangabeira forwarded to the courts on behalf of civilian political prisoners included the name of his son.

2. *An Explosion at the "Communist Arsenal"* (December 1935)

After religious services were held in Rio and São Paulo in memory of legalists killed a month earlier, news was received that Uruguay was

following Brazil's recommendation that it break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union because "funds from the Comintern" had been transferred via Montevideo to finance the November uprisings. Uruguay's decision, hailed in a public ceremony in Rio, was condemned in Geneva by Maxim Litvinov, Soviet representative at the League of Nations, in a speech that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry denounced as insulting to Brazil.¹

Relations between the Brazilian press and the Vargas administration were good. With the exception of Aparício Torelli whose publications had infuriated navy officers, and Plínio Mello, a Trotskyite, the arrested journalists were released in December and January, and therefore Herbert Moses, president of the Brazilian Press Association, wrote warm letters to Captain Filinto Müller, the Rio police chief, and two of his subordinates: Captain Afonso Miranda Correia, *delegado* of Segurança Pública e Social (commissioner of public and social safety), and Serafim Braga, head of the Segurança Social section. The released journalists included Osvaldo Costa and others who had worked for the Communist-line *A Manhã*. Pedro Mota Lima, the director of *A Manhã*, had gone into hiding after the publication of the newspaper's last issue on November 27, but the police, searching Mota Lima's home, had at least the satisfaction of finding "Communist propaganda."²

At a reception for Rio journalists on January 9, President Vargas thanked his guests for the press campaign in support of his administration's "struggle against Communism." Herbert Moses declared that the president's words had convinced the press that its campaign was motivated "solely by the principles of high patriotism."

Of the sensational police reports that helped the press campaign, none was more important in December than the account of a "violent explosion" at a hidden Communist cache of "war materials" in Rio's Grajaú district. Occurring on the twenty-third, when Congress was deciding whether to extend the state of siege, it involved a "Spanish house painter" who was living at the hiding place. The revelation may have strengthened the Justice Ministry's expressed resolve to deport "dangerous foreigners."

Following the explosion, police inspectors examined rifles, hand grenades, a machine gun, and a radio transmission set found at the "Communist arsenal" and reported that the arms had been stolen from the School of Military Aviation. The Spaniard, Francisco Romero, whose wounds from the explosion were less serious than those suffered by his family, was tortured with his wife and daughter and then interrogated at the Third Delegacia Auxiliar of the police. One of the "accomplices" he mentioned was arrested quickly in

Niterói and was reported to have revealed "diabolic plans," such as the destruction by dynamite of barracks and public buildings. "The Communist conspiracy," Police Chief Müller asserted, "has not yet been exterminated."³

The police, delighted with Romero's responses to their questions, told the press that he gave them over thirty names, including those of people the police had never suspected. On Christmas day Romero was shown a photograph of Honório de Freitas Guimarães. He identified the individual as "Martins," the PCB secretary for Rio and Niterói who had persuaded him to work for the Party and receive training in the fabrication and use of bombs, work that had cost Romero the loss of three fingers some time ago. The recent explosion, Romero said, had been caused by a shipment of dynamite that Martins had arranged to have transported to the Grajaú district residence. The police also learned that Martins had tried to organize an uprising by Rio workers on November 27 and was the author of a pre-uprising document, found at Romero's residence, calling on all Communists to present themselves as "the most ardent, hardworking, and courageous Aliancistas" (members of the ANL).

Romero said that the PCB's most powerful organ, the National Secretariat, had met from time to time at the Grajaú district residence. Besides Martins, its four members included the PCB secretary general, known as "Miranda" or "Américo." Romero, who did not attend the meetings, was unable to identify Miranda beyond his code names.⁴

3. *The Arrests of Berger and Miranda* (December 1935–January 1936)

Martins (Honório de Freitas Guimarães) and Miranda, the PCB secretary general, were much wanted by the police. But others, although not members of the PCB National Secretariat, were regarded as the supreme leaders of the November insurrection. They were Luís Carlos Prestes and some foreign Communists who had come to Brazil with him around April 1935.

Prestes, a former Brazilian army captain, was 38 years old in 1936. He had gained enormous fame and popularity in the 1920's when he had fought against the pre-Vargas political establishment by leading the rebellious "Prestes Column" throughout Brazil's interior. Later, as an exile in Argentina in 1930, he had embraced Communism, and he had been taken to Russia in 1931 by Arthur Ernest Ewert, a German representative of the Comintern. Prestes, known

to his many Brazilian admirers as the “Cavalier of Hope,” was not in Brazil in March 1935 when he was acclaimed honorary president of the ANL. He arrived secretly a little later with a false passport and a German Jewish wife. False passports were also used for the secret entries, at about the same time, of Comintern representatives Arthur Ernest Ewert, known as Harry Berger; Rodolfo Ghioldi of Argentina; Leon Jules Vallée, a Belgian; Marcos Yugman, a Pole; and Victor Allan Barron, a 27-year-old American. Ewert, Ghioldi, and Vallée brought their wives.

Prestes, in hiding in Rio’s Ipanema district in December, sent a note to Virgílio de Melo Franco, a prominent young anti-Getulista (opponent of Vargas), asking his assistance to get out of Rio. Virgílio, inclined to help those who turned to him in time of trouble, was agreeable to undertaking this dangerous mission, but Prestes let him know a little later that he was expecting a new ANL uprising and therefore preferred to remain in Rio.¹

In December 1935 the Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social (DOPS) studied reports and interrogations, with much help from British Intelligence agents, and concluded that the foreigners in Rio included a German Jew who had represented the Comintern in China. DOPS Chief Miranda Correia, acting on information that “suspicious characters” were frequenting a “*palacete*” (small palace) on Paul Redfern Street in the Ipanema district, learned that the resident was a robust German Jew who had attended meetings at the house in the Grajaú district before the explosion there had led Francisco Romero to tell the police all he knew. On December 26, three days after the explosion, DOPS agents entered the *palacete*—really just a comfortable home. They arrested Arthur Ewert (Berger) and his wife, Auguste Elise Ewert (whose United States passport had been issued to Machla Lenczycki). At the police headquarters Francisco Romero identified 46-year-old Berger as a participant at meetings in the Grajaú district house.²

In Berger’s residence the safe containing his papers was protected by an electrical device connected with a bomb that was supposed to destroy the papers if the police tried to open the safe. The failure of the protective system has been attributed to its installation by Paulo Gruber, a German who had posed as a Communist but who worked with the British Intelligence and cooperated with the Rio police.³

The papers taken at the Redfern Street house made a rich haul. Written by Berger and some Brazilian Communists, they discussed objectives and plans, especially those related to the uprising that broke out in the northeast in November. The police, imparting

choice passages to the press, called attention to one in which Berger explained that the hoped-for Popular National Revolutionary Government would be transformed later "into a Democratic Dictatorship of the Workers and Peasants, into a Soviet Government of Workers and Peasants."⁴

The documents revealed that Miguel Costa, nominal head of the "Prestes Column" of the 1920's, had written Prestes in August 1935 to express his reluctance to support an insurrection calling for "All Power to the ANL!"⁵ Although no revolt occurred in São Paulo in November, Costa was locked up. As honorary president of the São Paulo ANL, he was a victim of the reaction in São Paulo, where the police were filling the prison on Paraíso Street and the new, larger one at the idle Maria Zélia textile plant.

The Rio police received more information from Berger's papers than from Berger. Lieutenant Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, head of the tough Special Police (500 athletes wearing red berets), at first put the Bergers in comfortable quarters that were "bugged" with microphones. The microphones, however, only recorded Berger's voice saying, "Careful, Machla, even the walls have ears." Queiroz and his men, known as "tomato heads," then turned to torturing Berger, but with no more success.⁶

Prestes' wife, Olga Benário, was on Ipanema beach when the police first entered the Redfern Street *palacete*. Leaving the beach, she saw the Bergers being driven off and told her husband. The Cavalier of Hope and Olga, therefore, abandoned their residence on Barão da Torre Street in the Ipanema district. They did so just in time because the Bergers' servant informed the police where the Prestes couple was living.⁷ So precipitous was Prestes' change of residence, first to the home of a Communist in the Grajaú district and then to a small one-story house in Rio's congested Meier district, that he left his papers behind in a wall safe. The protective device on this safe also failed to explode when the police opened it.

Some of the letters found at Prestes' Barão da Torre Street residence were addressed to GIN—an abbreviation for three top leaders: "Garoto" (Prestes), "Índio" (Ghioldi), and "Negro" (Berger). One letter to GIN reported that the November 23 uprising in Natal had been unleashed by a foe of the Communists: "It was begun by Army Officer Aluísio Moura, ex-chief of police of Natal, . . . and during the clash he controlled everything and . . . deceived our comrades, disarming them."⁸

Letters from Ilvo Meireles, found among the Prestes papers, revealed that Eliezer Magalhães, kindhearted brother of Bahia Governor Juraci Magalhães, had furnished fellow medical doctor Ilvo Mei-

reles with money to help the cause that interested Prestes.⁹ Ilvo's letters referred also to Pedro Ernesto Batista, the popular mayor of the Federal District, but the names of almost everyone, including the mayor, were disguised by pseudonyms, and so Pedro Ernesto was not mentioned in the first press releases about the Prestes file.

The releases quoted from a letter in which Ilvo's brother, Silo Meireles, complained to Prestes that the Prestistas had organized "nothing, absolutely nothing" in police circles. Silo, a chief organizer of the uprising in the northeast, was captured after hiding in Pernambuco and was shipped to Rio, where he arrived under guard on January 14. He found that his sister Rosa, who had worked closely with Mayor Pedro Ernesto, had been locked up. Her chances of freedom had become remote with the discovery of the Prestes file and its documents implicating the Meireles family. Besides, she was the wife of Major Carlos da Costa Leite, accused of having helped supply the "Communist arsenal" in Rio and of having tried to start an uprising in Rio Grande do Sul on November 27 before going to Uruguay.¹⁰

Enlightenment about the pseudonyms followed the next important arrest, that of Miranda, the 31-year-old PCB secretary general. Miranda, who went by the more formal names of Antônio Maciel Bomfim and Adalberto de Andrade Fernandes, was living with his pretty 21-year-old illiterate companion, Elvira Cupello Calônio, known as Elza Fernandes, in an apartment on Rio's Paulo de Frontin Avenue. As the building had come under police surveillance because one of its apartments was occupied by Jorge Amado, who was often joined by intellectual leftists, Miranda had been advised by fellow Communists to change his residence, but he had considered it unnecessary.¹¹

On the morning of January 13, Miranda, Elza, and a friend were surprised by the visit of Segurança Social Chief Serafim Braga and nine police agents. Miranda, in pajamas in the back of the apartment, tried to flush some incriminating papers down a toilet before facing the men. He told them that he was a cabinetmaker, which seemed odd considering the excellence of the apartment.¹²

At the Polícia Central, Miranda, Elza, and their friend were placed in separate cells and interrogated. Elza said that she had recently come from São Paulo on foot (!), found work in the Copacabana district, and then joined Miranda, whom she had met on the beach. Now she was shown a file of photographs and said that she recognized the pictures of Honório de Freitas Guimarães, Berger, Rodolfo Ghioldi, and journalist Adelino Deicola dos Santos, a member of the four-man National Secretariat who had been mentioned

by Francisco Romero. After Elza spent four days in the prison quarters for women, where her companions included Rosa Meireles, she was transferred to the hospital of the Casa de Detenção.¹³

Miranda was tortured for four days at the Polícia Especial. The beatings, which later necessitated the removal of a kidney, helped the police extract information about the PCB, and thus they learned the meaning of GIN. Of further assistance were Miranda's papers, among them the replies to questionnaires that the National Secretariat had sent to comrades to learn about their conduct on November 27 and their ideas for the Party's future. José Medina Filho, an electrician in the shops of Lloyd Brasileiro, had replied at length, deploring his inability to lead a maritime strike on November 27 and requesting demotion from the Party's Central Committee. Late in January the police arrested Medina.¹⁴

On January 27 Elza Fernandes was released and told that she could return to prison from time to time to see Miranda. Communists hesitated to offer her lodging, but finally Francisco Meireles, brother of Silo, Ilvo, and Rosa and a close friend of Miranda, agreed that she could stay at his home in a Rio suburb.

Ilvo Meireles, writing to Prestes on January 30, promised to keep an eye on Elza. But by the time Prestes received Ilvo's message, Communist leaders felt that they had reason to fear what the police were learning from Elza and perhaps also from Miranda. In the previous days the Ghioldis, Leon Vallée, and Victor Allan Barron had been arrested.¹⁵

4. *The Elza Fernandes Case* (February 1936)

The arrest of the Ghioldis occurred on January 25, before the police released Elza Fernandes, and came about because two friends of DOPS inspector Francisco Menezes Julien told him that a foreign couple had rented an apartment on Sá Ferreira Street. The apartment owner was shown police pictures of Communists, and, although he could not name them, he admitted that some of them had frequently visited the apartment.¹ The police kept the unknown foreign couple under observation.

Ghioldi, unsuccessful in convincing the PCB National Secretariat that it should move to São Paulo, decided to leave Rio. After he and his wife, Carmen, well disguised, took a train for São Paulo, a DOPS agent was sent in a military plane to help the São Paulo police arrest the couple on their arrival.²

Brought back to Rio under escort, Ghioldi underwent "rigorous

interrogation." Unlike Berger, the 39-year-old Argentine cooperated with the police. He spoke about Leon Vallée, who, he said, was in charge of supplying funds to the men the Comintern had dispatched to Brazil. And he gave the police an address for Victor Allan Barron, who had been brought to Brazil by Vallée and whose transportation tasks had included driving the Prestes couple to their new residence in the Meier district.³

Within the next few days Vallée and Barron were arrested in Rio. At the police headquarters, Vallée, a tall intellectual Belgian with gray hair, chatted about literature with recently arrested journalist João Batista Barreto Leite Filho. DOPS Delegado Miranda Correia, eager to locate Prestes, decided that Vallée should be released and watched by Inspector Julien. But this tactic failed because Vallée eluded Julien on January 28. He and his wife, Alphonsine, disappeared.⁴

For Victor Allan Barron, arrested on January 28, the police had more savage ideas. They would torture him as they tortured Marcos Yugman, the arrested Polish Comintern agent. To get Barron to tell where he had taken the Prestes couple, he was turned over to Euzébio de Queiroz's "tomato heads." When reports reached Captain Miranda Correia, at the Polícia Central, that Barron had made several attempts to kill himself, the captain, alarmed lest Barron thus foil the efforts to find Prestes, had Barron transferred from the Polícia Especial to the Polícia Central.⁵

While Barron was still at the Polícia Especial, the Elza Fernandes case was discussed by the PCB National Secretariat, made up of Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú), Honório de Freitas Guimarães (Martins), Adelino Deicola dos Santos (Tampinha), and José Lago Molares (Brito). Elza, they decided, should be kept under PCB custody. One reason for this was that Elza, before finding asylum at Francisco Meireles' home, had brought a note from Miranda to João Barbosa Melo, asking that he shelter her, and soon after that Barbosa Melo had been arrested.⁶

The task of moving Elza was assigned by Honório de Freitas Guimarães (Martins) to Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, a 36-year-old Portuguese-born sailor known as Abóbora (Pumpkin). She was taken to a house, on the Rio outskirts, that was used by Deicola dos Santos (Tampinha) and Manoel Severiano Cavalcante (Gaguinho), the lessee.⁷ To act as a special guard, the PCB hired a poorly educated Communist carpenter, 53-year-old Francisco Natividade Lyra; his head seemed large for his small, muscular body, and therefore he was called "Cabeção" (Large Head).

While Elza carried out domestic chores for her captors, Honório

de Freitas Guimarães (Martins) repeatedly advised Prestes that she was a danger to the Party. Martins, a stocky, strong-willed fanatic, 32 years old, was known as the *milionário* because he received a handsome allowance from his mother. He was on poor terms with Miranda, who felt that the ambitious Martins wanted to take over the secretary generalship.⁸ But the relations between Martins and Prestes were excellent. Almost daily, at an agreed-upon place and time, Martins exchanged papers with a courier of Prestes.

Elza's captors heard her speak of Miranda's deplorable condition, the result of tortures, and they learned that the fondest dream of Miranda and Elza was to retire together to Bahia, his native state. Martins was convinced that Elza, hoping to secure Miranda's release, cooperated with the police, and he suggested that Miranda, granted the special privilege of meeting alone with Elza, had revealed Party secrets to her. The behavior of the pair, during a state of virtual war, coincided with the arrest of some of Moscow's best agents just when a new uprising was planned and was felt to be in shocking contrast to the behavior of the Bergers. What was to be done with Elza? When Hermínio Sacchetta, the São Paulo Communist leader, was consulted, he told the secretariat that she should be shipped to Uruguay.⁹

While Prestes relied on Martins for information about Elza and Miranda, he relied for advice on Leon Vallée. A report received from Martins on February 5 led Prestes to write that he and Vallée considered Elza "at the service of the police," but he added that he wanted the opinion of the secretariat. Martins replied that the girl was "evidently" a police agent and that "extreme measures" would be taken if necessary. Agreeing with Prestes that the police were acting cleverly, Martins wrote that the assistance of Prestes and Vallée was therefore of "utmost value."¹⁰

Vallée gave Martins a list of questions for the girl to answer. When Prestes saw the results of the interrogation, carried out by Deicola dos Santos, he suggested to Martins that the girl must be following police instructions in giving answers and should be made to reveal how the police had prepared her. Prestes sent Martins a second set of questions to get Elza to explain, among other things, whether she had known the Ghioldis' address and exactly how Miranda had written the note for Barbosa Melo. As Elza's replies again provided no basis for considering her a traitor, the secretariat tried to trick the illiterate girl by pretending to have received a letter from Miranda acknowledging that she had given Deicola dos Santos' address to the police and committed other wrongs. But she denied the charges.¹¹

At a stormy secretariat meeting, Elza's conduct was defended by José Lago Molares, a Spanish-born waiter who had recently returned to Brazil after being expelled in 1929 for Communist activities. Martins, reporting to Prestes, said that Molares' arguments against killing the girl would have persuaded the others had not Martins himself "saved the situation" by describing Prestes as favoring "extreme measures." Now, Martins wrote, he needed Prestes to give him written confirmation of that position.¹²

5. *The Assassination of Elza Fernandes* (February 1936)

According to Martins' report of February 14 to Prestes, the National Secretariat concluded that Elza had given the police much information about Ghioldi and Prestes but, when interrogated by the Communists, had simply "recited" what the police had taught her. Martins advanced, as his own suggestion, a plan to avoid adverse propaganda that might follow Elza's death: premature news of her death would be released, and, during the ensuing scandal, evidence would be furnished to show that she still lived; after that she would be killed.

On February 16 Prestes rejected Martins' plan because it would end the public silence about the matter. But he expressed, as Martins had requested, his agreement with the conclusion "reached by the National Secretariat" that extreme measures were necessary, and he suggested great care in executing them "to avoid a repetition of errors committed previously."¹

Miranda, in jail, was alarmed because he had received no more visits from Elza, and he was distressed to have learned that he was being described in a poor light. He arranged for released prisoners to take two notes to the home of Francisco Meireles. In one of them Miranda told Francisco (Chico) Meireles that he was sick, and he implored Chico to ask Ilvo Meireles to destroy "infamous slanders" that "the enemy" was spreading about him. The other note was a tragic, affectionate message to Elza, asking her to visit him or advise where she was, and he appealed to her, also, to repel "slanders" against him.²

Martins received the notes and said that Miranda should not have written them. Interim Secretary General Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú), a smart, active little northeasterner, 27 years old, argued that the sentiments were not characteristic of Miranda and that the notes might be forgeries made by the police in an effort to find Elza. But Martins and Deicola dos Santos (Tampinha) studied the

handwriting and concluded that the notes were authentic. On February 18, after Martins sent copies of the notes to Prestes, the Cavalier of Hope suggested that the police were using "new methods" to make use of Miranda's imprisonment. He reiterated that Elza's case should be resolved quickly, as he had indicated on the sixteenth.

Bangú told the secretariat that the notes, a new development, required postponing extreme measures in order to learn more about what the police knew and were doing. Although Molares was no longer included in the secretariat meetings, because he had defended Elza, Bangú's view prevailed. Therefore, on February 18 Martins wrote Prestes of the decision that "the present state of affairs of the girl be maintained until the situation has cleared and until we hear your opinion . . . , which should be final." Martins said that the Secretariat considered Miranda's notes authentic. He forwarded the one addressed to Elza and explained to Prestes:

We believe the contents demonstrate a state of desperation not justified in a leader of his responsibility. More than anything, they reveal worries, which are incomprehensible, about the girl's fate. . . .

Also we consider inexplicable the situation he has of easy communication with the other prisoners and of the visits of the girl while other less important prisoners continue rigorously incommunicado.

It surprises us that he accepts this state of affairs, and insists on the visits. Also it surprises us that he sends messages to Chico's brother.

Although we have the impression that there have been weaknesses in our companion Mir, we are resolved to intensify the campaign of the masses for his freedom and a habeas corpus has been sought.³

Prestes was sadly surprised by the vacillation and felt that the secretariat would have to reveal more resolution if it expected to direct the Party of the Proletariat, of the revolutionary class. He wrote to it on February 19, saying:

Even without having the originals of the supposed notes of Mir, already yesterday I expressed my opinion about what we should do. But supposing the notes are really in the handwriting of Mir . . . , how can one reach the conclusion that you have? Why modify the decision about the girl? What has one thing to do with the other? Is there or is there not treason on

her part? Is she or is she not a great danger to the Party, an element entirely at the service of the adversary, and a person who knows many things and the only witness against a large number of companions and sympathizers?

If you judge that the notes are authentic, how can you call this "weakness" of "our companion Mir"? Treason is treason and all the greater when the traitor is in a high position.

But let us return to the case of the girl. Fully conscious of my responsibility, from the first moments I have given you my opinion as to what to do with her. In my letter of the sixteenth I am categorical and I have nothing to add nor do I think that the notes attributed to Mir can modify such a decision. Therefore I do not understand your vacillation. The National Secretariat is sovereign and its decisions should not "wait for your opinion which should be final." Such language is not worthy of the leaders of our Party for it is the language of fainthearted people, incapable of a decision, frightened in the face of responsibility. Either you agree with the extreme measures, in which case they should be resolutely put into practice, or you disagree, and you should, in that case, courageously defend your opinion. . . . A leadership has not the right to vacillate on questions that concern the defense of the organization itself.

You will understand the vehemence of these lines because they translate with necessary frankness all my sadness in the face of vacillations of the directorship in whose hands is the future of the revolution of Brazil.⁴

Interim Secretary General Bangú, responsible for the "vacillation," replied on February 21, saying:

If we did not execute immediately the step you propose, it was due to reasons that we considered correct, because it might result in the separation of the Party from the masses and because the girl is in our hands securely, it being possible therefore to resolve the case calmly and safely. The fact that we got in touch with you once more and asked for a final solution does not mean that, if you were not here, we would not adopt an energetic resolution. But, taking advantage of all the experience you have, we wanted to resolve things well and carefully, since there is time for this.

Now, do not worry that the thing will not be done quickly, for the sentimental question does not exist here. We place the interests of the Party above everything.⁵

Honório de Freitas Guimarães (Martins) took charge of carrying out the extreme measures. Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú) left Rio, saying that urgent Party business required his presence in the north.

At the house where she had spent a week, Elza was asked by Martins, late one afternoon, to drink some coffee with him. As she sat down, Martins was joined by Deicola dos Santos (Tampinha), Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (Abóbora), Manoel Severiano Cavalcante (Gaguinho), and Francisco Natividade Lyra (Cabeção). Cabeção put a clothes line around Elza's neck and strangled her with the help of the others. Abóbora fainted but recovered before Elza's body, doubled in two and placed in a sack, was buried in the back yard in a grave dug by Tampinha and Cabeção.⁶

Early in March, at Prestes' request, Martins sent him copies of the correspondence about Elza Fernandes and other matters.⁷

6. *The Arrest of Prestes* (March 5, 1936)

In mid-February, while the police persevered in the search for Prestes, Judge Barros Barreto's collection of declarations from prisoners reached one thousand. The prisoners, already disappointed in the refusal of the lower courts to act on João Mangabeira's habeas corpus petitions, suffered another reverse on February 18 because the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts. This development did not restrain Senator Abel Chermont, of Pará, from submitting a habeas corpus petition to prevent further torturing of the Bergers.¹

Late in January, Victor Allan Barron had disclosed that he had taken the Prestes couple to the Meier district, and so the district was filled with DOPS agents and a group of eighty wearers of red berets that Special Police Chief Euzébio de Queiroz Filho and Chief Inspector Riograndino Kruehl furnished to help DOPS Inspector Julien. As a house-to-house search was impractical in the large, densely populated area, the police guarded the streets, ready to make an arrest. Explaining that the "permanent vigilance was arduous," Police Chief Müller pointed out that "my assistants remained at their posts day and night, in sunshine and rain."²

On March 4, when Müller was considering abandoning the operation, Victor Allan Barron admitted to DOPS Delegado Miranda Correia that he had left Prestes and his wife at the end of a streetcar line on "Norio" or "Orion" Street. Therefore Honório Street was thoroughly searched at the indicated location. While DOPS agents guarded the street, fourteen well-armed "tomato heads" invaded

home after home, evoking complaints. Statements made by the servant at House No. 279 on the morning of March 5 indicated that the sluths had found the right place, and so a shot was fired to signal other policemen to join them. With Special Police Group Chief José Torres Galvão leading the way, they confronted Luís Carlos Prestes, who was in his pajamas. Olga jumped protectively in front of the small, tired, and apparently frail Cavalier of Hope. Prestes simply said: "Don't kill me. I am not a dynamiter."³ While he, Olga, and the servant were conducted to the Polícia Central, on Relação Street, agents searched the house and seized the books, largely about Brazilian finances, and Prestes' correspondence.

At the Polícia Central the Cavalier of Hope was identified by Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, who had been close to him during the fighting in the mid-1920's. Then the prisoner, interrogated by Delegado Auxiliar Eurico Bellens Porto, said that his political ideology had been expressed in his manifesto of July 5, 1935—a long document ending with a call for "All Power to the Aliança Nacional Libertadora!" Prestes refused to speak about the November insurrection but said that he would present his defense later.⁴ When a clerk, recording the declaration, described him as "ex-Army Captain Prestes," the prisoner objected, maintaining that he was still "Army Captain."

Olga and the servant were sent to the Casa de Detenção, but Prestes was driven to the Polícia Especial headquarters, on a side of Santo Antônio Hill near the incline leading to Rio's Santa Teresa district. There he was confined to a comfortable first-floor room in an old building that had formerly served as the Military Police Hospital. Euzébio de Queiroz Filho made sure that the prisoner was watched at all times by two or three guards, and he deprived him of reading matter, paper, and pencils. Barros Barreto, after calling on Prestes, told the press that his collection of declarations had grown to twelve hundred, but he added that "neither Luís Carlos Prestes nor Harry Berger gave testimonies; their abbreviated declarations provided no information."⁵

On March 5, the day following Prestes' arrest, Victor Allan Barron was pushed from, or flung himself from, the second floor at the Polícia Central. Still alive, he was taken to a first-aid station, but he died later in the day.

The accounts of Barron's "suicide" and Prestes' arrest filled the newspapers at the time that Judge Edgard Ribas Carneiro, of the First District Federal Court, considered Senator Chermont's habeas corpus appeal on behalf of the Bergers, who were in the Casa de Detenção. The Bergers complained of electric shocks applied to their

heads, burns from lighted cigarettes, and a requirement that they remain on foot, which prevented sleeping.

The judge examined Berger's torso and denied the petition. He was convinced, he said, that the Bergers had had their "individual rights perfectly defended from any violence whatsoever." He described Berger as insensitive, unable to laugh or cry, and added that he was a faker who had lied about being given poisoned water and about being unable to speak Portuguese. The judge suggested that Berger, before his arrest, had been in touch with Senator Chermont.⁶

Chermont attacked the police during sessions of the Senate Permanent Section, which met during the congressional recess. Senator Renato Tavares da Cunha Melo, supporting the administration, expressed the hope that his colleague from Pará was not recklessly taking up the cause of two foreigners who sought to provoke "bloody anarchy" in Brazil.

7. *The PCB in Pernambuco Early in 1936*

The Prestes correspondence, found together with dollars and Dutch guildens at the Honório Street house, confirmed the conviction of the police that the Communist leaders were working for another insurrection. And it explained Prestes' decision not to have Virgílio de Melo Franco conduct him out of Rio. The Cavalier of Hope, in a letter to the National Secretariat, had recently written: "Exclusively for the work of the organization of the guerrilla groups of the northeast, I obtained through EÇA [Vallée] the sum of 30:000\$000 (a little more, really). This sum is now with me and should serve as the basis of the organization of all our plans."¹

According to a report transmitted to Prestes on January 25, "the companions of the northeast want to return to the fight sooner than we were imagining. And more than that, in order to support any movement south of them, they are already prepared, counting on at least taking Recife at the start." The report went on to say that with the necessary reorganization in Alagoas and other states, the insurrectionists in the northeast would definitely be ready in two or three months, and it added that "in Paraíba we can still count on organized elements (military)."²

A report about Alagoas, dated January 27, advised Prestes that "our situation is very good; we have elements in all the Military Police battalions." The Alagoanos gave assurances that, with eight days of advance notice, they would support any outbreak in Pernambuco or the south. And they added that they awaited instructions before

proceeding with their immediate plan to liberate companions by attacking the penitentiary.

Honório de Freitas Guimarães, writing Prestes on January 26 about the plans, reported that Ghioldi had agreed with the National Secretariat's resolution to pay serious attention this time to the masses in order to eliminate "tendencies of spontaneousness."³

The feeling that the November insurrection had failed because of insufficient preparation of the masses pervaded the Party literature starting in December 1935. In Pernambuco, considered the key to success in the northeast, the PCB Regional Committee stressed this point in its December 25 bulletin to its local committees and cells. While it mentioned the November "precipitation, that caught the Regional Committee itself by surprise," it argued that the "fundamental cause of the momentary defeat" had been insufficient attention to "workers, peasants, and common people." Explaining that "we did not give the brave soldiers . . . the backing they needed," the Regional Committee recommended steps that "in the next combats" would have the common people participating "in guerrilla forces and columns." These steps, the committee wrote, would be made easier because in the last month the misery of workers and peasants had increased, becoming unbearable.⁴

Early in 1936 the Pernambuco Regional Committee pointed to the increased costs of foods when it issued a manifesto calling on the people to overthrow "the government of national treason" and set up a Popular National Revolutionary Government headed by Prestes. It pictured the struggle as continuing "without interruption, in the guerrilla fighting of our dauntless brothers of Rio Grande do Norte." Discussing the need to fight for the freedom of "thousands of national liberators," the manifesto spoke of "our comrade and chief, Miranda, a great revolutionary with a will of iron, suffering since January horrible tortures in the grim Polícia Central of Rio at the side of Berger, the fearless anti-imperialist fighter." Four arrested local heroes were mentioned: 29th Infantry Battalion officers Otacílio Alves de Lima and Lamartine Coutinho, "brilliant military leaders"; Silo Meireles, "a model of dauntlessness"; and José Caetano Machado, "representative of the bravery of the bakers of Pernambuco."⁵

In a handbill, the Pernambuco Regional Committee denounced Uruguay's break in relations with the USSR. It predicted that the Brazilian people, guided by the PCB, would soon overthrow Vargas and Pernambuco Governor Carlos de Lima Cavalcanti, unmasking their sellout to the "imperialists of England, America, Japan, etc."⁶

Less optimism was shown when a Pernambuco Regional Committee member wrote confidentially on February 10 to the PCB National Bureau of Organization in Rio. He described two members of the five-man Regional Committee, including the secretary, as worthless, and the monthly income so badly affected by arrests that it had fallen to a thousand milreis (1:000\$000). The Committee's Syndical Bureau, finding all its cells destroyed after November, had reorganized nine, of which only four were functioning well. Cells of dockworkers and land transport workers were satisfactory, but most of the others, including "the Tramway and Coal" needed reorganization. The Great Western Railway cell had been inoperative since the November uprising. The Socorro Vermelho (Red Aid) groups, mostly non-Communist, were beginning, "very weakly," to provide assistance to the families of prisoners.

The letter said that "our Party forces in the interior continue dispersed." However, the discontent of backland chieftains seemed to offer "possibilities of struggles in the countryside":

We have, through connections with chieftains in five backland locations, the possibility of an uprising by two hundred men, without exaggeration, in each location. In one of those locations there is great discontent and the possibility of imminent struggles. The men there have arms, which is not the case in the other locations.

Our man, who will go to the countryside, has the job of providing directives. The directives, to be issued after a concrete examination of the situation, will possibly call for immediate struggles. . . . Once the struggle is initiated, recruitment will be much easier, making it possible to count on thousands of men. The chieftains of these locations are affiliated with the ANL and have a liking for the Party.⁷

Members of the PCB National Directorship soon had an opportunity to learn about the situation in Pernambuco first-hand. Following the publication of newspaper stories about the Elza Fernandes case, based on Prestes' papers, Bangú (Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha) moved to Pernambuco, together with Martins (Honório de Freitas Guimarães) and Abóbora (Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier). The trip, Abóbora declared later, was "a flight and nothing more than a flight, considering the repression of the PCB, and was undertaken, as Bangú said, to clear our heads." Bangú regarded the trip as an escape from police persecution and "from the scandal created by the press, which

published a great deal of news, illustrating it with photographs." But, he added, the principal reason was to have the secretariat "decide from afar on new policies."⁸

In Recife the three PCB leaders spoke with Cristiano Cordeiro, who had helped found the Party in 1922. In 1935 Cordeiro had been criticized by the Pernambuco Regional Committee for his failure to participate in the November insurrection, but he had nevertheless been arrested after its occurrence and had been released only shortly before Bangú, Martins, and Abóbora reached Recife.⁹

After two months in Recife, the three PCB leaders went to Salvador, Bahia. While there, Abóbora, the former sailor, was directed by Bangú and Martins to go to Moscow to see Otávio Brandão, an important PCB leader of the 1920's who had been expelled from Brazil in 1931. Bangú and Martins gave Abóbora a report to deliver to Brandão about the failure of the 1935 insurrection, and they asked him to obtain Brandão's advice about the future policy of the PCB.¹⁰

8. *The PCB in São Paulo Early in 1936*

If no uprising occurred in São Paulo in 1935 it was not because the PCB had not prepared for one. The preparation consisted of working in the barracks for the establishment of cells of the Party's military committee, which was known as the Comitê Anti-Militar and which was directed in São Paulo by João Raimondi (Tupi). Raimondi, a civilian educated in Italy and a former Brazilian army soldier, kept in touch with Antônio Vieira in the Guarda Civil of the state capital, Pericles Vieira de Azevedo in the federal army, and Davino Francisco dos Santos, who was receiving officer training in the important state Força Pública.¹

Despite the propaganda sent to the barracks, and despite the interest shown in it by some members of the Força Pública, PCB Regional Secretary Sebastião Francisco, the Party's top man in the state, was not optimistic about an uprising in São Paulo. Sebastião Francisco, 36 years old, had begun working at the age of 6 as an ox-cart driver in Mineiros de Tiete, São Paulo. He had joined the PCB in 1933 and in 1934 had given up his profession of decorative painter (of churches and other buildings) to devote full time to running the PCB in São Paulo.²

The second man in the PCB's São Paulo hierarchy, Hermínio Sacchetta, diligently supervised the establishment of Comitê Anti-Militar cells. Ten years younger than Sebastião Francisco, he had directed a strike of postal and telegraph workers in São Paulo in 1933

and had organized and run a business school, the Escola de Comércio Tiradentes. Zealously he promoted PCB propaganda, agitation, and organization.

In accordance with a conversation that Sacchetta had had with Harry Berger, the strategy, based on concepts developed in China, called for the São Paulo Communists to play their hand following a victorious rebellion in the "backward north." But the outbreak in the north, with a timing that surprised the São Paulo PCB, produced no victory. Davino Francisco dos Santos decided, after November 1935, that the São Paulo PCB leaders showed good sense in not ordering an uprising. Although he had once believed in the effectiveness of the work of the Party in the Força Pública's Cavalry Regiment and Central de Instrução Militar, he came to feel that the authorities had pretty well infiltrated areas of so-called Communist strength there.³

Infiltration carried out after November by São Paulo's Superintendência de Ordem Política e Social was blamed by Communists for arrests made when they held meetings to revive their apparatus and to promote strikes. Thus Antônio Vieira explains the arrest on January 22 of five, including young Communist militant Augusto Pinto, who had gathered to reorganize the nucleus in the Cambuci district. One of the five, Vieira writes, was a police informer.⁴

At various places during the next few days, São Paulo's Ordem Política e Social arrested sixteen more "adepts of the red creed." Among them was the PCB's regional secretary, Sebastião Francisco. He was seized together with Alfredo Godofredo, head of the Communist cell of the Light and Power Company of São Paulo, and other light company workers, such as Oscar dos Reis, Wolf Reutemberg, Jorge Cetl, and Domingos Pereira Marques. These arrests were followed by those of still more light company workers, federal employee João Varlotta, and one young woman, Sidéria Galvão, a schoolteacher accused of having helped Varlotta mimeograph papers. José Rodrigues Cró Filho, a worker in commerce who was arrested and accused of "exalted Communist" ideas, told the police of meetings at his home which had been attended by Hernesto Yosk, a German Jew recently expelled from Brazil.⁵

The prisoners were interrogated at the Superintendência de Ordem Política e Social and then jailed. Their likely destination was the prison recently installed in a spacious wing of the former Maria Zélia textile plant, famous for having provided workers with good showers. Maria Zélia held about four hundred prisoners compared with fifty or sixty in the prison on Paraíso Street, which had been a private residence until 1932. Paraíso (Paradise), at first reserved for arrested lawyers and doctors, was made available to some prisoners

who had health problems and needed better feeding than Maria Zélia offered. It bore resemblances to a hospital where members of the better social classes outnumbered workers.⁶

A residence adjoining Paraíso was rented for use as a prison for women. There Sidéria Galvão was joined by her 25-year-old sister Patrícia, whose modernistic writings appeared under the name of Pagu. Patrícia Galvão had interviewed Prestes in Buenos Aires in 1930 and returned to Brazil with Communist ideas, apparent in 1931 in the periodical *O Homen do Povo*, with which she and her husband of that time, Oswald de Andrade, had been associated. After participating that year in a strike in Santos, São Paulo, for which she had suffered a wretched experience in the Santos jail, she had written a "proletarian novel," *Parque Industrial*, which had been published under a pseudonym in 1933. Then Patrícia, separated from her husband, had traveled around the world, sending articles to Brazilian newspapers. In France, where she had been a translator and a participant in the Communist Youth movement, she had been jailed. Back in Brazil, she had romantically supported the ANL and the PCB.⁷

Another intellectual arrested in São Paulo early in 1936 was Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, 19-year-old son of an influential physician. Having won distinction as an ANL student orator, Paulo Emílio was sent to Maria Zélia. There he organized theatrical performances which provided political ideas as well as diversion. While some political prisoners ran a "school" for illiterates, teaching them to read and understand "the true reasons" for Brazil's "sad economic realities," Paulo Emílio helped establish a prison "university" for the literate prisoners. Finding a lack of opportunity for peaceful study, his only complaint about Maria Zélia, he obtained, after a few months, a transfer to Paraíso.⁸

Thus Paulo Emílio missed some rioting at Maria Zélia. On April 30 the prisoners, protesting limitations placed on visits by their families, broke down the wooden partitions erected to divide the large old factory room into eight sections. Despite the reaction of the jailers, who used tear gas, rifles, and revolvers to quell the riot, the prisoners observed May Day with fervor. Singing and carrying little red flags, they paraded with a picture of Luís Carlos Prestes, one meter high.⁹

According to a report that Augusto Pinto sent to the PCB, the food, full of bugs, became worse and the jailers censored the comedies performed at the theater. But the prisoners' chief complaint was the medical service which, in Pinto's words, was rendered by a prison doctor who appeared only half an hour each week and issued prescriptions that poisoned the inmates. After one inmate's death

was blamed on the prison medical service, the prisoners refused to agree to the transfer from Maria Zélia of a jailed doctor they liked. The argument developed into a battle in which the jailers wounded prisoners and wrecked the installations used for the theater, library, and school.¹⁰

Prisoners' reports found their way, sometimes via the ANL, to the PCB Regional Committee, which was dominated by Hermínio Sacchetta following the arrest of Sebastião Francisco in February. As PCB regional secretary, Sacchetta demanded hard work by his subordinates and continued to devote himself tirelessly, and with a burning energy, to the problems of organization and propaganda.

His *Problemas de Organização*, completed late in February, was published as a twenty-four-page mimeographed booklet only in April because of the "difficulties created by recent events." It told the Communists to "set the masses in motion" by slogans opposing taxes and calling for wage increases. Explaining that such reformist demands were clearly not the PCB's final objective, the booklet said that the hoped-for *governo popular* would be merely a stage on the highway to socialism. In the meantime the slogans were to help bring people of all political and religious beliefs into "popular fronts" and, it was hoped, create "a crisis that can transform itself into a revolutionary crisis."

The participants of mass movements who showed outstanding "combattiveness and political vision" were to be won for the PCB. They were to form Party cells, without revealing this to their mass organizations, for each cell had a double function: its mass movement work and its secret Party work. "There is no need for anyone to know us as Communists; on the contrary, if it is necessary, we deny that we are Communists."

The booklet discussed in detail the conduct of cell meetings and the responsibilities of a cell's officers: the secretary ("the best and most combative comrade") and the directors of organization, agit-prop (agitation and propaganda), and finances. Finance directors were told that "the Party does not live by the work and grace of God but from the money obtained at its base." They were called on to collect 1 percent of each member's wages and to raise more money from Party sympathizers and by organizing raffles, bingo games, picnics, and dances. The cell was to retain 25 percent of its income and forward the rest to "the higher levels—the district and local committees—and from there to the Regional Committee."

The "best activists" of the cells of a large city's district would form five-member district committees (*comitês de bairro*). The district committees, in turn, would organize the city's *comitê local*, ca-

pable of "studying problems, industry by industry, giving solutions and perspectives to the district committees and cells." In conclusion, *Problemas de Organização* stressed that the state's local and district committees were to give special attention to the "work of the masses, unions, commercial and professional associations, sports clubs, peasant leagues, and, above all, the work of the Aliança Nacional Libertadora, which is the popular work par excellence."¹¹

The PCB Regional Committee prepared all the local ANL literature. The pages of *Liberdade*, the mimeographed ANL monthly for the public, published the complaints of jailed political prisoners along with antigovernment propaganda. The internal circulars, with instructions for ANL officers, were signed by the ANL São Paulo directorship. The link between this directorship and the PCB Regional Committee was Alberto Moniz da Rocha Barros, an able lawyer, 27 years old, who worked for the São Paulo State Labor Department. Rocha Barros, friend and admirer of Sacchetta, was the PCB's "clandestine representative" in the São Paulo ANL. Although he was not a member of the ANL São Paulo directorship, he was in charge of the PCB fraction on that directorship.¹²

2. A State of War in Brazil: First Stage (March 1936–January 1937)

1. *Declaration of a State of War* (March 21, 1936)

When Justice Minister Vicente Ráo called on Vargas in Petrópolis on March 21, the president, using the authority given by Congress in December, signed a decree declaring the nation in a "state of war" for ninety days. "New studies and investigations," the decree said, "have revealed a grave renewal of subversive activities" and therefore "more energetic measures of prevention and repression have become indispensable." The new decree, signed in Rio by the cabinet and approved by the Senate Permanent Section, eliminated some individual guarantees that had remained in effect during the state of siege, such as immunities for federal legislators.

The first of the "more energetic measures" was the arrest on March 24 of Senator Abel Chermont and four congressmen: Otávio da Silveira, Domingos Velasco, Abguar Bastos, and João Mangabeira. They were accused of having been shown in captured Communist papers to be closely associated with subversive elements who were continuing to plot upheavals. The government declared that two of the five were admittedly Communists and that it did not know whether the other three had recently been converted "to the Soviet creed for doctrinary reasons, or seduced by other reasons."¹

Otávio da Silveira denied that he was a Communist or had conspired. Giving testimony to Delegado Auxiliar Eurico Bellens Porto, he said that he had opposed Vargas' policies and had established the Paraná section of the ANL in his clinic in Curitiba. The program of Prestes, he said, was not Communist but was a way to liberate Brazil from the "imperialist yoke." He added that when he had learned that Miranda was being barbarously beaten he had applied for a habeas corpus writ on his behalf. Asked how he had received this information about Miranda, he refused to answer.²

The government announced widespread dismissals, starting

with that of Professor Edgardo Castro Rebello from his National Labor Council membership. Castro Rebello was also dismissed from his professorship, as were Professors Hermes Lima, Leônidas de Rezende, and Dr. Maurício de Campos Medeiros. Dr. Odilon Bastista, son of Rio Mayor Pedro Ernesto Batista, lost his position of surgeon in the Directorship of Psychopathic Aid. Labor Minister Agamenon Magalhães disclosed that railroads, banks, and the Light and Power Company were cleaning house by firing employees.

While the War Ministry took steps to grant promotions to all soldiers who had fought against the Third Infantry Regiment insurrectionists, officials of the Rio police told the press of the search for Elza Fernandes. They expressed the fear that she had been condemned by "the red tribunal" following its study of "a questionnaire drawn up in French by the Belgian extremist Leon Jules Vallée, who is in hiding."³

On April 4 large headlines proclaimed that Pedro Ernesto Batista, mayor of the Federal District, had been arrested at his clinic by Captain Riograndino Krueel, general inspector of police. The police reported "very strong indications" of the mayor's participation in the preparation of the subversive movements. While Pedro Ernesto sought legal assistance, the new acting mayor, Municipal Chamber President Olímpio de Melo, dismissed a score of municipal employees for "extremist activities." Among them were medical doctor Eliezer Magalhães, brother of the Bahia governor, and veteran politician Maurício Paiva de Lacerda.⁴

Maurício de Lacerda, along with Congressman Otávio da Silveira and young Francisco Mangabeira, had founded the Popular Front for Land, Bread, and Liberty after the ANL had been closed by the Vargas government in July 1935. Another of its organizers had been Colonel Felipe Moreira Lima, a former interventor of Ceará and brother of Prestes Column diarist Lourenço Moreira Lima. The colonel, following the November insurrections, had sent messages to Prestes mentioning Lenin's ideas and advising that "profound transformations, as a rule, proceed in stages and with time intervals that vary for each people." The messages, which the colonel later admitted were "written in a bitter and contentious language when referring to a certain category of political leaders," were found among Prestes' papers, with the result that the army resolved to jail the colonel for cooperating with subversive movements. However, the army could not locate him, and so in April it announced that he would be classified as a deserter unless he presented himself within eight days. He continued in hiding. On April 24 Vargas signed decrees canceling Moreira Lima's army commission along with Miguel

Costa's honorary generalship. The decrees described the men as "fervent adepts of ideas that oppose the present regime."⁵

Felippe Moreira Lima issued a manifesto that mentioned his approximately forty years of army service and explained that he preferred exile to imprisonment, although exile would force him to leave his family in destitution. He expressed the hope that his sacrifice would lift the spirits of the victims of the reactionary government, torturer of prisoners and violator of defenseless women. He called on the army to intervene with the people against foreign capitalism and the Vargas government.⁶

In May, after reaching Buenos Aires, Moreira Lima issued a longer message in which he said that it was incorrect to conclude from his "confidential" messages to Prestes that he was calling for a subversive movement for the implantation of Communism. The former colonel used his extensive vocabulary to attack the Catholic clergy and to argue that the world was marching "victoriously" to the Left. He predicted an "explosion" in Brazil in a matter of months, "despite all the security laws, constitutional amendments, states of war, political truces, parliamentary and judicial cowardices, terrorism by rapacious capitalists, and propaganda of newspapers hired out to the international thieves."⁷

2. *The Trotskyites Attack Prestismo* (early 1936)

"With the putsch of November beaten," the Brazilian Trotskyites wrote in April 1936, "Getúlio Vargas and his bit players, protected by censorship, a state of siege, and now a state of war, have unleashed the fiercest reaction against the proletariat and the revolutionary militants."¹

Brazil's Trotskyite movement, normally made up of about fifty adherents, associated itself in the early 1930's with the International Leftist Opposition to the Third International, which considered itself a fraction within the Third International. Late in 1933 the International Leftist Opposition, feeling the need of a Fourth International, decided to change its name to the Communist Internationalist League. The Brazilian Trotskyites therefore began calling themselves the Brazilian Section of the new league. At about the same time, in 1934, Trotskyite leader Mário Pedrosa moved from São Paulo to join his wife's relatives in Rio and Niterói. Thus Niterói became the place of publication of the organs of the *Liga Comunista Internacionalista*: *O Comunista* and *A Luta de Classe*, the four-year-old Trotskyite periodical that had formerly appeared in São

Paulo. The publications condemned the German Stalinists' "capitulation" to Hitler and the "terrorism" of the "Stalin-directed Bureaucracy" in the USSR.²

In 1935 *A Luta de Classe* criticized the ANL by asking how the struggle against imperialism could be carried out without struggling against the bourgeoisie. Although Trotskyites described the ANL as opportunistic and denounced its failure to emphasize a sharp class distinction, with workers leading the struggle, they participated in the ANL movement. After the ANL was closed in July 1935, the plan of the PCB for an uprising was opposed by all Trotskyites who became aware of it. Edmundo Moniz, a law student associated with the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, declined an invitation of army Captain Agildo Barata to support the PCB's plan. He advised Barata that an insurrection would be absurd and would result in the jailing of uninvolved Trotskyites.³

Following the unsuccessful insurrection, Trotskyites were easy prey for the police. Among the first to be arrested in São Paulo were Aristides Lobo, Hilcar Leite, João Matheus, and Victor de Azevedo Pinheiro, all engaged in publishing or printing. Aristides Lobo, a well-known veteran Trotskyite, told the police that he supported neither the ANL, whose program he criticized, nor the military uprising, which he did not consider Communist. He was kept in prison although he pointed out that he had recently been separated from political activity due to illness and an eye operation. Trotskyite Fúlvio Abramo, a botanist, found himself in the same Maria Zélia section, or "box," as printer João da Costa Pimenta, a successful labor organizer who had had Trotskyite connections in the early 1930's. The "box" was occupied also by Manoel Medeiros, the Trotskyite printer whose death led to the rioting of prisoners disgusted with the Maria Zélia medical service.⁴

More than in São Paulo, the prisons in Rio became the scenes of intense animosity between Trotskyites and Stalinists. Unlike the São Paulo prisons, those in Rio contained insurrectionists, mainly army men, who stuck together and dominated the *coletivos*, the internal committees that sought to equalize the distribution of the prisoners' belongings and to speak for the prisoners. Proud of their "revolutionary" deeds, and hoping for a new uprising, the arrested military men hated the anti-insurrectionist prisoners, as jailed Edmundo Moniz found out when he reminded Agildo Barata of his reasons for declining the invitation to support the rebellion. Barata was the foremost PCB prisoner because of his rank, his combative role in the 1930 revolution, and the boldness he had shown in 1935 during the Third Infantry Regiment revolt.⁵

Imprisoned Trotskyites, expelled from the PCB before November 1935, were joined by some PCB members who found themselves expelled for having opposed the insurrection. The former included medical doctor Raul Karacik and journalists Plínio Mello and Álvaro Paes Leme. Paes Leme, once an active PCB militant, broke with Stalinism in 1934 and joined the young Trotskyite intellectuals of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista.⁶

On the *Pedro I* the Trotskyite circle was made up of Paes Leme, Plínio Mello, Karacik, one worker (from the hold), and two of the three leaders of the PCB's recent Barreto Leite–Besouchet–Gikovate "schism," whose formidable arguments against an insurrection had been expressed in Barreto Leite Filho's letter of October 26, 1935, to Prestes. Despite the letter, found by the police among Berger's papers, neither physician Febus Gikovate nor journalist Barreto Leite Filho was spared from arrest. Augusto Besouchet, a longtime hard-working PCB militant and labor organizer and recently a leading PCB Regional Committee member, escaped arrest by hiding in the Rio area and working at night in journalism under assumed names.⁷

Even before the Barreto Leite letter was found by the police and given some publicity, the PCB, in its December 1935 issues of *A Classe Operária*, announced the expulsion of those considered associated with its ideas. They included Augusto, Marino, and Lídia Besouchet, whose younger brother Alberto, an army lieutenant, was in hiding after participating in the November revolt in Recife. When *A Classe Operária* advised of the expulsion of bank workers from the PCB, it described them as associated with "the counter-revolutionary trotskyism" and as being "accomplices of Gikovate, the Besouchets, and other agents of the enemy of the working classes." Barreto Leite writes that he had already become a Trotskyite, due to his relations with Mário Pedrosa, and that, "in the case of Gikovate and the Besouchets, the evolution to Trotskyism was natural, after the break with the Communist Party."⁸

On the *Pedro I*, Barreto Leite, Gikovate, and Plínio Mello produced a handwritten "publication," a "self-criticism" of the Communist movement. Three issues appeared in the careful script of Plínio Mello, cousin and cabin mate of Barreto Leite. Although the authors sought to show some restraint in attacking the Stalinists for having unleashed the 1935 uprisings, the issues offended arrested military officers, such as Agildo Barata and Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo. The officers, awaiting a new uprising, felt that the critics of the November insurrection should be severely punished. According to the rumors aboard ship, they were to be thrown into Guanabara Bay or shot during the confusion when a navy vessel, scheduled

to revolt, came to rescue prisoners from the *Pedro I*.⁹ However, with the arrest of Prestes in March, a new uprising appeared unlikely. The offenders were not punished by the Stalinists, but they remained in their bad graces.

In the meantime, outside prison, Mário Pedrosa's opinions of the November uprising were expressed in *A Luta de Classe*, printed on a small manual press in a Rio apartment. Pedrosa and *A Luta de Classe* had the benefit of the thoughts of Professor Hubert Herring, expressed in the United States in *Current History* in January. According to Herring, "there was no evidence that Communists, a minute element in Brazil, had anything to do with the revolt," which had been led by Prestes, "a mildly socialistic and highly regarded leader of the liberal opponents of the dictatorial President." While the Brazilian Trotskyites, unlike Professor Herring, blamed the Stalinists for the revolt, they agreed with Herring that there was nothing Communist about it. Herring, *A Luta de Classe* wrote in April, had described well the PCB point of view when he had suggested, as a reason for the revolt, the anger of Brazilian industrialists at the Brazil–United States reciprocal trade agreement.¹⁰

In short, *A Luta de Classe* pictured the Stalinist *aliancismo*, headed by the führer Prestes, as having turned its back on the proletariat in attempting to find allies for its military putsch. With the proletarian base ignored and lost, the Trotskyites said, the putsch had been quickly crushed.

Although the true Marxists were described as knowing that the putsch had been unrelated to Communism, *A Luta de Classe* pointed out that the bourgeoisie felt otherwise, being unable to understand how "a group of citizens take pride in proclaiming themselves Communists, but at the same time take no less pride in affirming that their political activity has nothing to do with Communism." In the face of the resulting repression, the Trotskyites said, the PCB had the choice of repeating the "unprincipled error" of November 1935 or of becoming a small bourgeois party in accordance with the latest policy of the Comintern. *A Luta de Classe* argued that the PCB, a prisoner of Prestismo, could only "continue with its policy of confusion, collaboration, and adventurism" and should "formally liquidate its old label of partido Comunista." In its concluding appeal, the Trotskyite organ said that "the rudderless ship of the PCB must be abandoned to its own fate and allowed to get lost in the river rapids of opportunism. . . . It is necessary to build a new boat, in which all the revolutionary vanguard of the working class can be brought together. Let us construct it out of materials used to build the Communist International in the glorious times of Lenin, adding new materials

gathered from the experience of later years, . . . consubstantiated in the documents and theses of the revolutionary proletarian organizations that raise the banner of the FOURTH INTERNATIONAL."¹¹

3. *Foreign Attacks Help Extend the State of War* (May–June 1936)

Before April 11, when Harry Berger was moved from the Casa de Detenção to the Special Police barracks, the police tortured him several times in front of his wife. And in his presence they submitted her to electric shocks and thrashings. Undressing her, also in his presence, they whipped her and tortured her on the breasts.¹

Treatment of this sort was not inflicted on Prestes or his wife. In the case of the Cavalier of Hope, languishing in the Special Police barracks, a council of Military Tribunal judges spent months deliberating whether he was an army "deserter." It explained its failure to have the accused appear before it when it met in mid-August by pointing out that Prestes was "dangerous to transport even under guard." Some of its members felt that he could not be judged a deserter because in 1924 he had submitted his resignation from the army before embarking on revolution.²

Prestes' wife, Olga, now calling herself Maria Prestes, was pregnant. Considered less dangerous than her husband, she made several trips from the Casa de Detenção to the Polícia Central to answer questions about her past Communist activities in Europe and to defend herself against being deported, together with Berger's wife, to Nazi Germany. Speaking Portuguese reasonably well, Maria Prestes maintained that she was a Brazilian, being married to Prestes. But on June 16, First Delegado Auxiliar Demóclito de Almeida concluded that her expulsion was "necessary for the Brazilian community," and on the next day the Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition submitted on her behalf. As she was bearing a Brazilian child, her deportation was unconstitutional; but Supreme Court Judge Carlos Maximiliano, who acted as *relator* and thus analyzed the case for his fellow judges, stated that it was uncertain whether the unborn child was Brazilian. Late in August, Vargas signed decrees expelling the wives of Berger and Prestes, thus sending them to Germany, where they were arrested.³

The Comintern put the blame for the November uprisings on Vargas, with Fernando de Lacerda, Maurício's brother, writing in Moscow that Vargas had driven the "heroic Brazilian patriots to a pitch of exasperation." After Prestes was jailed, the Comintern embarked on an international campaign to secure the release of the

Cavalier of Hope. The opening appeal was written by Otávio Brandão, whose star in Moscow had risen because Fernando de Lacerda, unfriendly to him, had been unrealistic in calling for the November revolt. "And now," Brandão wrote in March 1936, "Vargas, this abominable traitor and hangman, the shame of the nation, has just arrested our Comrade Prestes, the beloved son of the Brazilian people. . . . We demand the help of the international proletariat, the toiling masses of the whole world, of all liberals and democrats, of all honest men, to secure the immediate liberation of Prestes." Pages of the Comintern's *International Press Correspondence* (*IPC*) were filled with articles about Prestes, his past "glories" and his present situation, and about the "16,000 fighters for freedom, who are lying in chains in Vargas' prisons." (The figure in two weeks was raised by *IPC* to 17,000.)⁴

The articles emphasized that Prestes' life was in danger and that Vargas, the Brazilian police, and the Brazilian press were engaged in a vile campaign of slanders against him. Harrison George, of New York, wrote in *IPC* that the Brazilian police, "headed by the infamous Serafim Braga, undoubtedly will murder Prestes, as they have murdered many others—unless world-wide protest forces these Vargas bloodhounds to stay their hands." The World Committee against War and Fascism reported that "75 well-known public figures in France—prominent figures in politics, literature and science—sent air-mail letters to Vargas." The Comintern set up an International Solidarity Committee for Luís Carlos Prestes and all the political prisoners in Brazil. An Intellectuals' Vigilance Committee was also formed.⁵

When the Brazilian police suggested that Elvira Cupello Calônio (Elza Fernandes) had been murdered by Communists "on the orders of Luís Carlos Prestes," the Comintern wrote that "the vile-ness of these provocative lies" of Vargas and the imperialists exceeded all that had gone before. The Vargas government, it said, "has murdered not only Elvira Cupello but the student Warschawski, the captain Medeiros, and the revolutionist Barron." In murdering Cupello, *IPC* wrote, the Vargas government was applying methods worthy of the instigators of the Reichstag fire and was seeking to undermine Prestes' influence with the masses and have a pretext for killing him. (Like *IPC*, the PCB in 1936 was engaged in a successful misinformation campaign which hid the fact that the Party itself had murdered Tobias Warschawski in 1934. Warschawski, an enthusiastic Communist Youth orator, had been shot, not far from Vista Chinesa, by Party members who felt that he had informed the police

about PCB leader Deicola dos Santos, but the evidence indicates that the Party may have misjudged him.)⁶

In Buenos Aires the Comité pro-Amnistía de Presos y Exiliados Políticos de América started publishing *Amnistía*. It showed concern about the health of Ghioldi. And it reported that twenty-eight members of the British parliament, and one candidate for a seat, had sent a telegram to Vargas to express their profound grief at hearing of the arrest of Prestes and to request his freedom.⁷

In Washington a delegation of notables, including President Chester Arthur's grandson and Jeanette Rankin (the first woman elected to the U.S. Congress), called on the State Department and the Brazilian Embassy. At the State Department it declared that "the actions of the American Embassy in Brazil in connection with the arrest, questioning and death of Victor Allan Barron, and the intense interest shown in attempting to aid the Brazilian police in bringing about the arrest of Luís Carlos Prestes, throw much light upon the whole matter of American diplomacy in Brazil. . . . This same Luís Carlos Prestes, and the National Liberation Alliance of which he is president, is the main bulwark of the people of Brazil against American and British greed."⁸

"Imagine," Ambassador Osvaldo Aranha wrote Vargas from Washington, "the consulate was visited by a commission that *demand*ed the release of Prestes, *protest*ed against the *assassination* of an American in Rio and insulted you and [spoke of] your *fascism* and *imperialism*. . . . Here Luís Carlos Prestes is called 'our beloved.' . . . The publicity that these people make is incredible."⁹

On May 28, Vargas wrote Aranha, saying that "the Communists of the entire world, except for Russia, continue to bombard me with strong telegrams and letters, demanding the liberation of Prestes and his henchmen." Vargas told Aranha of the "audacity of two English ladies, disguised Communists," who had come to Brazil to investigate the treatment of the political prisoners and whom the police had "delicately invited to return by the first ship to London." Richard Freeman, who had accompanied Lady Hastings and Lady Marian Cameron on this trip, wrote in *IPC* that Prestes' life was in danger. "Yet Prestes, not Vargas," he added, "holds the centre of the Brazilian stage. . . . Each story designed to show that this young god has feet of clay serves only to increase the stature of this legendary figure."¹⁰

Freeman argued that Arthur Ewert (Berger), "a specialist in colonial problems," had "settled in Brazil to study that vast country, weakened and impoverished by British and American exploitation," and that "neither Ewert nor his wife had played any part in the No-

vember Revolution nor, for that matter, in Brazilian politics in any shape or form." Their arrest, Freeman contended, was carried out to give the Vargas government an excuse to talk about "Moscow plots" and "foreign importations."

The pro-Prestes campaign in Spain featured the presence of Prestes' mother, Leocádia, in crowded bullring meetings where the brutality of Filinto Müller in Rio and Etelvino Lins in Recife was denounced. It resulted in a telegram to Vargas signed by Francisco Largo Caballero and fifty-nine other Popular Front members of the Spanish Cortes. They demanded that Prestes and all the other political prisoners in Brazil be released. Aranha, in a cable to Vargas from Washington, said he knew that Otávio Brandão and Fernando de Lacerda were in Spain, writing slanders and lies each day about the Brazilian situation.¹¹

The publication of the telegram from Spain in the Brazilian press provoked protests in the Brazilian Congress. Congressman Adalberto Correia indignantly declared that, "on account of the energy and patriotism of the Brazilian government in handling the Communist uprising of November, we have been the target of severe rebukes by the mercenaries of Moscow." Congressman Martins e Silva read a telegram that he had addressed to Largo Caballero to inform the Spanish socialist leader that Brazil was in no need of "threats of foreign Communist parties because we are a free people." The political prisoners, he added, would be judged by men of responsibility "without . . . intimidations of red parties."¹²

Spanish groups in Brazil sent telegrams of support to Vargas. One telegram, signed by seven Spanish societies, told the president that "the Spanish colony of Rio . . . learned, with profound surprise and sadness, of the telegram that some Spanish legislators sent Your Excellency attributing to themselves the right to pass judgment on domestic political acts of the country." The Central do Brasil railroad workers' union sent Vargas a "vehement" protest against the Spaniards' "extraordinary attack on the dignity of our nationality."¹³

In mid-June, when Vargas asked Congress for a ninety-day extension of the state of war, he pointed out that, in addition to "the persistence of the reasons known to the nation's representatives," there had to be added the "strong campaign . . . inspired abroad against our country by international Communist centers."

Congress, which had renewed its regular session on May 3, approved the state-of-war extension on June 20 by a 158-46 vote. Bahia Congressman José Joaquim Seabra, speaking for the opposition, declared that a state of war could not be decreed during a time

of peace, and he argued that the authorities were accusing political adversaries of being Communists in order to persecute them.¹⁴

4. *The Arrests of Marighella, Molaes, Morena, and Sócrates*
(May–July 1936)

Congressmen and judges offered opinions about the status of the arrested legislators and fallen Mayor Pedro Ernesto. The discussions continued for months, and, while they did, the presidency of the Republic was deluged by documents about the cases of Pedro Ernesto and Eliezer Magalhães. As for the arrested professors, Police Chief Müller reviewed reports and then set one of them free: Luís Frederico Carpenter.¹

Vargas' daughter Alzira, a student at the Rio law school, asked her father about Pedro Ernesto and the professors who had been arrested. He told her that the November insurrection had been a cold "premeditated assassination" that had brought on a wave of indignation and that the repression had to be drastic to satisfy outraged public opinion and to reestablish a much needed feeling of security. He admitted that, under the laws of exception voted by Congress, many injustices had been carried out, some by men who wanted to give trouble to others, but he argued that it was up to the judiciary, not the president, to determine which of the suspects were really guilty. Vargas went on to say that a group of unscrupulous plotters, more intelligent than Pedro Ernesto, had so involved the mayor in their net of conspiracy that it had become necessary to remove him for "the security of the regime." As for the professors, Vargas said that their arrest had been demanded by military leaders who considered it unjust to punish only military rebels and ignore "the instigators of everything, the intellectuals who preached the subversive ideas." It was alleged, Vargas added, that the professors had been more dangerous than the rebels because of their use of classrooms and writings "to instill Communism in the immature minds of young people." After Vargas told Alzira that the professors could be expected to be set at liberty if "nothing were found against them," Alzira examined papers, received by her father, that contained accusations against suspects as well as recommendations for "holding back the Communist tide." Among the papers was a report addressed in February to Justice Minister Ráo by Congressman Adalberto Correia, of the National Commission for the Repression of Communism. It called for the preventative imprisonment of Pedro Ernesto, Maurício

de Lacerda, Eliezer Magalhães, Virgílio de Melo Franco, Colonel Felipe Moreira Lima, Valério Konder, Odilon Batista, and Anísio S. Teixeira, who had served as Pedro Ernesto's education secretary.²

Captain Müller, who helped keep Vargas up to date about Communist subversion, was receiving information from all over Brazil. Etelvino Lins, first *delegado auxiliar* in Recife, reported about arrests and investigations there. Ceará's police chief advised Müller that the Communist Party in that northern state had recently been foiled in an attempt to unleash a wave of guerrilla warfare inspired by ex-Colonel Felipe Moreira Lima.³ In Niterói, across the bay from the Federal District, a seemingly endless number of PCB and Socorro Vermelho groups were discovered and broken up.

In the Federal District itself, Müller's police were diligent, and the public was kept informed of the destruction of one Communist center after another. The arrest of pharmacist Taciano José Fernandes late in April led to the arrest of Carlos Marighella on May 1, when Marighella visited Taciano's residence. The police, searching the residences of both men, found hand grenades, tear gas bombs, and revolvers. Papers at Marighella's home, mostly typed articles ready for printing, included the April financial statement, drawn up by Marighella, listing contributors and recipients of money. (916\$000 was paid out between April 8 and 17.)⁴

Marighella was not helpful in identifying the code names on the financial statement. He told the police that he was a 24-year-old engineering student who had joined the PCB in Bahia in 1934 and had been forced by police persecution to come to Rio in October or November 1935. In Rio he had joined José Athayde, whom he had known in Bahia. Following the repression in Rio, which had left the Party short of leaders, Athayde had asked Marighella to serve as PCB secretary of organization. The police told the press that they had caught the replacement of PCB Secretary General Miranda and that he had come from Bahia especially to take that top post.⁵

At Marighella's residence the police found a copy of *O Libertador*, which described itself as the "illegal organ of the national-revolutionary movement," bringing back to life, "under the Getuliano state of siege, the best traditions of 5 de Julho, the newspaper of revolutionaries of 1922 and 1924." *O Libertador* printed a translation of Hubert Herring's account, in *Current History*, of the 1935 uprising. Manifestos found in Marighella's residence demanded the release of Pedro Ernesto and the reinstatement of "our companions" in the mayor's office. By then Pedro Ernesto was in a prison hospital and former municipal employee Maurício de Lacerda was in the

Casa de Detenção, together with prisoners who had spent three months on the *Pedro I*.⁶

During most of May, Marighella was tortured. Following an initial thrashing at the Polícia Central, he was asked by Serafim Braga, head of the Delegacia de Ordem Social, to name the intended recipients of letters, found in the prisoner's pockets, describing "atrocities" in Brazil. He said he did not know and was so uncooperative about naming anyone that he was tied up, partially undressed, and subjected to a series of blows, including some to the kidneys. Taken to Antônio Emílio Romano, head of the Delegacia de Ordem Política, he refused to declare that the PCB was planning a new revolution. Blows to the head, ordered by Romano, brought blood from the prisoner's nose and caused him to faint. When he recovered, he was told that he would suffer a "spiritual session" at the Special Police unless he confessed. The threat was carried out, and that evening he found himself at the barracks, surrounded by police investigators, among them José Torres Galvão, a Special Police athlete known as a torturer, and Francisco Menezes Julien, a "scientific civilian investigator" who did not belong to the Special Police. After Marighella received a long series of blows and kicks, the so-called Chinese torture was applied: while Marighella's testicles were squeezed and cigarettes were used to cover his body with burns, Galvão, the arrester of Prestes, pushed his tie pin under Marighella's nails, drawing blood. Upon being knocked down, the prisoner suffered a gash on the forehead. He fainted before dawn and was taken to the Special Police infirmary; but, after he regained consciousness, he was tortured further, this time in a tiny cubicle, the Sala Santa Fé of the Special Police.

Taken back to the Polícia Central, Marighella was tied up and whipped. He was put in a dark room and, after a powerful light was focused on his eyes, was questioned by an invisible investigator. President Vargas, he was told, was desperate to know where *A Classe Operária* was being printed. The torturing of Marighella lasted until May 23.⁷

As in Maria Zélia, Rio's Casa de Detenção prisoners protested against the medical service. In June, after the death of an imprisoned Chilean vagrant, the illness of journalist Eneida Costa de Moraes became the concern of the prisoners' *coletivo*, which was elected monthly and which, in the words of Agildo Barata, "coordinated the activities of the political prisoners of the Left." Although Eneida had refused to be transferred to the prison hospital, assistance for her was demanded by the *coletivo* leaders: ANL President Herculino Cas-

cardo (formerly interventor of Rio Grande do Norte and a navy commander), Agildo Barata, ex-Major Alcedo Batista Cavalcanti, and medical doctor Sebastião da Hora. They pushed guards aside and entered the office of the prison director. Finding the vice-director there, they made him send for a doctor.⁸ As a result of this incident, the *coletivo* leaders were locked up in small dark cells in the *galeria* of the nearby Casa de Correção.

The Casa de Correção, theoretically for prisoners with sentences to serve, was filled with prisoners who had yet to learn why they were under arrest. On one side of its triangular-shaped courtyard was a high wall, behind which lay the Correção infirmary. On the other two sides were the *galeria* and the Sala da Capela (Chapel Room). The *galeria*, consisting of several floors of ancient cells, was frequently occupied by military men arrested after the 1935 uprisings. Many intellectuals ended up in the bed-filled Sala da Capela. Convicted common criminals carried out chores for all the political prisoners and received tips from them. The food, while Carlos Lasance ran the Casa de Correção, was abundant and good.

At about the time that some Detenção inmates were sent to the Correção's *galeria*, about eighty other political prisoners were transferred from the crowded Detenção cells to the Sala da Capela. There, Hermes Lima writes, the Prestes Column secretary, Lourenço Moreira Lima, was an indefatigable conversationalist and Maurício de Lacerda an indefatigable reader of books. Apolônio de Carvalho, an artillery lieutenant who had been arrested in Rio Grande do Sul in November 1935 and sent to Rio the following March, recalls that Sala da Capela inmates Cascardo, Barreto Leite, Gikovate, and Hermes Lima spent much time playing bridge, while he devoted himself to sports or to studying at the "university" organized by the *coletivo* of the Correção. Some prisoners placed bets, through intermediaries who had connections with the city's popular *jogo do bicho*. When Graciliano Ramos, a former Alagoas education secretary (and heavy cigarette smoker), was transferred to the Sala da Capela, he found that some of the one hundred prisoners there, men of the upper classes, were building chairs in a carpenter's shop they had set up in a small side room.⁹

Late in June 1936 about fifty Casa de Detenção prisoners addressed a letter to Vargas listing "medieval processes" applied to Marighella and others by Antônio Emílio Romano, Serafim Braga, and José Torres Galvão, sometimes in the presence of Francisco Julien. Among the alleged victims of beatings, kicks, and thrashings (with a rubber whip) had been Francisco Romero and his 12-year-old son, sailors José Ferreira Ramos and Felix Wandiswel da Costa Rego

Sobrinho, naval radio operator Miguel Xavier Borba, Rodolfo Ghioldi, Miranda, pharmacist Taciano José Fernandes, baker Carlos Emílio, cook Assis Halem, and commercial worker Milton Rodrigues da Silva. Júlia Santos, Prestes' maid, had reportedly been thrashed violently and subjected to electric shocks in her armpits and face.¹⁰

In July the Federal District police released news of a capture they considered even more sensational than that of Marighella. They announced the arrest of the "No. 1 Comintern agent" in South America, the "extremist" who had been "designated by the Comintern to carry out here the same assignments as those given to Harry Berger." This "special envoy of the Comintern in Latin America," the police said, had worked for a Communist uprising in the theater of the Chaco war.¹¹

The dreaded individual turned out to be Spanish-born waiter José Lago Molares, who (unknown to the police) had been demoted from the PCB National Secretariat because of his refusal to agree to the murder of Elza Fernandes.¹² He had visited Moscow in 1928 as a Brazilian representative to a congress of the Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions). Expelled from Brazil in 1929, he had spent time in Spain and Uruguay before returning to Brazil late in 1935. He had not accompanied Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú), Honório de Freitas Guimarães (Martins), and Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (Abóbora) on the flight to the northeast in March 1936.

Molares' arrest with two accomplices at a house near the Olaria railroad station in July 1936 was attributed by the authorities to astute "secret service work" following the suspicion that "sovietic agents" may have come to Brazil from Montevideo after Uruguay broke relations with the USSR. One captured "accomplice" was Molares' Argentine girl friend. The other was Roberto Morena, described in the press as the "intensely active secretary of the party's political bureau."¹³ Morena, a 34-year-old Brazilian carpenter with whom Molares had worked in Rio before 1929, had been held at the Dois Rios Correctional Colony following his involvement in a São Paulo railroad strike in 1932. He had joined Molares in Uruguay in 1934, and in 1935 he had carried out PCB organizing work in Rio Grande do Sul. In May 1936 he had followed Molares to Rio.¹⁴

An ANL mimeographed "appeal to the people and armed forces," seized with Molares and Morena, pictured the 1935 uprising as the culmination of the armed revolts of the 1920's, 1930, and 1932. It declared that strikes and guerrilla uprisings were "recommencing" and that "new and great battles approach!"¹⁵

Ten days after Molares and Morena fell, the public learned of the arrest of a former army captain much wanted by the authorities:

Sócrates de Castro Gonçalves, who was reported to have headed the November uprising at the School of Military Aviation. A letter from Honório de Freitas Guimarães, found at Prestes' Honório Street residence, called Captain Sócrates an outstanding, combative "Party member."¹⁶

In 1935 Sócrates had led a few Aviation School rebels in an unsuccessful attack on the nearby Aviation Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Gomes. Sócrates, although shot in the leg, escaped and made his way to Paraná. Later, in Paraguay, he worked at selling coffee, together with Glauco Pinheiro Menezes, who had rebelled in Olinda, Pernambuco, in 1935. On one of their trips to Porto Murtinho, on the Brazilian side of the Paraguay border, the two former rebels were arrested by the police and conducted, under a guard of twenty soldiers, by truck and rail to Rio. From Sócrates' declarations at the Polícia Central, it appeared that he had vacillated in November before the more resolute Captain Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo had persuaded him to revolt. On July 21 Sócrates was transferred to the Casa de Detenção. He was, Graciliano Ramos writes, thin and dirty and wore a long, red beard. Days of travel with his hands tied had injured his wrists.¹⁷

5. *Oswaldo Costa and Domingos Braz Are Arrested; Jofre Is Killed* (August 1936)

After the arrest of Molares and Morena, it remained up to another old militant of the 1920's, Domingos Braz, to keep the Party afloat in Rio. Braz, once a textile worker and composer of sonnets, was a 33-year-old native of Petrópolis. He had run for Congress in 1930 as candidate of the Bloco Operário e Camponês. More recently, as PCB director of agitation and propaganda, he had been responsible for *A Classe Operária*.

Looking for a suitable meeting place for the Party leadership late in July 1936, Braz turned to Oswaldo Costa, who had helped publish *A Manhã* in 1935 and was writing articles and manifestos for the Party. Costa offered his home, but the arrangement was short-lived because on August 7 Costa was arrested when he went to meet a *Diário da Noite* journalist whom he had hoped to persuade to publish an article about Prestes.¹ This time the police did not release Costa quickly, as they had done in December 1935.

Oswaldo Costa's arrest coincided with a shoot-out in the São Mateus suburb, where Communists briefly defended a hiding place from police agents. The agents killed a defender and seized a boy, the

son of one of the Communists who escaped. At the police headquarters the boy described Communists he knew and then accompanied inspectors on an automobile ride to buildings where he suggested that Communists might be found. The boy identified the shoot-out victim as ex-Corporal Jofre Alonso da Costa, who had rebelled as an aviation student in November.²

A Classe Operária and *O Libertador* (now the "organ of the anti-imperialist military") wrote that Jofre, "the heroic corporal," had been cowardly machine-gunned while sleeping. (This allowed the Communists to get back at the authorities, who asserted, untruthfully, that at least one of the three legalists killed at the Aviation School had been shot while sleeping.) After the failure of the "November insurrection in our glorious Military Aviation," *O Libertador* said, "our heroic companion Jofre . . . continued fighting for the overthrow of this bloody government of national treason . . . that seeks to demoralize the armed classes. . . . His assassination cannot remain unpunished."³

On August 13, the day after Jofre's body was identified, Serafim Braga's inspectors arrested Domingos Braz in front of the Brahma Bottling Works when he met with a Party messenger. The inspectors, searching Braz' residence in the Catumbi district, found the lengthy handwritten message that Felipe Moreira Lima had written in Buenos Aires in May. They also found Braz' table of contents for *A Classe Operária*, no. 199, yet to be published. It scheduled three articles about Prestes, one expressing praise for the "noble gesture of the Spanish noncoms" on his behalf.⁴

The search of Braz' residence allowed the police to announce that at this "new clandestine headquarters" of the PCB they had found the minutes, "still in manuscript form," of the latest meeting of the "extremist leaders." The public learned that the leaders had devoted most of their attention to the recent outbreak of civil war in Spain and had resolved that the PCB would work with the Socorro Vermelho (Red Aid) to raise funds for the Communists of Madrid.⁵

For two weeks two police inspectors had been observing a Meier district medical doctor, Odilon Machado, and now they arrested him on the charge of being treasurer of the Brazilian headquarters of the Socorro Vermelho. "Hundreds of people," the police disclosed, "were contributing to the Socorro Vermelho without knowing that they were assisting the extremist cause."⁶

Shortly before Brazil patriotically commemorated Independence Day, September 7, the São Paulo Superintendência de Ordem Política e Social concluded its investigation of "extremist activities" in the São Paulo União dos Trabalhadores Gráficos. Victor de Azevedo

Pinheiro, João Matheus, and Aristides Lobo were deemed guilty. The list of "extremists" also included veteran labor leaders Everardo Dias, João da Costa Pimenta, and João Daladéia, although Victor de Azevedo, when asked about Pimenta and Daladéia, said that they were no longer involved in politics.⁷

Independence Day commemorations in Rio, with music, parades, orations, and large crowds, gave encouragement to the anti-Communist Ação Integralista Brasileira, whose members marched in green shirts for "God, Country, and Family." Green Shirt Chief Plínio Salgado, who observed the holiday by speaking in Rio's Municipal Theater, was smarting from a setback in Bahia, where Juraci Magalhães had closed the local Integralista headquarters. But he could take comfort from Vargas' Independence Day speech, which came close to proclaiming the Integralistas' motto. The president said that "the persistent and audacious campaign maintained by the extremists makes use of a variety of methods and seductive blandishments, all with a single purpose: to destroy the nation, the family, and religion."

Workers, belonging to the vast network of government-approved unions, gave an imposing Independence Day demonstration of support for the administration, which was drafting legislation for providing minimum wages and a system of labor justice.⁸

6. *Lúcio Meira Represses Communism in the Navy*

Before the 1935 uprisings, journalist Aparício Torelli published, in *Jornal do Povo*, chapters about the naval revolt of 1910 led by sailor João Cândido. The chapters were written by a young medical doctor, Adão Pereira Nunes, secretary general of the ANL of Rio de Janeiro state. Their revolutionary message delighted Professor Leônidas de Rezende but enraged the navy officers. After Carlos Pena Boto and other navy officers marched into Torelli's office to reprimand him, the humorist referred to the sign on his door, "Enter without Knocking." "Don't knock me down," he said.¹

Torelli was in jail in 1936 when navy Captain Lúcio Meira, studying Communist infiltration in the navy, wrote: "The unthinking liberty that permitted the sale and distribution of yellow newspapers in the pay of the Communist Party—*A Manhã* and *Jornal do Povo*, etc.—completed the insidious work of propaganda aimed at the destruction of the Navy, the most perfect and most genuinely national organization of the Nation." Meira lamented "our excessive complacency" that allowed conspirators to seek, "with the best pos-

sibilities of success, a repetition of the bloody perversity of 1910" and to present "the appalling figures of that era as national heroes." He argued that "*Jornal do Povo* of Sr. Aparício Torelli" sought to create antagonisms between military ranks "by publishing serially the biased history of the 1910 revolt."²

Meira noted that, after "the first phase of propaganda," the Communist "Political Secretaryship" of the navy felt that it had enough adherents to permit participation in uprisings, but that on November 27, 1935, it could do nothing because the fleet was on maneuvers near Ilha Grande and the uprisings were precipitous. Following the uprisings, the cruisers *Bahia* and *Rio Grande do Sul* were sent to Pernambuco to help restore order in the northeast. Returning south, they were in Salvador, Bahia, on Christmas Eve. There, according to Meira's investigations, Bangú (Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha) made plans for a revolt, in which he was to lead a brigade of Communist civilians to the docks of Salvador to help rebelling sailors. Although the scheme was said to have been supported in Rio by sailors aboard the most important warship, the *São Paulo*, it was abandoned at the last minute as impractical.

Meira also disclosed that PCB demoralization following Prestes' arrest in March did not prevent the Anti-Militar in Rio from arming sailors to support a possible army uprising on April 10. As the larger ships were tied up, without munitions, at Rio's Ilha das Cobras, the destroyer *Paraíba* was designated to rebel under sailor Carlos dos Santos Friederick and speed to the *Pedro I*, liberating prisoners and taking them to join conspirators on the *São Paulo* at Ilha das Cobras. But when Friederick sent two sailors to check on army cooperation, the answer was disappointing. Worse yet, navy officers had learned of the conspiracy and put the marines on the alert on the docks near the *São Paulo*. Scores of sailors were caught with their weapons and arrested. During the ensuing investigation, headed by Captain Lúcio Meira, more arrests were made. One hundred fifty-two sailors, "confessed Communists" according to Police Chief Müller, were kept in prison.³

Meira concluded that the November 1935 uprising was not the last of the plots and that the navy had shown excessive tolerance, due to sentiment or a lack of sufficient proofs of subversion.

Meira was not known for his tolerance in 1936. Prestes testified later that "Lúcio Meira arrived at the Special Police at 8:00 P.M. each evening to direct the beatings of the sailors, who passed the door of my room, going to the garage, where they were beaten." Marighella has recalled the activity, at the Special Police barracks, of Meira, "who not only interrogated the prisoners and beat them, or had them

beaten, but also directed . . . all the work of determining which sailors should be jailed." Marighella mentioned one sailor who, "arrested and terribly beaten, and knowing that his family was in terrible shape," committed suicide.⁴

7. *The PCB Boycotts the New Tribunal* (October 1936)

The congressional opposition, after failing to prevent the June 1936 extension of the state of war, argued against trials and possible convictions of arrested lawmakers. But on July 8 the Chamber of Deputies approved, by a 190–59 vote, the finding of its justice commission, which would allow the trials.

The congressional majority next dealt with a Justice Ministry proposal to create special tribunals to handle cases of subversion and to establish agricultural colonies where the guilty were to work. Oppositionist Congressman Seabra, objecting to the special tribunals, said that "true Communists can be punished under constitutional laws."¹

In July *A Classe Operária* urged that all Brazilians support its campaign against the Justice Ministry proposals because the victims would not be limited to Communists and *libertadores* but would include everyone who struggled for a better existence. It explained that Vargas, "the Hitler of Latin America," wanted no disturbance while he turned Brazil over to enslaving imperialism and therefore raised "the specter of Communism" in order to jail protesting patriots. The special tribunals and agricultural colonies, *A Classe Operária* wrote, would be exactly like the Nazi courts and concentration camps.²

In the Chamber's justice commission on July 29, Deodoro de Mendonça proposed a single special tribunal and five agricultural colonies. Congressman João Café Filho, who called himself "a socialist, not a Communist," said that Mendonça's suggestion was unconstitutional. Congressman João Neves da Fontoura, leader of the opposition, read from Paragraph 25 of Constitutional Article 113: "There will be no exceptional tribunals."³

Mendonça conferred with majority leader Pedro Aleixo and then modified his project slightly to satisfy congressmen from Rio Grande do Sul. The revised version, favored by the justice commission, received a 140–61 vote of approval in the Chamber plenary on August 31. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Senate on September 9. The decree, signed on September 11 by Vargas, the military ministers, and the justice minister, stipulated that the new

Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (TSN), a Rio organ of the Military Justice system, would function during the state of war and until it had tried all the cases of subversion. The TSN was to consist of five judges: two military men, two civilians, and one professional magistrate. The five agricultural-penal colonies were to be administered by the Justice Ministry.⁴

Vargas, requesting authority to extend the state of war for ninety more days, cited verdicts to be rendered by the TSN and the need to defend the institutions, "still threatened by subversive activities oriented and financed by international organizations." The Chamber's approval was by a lopsided 143–8 vote because the frustrated minority had walked out.⁵

After the justice and military ministers discussed TSN nominations with Police Chief Müller late in September, the names of the new tribunal's judges were announced. It was no surprise that the TSN presidency went to Judge Frederico de Barros Barreto, who had taken testimony from hundreds of prisoners and had been authorized to hear the arrested legislators. Early in October, Honorato Himalaya Vergolino, prosecuting attorney of the TSN, called on Vargas with Barros Barreto and the other judges: army Colonel Luís Carlos da Costa Neto, navy Captain Alberto Lemos Bastos, and civilians Antônio Pereira Braga and Raul Machado.⁶

The prisoners in Rio, turning to arrested law professors and lawyers, set up a "Justice Commission" to study the TSN procedures and a possible ANL boycott of the tribunal. João Mangabeira reported that the TSN trial system favored the prosecution. The prisoners' Justice Commission objected to arrangements that allowed trials to be held beyond the reach of the public, even in jail if the judges wished, and even without the presence of the accused.⁷

In listing the advantages of a boycott, the prisoners' Justice Commission said that it would be "occurring for the first time in the judicial history of Brazil, would have enormous repercussions, with great popular agitation," and would find "echo in the entire world, bringing . . . great demoralization to the government." Another advantage would be the absence of "minute judicial inquiry" of the ANL directors, who "as a consequence, will not compromise themselves or the ANL."

The prisoners' Justice Commission saw some possible disadvantages in the boycott: (a) irrevokable sentences would impede requests for indemnifications to which it was felt that military and civilian functionaries were entitled; (b) the courts would assume that the boycott's adherents were inspired by their lack of a good defense; and (c) the ANL boycott would lead judges to conclude that the ANL

was “nothing but a front of the Partido Comunista.” The commission also observed that the TSN might be magnanimous in sentencing prisoners who defied the boycott.⁸

After studying these conclusions, the Rio political prisoners chose “almost unanimously” to carry out a “total boycott.” They resolved to have no contact whatsoever with the tribunal and to publicize their decision throughout Brazil and abroad.⁹

To help launch the publicity, two manifestos were issued early in October. The shorter one, originating in the Casa de Correção and signed by thirty-five former army officers, quoted João Mangabeira’s statement, published on October 2 in *Correio da Manhã*, that not even the French or Russian revolutionary tribunals, in the midst of civil war, nor those of Hitlerism, nor those for judging spies, traitors, and deserters in World War I, had dared to do what Brazil had just done: invert the legal process by requiring the accused to prove his innocence. The signers declared their willingness to defend themselves before constitutional organs of justice but not the TSN—“the supreme mockery thrown in the face of Civilization.”¹⁰

The longer manifesto bore the signatures of 445 Casa de Detenção and Casa de Correção prisoners, including members of the ANL national directorship: Major Alcedo Batista Cavalcanti; navy officer Roberto Sissón (ANL secretary general); army Captains Agildo Barata, André Trifino Correia, and Antônio Rollemberg; Second Lieutenant Ivan Ramos Ribeiro; journalist Benjamim Soares Cabello; and medical doctors Valério Konder, Manoel Vanâncio Campos da Paz, and Ilvo Meireles. The “Popular Revolutionary Government of Natal” had one signer (Lauro Cortês Lago); the “Junta Revolucionária” of the Aviation School had three (Captains Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo and Sócrates Gonçalves da Silva and First Lieutenant Benedito de Carvalho); and the “Junta Revolucionária” of the Third Infantry Regiment had one (Captain Álvaro Francisco de Souza). Antônio Maciel Bomfim (Miranda) signed as PCB secretary general, Carlos Marighella as engineering student, Rosa Meireles as a teacher, and Maria Werneck de Castro as a director of the União Feminina do Brasil. Another signer was a priest, Father Manoel Nascimento de Oliveira, who, the police decided, was the true treasurer of the Socorro Vermelho. Odilon Machado, formerly suspected of holding this post, also signed.

The manifesto argued that the “hateful political dictatorship” had “unmasked itself” because, after a year of terror in which it could fabricate any kind of “proof,” it had decided that it needed “a tribunal of exception, with secret judgments,” in which the right of defense was denied.¹¹

A Classe Operária hailed the "heroic resolution" of the boycott. The agricultural colonies, it said, would be "places for the physical liquidation of the prisoners, new and appalling Clevelândias, where they will go never to return."¹²

Those caught in the act of rebelling in 1935, such as Agildo Barata, may have found it easier to boycott the TSN than those who felt that they could clearly demonstrate their innocence. ANL President Herculino Cascardo was prepared to prove himself innocent despite the faults he found in the trial methods established by the TSN, and he resisted the boycott. When prisoners asked about the absence of his signature on boycott manifestos, the proboycott leaders explained that Cascardo was held incommunicado in the hospital of the Military Police in Rio. But, like Cascardo, quite a few non-Communists in Rio, who had been attracted to the ANL in 1935, refused to adhere to the PCB's order about the boycott.¹³

An inquiry from Mário Pedrosa about the boycott was received by the arrested Trotskyites in Rio. Barreto Leite Filho, the only Trotskyite listed in the government's indictment about the Rio uprisings of 1935, felt that the PCB wished to use the boycott to involve both the innocent and the guilty in a move to try to disrupt the justice system. He opposed the boycott and, after discussions with Gikovate and Plínio Mello, wrote to Mário Pedrosa to explain that the situation was similar to that in Russia in 1905 when the question of boycotting parliament came up. A boycott would be timely only if supported by a mass movement, and he saw no expectation of such a movement. After Barreto Leite's position became known, the circle of prisoners who were agreeable to speak with him became larger.¹⁴

8. *Resistance to the Boycott in São Paulo* (October 1936–January 1937)

A serious divergence about the boycott arose in São Paulo, although the prison *coletivos* there were in the hands of the boycott-supporting PCB. The difficulty originated in the poor relations between arrested ANL state officers and the PCB men outside jail who took over the ANL state directorship and ran it, releasing a steady stream of public ANL manifestos and internal ANL circulars.

The outside directorship of the São Paulo ANL issued its boycott instructions before it acquainted the prisoners with the studies and manifestos of the Rio prisoners. Arrested São Paulo ANL directors resisted the instructions.

In a memorandum to the political prisoners, written on October

24, the São Paulo outside directorship declared that "we felt genuine surprise and, why not say it, the worst impression upon receiving the message about the way in which the political prisoners of S. Paulo regarded the question of boycotting the Tribunal Especial." The prisoners were accused of "nourishing illusions about the possibilities of defense" and rejecting a "stirring attitude" in exchange for "a very remote advantage of a reduction in the punishment." "Your attitude," the outside directors wrote, "reveals an indiscipline that is below your political conscience and shows a lack of confidence in the Revolution that shocks us immensely." The outside directors had still other complaints. The prisoners, they said, did nothing to prepare the mentality of their families and "turned a deaf ear to all our requests for financial help." "Despite all that," the prisoners were told, the São Paulo ANL was coming along well, with seven commissions of the directorship functioning and with work of the masses launched.¹

The outside directorship distributed copies of the papers issued in the Rio jails about the boycott, and then, early in November, it addressed the São Paulo prisoners again. It spoke of the government's joy to learn that "the S. Paulo companions resist the boycott." Asking again for support, it reported that São Paulo ANL agitation groups, "bothered" by the reaction's agents when writing on walls, had shown their combativity in "two struggles carried out under shooting, . . . an expressive sign."²

Sebastião Francisco recalls that he supported the boycott because it was a PCB order, and he adds that a majority of the São Paulo political prisoners were Communists. Furthermore, he points out, the Maria Zélia prisoners received a letter from Agildo Barata telling them to support the boycott.³ Around mid-November the outside directorship of the São Paulo ANL learned that a majority of the São Paulo political prisoners favored the boycott, but that important arrested ANL leaders would support neither the boycott nor the outside directorship. The arrested leaders, saying that they were the "real leadership," complained about orders from "companions outside of jails." The outside state directorship replied that the boycott initiative had not come from it but from the Rio prisoners, and it added that the unarrested São Paulo leaders had a knowledge of the political situation that their jailed companions lacked, and were in a better position "to make the Revolution."⁴

After the fight became more acrimonious late in 1936, the outside directorship addressed a strong message to "the political bureaus of the São Paulo prisons," saying that the São Paulo prisons lacked "an *aliancista* directorship sufficiently energetic and pres-

tigious to have itself heard and respected." The message attacked four arrested individuals, including ANL State President Caio Prado Júnior, who was apparently sharing none of his wealth with the outside directorship. He was, the message said, "guilty of fractionalism and indifference, incomprehensible from one occupying his post." Another of the individuals, who had said that the outside directors were a bunch of "asses," was described as a police supporter "due to the effects of alcohol." The fight extended to the port city of Santos, where the arrested president of the ANL municipal directorship opposed the boycott and the ANL state *direção solta* (unarrested directorship).⁵

Despite the fight, two anti-TSN manifestos were signed by São Paulo prisoners after they had studied the Rio ANL documents. The first manifesto, dated November 27, contained the signatures of sixty-four Maria Zélia prisoners and mentioned the "material impossibility of getting signatures of those held in Paraíso and the Hospital Militar." The signers, headed by Communist Augusto Pinto, vowed not to appear before the "illegal" TSN and mentioned the "deplorable" prison conditions, which, they said, had cost the life of printer Manoel Medeiros and had driven four prisoners insane. The manifesto asserted that decorative painter Sebastião Francisco (one of the signers) and others continued to suffer from terrible beatings.⁶

In the second manifesto, dated December 2, the signers of the first were joined by others in Maria Zélia and those who had been unable to sign earlier, such as Patrícia and Sidéria Galvão. The outside directorship issued a printed version with 120 names and a note saying that 145 more had also signed. "Up to now," these prisoners said, "our protests were repressed by gas bombs and shooting. Now they want to stifle them with the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional. . . . We disavow the lawyers designated by the TSN to defend us."⁷

The manifesto did not bear the signatures of prestigious ANL officers Caio Prado Júnior and Miguel Costa, who were in Paraíso. Some of the Paraíso prisoners who did sign were lawyer João Penteadó Stevenson (of the arrested state ANL directorship), medical doctor Osório César, bank worker José Silveira, Trotskyite author Aristides Lobo, and Communist medical student Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes.⁸

Miguel Costa, whose correspondence with Prestes appeared in the press after the police seized Prestes' papers, was critical of the Cavalier of Hope. His caustic remarks in Paraíso concerned even Prestes' activities with the so-called Prestes Column. Prestes, Costa said, was good at tactics but bad at strategy, both in military and political work.⁹

9. *Sobral Pinto's Assignment to Defend Prestes and Berger*
(January 1937)

In December 1936, when Vargas requested authorization for another ninety-day extension of the state of war, he explained that the TSN was at last set up and able to begin contributing to the repression of subversion. Seabra argued this time that a state of war was incompatible with the start of the process of selecting a new Brazilian president. But the lower house, by a 166–54 vote on December 14, approved Vargas' request and the Senate ratified the decision a few days later.

The TSN lightened its burden somewhat by ordering the release of over one hundred political prisoners who, it felt, were neither guilty nor dangerous. Among them were Professors Castro Rebello, Leônidas de Rezende, Pedro da Cunha, and Hermes Lima. Hermes Lima, young, studious, and calm, was described by fellow prisoner Graciliano Ramos as "the most civilized person I have ever known."¹

Most of the remaining prisoners refused to recognize the TSN. The list of boycotters included Senator Chermont and Congressmen João Mangabeira, Abguar Bastos, and Otávio da Silveira. When TSN Judge Raul Machado and Prosecuting Attorney Himalaya Vergolino called on Prestes at the Special Police barracks, the prisoner would neither acknowledge the citation for a trial nor agree to name a lawyer.²

At the barracks the judge and the prosecutor also found Harry Berger. He had been closeted for many months in a small, dark, unfurnished space, with little fresh air, under stairs that were constantly used, day and night, in a noisy way by "tomato heads," and he had so often received electric shocks and blows to the head that he expected to lose his mind. He acknowledged with his signature the trial citation but refused to make any statement because, he said, he had no lawyer and could not speak or write Portuguese.³

With so many political prisoners refusing to name lawyers, the TSN turned, early in January, to the Federal District section of the Council of the Order of Lawyers of Brazil and asked it to assign lawyers to prisoners. Some council members considered the TSN unconstitutional, and when a vote was taken it showed an even split on whether or not to cooperate with the TSN. The president of the Federal District Lawyers' Council, Targino Ribeiro, broke the tie by voting to cooperate—but with the understanding that in doing so the council was not necessarily recognizing the TSN's constitutionality.⁴

Jorge Fontenelle was named to represent Ilvo Meireles, who was

accused, among other things, of murdering Elza Fernandes. Honório de Freitas Guimarães (Martins), Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú), Adelino Deicola dos Santos (Tampinha), Leon Vallée, and Carlos da Costa Leite were also assigned lawyers although they were hiding or out of the country. When it came to designating a lawyer for Prestes and Berger, Targino Ribeiro turned to Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto; instead of using the authority he had to force the lawyer to take on this unpopular task, he merely asked him if he would do it.⁵ Sobral Pinto, a devout Catholic who had prosecuted revolutionaries in the 1920's, accepted.

In the office of Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, Sobral Pinto met with Prestes. The prisoner, indignant, spent one and one-half hours lashing at the whole world. He did not speak, Sobral Pinto recalls, "in terms of national opinion, but always in terms of international opinion, of which they, the Communists, considered themselves the masters."⁶ As for Sobral Pinto's mission, Prestes said that if the lawyer defended him it would be against his wishes. He added that Sobral Pinto would only pretend to defend him. If he got out of prison, Prestes said, he would denounce the lawyer for being a fake.

Prestes told Sobral that he had long been out of contact with people and the world, had been constantly watched by three police agents, and had been unable to read books or newspapers or use pencil or paper. Under such circumstances he did not feel that an ample defense could be made. And, he exclaimed, if Senator Chermont, despite parliamentary immunities, was jailed for submitting a habeas corpus petition on Berger's behalf, how could a lawyer without those immunities enjoy the freedom necessary for an efficient defense?⁷

Sobral, thinking that the prisoner was justified in some of his remarks, remained silent, but, after he left, he drew up a statement for the TSN containing many of Prestes' complaints. The statement also criticized the TSN's trial arrangements and tried to explain Prestes' feeling by quoting Lenin: "Tribunals are organs of power. . . . What power requires is not a procedure but the persecution of the internationalists." Sobral added that, in accordance with the prisoner's wishes, he had no plans to defend him but wished to keep in touch with him in case he changed his mind.⁸

Before submitting the statement to TSN Judge Raul Machado, Sobral returned to the barracks and had it shown to Prestes. Had Sobral really written it, Prestes asked the lawyer when they met half an hour later. The prisoner went on to say that it reflected faithfully the views he had expressed. Sobral, after presenting it to the judge, made weekly visits to the Special Police barracks to ask Prestes if he wanted anything from him.⁹

At the barracks Sobral found the once-robust Berger in terrible shape, dirty and with long fingernails. The German seemed somewhat, but not altogether, lucid. Berger's "thinness and paleness," Sobral wrote Judge Machado on January 15, "leave not the slightest doubt about the fragility of his health. . . . The place chosen to imprison him is the worst possible choice for a man dominated by that physiological destitution I have described." Sobral asked that Berger be moved to an appropriate place and given medical treatment that would demonstrate that Brazilians possessed the warm qualities mentioned in Vargas' speech of January 1. The judge referred the matter to Euzébio de Queiroz, who replied that no better place existed for Berger in the barracks since the only room offering both security and comfort was occupied by Prestes.¹⁰ The chief of the Special Police told of Berger's refusal to eat for days on end, but he did not mention that the guards sometimes used foul methods to make the food unattractive.

10. Manifestations of the Boycott (January 1937)

On January 6 TSN Judge Pereira Braga installed himself in the council room of the Casa de Correção to hear defense declarations from eight former army officers: Agliberto de Azevedo and Ivan Ramos Ribeiro (of the Aviation School) and José Guttmann, Humberto de Moraes Rego, David Medeiros Filho, Durval Miguel de Barros, Raul Pedroso, and Francisco Antônio Leivas Otero (of the Third Infantry Regiment). All eight refused to appear.¹

On January 8 another TSN judge, Colonel Costa Neto, tried his luck. He went to the Casa de Correção with some DOPS agents and one hundred Military Police soldiers. The two Aviation School rebels who were summoned this time, ex-Captain Sócrates Gonçalves da Silva and Benedito de Carvalho, said that only as dead men would they leave the pavilion to comply with the judge's order. The judge therefore further strengthened his position by calling for a contingent of the Special Police, and he told its commander to use force to bring Sócrates and Benedito before him. Sócrates, in his underwear, and Benedito, wearing pajamas, were dragged in and forced to sit down, but they answered no questions. Benedito simply said that he did not recognize the tribunal. Sócrates turned his back on Costa Neto and remained silent. So the judge ordered the prison director to transfer the two prisoners to the Casa de Detenção.²

Later Judge Raul Machado spoke of a "conspiracy of indiscipline and confusion." He pointed out that the prerogative of deciding

about the constitutionality of laws belonged to the Supreme Court and not to individuals. Judge Costa Neto told the press that the defiant prisoners adhered to a plan whose criminal objective was to scoff at justice and provoke confusion. There were, the colonel said, two currents. He described one as made up of "repentant persons who respect authority, recognize the Tribunal, and seek to defend themselves, like Sr. Hercolino Cascardo." The other, he said, obeyed the orders of Moscow and was engaged in the inglorious, revolting, and anti-Brazilian task of disparaging the nation and its institutions.³

On January 11, Costa Neto returned to the council room to receive declarations from Captains Agildo Barata, Álvaro de Souza, and José Leite Brasil, leaders of the Third Infantry Regiment revolt. The judge was accompanied by a Military Police detachment, Prosecutor Himalaya Vergolino, and TSN President Barros Barreto. "My presence," Barros Barreto told the press, "has the purpose of reinforcing the authority of those who judge."

José Leite Brasil, abandoning his earlier PCB fanaticism, appeared spontaneously with his lawyer, who submitted documents and testimonials. On the other hand, Agildo Barata and Álvaro de Souza had to be brought in by guards. After they were forced to sit, cries of "Death to the Security Tribunal" broke out in the prison patio. While Agildo repeated the cry, Álvaro, usually quieter than Agildo, tried to attack Euzébio de Queiroz but was restrained by guards of the Special Police. With raised fists the two prisoners shouted "vivas" for the ANL. Colonel Costa Neto ordered them transferred to the Casa de Detenção. While being conducted there, they insulted the TSN in a stream of remarks. Presiding Judge Barros Barreto authorized the prison director to allow José Leite Brasil to communicate with his family. He ordered solitary confinement for the other two.⁴

The TSN, turning to ANL leaders for statements, summoned prisoners for the first time to the TSN headquarters, a schoolhouse in the Botafogo district that had been taken over for its use. Captain Carlos Amoreti Osório, ANL vice-president, appeared with his lawyer. The lawyer, before reading a prepared statement, said that it needed to be modified because on the previous day the Supreme Court had ruled that the TSN was constitutional.

Despite the Supreme Court decision, ANL founder Francisco Mangabeira said that he wanted no defense presented on his behalf to the TSN. ANL Secretary General Sissón assumed the same position and added that his trouble stemmed in part from the desire of DOPS Director Miranda Correia for "personal vengeance." A series of dig-

nitaries, including Rio State Governør Protógenes Guimarães, testified on behalf of ANL President Herculino Cascardo.⁵

Like Cascardo, arrested Congressman Domingos Velasco cooperated with the TSN. He was visited at the Gaffré Guinle Hospital on January 15 by TSN Judge Lemos Bastos, Prosecutor Himalaya Vergolino, and defense lawyers Acúrcio Tôrres and João Neves da Fontoura (minority leader in Congress). The visit nearly coincided with the escape made from that hospital by ex-Captain André Trifino Correia (a Prestes admirer and ANL organizer) and ex-Lieutenant Mário de Souza (of the Third Infantry Regiment). Later in January TSN President Barros Barreto advised Police Chief Müller that all political prisoners in private hospitals should be transferred to the Military Police Hospital.⁶

The resistance to the TSN demonstrated by the Rio political prisoners evoked the admiration of the São Paulo political prisoners, including Caio Prado Júnior. The unarrested São Paulo ANL directorship, in a letter to the jailed president of the ANL's Santos directorship, reported that Caio Prado Júnior and other jailed officers of the state ANL had signed "a proclamation to the Rio prisoners" to manifest "the enormous enthusiasm felt by the prisoners of S. Paulo for the first concrete acts of struggle against the infamous Tribunal." In this appeal for the support of the hesitant Santos companion, the São Paulo directorship said that "now the whole world perceives that the penalties decreed by the Tribunal are, in advance, undermined juridically and politically and will not prevail in the end."⁷

3. The Rough Road to Normalcy (August 1936–October 1937)

1. PCB Views on a New Revolution (last half of 1936)

Following the flight of Bangú (Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha), Martins (Honório de Freitas Guimarães), and Abóbora (Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier) from Rio to the northeast in March 1936, and the disappearance at the same time of Tampinha (Adelino Deicola dos Santos), the PCB had no effective National Secretariat. This situation prevailed until late 1936 or early 1937 when Bangú organized the National Secretariat in São Paulo with the help of the Regional Committee there. Before Bangú took this step, the São Paulo Regional Committee, headed by Hermínio Sacchetta, noted that it had lost its contacts with the Party in the federal capital. It therefore sent one of its members, 22-year-old Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, to reside in Rio to “make connection with the National Secretariat . . . and send information to São Paulo about the political situation.” Câmara Ferreira found that no PCB National Secretariat existed in Rio, but he remained there, sending political information to São Paulo.¹

In Bahia, Abóbora had received from Bangú and Martins the mission of carrying reports to Moscow and receiving advice about future PCB policy. He left Brazil on the *Raul Soares* in October 1936 but remained for three months in France, spending some of his time with a brother-in-law of Martins, Afonso de Figueiredo.² As Abóbora did not reach Moscow until January 30, 1937, the PCB found itself with policy decisions to make many months before it learned about his conversations in the Soviet capital.

Despite the setbacks of March 1936, PCB policy continued unchanged until August 1936. In Rio as late as July and August the PCB still showed interest in a violent revolution that would prepare the way for a “popular government” dominated by the masses. A Rio circular of the PCB Bureau Nacional de Frações Sindicais, directed to regional and local committees, cells, and party fractions in labor

unions, pointed out that the government had "transitorially defeated the movement in November," but that "the situation of the country continues revolutionary." The circular called for avoiding conditions that had resulted in a weak strike movement "at the moment of the November insurrection. It is important that we do not continue in the same error of awaiting the spontaneous movement of the masses or of believing in promises of certain leaders even though we form the United Front with them. . . . We, the Communists, the vanguard of the mass, must organize and mobilize for the fray, acting as directors and not as simple executors of resolutions, without initiative."³

When the "Political Bureau of the PCB" issued an appeal in Rio in August 1936 for a United Front for Democracy, it did not mince words about what it had in mind. The leaflet stated that the appeal was not being made on behalf of the "bourgeois democracy." It was not, it said, calling for the political system used by the "so-called democratic countries" but, rather, the "democracy of the full proletarian masses, the masses of the people, with these masses making their rights prevail." The leaflet explained that it was "the dictatorship of the proletariat" that had "brought the backward Russia of czarism to the marvel that it is today." For those who might hesitate to choose the path adopted in the Soviet Union, the "Political Bureau of the PCB" had reassuring words: the path had led to the new Soviet constitution. "In the Soviet Union there has been decreed the secret vote, equal and direct for all, and there has been voted the most democratic constitution ever elaborated by any government!"⁴

A Classe Operária, whose monthly issues in the last half of 1936 were published mostly in São Paulo,⁵ decided in August 1936 to settle, temporarily, for the reestablishment of "bourgeois democracy." In doing so the PCB suddenly abandoned its oft-repeated call for a *governo popular*, which was associated with the 1935 uprising. It explained that "we, Communists, do not struggle, at this moment, for a government that is ours. All our activity is based on the principles of scientific socialism, which, in the present historic and objective conditions of Brazil, do not authorize us to do this." *A Classe Operária* found that all the nation, not just Communists and Aliancistas, opposed Getúlio, and it argued that the people, including groups "most separated from the revolutionary movement," should topple the Vargas government. This step, *A Classe Operária* warned, should not be carried out by "a restricted coup." It declared that "Marxism-Leninism, the theory of the revolutionary proletariat, has a clear point of view about terrorist acts, putsches, and other things of that nature."⁶

Terrorism, *A Classe Operária* wrote, was a tool of the Inte-

gralistas and Trotskyites. It reported that the Trotskyites had recently employed terrorism in seeking to assassinate Stalin. Publishing information received from Moscow about the trials that resulted in the execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and fourteen other old Bolsheviks, *A Classe Operária* described the "villainous defendants" as having been guided by the "old hydrophobic dog Trotsky." It quoted from the "confessions" of Kamenev and Zinoviev to reveal that, in their effort to eliminate Stalin, they had been willing to trade off Soviet territory and had carried out "the most repugnant counter-revolutionary acts" with the assistance of Nazis. Readers of the PCB monthly learned that humanity would long ago have been overcome by the hecatomb of a new war were it not for Stalin and that the purpose of the plot to assassinate him had been to destroy his policies favoring peace, socialism, and democracy. "Will there ever be a more hedonic, more abominable crime than this?" *A Classe Operária* asked.⁷

2. *The ANL's Tactical Retreat* (September 1936–January 1937)

Like the PCB, the São Paulo ANL directorship expressed its interest in violent revolution as late as July 1936. In a mimeographed circular addressed that month to "all Aliancistas," it hailed the "constant increase" in the "numerous columns of the national-liberation guerrilla fighters in the northeast" and wrote that their installation of "popular governments in municipalities in the interior," was "reverberating in the whole nation." The São Paulo ANL predicted that "those dispersed flames, which crackle throughout all the backlands, will be transformed into a large revolutionary fire."

The São Paulo ANL explained that the purpose of the ANL was to organize the people to fight for a "popular-revolutionary victory" and it expressed its support for "any movement that proposes to overthrow Getúlio, establish democratic liberties, and give legality to the ANL." It called itself a nonsectarian united front for bringing together people of diverse tendencies, and therefore it advanced a "general minimum program" that opposed high living costs, the foreign power companies, and the tax and "quota" payments that vexed coffee producers.¹

The São Paulo ANL "nuclei" were organized like PCB cells, each with a secretary and chiefs of organization, agitation-propaganda, and finances. The state directorship lamented that only about six nuclei existed in São Paulo city and that the ANL had attracted few intellectuals; but it took pride in the many fliers it issued, in the six

"brigades" that covered walls with slogans, and especially in its mimeographed monthly, *Liberdade*.²

Unlike previous issues of *Liberdade*, the four-page September issue, number 8, was splendidly printed. The ANL's national directorship in Rio, while praising this "victory over the past," had a fault to find when it wrote to São Paulo on November 1: number 8, like the earlier numbers, called for a *governo popular*. The "word of order" of *governo popular* had for some time been out of date, Rio explained, "because we propose a government of national salvation, on a democratic basis, with or even *without our participation*. . . . The *governo popular* has become a perspective, for a new stage, it being our immediate task to deter the advance of the reaction." The São Paulo ANL was told that, while the base and the mass should be "made to *feel*" that the ANL was not renouncing any part of its original program, it would be unwise to speak of unleashing armed struggles, for that would alienate allies.³

The São Paulo ANL, replying on November 11, agreed that the *governo popular* did not correspond to the ANL's "*immediate objectives*" brought about by the recent "advance of the reaction." Having been given no substitute word of order by Rio, São Paulo suggested, "For a government that guarantees democratic liberties."

The São Paulo ANL acknowledged the need to "retreat in order better to advance." It wrote that the work of creating a mass organization might best "radiate from Rio de Janeiro," but added that "we shall continue our independent work here."⁴

A part of the work of the São Paulo ANL early in 1937 consisted of seeking strong allies. Alberto da Rocha Barros tried to forge an alliance between the ANL and presidential candidate Armando de Sales Oliveira, who, as the recent governor of São Paulo, had been accused by the ANL of being a profascist "agent of enslaving imperialism."⁵ The São Paulo ANL turned also to Goiás Governor Pedro Ludovico, whom it considered on poor terms with Vargas,⁶ and to the conservative São Paulo Federation of Industries.

In its letter to Ludovico, the São Paulo ANL proposed the "formation of the UNIÃO DEMOCRÁTICA E PROGRESSISTA of your state, in which the Aliancistas will participate as a mass." It argued that the Vargas government backed the Spanish fascists and Italy's "rapacious conquest of Abyssinia," favored Germany's desire for Brazilian cotton, and "provided facilities to the Japanese." Blaming a lack of raw material development in Goiás on the imperialistic interests, represented by Getúlio, the ANL wrote that "German imperialism has taken possession of the nickel mines of Goiás; imperialism maintains silence about the Goiás petroleum reserves, and the cot-

ton production of Goiás does not expand for obvious reasons of foreign interests."⁷

The São Paulo ANL congratulated the directors of the São Paulo Federation of Industries for issuing a memorandum in favor of the development of national industry and wrote that its own aspirations coincided exactly with those of the federation. But it suggested that the federation consider heavy, as well as light, industry and advocate the elimination of large landownings in order to augment internal markets.⁸

Turning also to its own reduced following for help, the São Paulo ANL directorship issued a "self-criticism," which said that nothing was being accomplished in mass work. To reverse this situation it assigned each member of its central commission and nuclei to one of four subjects: wages, taxes, coffee production, and democracy. It called for approaches to teachers' associations, the Association of Public Employees, and the Retail Commerce Association and for more work with "parliamentary connections," the legal press, intellectuals, and youth. "Labor unions," the directors wrote, "are in a secondary category because of the work there of the P. [PCB], as an adhering organization."⁹

As the minimum monthly contribution of a nucleus was set at only 20\$000, the São Paulo ANL was in poor financial shape and owed 3:500\$000 to one benefactor. Income in January 1937 was not expected to cover the expenses of 2:225\$000, almost half of which was for the salaries of three officers (300\$000 each), with most of the remainder assigned to the production and distribution of three mimeographed manifestos and one mimeographed circular (about one thousand copies of each).

Seeking financial relief, the São Paulo ANL resolved early in 1937 to sell, to the Comitê Anti-Militar of the São Paulo PCB, the press that had printed number 8 of *LIBERDADE*. The PCB agreed to pay 1:000\$000 for the press and to print five thousand copies of number 9 of *Liberdade* (four pages), a service considered to be worth 200\$000.¹⁰

3. *Moscow Recommends a Far Right Position* (February–March 1937)

To reach Moscow, Abóbora (Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier) traveled from France by rail through Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, on a trip paid for by the brother-in-law of Honório de Freitas Guimarães. Upon reaching the Soviet capital on January 30, he went

at once to the Hotel Lux, which was used by the Comintern. There he found Otávio Brandão, his wife, Laura, and their four young daughters.¹

Brandão in 1935 had refused to agree with Fernando de Lacerda's assertion (arrogantly made, Brandão thought) that one million Brazilians would support Prestes in a successful revolution. The disagreement had led to Brandão's dismissal from all Comintern political work, and he had lived in poverty and in fear of purges: the shootings and deportations to Siberia inflicted on those felt to be holding opposition sympathies. But after November 1935 the Comintern became respectful of Brandão and asked him and Laura to broadcast in Portuguese on radio programs directed to Brazil, Portugal, and the African Portuguese-speaking areas. In the meantime the sensitive Fernando de Lacerda suffered a nervous breakdown and was admitted to a mental hospital in Moscow. When he found it difficult to leave the hospital, he sought assistance from Brandão, who helped persuade the hospital commander to release him.²

Brandão had known Abóbora as a Portuguese-born sailor in Rio who had distributed bundles of *A Classe Operária*, published by Brandão, to ships going north and south. In Moscow, Brandão introduced Abóbora to three of Prestes' four sisters, and he went with him to see Fernando de Lacerda, whom Abóbora had known in Brazil, and directors of the Comintern. Brandão served as interpreter although his Russian was far from perfect.³

As a result of the talks, particularly Abóbora's talks with Brandão, Abóbora received what he called "the word of order of Russia, which, bearing in mind the failure of the revolution of 1935, was that the people should be agitated by intellectual propaganda against the trusts and any sort of imperialist domination." Brandão recalled later that he told Abóbora "the Brazilian Communists should build up a united front especially if it were anti-imperialist; they should in this way revive the ANL, using the same name or a new name. If it were found impractical to have it anti-imperialist, it should be a united front for democracy. The Brazilian Communists should attract the masses; they should put ideas of putsches out of their heads." According to what Brandão has written, the PCB was to "adhere to the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International about an anti-imperialist front."⁴

At its Seventh World Congress, held in the summer of 1935, the Comintern had moved to the Right, far from its sectarianism of the early 1930's, and had called for antifascist Popular Fronts of all lovers of peace and for the defense of the Soviet Union by the workers of the world, no matter what the cost. The policy, as the PCB

found out, was subject to different interpretations. Also it left some PCB members dissatisfied. The Trotskyites were not alone in claiming that the Comintern was abandoning the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

Before Abóbora returned to Brazil, he stopped in Paris, and there he met Honório de Freitas Guimarães, who was planning to go to Moscow with the intention, some thought, of replacing Fernando de Lacerda as PCB representative to the Comintern. In Paris, Freitas Guimarães learned of Brandão's recommendations to the PCB not only from Abóbora but also from Brandão himself. Brandão had come to France to participate in an international propaganda campaign to gain the release from Germany of Prestes' daughter, born in Berlin and held with her mother in prison there.

In Paris, Brandão and Freitas Guimarães quarreled about PCB policy, with Brandão gaining the impression that the combative Freitas Guimarães favored another insurrection. Later in Moscow, people had to step in between the two men to prevent Freitas Guimarães, a strong man, from hitting Brandão. Freitas Guimarães, instead of replacing Lacerda on the Comintern's Executive Committee, joined him in accusing Brandão of having made suggestions in Paris for a plot against the Comintern. Again Brandão was faced with the specter of being purged by the police of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of the Interior). But during an eight-month inquiry, Brandão defended himself successfully by citing the line taken in his articles in the Comintern's *IPC* and in other publications.⁵

Certainly there was no trace of Trotskyism in these articles. Brandão, who published thirteen articles in *IPC* in 1937 (compared with only one written by Fernando de Lacerda), damned "Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyism." He argued that the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM), hated by Stalinism in Spain, was receiving instructions from Trotsky even though "again and again" it declared that it was not Trotskyite. Brandão accused the POUM and its organ *La Batalla* of slandering the Soviet Union and disrupting the Spanish People's Front.⁶

In Brazil the PCB did not await the return of Abóbora in July 1937 before proclaiming its turn to the Far Right. On March 1, the PCB Regional Committee of Bahia published an antisectarian circular that was reprinted by the National Secretariat. The circular, a manual for winning the masses of the interior to "the struggle for Democracy, against Fascism and Imperialism," called for "an enormous modification of our methods of work—a break with the leftist, sectarian forms." It said that application of the directives for guerrilla fighting contained in the Party's previously published *A*

Luta dos Guerrilheiros, "today condemned by the PCB Political Bureau," would provide no results and would only impede the Party's work in the interior. Explaining that this "great modification of the party political line places before us important tactical problems formerly not studied," the circular recommended sponsoring "general demands, felt by all the people of the municipality . . . from the *fazendeiros* [large landowners] and people of commerce to the peasants and wage-earning agricultural workers."

The Communists were told to "abolish harsh and rude language" and speak "in a manner that does not wound the deep sentimentalism of the people of the interior." Comrades were to cease believing that they would be known as "fearless revolutionaries" if they disrespected traditional customs and made fun of religious sentiment. "The people," the circular said, "need to see in the Communists creatures as human as any other, . . . worthy of the respect and the liking of all, due to their wider vision and dedication to the collective interest."⁷

Unsectarian circulars were issued in São Paulo, where the PCB National Secretariat included Interim Secretary-General Bangú and the Paulista leaders, Sacchetta (Paulo) and student Hílio de Lacerda Manna (Luís).⁸ There the PCB Political Bureau called for an antifascist, anti-Vargas "UNION OF IRON of all parties, state governments, Catholics, Protestants, spiritualists, atheists, workers, students, intellectuals, capitalists and property owners, peasants and *fazendeiros*, officers, soldiers, and sailors!" The secretariat ordered the PCB to describe Prestes as an antifascist democrat.⁹

The "supreme 'Duce' Getúlio Vargas" and the fascists were blamed for using the expressions "red peril" and "struggle against extremism" to misrepresent the PCB, which, its Political Bureau proclaimed, did "not seek to destroy the democratic institutions established in the constitution" but, on the contrary, considered the constitution to be "the only path capable of saving Brazil from the fascist invasion."

If the PCB's São Paulo circulars showed an aggressive tone, this was because they urged concrete steps to prevent the fascist nations, aided by Vargas and the Integralistas, from turning Brazil into another Spain in order to gain raw materials and strategic territory. Communist comrades and sympathizers, whose views were unknown, were to "present themselves as volunteers in the fascist barracks" in Brazil in order to stir up trouble and reduce discipline. Such infiltrators among sailors, port workers, and railroad workers were to denounce "the disembarkation of foreign fascists" and work against any transfer, of men and materials, that might be planned by

the opponents of democracy. "Our central practical preoccupation," the PCB Secretariat wrote in March 1937, "will be the organization of the Detachment of the Popular Army of Defense of the population against the fascist invasion."¹⁰

4. *The Slaughter at Maria Zélia* (April 21, 1937)

While prisoners were sunbathing in the Maria Zélia patio late in 1936 or early in 1937, Abdon Prado Lima managed to vault the high patio wall, avoid shots by guards, and enter the back of a house on Celso Garcia Avenue. Going through the house, he reached the street and disappeared. After that the guards found ways to make sunbathing unattractive. Most effectively, they indicated that they were looking for an incident that would allow them to carry out a slaughter. Prisoners Augusto Pinto, José Silveira, and Reginaldo de Carvalho persuaded the other prisoners that it would be best to sunbathe no more.¹

Natálio Rodrigues, an arrested baker who had been transferred from Paraíso, spoke to some of the Maria Zélia prisoners about escape, but the plan he had in mind was not for Maria Zélia but for Paraíso, where he contemplated the excavation of a nine-meter tunnel. Despite his inferior social status, he arranged to be transferred back to Paraíso. There he and two other laboring-class prisoners, one a bricklayer and the other an electrical worker, José Ferreira de Carvalho, selected a place in the prison basement for the excavation work. Starting late in January 1937, they dug with iron bars, taken from the frames of unused beds in the basement, and they put the earth from the tunnel on top of broken-down beds.²

José Ferreira de Carvalho gained a participant by turning to his close friend, Trotskyite journalist Victor de Azevedo Pinheiro, who was translating a book. The group was joined by Trotskyite printer João Matheus and might have been joined by Trotskyite translator Aristides Lobo had he not been recently released. Students, who made up a small minority in the São Paulo jails, were represented in the tunnel endeavor by Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes and Hélio Morato Kraembuhl. Others among the seventeen would-be escapers were Issa Maluf, an accountant and friend of Sacchetta; Alexandre Weinstein, an engineer; and Benedito de Almeida, a teacher from Santos.³

The tunnel was completed in fifteen days. At 5:00 P.M. on February 10 the seventeen prisoners, wearing civilian clothes under their khaki canvas uniforms, went through the tunnel and found themselves inside a property from which access to the street was

barred by a locked gate. The fugitives therefore climbed walls and jumped to the adjoining properties, from which it was easier to reach the street. They were not disturbed despite the fuss made by poultry after Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes' jump put him in a chicken coop. With the exception of Maluf, who was jailed many months later, none of the seventeen was recaptured.⁴

News of the Paraíso escape was kept from the public for ten days, but it reached Maria Zélia almost as soon as it occurred. There it inspired planning by a group that included Augusto Pinto, Sebastião Francisco, and João Raimondi, who, as Tupi in the PCB before 1935, had promoted subversion in the Força Pública. Força Pública men involved in the Maria Zélia escape plan were Davino Francisco dos Santos, José Aparecido da Fonseca, and Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira.⁵

The prison, the upper floor of a large factory pavillion, was connected by a narrow passageway to a similar pavillion that was abandoned. As access to the passageway was blocked by a steel gate, the plotters decided to make a hole in the cement wall next to the gate. Prisoners who had their stalls (mattresses, blankets, etc.) in the vicinity were shifted elsewhere to make room for the stall of young Jacob Benjamim Leipzig, one of the schemers. Leipzig and others worked on the wall with pieces of iron that were hidden, when not used, in Leipzig's mattress.⁶ A vigilance committee warned against the appearance of guards and prevented the approach of prisoners who were not involved in the plan.

After twelve days a small but adequate hole was completed. The cold, clear night of April 21 was chosen for the escape because in the city at that time an important ANL rally was expected to occupy the attention of the police.⁷ At 11:30 P.M. several dozen prisoners made their way through the hole, one at a time. When a shot rang out, many of the last prisoners to pass through the hole returned prudently to the prison. By then, twenty-six men were striking out for freedom; having discarded the uniforms that covered civilian clothing, they descended stairs that led from the upper floor of the abandoned pavillion to the ground level, and entered the vast, moonlit yard. Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira and José Aparecido da Fonseca used a stairway that had not been considered in the plan. Separated from the others, they crossed the yard and made their way to freedom by surmounting a wall and barbed wire.⁸

The shot of a prison guard, which sent some prisoners scampering back to jail, was followed by the wail of a siren. The twenty-four prisoners who reached the yard by using the agreed-upon stairway were attacked by guards. Most of them sought protection from bul-

lets by rushing into the old textile plant's toilet rooms that adjoined the yard. Others fell to the grass and lay there. Augusto Pinto turned himself over to guards. Naurício Mariel Mendes and João Varlotta came out of toilet rooms with white handkerchiefs raised as a sign of surrender.

Inspector José Pereira Leite, commander of the garrison of the Guarda Civil, withdrew when it was clear that the situation was controlled by seventy-one of his guards. Waldemar Schultz and Celso Nascimento Rosa, prisoners lying on the ground, were forced to crunch and eat bits of cement and dirt and then ordered to get up while a guard shot at their feet. In this way Schultz was wounded in the left foot.

The prisoners were lined up, searched, and hit by a guard. When they were threatened with a mass shooting, Augusto Pinto exclaimed, "Are you going to shoot us? After we surrendered? What stupidity!" He was placed in the last of the three groups, which, in accordance with the orders of Sergeant Gregório Kovalenko, were to be conducted under blows back to prison, one group at a time. The marches of the first two groups were interrupted by frequent halts, during which the prisoners were struck by rifle butts with such force that serious concussions resulted. Celso Nascimento Rosa, having eaten cement, collapsed under blows and had to be taken to a hospital. Leipzig received concussions in the cheekbone and back and abrasions on a leg. Sebastião Francisco was injured in the loin.⁹

The fate of the last group, under the personal command of Kovalenko, appeared ominous to members of the retreating second group for they heard a guard announce, "We *are* going to shoot the others." Three shots in the head brought instantaneous death to José Constancio da Costa. Death apparently came less quickly to Augusto Pinto, for a subsequent investigation disclosed the severance of a foot before the coup de grace was administered in the chest. Machine gun fire killed João Varlotta. Turning to Naurício Mariel Mendes, Kovalenko asked, "Aren't you dead yet?" Then he used the butt of his machine gun to crush the skull of the prisoner, who died later. Kovalenko was at work on Oscar dos Reis (who received many bullet wounds) and Antônio Donoso Vidal when the lights from arriving ambulances illuminated the execution scene in the yard. The destruction of life was halted, but many days passed before it became known that Oscar dos Reis (a former Light and Power Company worker) and Antônio Donoso Vidal (a former corporal) would survive.¹⁰

The episode, which cost four lives, was brought to the attention of the Paulistas in an unusual manner on April 22. Women, related

to Maria Zélia political prisoners, took their places in the women's section of the State Assembly gallery. Some had babies with them. During a discussion on the assembly floor about wheat, one of the speakers mentioned democracy. Then a woman in the gallery, Leonor Puca, raised her voice to announce that "four youths were assassinated early this morning, *senhores deputados!* The whole nation has got to know that this crime was committed to open the way for the implantation of dictatorship in our nation."¹¹

Guards cleared the gallery, but the matter did not die. On April 23, State Assemblyman Moura Rezende, of the minority Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP), spoke of the "cry of anguish that came from one of the women who are related to the Maria Zélia prisoners." He declared that the note furnished by the police to the press had confirmed that the tragic facts were the result of "the will and the violence of the authorities."

Edgar França, vice-leader of the majority Partido Constitucionalista, pointed out that "many of the prisoners are adherents of direct and immediate action, and against them it is of no use to apply prudence and persuasive methods." But he promised an investigation.¹²

On April 25 a letter was addressed to a state assemblyman by Davino Francisco dos Santos, Jacob Benjamim Leipzig, Sebastião Francisco, João Raimondi, and twelve other Maria Zélia prisoners. In describing the tragedy, they reported that, "after everything had been quieted," Lieutenant Pantaleão de Lima, of the Guarda Civil, telephoned from the prison to say, "We are acting with full violence." This violence, according to the prisoners' letter, consisted of vandalism by guards who "took revenge even against those who had not fled, breaking everything they found, and even wrecking furniture, etc."¹³

The Political Secretaryship of the PCB Regional Committee and the state directorship of the ANL issued circulars and handbills about the slaughter. The PCB's circular to its comrades called for "a vast work of ORGANIZATION AND AGITATION, in which every Party organism is responsible for stirring up mass protests." Both the PCB circular and the ANL handbill of April 23 demanded an impartial inquiry and the dismissal of Leite de Barros and Egas Botelho of the Political Police. The ANL wrote that "the Partido Constitucionalista, its president, Sr. Armando de Sales, candidate for the presidency of the Republic, and the government of Sr. Cardoso de Melo will be considered responsible for the slaughter if they do not promote the impartial investigation of those guilty for the events and if they do not punish those who are responsible!"

The May 1, 1937, number of *Juventude*, the handwritten monthly of the Maria Zélia prisoners that was passed from prisoner to prisoner, bore a headline, "Sacrifice of Youth," and a drawing showing five prisoners with their hands raised and surrounded by soldiers who were shooting at them. The drawing was by Otávio Falcão, a valued collaborator of *Juventude's* editorial board, which was made up of Ermelindo Maffei (director), Reginaldo de Carvalho, Hilário Correia (poet), and Clóvis Gusman.¹⁴

During the investigation that was completed in June 1937, the guards maintained that Francisco Ferraz de Oliveira and José Aparecido da Fonseca had made their escape when the third group of prisoners was about to be returned to jail, and that, while the escape distracted Gregório Kovalenko, the prisoners of the third group threw themselves on the sergeant and his men, leading to a shoot-out that lasted five or ten minutes. Prison doctors, who had arrived on the scene with the ambulances, confirmed that Kovalenko had shown them fresh scratches, some bleeding, on his chest.¹⁵

The inquiry found all the Guarda Civil members innocent. Although Kovalenko was given a seven-year sentence at a trial concluded several years later, he was absolved by an appeals court in 1941. On the other hand, José Stacchini writes, José Constancio da Costa and Naurício Mariel Mendes were condemned to prison sentences by the TSN even though they had already been killed.¹⁶

5. *Tortures in the Recife and Santos Jails (1936–1937)*

The beatings administered by the Recife police, seeking confessions from prisoners, were sometimes fatal. This was particularly true under Pernambuco Police Chief Malvino Reis Neto in the first part of 1936. Captain Reis, in playing a leading role in crushing the November 1935 uprising in Recife, had ordered a rather unrestrained shooting that he recognized went beyond the law, but he felt that "it was the only way to deal with Communists." After the uprising had been quelled, Reis moved the former occupants of the Recife jail to Fernando de Noronha Island, but even this step did not prevent overcrowding by the hundreds of new prisoners. Reis arranged to have the acting governor name Delegado Auxiliar Etelvino Lins, a lawyer, to head an investigation of those responsible for the revolt.¹

The early arrests in Pernambuco were mainly of military men and left the PCB functioning in the state. José Caetano Machado, the 36-year-old baker and PCB strongman who had unleashed the Recife uprising of 1935, was in jail, but he issued Party instructions in mes-

sages to the local PCB directors. At least some of the messages were contained in loaves of bread that Caetano baked in prison and was allowed to give to his wife, Maria, when she visited him. The police followed her, thus learning about Party members. Then they arrested Maria and gained more information from her and Caetano (who later regretted having behaved "weakly"). Gregório Lourenço Bezerra writes that, as a result of the "indiscriminate messages" and the "carelessness and irresponsibility of Comrade Caetano Machado," all the Party directorship of Pernambuco was imprisoned, along with Pascásio Fonseca, who was in Maranhão.²

Messages found in loaves of bread led the police to believe that a "Communist uprising" was planned for the Saturday of Carnaval of 1936,³ but Caetano, taken before Malvino Reis, denied that "another movement was being prepared." Therefore, Caetano testified later, Malvino ordered Wandenkolk Wanderley, chief of the police investigators, to "beat him with full force." According to the baker's testimony, he was beaten in the investigation room and then manacled and taken in an automobile to the woods of Beberibe. "I was struck in the stomach during the trip there and back. My wife Maria Medina Machado was also beaten." While Caetano was held at the building of the State Secretaryship of Public Security, he "was present at the beatings of José Francisco de Oliveira, Antônio Vanderlei Bosford, and Epifânio José Bezerra, who were imprisoned with me in a lamentable state and whose testimonies were obtained under violence and threat of death; Jacob Pingo was beaten and forced to sign a declaration of suicide."⁴

Another fellow prisoner of Caetano at the secretaryship was José Maria de Souza, a PCB leader who "was in a hopeless state, almost unconscious," due to beatings. José Maria died a little later at the hospital of the Recife Casa de Detenção. Another who died from beatings was Luís Bispo de França, a 28-year-old Pernambuco Tramway Company construction worker. He had been the Pernambuco PCB regional secretary at the time of preparation for the 1935 uprising and had been arrested early in 1936. Because of his "firmness in the face of the police executioners under the orders of agent Wandenkolk [Wanderley]," Bispo's memory was honored, along with that of Augusto Pinto, by the PCB in 1962.⁵

It is a wonder that Gregório Lourenço Bezerra survived. The evidence indicated that, during an early phase of the November uprising in Recife, Sergeant Bezerra had killed Lieutenant Xavier Sampaio, his superior who had done him favors. Bezerra, questioned in January 1936 by a military police investigation and the Etelvino Lins panel, denied any connection with the PCB or the November events.



Auguste Elise Ewert, wife of International Communist "Harry Berger," being questioned by the police, 1936. (*O Globo*)



House at Rua Honório, 279, where Luís Carlos Prestes was arrested on March 5, 1936. (*Correio da Manhã*)



Left: Communist leader Agildo Barata, at left. Above: Aparício Torelli (the "Baron of Itararé"), antigovernment writer, 1937. (O Globo)



PCB leader Honório de Freitas Guimarães, sometimes called "Martins" or "o milionário."



Rodolfo Ghioldi, Argentine Communist leader. (O Globo)



Left to right: Police Chief Filinto Müller, War Minister João Gomes, Justice Minister Vicente Ráo, and Federal District Mayor Pedro Ernesto Batista, 1935.



Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, head of the Special Police. (*O Globo*)



Judge Frederico de Barros Barreto, who headed the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional. (*O Globo*)



Elza Fernandes, executed by the PCB leadership, 1936.



Francisco Natividade Lyra, Communist known as Cabeção, an executioner of Elza Fernandes.



Luís Carlos Prestes at the Special Police barracks, testifying before a military council about the charge of desertion from the army, February 1937. (*O Globo*)



Prestes, about to testify at the Supreme Military Tribunal, had been hit in the face by members of the Special Police, September 1937. (*O Globo*)



Harry Berger, surrounded by members of the Special Police, before testifying at the Supreme Military Tribunal, September 1937. (*O Globo*)



Prestes at the Supreme Military Tribunal, September 1937. (*O Globo*)



Harry Berger at the Supreme Military Tribunal, September 1937.
(*O Globo*)



Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto, lawyer of some of the Communists. (*O Globo*)



Left: PCB leader Sebastião Francisco and his companion, Ida D'amico, before their arrest in Rio in 1940. Ida committed suicide following police torture. Above: Writer Patrícia Galvão, prisoner.



Hermínio Sacchetta, journalist, Trotskyite leader, and former PCB leader in São Paulo, 1940.



DEMANDEZ
SA
LIBERATION



Left: French postcard demanding freedom for Prestes and showing his wife, Olga, and their baby in a German prison. (*O Globo*)
Above: Leocádia Prestes, mother of Luís Carlos Prestes. (*O Globo*)

OLGA BENÁRIO PRESTES
Le site de l'ancien défenseur du peuple brésilien est en Allemagne nazie, détenu à Berlin. Le site est un mouvement dans la prison de la Gestapo.



Posters about Luís Carlos Prestes in Paris, 1936–1937. (Coleção de Hélio Silva)



Major Carlos da Costa Leite, who was imprisoned in Brazil after serving in the Spanish Civil War. (*O Globo*)




PCB leader Agostinho Dias de Oliveira. (*O Globo*)



São Paulo anti-Vargas intellectuals: Francisco Morato de Oliveira (at far left), Trotskyite Plínio Mello (at right end of near table), Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta (standing, speaking), and Trotskyite Febus Gikovate (wearing suspenders and glasses, seated near Pedroso d'Horta).



Prestes with diplomat Orlando Leite Ribeiro, friend of Prestes and Vargas.
(*O Globo*)



Prestes leaving prison in the company of Trifino Correia (with mustache).
(*O Globo*)



Communist writers Jorge Amado, left, and Pedro Mota Lima, 1945. (*O Globo*)



(1) Luís Carlos Prestes, (2) Maurício Grabois, (3) Milton Caires de Brito, (4) Agostinho Dias de Oliveira, (5) José Maria Crispim, (6) Alcides Sabença, (7) Carlos Marighella, (8) Alcêdo Coutinho, (9) Gregório Bezerra, (10) Joaquim Batista Neto, (11) Osvaldo Pacheco, (12) José Claudino da Silva, (13) Jorge Amado, (14) Abilio Fernandes, and (15) João Amazonas. (*O Globo*)



From left to right, Diógenes de Arruda Câmara, Pedro Pomar, Gregório Bezerra, and Vivaldo Vasconcelos. (*O Globo*)

He became the victim of tortures that included the use of *anjinhas*, iron rings for inflicting pain in the fingers. When Bezerra, 35 years old, was driven to the Beberibe woods with Wandenkolk Wanderley and his men, the car was stopped at intervals so that the prisoner could be taken out and whipped. The beatings in the Beberibe woods, Bezerra recalls, left him unconscious.⁶

Malvino Reis was determined to get Bezerra to confess that he had killed Lieutenant Xavier Sampaio and conspired in the army barracks and the CPOR (Reserve Officers' Preparation Center). On the evening of March 8, 1936, the prisoner was called from the Casa de Detenção to Reis' office and confronted with two witnesses who had testified against him. Fearful of new tortures, Bezerra confirmed the statements of the two witnesses, but he maintained later that the witnesses had testified falsely under torture. Bezerra also subscribed to what he later stated was "the ignoble farce . . . of the existence of a 'comissão anti-mil,' of which I was secretary . . . and later treasurer."

On March 27, according to Bezerra's later statement, "I was taken again to the Secretaryship of Security, where Captain Malvino said that he, the captain, had killed Luís Bispo de França by beatings and that . . . José Maria de Souza . . . was about to die—the result of tortures inflicted on Captain Malvino's orders. He added that a similar fate awaited me. Then an employee presented me with a testimony already written, which included everything Captain Malvino wanted. I had not the slightest doubt about the truth of the assassination by the police of prisoner Luís Bispo de França, and, as I was on the verge of suffering the same fate as Luís Bispo, I signed the document."⁷

Bezerra attributes his escape from death to Malvino's departure from his post, the result of a disagreement with a superior.⁸ But in August 1936, after Captain Frederico Mandelo Carneiro Monteiro had taken Malvino's place, Bezerra's brother, José Lourenço Bezerra, died in prison. José, a married man with five young children, sold newspapers on trains and distributed *A Classe Operária* in the northeast. Arrested on August 4, he denied connections with the PCB. He was beaten and released on August 13.

On the evening of August 13, José was rearrested because, the police said, they had found a letter from him which proved his Communist connections. His death in a cell on August 18 was attributed by the police to suicide by hanging, and the press was furnished with a photograph of the body showing electric wires around the neck. But skeptical public opinion forced an investigation, and the body was exhumed in September 1936.⁹ When Gregório Bezerra, testify-

ing in November, declared that his brother had been assassinated, the judges asked for the basis of his affirmation. He spoke of the sufferings endured by himself and "hundreds" of others.¹⁰ "I ask you," he said, "to visit the hospital of the Casa de Detenção."

Beatings and tortures were also commonplace in the jail in Santos, São Paulo. The state government, which sometimes showed a desire to have civilized conditions prevail at Paraíso and Maria Zélia, revealed little interest in, or control over, what happened in the Santos public jail. The jail had long been well known for thrashings, for throwing political prisoners into crowded cells in which the worst specimens of society carried out acts of perversion and sadism, and for placing political prisoners, naked, in tiny, filthy, windowless cement cells. After the 1935 uprisings, José Stacchini spent sixteen days in the nude in such a cell. Later he was transferred to Maria Zélia, where he found a library and a "university" and learned some German and how to play chess.¹¹

An anonymous political prisoner, after his release from the Santos jail in February 1937, wrote an account in longhand for *O Radical* of Santos.¹² It would seem better, after beatings and tortures, to end up alone in the nude, nourished seldom and badly, than to be thrown into crowded Cell No. 3, "famous for acts of savagery." Jailers and their favorite scoundrels won the unanimous applause of the vagabonds, thieves, and drunks by picking on the demented prisoners. They killed six of them, according to the letter to *O Radical*.

Pity the political prisoner who, after being beaten down by thrashings, was put in a tiny cell with the homosexual and sadistic bandit "Macaca Oca," who was given a sharp penknife and instructions to torture. Following the success of his mission, carried out with the help of the jailer, Macaca Oca returned to Cell 3 to narrate the episode in detail "to the satisfaction of the miserable bandits, who celebrated the great feat of their companion with loud laughs and insults, upsetting the other political prisoners who were there and could not even . . . protest against the infamous savageries practiced against their unhappy companion who had suffered so much and continued to suffer only because he had an ideal and upheld it before the authorities."

6. *Levinson and Sobral Try to Save Berger* (January–May 1937)

On January 29, 1937, Sobral Pinto submitted a paper on behalf of Harry Berger to TSN Judge Raul Machado, general *relator* of the case against thirty-five individuals who had been named "the extremist

chiefs" by prosecutor Himalaya Vergolino. Sobral's paper, which focused on reasons for the Communist movement, presented Berger as a symbol of the aspirations of the proletarian masses. The lawyer admitted that Communism, while appreciative of national interests, had an international dimension, but he pointed out that this was also true of capitalism, which had foreign representatives in Brazil. He wrote that "not infrequently the interests of usurious foreign capitalism clash with the interests of the working classes, but, even so, they are respected and considered friendly to the nation." In a reference to Berger as a person, Sobral tried to demolish Judge Ribas Carneiro's caricature of Berger as a cold, insensitive individual. "Outward appearances," he wrote, "rarely reveal the world of emotions beneath the bosom. . . . This is certainly the case of Harry Berger, who, if considered from a closer range and with less superficiality, is no different from so many other foreign revolutionaries whom the Brazilian government, in other eras, praised with demonstrations of esteem."¹

On the day before Sobral Pinto drew up this brief, an American lawyer, David Levinson, arrived in Rio with a letter from Berger's sister, Minna Ewert. Minna, who had been working with the Red Cross in London since 1936, stated in the letter that Levinson, or any person designated by him, was authorized to act on behalf of her brother. Levinson, a University of Pennsylvania graduate who spoke no Portuguese, settled down with his wife at the Glória Hotel. There he told reporters that he had successfully defended Comintern Secretary General Dimitrov in the case of the Reichstag fire and had won cases for Communists in Hungary. Recently, he said, people had come to his New York office to seek his help for Prestes and Berger, neither of whom he knew.²

Levinson discussed the Berger case at the United States Embassy and Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Ministry). In reply to his requests to see the prisoner, Itamaraty put him in touch with Judge Barros Barreto, who said that Levinson would have to make the arrangement with Filinto Müller. A secretary at the United States Embassy spoke to Osvaldo Aranha, who happened to be in Rio, about the procedure Levinson should follow to get permission to act as a lawyer in Brazil. Aranha recommended that Levinson see Miranda Jordão, president of the Order of Lawyers. Jordão consulted Targino Ribeiro and it was decided to send Levinson to see Sobral Pinto.³

The press was soon full of stories about Levinson, who was described as "a Comintern agent." Reporters, turning for news to Aranha, Targino Ribeiro, and Judge Barros Barreto, learned from Barros Barreto that Levinson had been informed by Judge Raul Machado

that Brazilian regulations would not allow him to act as a lawyer or even an assistant lawyer.

Sobral Pinto received Levinson on February 10. He liked the American and told him what he had done for Berger, but he had to explain the laws that prevented Levinson from serving as Berger's attorney. Sobral drew up a petition to Raul Machado in which he argued that Levinson should be allowed to see Berger. It would be well, Sobral wrote, if Levinson would tell Berger what Minna had done and let him know that he was not forgotten by friends and family. Levinson could also serve a useful purpose by discussing defense strategy with the accused and by considering with him the selection of a Brazilian lawyer. Unfortunately, Sobral Pinto wrote Machado, Berger's despicable conditions of confinement prevented him from placing any confidence in the lawyer whom the Brazilians had forced on him. What did it matter, Sobral asked, whether Levinson was or was not a Comintern agent? Was there any basis for fearing that the suggested conversation about a legal defense would result in a new Communist conspiracy?⁴

On February 12 a DOPS section chief appeared at the Glória Hotel and escorted Levinson to the Polícia Central. There Delegado Especial Israel Souto explained that the Brazilian lawyers' organization had arranged for Berger's defense and that Levinson therefore had no need to remain in Brazil. Levinson was advised that he could avoid arrest if he would return to his hotel and make arrangements to leave Brazil by the next steamer.⁵

Judge Barros Barreto told the press that he became suspicious of Levinson as soon as he learned of his presence in Brazil and that he considered the American lawyer "a dangerous element, whose real mission differed from that attributed to him." This suspicion, the judge revealed, had persuaded him to refuse to receive Levinson on two occasions and to advise Police Chief Müller that Levinson was not to see Berger, Prestes, or any other political prisoner.⁶

Levinson's departure from Brazil was the subject of a letter that Sobral Pinto sent to Agamenon Magalhães, who, with Ráo's resignation from the cabinet, had become acting justice minister as well as labor minister. The American was expelled, Sobral wrote, so that he would not see the condition in which Berger was held under a staircase used by members of the Polícia Especial. Levinson, back in New York, discussed his recent experience when he addressed the Joint Committee for the Defense of the Brazilian People. The committee, which attacked Brazil for not providing trials for political prisoners, had received letters from Prestes' mother about docu-

ments to be sent to Levinson to help him defend the Cavalier of Hope.⁷

Sobral Pinto, seeking to save Berger from insanity, saw an article in *A Noite* about a man who was punished by a fine and prison sentence for treating a horse so badly that it died. On March 2, Sobral sent the article to Raul Machado together with a letter which quoted legislation forbidding that animals be kept in places that were "unsanitary or that restricted respiration, movement, or rest, or deprived them of air or light." Berger, Sobral again reminded the judge, had been existing for endless months without sanitation, bed, fresh air, or sunlight, without any change of clothing or space in which to move about and deprived of any reading matter or means of writing. The lawyer's request for a change for Berger was forwarded by Machado to Müller, but no action was taken.⁸

"You cannot," Sobral Pinto wrote Prestes' mother, "imagine my distress. Harry Berger, with expressions of rage . . . , considers my visits as the efforts of a scurrilous humbug, at the service of the police, seeking to get some jeopardizing declaration. . . . He reads with indifference telegrams that I receive from London, letters from his sister sent to him through me, and long epistles from London lawyers, . . . , and ends up by saying that he does not have a lawyer at his side but an astute police agent!"⁹

Minna, in one of her letters to her brother, lamented that her only news about him came from newspaper accounts which said that he had lost 40 kilos, was seriously ill, and was sleeping on the floor without mattress or covers. Minna wrote about Berger's wife, known to the family as Sabo: "She has been in Hamburg, under the vigilance of the Gestapo since October 18, following the deportation from Rio. She writes me that things are going badly for her."¹⁰

Early in April, Sobral Pinto advised Raul Machado that nothing had come of the judge's communication to Müller and that the public authorities, evoking laws for punishing Berger, should themselves adhere to laws governing the handling of prisoners. This time Machado forwarded the lawyer's complaint to Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, head of the Special Police.

Asked to submit a final defense argument, Sobral replied on April 14 that such an argument was impossible because the authorities had destroyed Berger's early faith in his government-appointed lawyer. The prisoner, once hopeful that Sobral could have him treated as a member of the human race, now saw Sobral as another enemy. As for the TSN trial, Sobral wrote that it was not a fair and open debate but consisted of handling papers secretly for a long time. Even

so, he said, "the authorities have been able to turn up nothing solid and firm about the Communist activities of Harry Berger."

For those who exclaimed ceaselessly that "Communism is the enemy," Sobral quoted Michael Bakunin's words to Nicholas I: "this clamor against communism will probably contribute much more effectively to its spread than the propaganda of the communists themselves." Nicholas I, Sobral wrote, had agreed, but his successors had ignored his warning and therefore had fallen before the Communist movement. "This," Sobral concluded, "was the result of the special tribunals, the systematic neglect of the law, and the frequently repeated use of conscious violence that disrespects not only all the public liberties but even the dignity of human nature."¹¹

7. *Prestes at the Special Police Barracks* (March 1936–July 1937)

Prestes was furious at the "total prohibition" against reading and writing. He had been an outstanding mathematics student and would have liked to occupy his lonely hours writing a book on mathematics for young people. When fury overflowed, the Cavalier of Hope called Euzébio de Queiroz a "barbarian," a "bandit," and other names. The commander of the Special Police replied by knocking the prisoner down with a blow to the jaw. On the next day Prestes apologized, saying that he had "lost his head"; whereupon Queiroz also apologized, saying that he had acted in a manner unusual for him.¹

All the guards who watched the prisoner, two or three at a time, were required to write notes about the prisoner's movements, and the notes were studied and compared by Queiroz. Later Queiroz asserted that "when Prestes was prisoner in my barracks I hardly had a minute of rest. I was continually called on to restrain the Red Chief, whose explosions of irritability were frequent. His moods were dark and sullen. Constantly his countenance was made inhuman by a strange expression. Aside from the hours when fits of rage and revolt seized him, he never uttered a single word."²

Prestes, recalling his experience, spoke of the terrible isolation and threats to shoot him if he did not give testimony or reveal the names of companions. "However, the most harrowing thing was to witness what was happening to others. . . . They were workers, including women—for I would hear the screams through the window of my room." From the window, Prestes added, one could see the garage of the police. Each night from 10:00 or 11:00 until 2:00 or

3:00 in the morning, "there could be heard and seen the most degrading scenes of beatings, provoking grievous screams." Prestes' room was above the space that held Berger. "Every night," Prestes recalled, "policemen of the guard corps . . . came and banged and yelled, so that no one could sleep."

From the conversation of two night watchmen at the door of Prestes' room ("what else was there to do but hear them?"), the prisoner concluded that the Special Police was a perverted group. "The commander himself, Euzébio de Queiroz, was known among his soldiers as a homosexual who hired young soldiers so that he could use them in this way."³

Although Euzébio de Queiroz did not know it, some of the guards, friendly to Prestes, slipped newspapers to the prisoner. Later, when Queiroz believed that Prestes had spent about a year without reading material, he furnished Prestes with some anti-Communist tracts and a book about Mussolini's conquest of Abyssinia.⁴ Also the long-drawn-out inquiry about Prestes' supposed desertion from the army provided the prisoner with documents bearing on the case, as well as visits by the Military Justice Special Council that sought to settle it. A hearing, held by the Special Council at the Special Police barracks on February 26, 1937, was open to the public. Prestes, who had not been available to the public in Brazil since rebelling in 1924, was wearing a thick beard. He had much to say: "I am a Communist! I am director of the Aliança Nacional Libertadora! Under those conditions I ask the council how I can choose a lawyer of my entire confidence. . . . I would expose him to threats and harassments in a regime of exception, like this one in which even legislators are dragged to the jails and submitted to the worst provocations!" Prestes spoke about elderly Senator Chermont, who had been arrested and "subjected to violences" at the garage of the Special Police.⁵

The presiding officer said that the facts presented by Prestes concerned another tribunal, the TSN. Smiling ironically at the thought of the TSN, Prestes said, "What justice! A tribunal that was created during this year of terror which found me in prison cannot be recognized by me."⁶

The news about Prestes' parenthood moved slowly and circuitously. Olga, expelled from Brazil illegally on September 23, 1936, was in a Berlin prison on November 27 (anniversary of the Rio uprisings) when she gave birth to Anita Leocádia Prestes. Letters written by Prestes' mother, Leocádia, in Paris on January 1 and 9 reached Olga on January 31, and Olga replied at once with the news about the girl. Prestes' mother, after receiving this, her first letter from Olga, decided on March 6 to address her son in care of Sobral

Pinto because she had had no replies to anything addressed to her son in prison. She advised the Cavalier of Hope about Anita Leocádia, named "in honor of the Brazilian heroine Anita Garibaldi and with kindness to your mother."⁷

Sobral, calling himself the "ex-officio lawyer of Prestes," sent Judge Raul Machado a copy of Leocádia's letter and quoted the conclusions of the St. Petersburg International Penal Congress about the rights of prisoners. On the next day, March 12, Sobral wrote Leocádia that the judge, human and tolerant, had promised to arrange for a regular family correspondence, and he assured the worried mother that her son was in a satisfactory room and was receiving good and ample food. The judge made it possible for Prestes to see Leocádia's letter of March 6 and arranged for weekly letters to be exchanged between mother and son.⁸

Early in May, with the TSN preparing to hand down sentences for the "35 extremist chiefs," Sobral went to the barracks with a document he had prepared to explain to the tribunal why no final defense was being presented on Prestes' behalf. As Queiroz would not allow Sobral to discuss the document privately with Prestes, the discussion took place in Queiroz' office in the presence of Queiroz and some guards.

Prestes said that his real reasons for not defending himself were not those given in Sobral's document. Unable to speak confidentially with his ex-officio lawyer, he offered Sobral a sheet of paper on which he had written his reasons. Queiroz ruled that the paper would have to be censored. Prestes, saying that he could at least make use of the spoken word, started reading from his paper, which declared the TSN was in violation of the 1934 Constitution. When Prestes asked if the constitution was still in effect, Queiroz said that it was, "despite you people having wanted to destroy it." In this tense atmosphere Prestes continued his reading. His comments on the TSN procedures contained caustic comments about the Brazilian authorities and the Special Police. After ten minutes, Queiroz told Prestes to stop reading and to hand over the paper so that it could be sent to Müller's office. Prestes replied that the paper was his and that, if he could not even read it to his ex-officio lawyer, he would destroy it. As he was tearing it up, Queiroz and the guards jumped on him. They seized the torn pieces and took Prestes to his prison room. Sobral Pinto, in letters to Queiroz and Raul Machado, indignantly protested against this incident and the prevention of a "free understanding" between the defendant and his lawyer.⁹

The judgments, handed down by the TSN on May 7, brought prison sentences of sixteen and a half years to Prestes and thirteen

and a third years to Berger. Sobral, drawing up appeals to the Supreme Military Tribunal, argued that the situation of the defendants made the trials mockeries of justice. He also argued that it was excessive to assign two nonconcurrent prison terms for the two alleged crimes of making a revolution and plotting a second revolution, because, if a crime existed, it was a single crime.¹⁰ In developing this theme, Sobral wrote about the "character" of the revolutionary struggle in a way that was criticized by Leocádia Prestes.

Sobral, replying to Leocádia's letter about "the struggle for democracy and national liberation," said that he had not discussed the "character of the struggle" with her son but had been guided by the "theoretical explanations" officially presented at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. He mentioned Maurice Thorez' discussion about a second phase of struggle that would result in the dictatorship of the proletariat and told Leocádia that her son, after an ANL victory, could be expected to work for the second phase.¹¹

Prestes, Sobral wrote Leocádia, had "categorically" opposed the presentation of any defense and had made clear his dislike of "receiving alms" from the bourgeois lawyer. But, Sobral added, he was doing Prestes no favor but was simply carrying out his duty and adhering to his Christian principles. Already Sobral had rejected money sent by Minna Ewert and told her that it was a "question of honor" for a lawyer to reserve time for "the poor and abandoned."¹²

Prestes' mother mailed Sobral clothing and other things for her son. Euzébio de Queiroz and three of his subordinates broke up the bars of soap and chocolate, held up the handkerchiefs to the light, and almost tore out all the lining of a suit. They were looking for messages and "little steel saws," Sobral wrote Leocádia.¹³

8. *Sentencing the Red Chieftains* (May 1937)

Agamenon Magalhães, the Pernambucano who became acting justice minister early in 1937, was suspected of favoring the continuation of Vargas in office despite the constitution's provision for the election of a new president in January 1938. Agamenon broke with Pernambuco Governor Carlos de Lima Cavalcanti, who worked with Bahia Governor Juraci Magalhães to try to assure that the election would take place.

During the squabble the governor and the acting justice minister were attacked by their political foes for being pro-Communist. The case against Lima Cavalcanti, accused of favoring the 1935 revolt despite his absence from Brazil, went to the TSN. Complaints

against Agamenon were made in Congress. Adalberto Correia, head of the year-old commission to repress Communism, pointed out that Agamenon, as labor minister, had found posts for Silo Meireles and Professor Castro Rebello, and he quoted from a thesis, written by Agamenon in 1932, that praised Lenin's New Economic Policy. While DOPS inspectors arrested men who Adalberto Correia said were agents of his commission, Agamenon declared that the commission no longer existed.¹

Early in March, Vargas and Agamenon argued that the state of war should be extended for another ninety days because the TSN was at work on 237 cases and had yet to begin consideration of 223 denunciations. Congressional Justice Commission Chairman Waldemar Ferreira, supporter of the presidential aspirations of São Paulo's Armando de Sales Oliveira, suggested a bill that would extend the state of war for only thirty days but allow the TSN to continue beyond that period. Government leader Pedro Aleixo favored separate bills, one to allow the TSN to function without a state of war and the other to extend the state of war for ninety days. His view prevailed in both houses.²

Prisoners were being brought daily, often in armored cars, to the TSN. Barreto Leite Filho, expelled from the PCB, and Sissón, of the ANL, appeared with their lawyer, Sobral Pinto. José Guttmann, raising a clenched fist before the judges, said that he would accept no lawyer because he wanted to be held responsible for his acts on behalf of the liberating movement. Agildo Barata, also brandishing the clenched fist, refused to comment on testimonies "extorted by the police" and discussed beatings so heatedly that Judge Costa Neto told him to quiet down. Twenty-nine of the "35 Red chieftains" refused any defense.³

Prisoners assuming this attitude were moved to the Casa de Detenção because they made life in the Casa de Correção difficult for those who did not boycott the TSN. The wives of Barata, Alcedo Cavalcanti, and Ivan Ramos Ribeiro petitioned the TSN to block the transfer of their husbands, but the TSN replied that the evidence made the transfers necessary. A few days later Barata's wife, Maria, leaving prison with the Barata boy, was accused of using the boy's shoes to smuggle messages from Agildo to his comrades, and so Maria spent a day in jail.⁴

Before the TSN judged the "35 chieftains," it released 17 Colégio Militar instructors accused of having advanced "Communist propaganda." And Himalaya Vergolino, after studying 140 denunciations received from São Paulo, decided not to prosecute Caio Prado Júnior, João Penteado Stevenson, Maurício Goulart, Danton Vampré, and six

others. Writer Patrícia Galvão was less fortunate. After she was acquitted by a federal judge in São Paulo, the government appealed to the Supreme Military Tribunal and it resolved unanimously that she had been involved in "the extremist movement."⁵

Finally, on May 7 the TSN held a "solemn session" to hand down its verdicts. The crowd of spectators heard a report in which *relator* Raul Machado discussed papers found at the two residences of Prestes. He disclosed that the five judges had reached unanimous decisions in all cases except that concerning Pedro Ernesto, with a majority sentencing the former mayor to 3 $\frac{1}{3}$ years and a minority voting for 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ years. Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo, found guilty of the death of Lieutenant Benedito Bragança, received the longest sentence: 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ years. Some of the other sentences were:⁶

Prestes	16 years, 6 months
Berger	13 years, 4 months
Mário de Souza	12 years, 4 months
Durval Miguel de Barros	12 years, 4 months
Agildo Barata	10 years
Álvaro de Souza	10 years
Sócrates Gonçalves da Silva	10 years
Ivan Ramos Ribeiro	10 years
Humberto Morais Rego	8 years
José Guttmann	8 years
José Leite Brasil	5 years, 9 months
José Medina Filho	4 years, 4 months
Rodolfo Ghioldi	4 years, 4 months
Antônio Maciel Bomfim (Miranda)	4 years, 4 months
Leon Jules Vallée	4 years, 4 months
Honório de Freitas Guimarães	4 years, 4 months
Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (Bangú)	4 years, 4 months
Adelino Deicola dos Santos	4 years, 4 months
Carlos da Costa Leite	3 years, 10 months
Ilvo Meireles	4 years, 4 months
Francisco Mangabeira	6 months
Francisco Campos da Paz	6 months
Hercolino Cascardo	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ months
Roberto Sissón	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ months
Carlos Amoreti Osório	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ months
Benjamim Cabello	6 months

Prosecutor Vergolino said he would ask the Supreme Military Tribunal to increase some sentences, particularly those of ANL lead-

ers, who were now set free because their TSN sentences were for less time than they had served. Sobral Pinto and other lawyers planned to appeal to the Military Tribunal to get sentences annulled or reduced.⁷ Guttmann opposed an appeal of his case, and no appeals were made on behalf of nine who were in hiding or outside Brazil.

On May 12 the TSN announced sentences for the arrested federal legislators. As Domingos Velasco and Senator Chermont were absolved, they were set free along with Abguar Bastos, who received a 6-month sentence. Francisco Mangabeira, recently freed, was present to hear his father, João, receive a 3½-year sentence. Otávio da Silveira, mentioned in the Prestes paper and found guilty of publicizing Prestes' July 1935 manifesto, was sentenced to 3 years and 10 months. His lawyer, like the lawyers of João Mangabeira and Abguar Bastos, drew up appeals to the Military Tribunal to have their clients exonerated. Vergolino declared that he would appeal to reverse the decisions to acquit Velasco and Chermont.⁸

The TSN announced that in August it would render decisions about 137 individuals accused of being "co-responsible" for the 1935 revolt. Furthermore, it had yet to consider over 200 denunciations coming from Recife and over 350 from Natal. To better handle "condemned rebels," the executive branch of the government appropriated 2,300 contos for a new prison on Ilha Grande capable of holding 350 inmates. Its construction was to be followed by that of an "agricultural colony," also with a capacity for 350, on a beach near the Ilha Grande Correctional Colony.⁹

A Classe Operária, analyzing the prison sentences assigned to the "35 chieftains," wrote that a logical distribution would have weighed most heavily against the leaders of the November movement, those said to have been "sold to 'Moscow gold.'" But, the PCB monthly observed, Getúlio had preferred "political maneuver" and demagoguery to logic, and therefore 17 military officers had been sentenced to 168 years—"almost ¾ of the total" of 240 years. "Is it not demagogic brutality to condemn Agliberto, the young, pure officer, prestigious fighter, to 27 years, and that terrible 'foreign agitator,' 'Komintern agent' Berger, to only 13 years? Is it not demagogic to condemn Agildo, Álvaro, and Sócrates to 10 years each, and Ghioldi and Miranda to the relatively ridiculous 4 years each? To sentence the military . . . with 168 years and in reality absolve the members of the ANL national directorship?"¹⁰

In the halls of Congress in May, released lawmakers attacked the Rio police furiously.¹¹ But the conditions they condemned persisted, and in the latter part of that month another suspected Communist, chauffeur Manuel João Rabelo, lost his life. Having been de-

nounced as head of a Communist cell of transport workers, Rabelo was arrested at his home, where the police found copies of *A Classe Operária*. Under interrogation at the DOPS, he revealed "the names of some companions" and told the police that the Communist publications were printed in the Ramos district. Antônio Emílio Romano, head of the Delegacia de Ordem Política, assigned two investigators to go in a police car to Ramos with Rabelo, who was supposed to show them the exact publication place. In explaining later what happened, Romano told the press that the prisoner had tried to jump from the car, had been hauled back, and in Ramos had said that the printing press was in Penha, not Ramos. Romano added that Rabelo had subsequently become ill and been sent to the Filinto Müller Hospital at the Special Police barracks, where he had died.¹²

On May 30, about ten days after Rabelo died, the Rio police arrested printer Iguatemi Ramos, who confessed to having published two issues of *A Classe Operária* at a Communist center in the Vicente de Carvalho Station district, where Trifino Correia and Mário de Souza had hidden immediately after their escape from the Gaffré Guinle hospital.¹³

9. *Macedo Soares and the End of the State of War* (June 1937)

José Carlos de Macedo Soares became justice minister on June 3. He wasted no time in taking steps to allow the presidential election campaign to go forward in an atmosphere of democratic liberties. After a well-publicized visit to Rio's Casa de Detenção and Casa de Correção, he ordered Police Chief Müller to release 308 political prisoners who had not been tried. Similar orders were sent to the states. Davino Francisco dos Santos writes that by the end of June the number of prisoners in the São Paulo jails dropped from over 400 to a few dozen. His own release was delayed and so he found himself one of twelve remaining in Maria Zélia. The huge prison, he reports, had become a sad and lonely place.¹

In Congress, Adalberto Correia criticized the new justice minister and expressed surprise that Müller was not resigning. A telegram to the government from Natal pictured the population of Rio Grande do Norte as shocked and "desolate" at the liberation of 345 prisoners of that state, principally because they included men considered responsible for murders and looting during the brief interval when revolutionaries controlled Natal in November 1935.²

Prisoners who had been shipped from the north to await TSN judgments were now put aboard the *Duque de Caxias* for return to

their states. At the Rio docks they sang the "International" and shouted *vivas* for Russia, Prestes, and the Third Infantry Regiment. When the ship stopped at Salvador, Bahia, they were so disorderly in the city that the police had to put them back on board. Those whose destination was Maranhão got into a fight with the police in Fortaleza, Ceará. Three prisoners and two police corporals were wounded.

Many of those freed in Rio, such as Maria Werneck de Castro, were on the lengthy list of suspects scheduled to be judged in August by the TSN as possibly "co-responsible" for the "extremist activities." Judge Barros Barreto, asked by *O Globo* whether it would be easy to recapture defendants if necessary, replied that it probably would not be. Amidst talk that Congress would reorganize or close down the TSN, Judge Costa Neto submitted his resignation. But War Minister Eurico Gaspar Dutra persuaded him to withdraw it.³

When Macedo Soares consulted federal legislators, he found little support for a further extension of the state of war. Congressmen favoring Armando de Sales Oliveira, opposition candidate for president, adamantly opposed extension, and so did many backers of José Américo de Almeida, the "official," or government, candidate. After Macedo Soares reported his findings to Vargas, it was decided to let the state of war lapse on June 18.

Without the state of war, Costa Neto pointed out, "preventive imprisonment" orders should be canceled in all cases that did not include proofs of serious crimes, such as dynamiting. The justice minister, explaining to Müller that "preventive imprisonment" could not be decreed without the state of war, irritated the police chief by liberating the 152 sailors before the state of war expired and by suggesting that other prisoners, such as Maurício de Lacerda, be set free. Such a step, Müller said, would "cause alarm in the public spirit."⁴

In the latter part of June, Macedo Soares canceled the "preventive imprisonment" orders against civilians Maurício de Lacerda, Osvaldo Costa, Luís Lins, Barreto Leite Filho, and Eneida Costa de Moraes and former military officers Alcedo Batista Cavalcanti, Nemo Canabarro Lucas, and Aristides Correia Leal. The Supreme Military Tribunal freed Miguel Costa, who had been brought to Rio on orders of the TSN, and his brother Daniel, who had remained in Paraíba. In granting a habeas corpus decree in favor of João Mangabeira, the Military Tribunal expressed its unanimous opposition to the view of Barros Barreto. Then Mangabeira, although in poor health, gave an impassioned speech in Congress in which he accused the police of having assassinated army reserve Captain José Augusto de Medeiros in December 1935, taken his body to Vista Chinesa, and

riddled it with bullets. He referred also to the cases of student Marghella, beaten horribly in May 1936, and 18-year-old Helena Facioli, her whole body tortured by pliers on May 1, 1937, at the "beauty parlor" of the Polícia Central because she would not declare that her lover was a Communist.⁵

O Globo, agreeing with Adalberto Correia that too many people were being freed, said that Brazil was in "the most desolating state of confusion." One example of the confusion was the erroneous release of ex-Lieutenant Durval Miguel de Barros, condemned to over twelve years. In walking out of jail he presented the borrowed identity card of a soldier who had been set free.⁶

Although the Supreme Military Tribunal would not liberate Congressman Otávio da Silveira, it approved a habeas corpus petition submitted by Lourenço Moreira Lima in favor of ninety prisoners being held at the disposition of the TSN, among them David Capistrano da Costa and Dinarco Reis. The Military Tribunal agreed with the lawyer that accusations had not been formulated within the time period established by the Military Justice system. Aloísio Neiva, director of the Casa de Detenção, vowed that before freeing the ninety prisoners, he would this time insist on "perfect identifications."⁷

After Macedo Soares received a letter from Sobral Pinto about the situation of Berger and Prestes, the new justice minister told the lawyer he must be exaggerating, but he agreed to go to the Special Police barracks to see for himself. Later he gave orders that would allow Berger to have a bath, get his nails cut, and receive proper clothing. And he phoned Sobral to apologize for his initial disbelief.⁸

Arrangements were made to move Prestes and Berger on June 21 to special cells being prepared for them at the Casa de Correção. But Müller, unhappy at the prospect of losing control over the two prisoners, delayed the transfers. Prestes reached his new cell on July 8, and, although he had requested that Berger be moved ahead of him, the German was not transferred until October 3. Sobral wrote Leocádia in July that her son's solitary cell opened onto a little patio and that the prisoner could correspond freely with members of his family, converse privately with his ex-officio lawyer, and receive newspapers, books, and clothing. He "feels restituted to human dignity," Sobral wrote.⁹

The feeling of restitution was less than complete because, Prestes recalls, "without any doubt the situation at the Special Police was better than that in the new cell, from the point of view of lodging." The new cell, one of four built at the Correção infirmary, was so well walled that it seemed appropriate for the Middle Ages. Start-

ing in October, the screams of the demented Berger could be heard from the adjoining cell. If Prestes had a sense of restitution, it was due largely to the considerations shown by Casa de Correção Director Carlos Lassance, known to the prisoners as "the major."¹⁰

Some of Sobral's visits to Prestes concerned the prisoner's daughter, who, the press reported, was to be separated from her mother and placed in an orphanage run by the German state. Sobral, hoping to help get the child turned over to Leocádia in France, wanted a notarized statement from Prestes about his parenthood. Delays were caused by the hesitation of notaries to cooperate with Communists, and by Prestes' reluctance to sign anything that might be used to worsen his wife's precarious situation. The Comintern, calling on the people to send messages to the German government, emphasized the danger of assassination of "a beautiful little girl with big blue eyes and a tender smile." Brandão, campaigning in Paris to get the girl "out of the Gestapo," was pleased with the assistance rendered by "the Belgians and English, who sent representatives to Berlin." In 1938 Anita was turned over to her grandmother.¹¹

10. The Military Tribunal Reviews the TSN Sentences
(September 1937)

The Supreme Military Tribunal, studying appeals from the TSN sentences, resolved to hear the prisoners but limit their statements to fifteen minutes each. Thus Prestes, Berger, Agildo Barata, Agliberto de Azevedo, Antônio Maciel Bomfim (Miranda), and Ghioldi were scheduled to appear on September 8. Such was the public interest and the fear of the "dangerous Red chieftains" that traffic was not permitted in the streets around the tribunal and they were filled with guards, inspectors, and red-beret-wearing members of the Special Police.¹

Ghioldi, placed in a wagon for the trip to the tribunal, would not have recognized the emaciated, bent figure of Berger, who was already in the wagon, had not Berger spoken to him. Berger told Ghioldi that the beatings and tortures he had suffered had exceeded anything he thought possible. Principally, he said, the blows had been to his head. He added that he did not expect to survive but that, if he did, it would be without his sanity.²

Prestes was escorted from the Casa de Correção by Police Officers Antônio Emílio Romano and Euzébio de Queiroz. Upon reaching the tribunal building, Prestes was left in the care of a group of Special Policemen. In the opinion of Queiroz, the ensuing exchange

of blows between Prestes and a "tomato head" who frisked him was provoked by Prestes, who then turned his face so that a blow would fall on his nose. Prestes screamed and was brought before the judges, with blood on his face. He raised a clenched fist and declared that the frisking had been unnecessary because he had come from jail. The tribunal president remarked that the prisoners had been called to present their defenses, not to provoke confusion, but one of the judges sent for a doctor.³

Prestes, the first to make a declaration, said that he had just emerged from a round of boxing. He assailed the police, the tortures, Lúcio Meira, the "Tribunal de Repressão," and the "campaign of slander" that transformed respected men into "vile and miserable traitors." The case against himself, he said, was simply a police fabrication.

Prestes praised his lawyer but said that he did not agree with all the points Sobral Pinto had made to Raul Machado. To clear up the matter, he read a statement containing thoughts expressed on the paper seized from his hands in the Special Police barracks. According to the statement, which he was allowed to finish despite going beyond his time limit, no one was more willing than he to explain publicly, before the Brazilian people and world opinion, his actions, attitudes, and every detail of his revolutionary life. Prestes lamented that he could not orient, with the words of his Party, the millions who wanted to hear those words, but he promised to continue struggling against all who exploited and oppressed the Brazilian people. In conclusion, he said that the "revolutionaries of 1935" had received no money from Pedro Ernesto or Russia; they had been financed by the funds that Aranha and Vargas had provided Prestes in 1930 when they wanted him to support their "assault on the power."

Berger spoke in English. Occasionally Prestes and Ghioldi corrected the interpreter and Berger did so once. His straightforward message was a refusal to deny his belief in Communism or his mission to Brazil on its behalf in 1935. He praised the Brazilian people and world proletariat and expressed faith in "the final victory, freeing humanity from hunger and oppression," but he added that a "barbarous death" might prevent him from witnessing it. His mind, he said, could not resist the "electrical applications" he suffered in prison.

Agildo Barata, weakened by illness, read his statement. He argued that no one who had revolted in November 1935 had declared himself in favor of soviets or the proletarian dictatorship. The movement, he said, had been for a democratic and nationalist government, the need of which had been made clear by the developments

since 1935. The Brazilian Navy was pictured as in no condition to save the country from the fascist powers, avid for Brazil's raw materials. And the government, Barata complained, "instead of taking steps to end the bloody tumults of the representatives of International Fascism, in collusion with the Integralista chiefs, those declared agents of national treason, imprisons the very people who . . . fight for national liberation. . . . We ask: Who should be appearing before Justice as accused of infamous crime, of treason against the nation?"

Agliberto, like Barata, read a statement that defied anyone to prove that the 1935 movement had been Communist. Antônio Maciel Bomfim, who had headed the PCB at the time of the movement, made the same point.

The erudite Ghioldi proved to be a skillful orator who could be ironic when referring to Prosecutor Vergolino. He asserted that the world proletariat supported the Soviet Union, but he denied police charges that the Comintern had been involved in the Brazilian revolution in 1935. Expressing pride on being an Argentine Communist, he said that it had been his duty to collaborate with the Brazilian people in their struggle for liberty. Speaking also as a citizen of Latin America who wanted to free the continent from fascist threats, imperialist despotism, and economic and cultural backwardness, Ghioldi looked forward to the establishment of "a free confederation of anti-imperialist Republics in Latin America."⁴

During the following days, while seventy more political prisoners were set free, Aranha, Juarez Távora, and Miguel Costa confirmed the delivery of 1,000 contos to Prestes in 1930. Lawyers Evandro Lins e Silva, Jorge Fontenelle, and Letácio Jansen Correia argued that neither the 1835 revolt nor their clients were Communist.

Public concern about Pedro Ernesto assured an attentive crowd to hear the brilliant statement of Mário Bulhões Pedreira, who insisted that the Prestes correspondence proved the innocence of the fallen mayor. Already, on May 17, 1936, Eliezer Magalhães had written a forty-page letter in pencil to his brother Jurandir Magalhães, in which he had said that contributions to the revolutionary cause, supposedly furnished by Pedro Ernesto, had really been furnished by himself: "In order to encourage my companions with a backing which I knew was lacking, but which, however, would be of value in stimulating their revolutionary ardor, whenever I provided money I . . . assured them that it had been given by Dr. Pedro Ernesto."⁵

On September 12 the Supreme Military Tribunal unanimously acquitted Pedro Ernesto. None of the other "35 Red chieftains" was

absolved; but some of the military officers, who had been sentenced to 10 years, received reductions to 9 or even $7\frac{1}{4}$ years. Agliberto's sentence was reduced from $27\frac{1}{2}$ years to 19.⁶ The court appeared to share, in part, the view that *A Classe Operária* had expressed about the judgments of the TSN.

Pedro Ernesto left a prison hospital in Tijuca at 3:00 P.M. on September 13 and was received by a rejoicing crowd. By the time the cortege reached Rio Branco Avenue it was so large that traffic was disrupted. The União Democrática Brasileira, which hoped to place Armando de Sales Oliveira in the presidency, closed its office to allow its workers to participate in the downtown celebration, where Nicanor de Nascimento and three other speakers praised Pedro Ernesto. His freedom was also hailed in speeches in Congress and by letters and telegrams that reached him from dignitaries, including Rio Grande do Sul Governor José Antônio Flores da Cunha. As for the PCB, it saw in "the enormous popular demonstration" evidence that "the great majority of the people" opposed the green-shirted Integralistas. However, Pedro Ernesto disappointed the PCB leaders late in September when he called on the Carioca people to vote for Armando de Sales Oliveira for president.⁷

4. The Presidential Election Campaign (February 1937–November 1937)

1. *The PCB Negotiates with Armando de Sales* (February–May 1937)

Armando de Sales Oliveira resigned the São Paulo governorship in December 1936 to become president of the state's Constitutionalist Party and, not much later, its candidate for the presidency of the Republic. Even before the governor resigned, the PCB of São Paulo analyzed his presidential candidacy with suspicion. It wrote, in its *Boletim Interno da Comissão de Agit-Prop*, that Getúlio Vargas, if he could not "eternalize himself in Catete Palace," might seek an alliance with Armando de Sales. Such an alliance, the PCB said, would arouse against the governor's candidacy "the hatred of all the people." To prevent that from happening, the *Boletim* urged that letters, telegrams, and signed manifestos be sent to Armando de Sales demanding that he close down Ação Intergralista of São Paulo and condemn the TSN.¹

In January 1937, when it became clear that an alliance between Getúlio and Armando was out of the question, the São Paulo PCB began negotiating an alliance of its own with Armando. Alberto da Rocha Barros took the matter up with his friend, liberal Armandista state assemblyman Paulo Duarte, an intellectual who had recently declined the invitation of Rocha Barros and two other Communists to join the PCB, not because he did not like Rocha Barros and many of his ideas but because he considered most of Rocha Barros' Communist companions "cold, disciplined, and opportunistic" members of an organization "made of steel."

Now Rocha Barros proposed to Paulo Duarte that the Communists throughout Brazil vote for Armando in return for his supporting legality for the PCB and amnesty for those accused of involvement in the 1935 uprisings. Duarte considered the conditions

acceptable because of the "barbarities" committed by the government, often against people who had had nothing to do with the uprisings, and because he believed it sensible to have a PCB operating in the open. But Armando preferred delay to taking a step that might alienate conservative backers and some governors, such as Flores da Cunha of Rio Grande do Sul.²

After several weeks passed, Rocha Barros wrote Duarte on February 20, "confirming once again" that the São Paulo and Rio "groups" had given Rocha Barros full powers to speak for them, and proposing that the groups provide Armando with the backing of "vast sectors" in return for steps to legalize the movement for "Democracy as a Regime of Liberty." However, Duarte found once more that his Armandista companions lacked the Communists' fondness for "rapid action." He told Rocha Barros to be patient.³

Writing again on February 25, Rocha Barros told Duarte that "new developments" required the release, within a week, of a manifesto launching the new organization under the "common control" of Communists and Armandistas. Getúlio, he reported, planned "to break up our negotiations with Armando" by creating a National Labor Party in São Paulo in ten days and by proposing "partial amnesty" to prominent Rio political prisoners if they would announce the dissolution of the ANL. Rocha Barros added that the ANL's National Directorship had rejected the deal for partial amnesty and had ratified the powers given the São Paulo directorship to continue negotiating with the Armandistas. He urged that a "popular antifascist organization" be put into motion quickly both to "neutralize" Getúlio's work with the São Paulo proletariat and to transform Armando de Sales into "the Brazilian Roosevelt."

This news led Duarte and Armando to think that the PCB in Rio had informed Vargas of its negotiations with Armando and might be betraying them. Nevertheless, Duarte was willing to issue a joint manifesto with the Communists for a "united front for Liberty" which would leave him, and not Armando, the victim if anything went wrong. But Armando opposed the idea and continued to favor postponement of a reply to the Communists.⁴

On February 27 Rocha Barros warned Paulo Duarte that Vargas was courting the São Paulo ANL sympathizers by inviting the recently imprisoned Maurício Goulart to Catete Palace in a move to gain support for the Labor Party and by "opening the perspective of liberty of organization for our people." Vargas was said to be assisted by the repressive steps of the São Paulo government, responsible for fierce beatings of José Stacchini and others. Of the approximately

500 political prisoners in São Paulo, Rocha Barros admitted that the state government had freed 94, but he pointed out that 90 percent of those released were innocent persons, unknown to the masses, and that the remaining prisoners were badly treated. The state police, he added, had prohibited meetings of the unions of cabinetmakers and weavers.⁵

The March 1937 issue of *A Classe Operária*, published in São Paulo, described Armando de Sales as the only anti-Getulista presidential candidate "up to now" and listed some points to be demanded by an "anti-Getulista front," such as the closing of Ação Integralista, the imprisonment of its leaders, and the reestablishment of the 1934 constitution without its "terrorist amendments."⁶

The São Paulo PCB, in an internal paper about the political situation, admitted that Armando as governor, and his man in the federal cabinet, the "loathesome Ráo," had carried out reactionary measures, and therefore many in the prisons and the Party base considered it "despicable to negotiate with Armando." But, according to the paper, such a "sentimental" opinion, favoring an "independent" PCB position, would conflict with the policy of negotiating with all sorts of groups, including "feudal-bourgeois parties," to oppose fascism, "the principal enemy."

In discussing Armando's association with English imperialism, the internal study said that "just a few days ago his representative in negotiations with us" explained how "difficult it is to convert him to socialism" because he had received his training in banks that represented the Rothschilds. But the PCB was forced "to admit that the English agents in Brazil, placed in opposition to Getúlio, the Italian-German-Nipponic agent, favor a democratic line in order to recuperate power." This "Marxist analysis" was said to have been receiving "constant confirmations," such as the struggle between Getúlio and Bahia, which, like São Paulo, was "predominantly" under "English influence." According to the paper, "the opposition to Getúlio is condemned to be democratic and anti-fascist," and therefore "Armando offers better possibilities of democratization than the people of Getúlio."⁷

The paper disclosed that Armando had accepted "in general" the position of the PCB Regional Committee but had vacillated in execution, particularly with respect to the March 1937 extension of the state of war. But it added that "the appearance of a large mass organization, a front against fascism, should . . . cure his hesitations." In conclusion, the paper said that the negotiations with Armando meant no renunciation of the PCB line despite what "appears to be the opinion of the prisoners whose opportunism was revealed by the

boycott question, and of comrades of the base, who are so little politicized." The paper quoted "Dreifus" (Carmo Giaconelli), a metalworker who had studied under Sacchetta, as saying that "it will not be the proletariat marching with Armando, but Armando marching with the proletariat."⁸

In April the disgust of the PCB with Armando was made clear in an ANL State Directorship internal document. On April 21, it reported, the rulers of São Paulo politics prohibited the planned ANL rally. Worse yet, it lamented, early on April 22 the Maria Zélia guards murdered four prisoners, including Augusto Pinto, a member of the ANL State Directorship and political secretary of the ANL Municipal Directorship. "The people," the ANL wrote, "will not understand our negotiating, over the dead bodies of our companions, a common action with those they consider responsible for the bloodshed." The ANL listed measures that the São Paulo political rulers and their presidential candidate would have to adopt to show that they were not guilty: an investigation by a commission whose disinterested membership was suggested by the ANL; the dissolution of the Reserve Division of the Civil Guard and the immediate jailing of the "Nazi" guard Kauffman, described as chiefly responsible for shooting the defenseless prisoners; and the dismissal of the state secretary of public security, the superintendent of *Ordem Política e Social*, and the *delegado* of *Ordem Política*.⁹

Rocha Barros, mentioning the urgent need of these steps in a letter of May 4 to Paulo Duarte, wrote that the ANL was filled with pessimism about the events of April 21 and 22 and about the state government's prohibition of a May Day rally prepared by eighteen unions. He pleaded for an anti-imperialist, anti-large-landowning alliance. As for the Maria Zélia slaughter, he said that the ANL did not favor prison escapes, and therefore the escape effort had apparently been the work of provocative agents, infiltrated into the prison, or of Vargas.¹⁰

Duarte could not agree with this analysis or with the accusation against Kauffman, an exile from Nazi Germany who had not been at Maria Zélia at the time of the killings. Duarte regarded the anti-large-landowning position as demagoguery by Brazilian Communists, whose mentality made them fanatics and did not permit the rational discussion of political matters. On the other hand, he condemned the mentality of Brazilian capitalism and considered the prohibition of the May Day rally "stupid." Armando de Sales, he concluded, was less responsible for the repressive acts of Governor José Joaquim Cardoso de Melo Neto than was generally supposed.

Still working for an accord with the Communists, Paulo Duarte

drew up, with Armando's approval, a proposed program. But it opposed some Communist aims and was rejected by Rocha Barros. Furthermore, the negotiators diverged on other matters. Duarte felt that submission to the Communists' demands following the Maria Zélia affair would have meant "the complete demoralization of the government." And Armando de Sales concluded that an alliance with the Communists would alienate the army, the church, and other conservative forces. Duarte finally told Rocha Barros that he might share his faith in the PCB if it were under Rocha Barros' guidance but could not do so as long as it was dominated by the Comintern.¹¹

Late in May the PCB's Political Bureau, which had not yet moved to Rio, wrote that "the time that Sr. Armando de Sales has for defining himself, in practice, in favor of democracy, is very short." It pointed out that "the assassins of Maria Zélia continue unpunished. The jails of São Paulo continue stuffed with the best sons of our people. In the meantime the Integralistas and Nazis have the open protection of the police to act freely."¹²

2. *José Américo Becomes a Candidate* (May 1937)

While the Armando de Sales candidacy gained strength, culminating in his nomination by São Paulo's Constitutionalist Party in mid-May, the Communist leadership warned in São Paulo that Vargas was planning a fascist coup that would extend his mandate. Thus the PCB viewed with misgivings the federal government's interventions in the Federal District and Mato Grosso and its moves in the south against ambitious Governor Flores da Cunha, who came around to giving his support to Armando de Sales.¹

Vargas, however, yielded to the pressure of politicians who wanted to assure an election by forcing the president to accept the candidacy of former Transport Minister José Américo de Almeida, a civilian from Paraíba. Following José Américo's nomination at Monroe Palace in Rio on May 25, the PCB attributed the "failure of Getúlio and fascism" to the will of the popular masses and the anti-fascist sentiments of certain governors and most of the army officers. The Political Bureau of PCB's Central Committee (CC) pointed out that the "victory, even though partial and momentary, is a precious and profound lesson for the Brazilian people. It is a perfect example of their strength, their capacity for action, when they unite to face any enemy."²

The CC's Political Bureau saw José Américo as "a politically clean and popular figure," but it warned that the "filth of Getúlio"

was dirtying his candidacy and that the reactionary forces around the president would do their best to eliminate from his platform "the demands most desired by the people." To liberate José Américo from these forces, the Political Bureau called for pressure by the masses.

For the time being the PCB endorsed neither of the two candidates. It awaited their pronouncements about its own program: a return to the 1934 constitution without the "fascist amendments," punishments for the "hangmen," an end to Integralismo and the jailing of its leaders, tax reductions, wage increases, price controls of food, liberty and amnesty for all political prisoners, protection for national industry, and measures "against trusts and monopolies."³

The São Paulo secretaryship of the ANL published a mimeographed booklet, *A Sucessão Presidencial*, on June 10. Analyzing "the forced retreat of Getúlio," it noted with pleasure that his government "is now ready to denounce" the trade agreements with Germany; the agreements, according to the ANL, had been providing "compensation marks" that cost 5\$000 apiece and were worth only 3\$000. This German reverse, the ANL said, would not help the English, who backed Armando de Sales, but would benefit the United States, "linked in large part to the contingent that presented the José Américo candidacy." Aranha in Washington and high government authorities in Rio were thought to favor more commerce with the United States.

Despite the ANL's refusal to follow the "old and spineless policy of unconditional backing" of a candidate, it vowed to eradicate from the workers "ancient vices," inherited from anarchists, of abstaining from elections. And despite the setbacks to fascism in Brazil, the ANL was not overly optimistic. Filinto Müller, it wrote, was again "flaunting imaginary terrorist plans in the press" to justify another extension of the state of war.⁴

After the expiration of the state of war was achieved, the victory was described as "a scant crumb" in a leaflet about the presidential succession issued by the PCB's Regional Committee of Bahia. The Bahian Communists, ignoring completely the presidential candidacy of Plínio Salgado, which had been launched in June, wrote that either Armando de Sales or José Américo might install "a regime of liberty for Brazil," in view of the popular demand for democracy. But the two candidates were told to do more than use the word *democracy* to decorate a showy banner. The Bahians' preference would depend on specific attitudes assumed "immediately" by the candidates about the PCB program.⁵

The Bahians' leaflet was reprinted by the Communist leaders in

São Paulo because they agreed with its views and because the Communist movement in Bahia was well regarded. Salvador, Bahia, neither a major center nor the location of an uprising in 1935, had been spared the worst aspects of the repression. Maurício de Lacerda's son Carlos, who left off hiding in Rio State to campaign for José Américo, has written that "Juraci had created the reputation of being a liberal and Bahia had become converted into a sort of sanctuary for Communists."⁶

Carlos Lacerda has recalled that in Bahia he met Lauro Cortês Lago, who had served in the short-lived revolutionary government in Natal. Lacerda could also have met ex-Corporal Giocondo Alves Dias, a leading Natal rebel, who went to Bahia after getting out of prison. Giocondo found a local Communist group that had been greatly strengthened since 1935 by the work of Carlos Marighella's fellow students in Bahia: medical student Milton Caires de Brito and law students Armênio Guedes and Rui Facó. Agronomy student Diógenes de Arruda Câmara, a capable organizer who came from Pernambuco to Bahia in 1936, was brought into the Party that year by Caires de Brito.⁷

In Pernambuco, no sanctuary for Communists, over two hundred "national liberators" remained in the Recife Casa de Detenção despite the end of the state of war. Twenty-nine of them issued a manifesto in August 1937. It recognized that Vargas had suffered setbacks due to "popular pressure," and it hailed the "repudiation" of Integralista "adherence to the José Américo candidacy." Like other Brazilian Communists, the Pernambucanos expressed support for no candidate but stressed the need of an antifascist front to be formed "even with the adversaries of yesterday." Their manifesto warned that Vargas, with the help of Plínio Salgado and Labor Minister Agamenon Magalhães, was preparing an "Integralista coup" against the national sovereignty, along the lines that had occurred a year earlier in Spain. Among the manifesto's signers were ex-Lieutenant Silo Meireles, ex-Lieutenant Colonel Antônio Muniz de Farias, ex-Captain Otacílio Alves de Lima, medical doctor Alcedo Coutinho, baker José Caetano Machado, journalist Paulo Mota Lima, ex-Lieutenant Lamartine Coutinho, and ex-Sergeant Gregório Bezerra.⁸

3. *Prestes, the Trotskyites' Candidate for President* (June 1937)

All the Brazilian Trotskyites liked the idea of establishing a new party, the Partido Operário Leninista (*POL*) to support Trotskyites in France who hoped to establish the Fourth International. Medical

doctor Febus Gikovate, released from prison in Rio in May 1937, gave considerable help to Mário Pedrosa, the most dedicated organizer of the new party. Others who helped were Hilcar Leite, who came to Rio after gaining his freedom in São Paulo in April 1937, and Alvaro Paes Leme, who spent several months at the Dois Rios Correctional Colony before his release in 1936. Barreto Leite Filho, following his release in June 1937, returned to the *Diário de Notícias* and to the side of Mário Pedrosa, whom he admired. "We were happy," he recalls, "if we could write a manifesto for an invisible organization of 15 or 20 people, but they were manifestos which nobody read." He adds that the Besouchets, after leaving the PCB, went the same way he did.¹

Aristides Lobo, who headed the São Paulo Trotskyites while he made translations for a Rio publishing firm, showed an interest in joining the POL organizational work. His past relations with Mário Pedrosa had suffered from personality clashes and a disagreement about the participation of Trotskyites in the French Popular Front. Pedrosa and the Rio Trotskyites accepted Trotsky's thesis favoring participation, while Aristides Lobo opposed it.²

The new unity among the Trotskyites ended abruptly when Mário Pedrosa, at a meeting in downtown Rio, made the sensational recommendation that the POL adopt the candidacy of Luís Carlos Prestes in the presidential election. In São Paulo, Aristides Lobo disagreed, saying that the POL should support no candidate. Among the Rio Trotskyites who opposed Pedrosa's recommendation were student Hélio de Almeida, veteran agitator José Salvador, Azair Leal, and Edmundo Moniz. Moniz resolved to revamp the Liga Comunista Internacionalista and remain with it instead of working with the POL and its campaign for Prestes.³ Barreto Leite Filho, on the other hand, was one of those who supported Mário Pedrosa.

Mário Pedrosa's position about the presidential campaign was published in June in the *Theses Approved by the Provisional Central Committee of the Partido Operário Leninista*.⁴ This forty-page mimeographed booklet dismissed Plínio Salgado as the representative of German imperialism and concentrated on explaining the struggle between the forces backing Armando de Sales and José Américo. While admitting that Brazil's production had reached the highest level in history, the theses contended that this production was insufficient to satisfy the demands of both the domestic and foreign markets. Armando de Sales was described as the representative of the new bourgeois industrialist and small agricultural interests, strong in São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, which favored domestic consumption that would help Brazilian industry. José Américo was

said to represent the old, inefficient, large landowning bourgeoisie of the northeast, which served Yankee imperialism and wanted to use government centralism to organize the shipment of Brazil's raw materials abroad. The POL wrote that Armando de Sales "prepared to play the game of the industrialists against the masses," and it added that his antifascism and the anti-light company stand of José Américo "are demagogic expressions with which English capital and American capital seek to cover their positions of privilege and their monopoly over all the Brazilian economy." Both men being wine from the same barrel, the POL opposed the workers having anything to do with either.

The POL explained that the Communist ex-Party, "which still maintains the pretention of calling itself Communist," had adopted a policy of trying to decide which of the two "makes the most seductive promises." The PCB, relying on "hollow words" and vacillating "between giving support to one or the other or both," was pictured as carrying forward the old corrupt tactic of social democracy, "whose only thought was to ask how to act so as not to cause fear in the bourgeoisie."

The POL admitted that Prestes was nothing more than a raving, small bourgeois *caudilho*, who did not represent, as his party did not represent, "the historic interests of the working class." However, he had been transformed by the bourgeoisie into its principal enemy, into the most representative figure of Communism in Brazil. To vote for Prestes for president "is to vote for amnesty, is to raise again, in a gesture of revolutionary defiance, of class against class, the banner of Communism, which Stalinism, of which Prestes is an instrument, let fall into the mud of opportunism."

The POL admitted that the proletariat would never be allowed to elect its own candidate to the presidency. But it maintained that votes for Prestes would provide "a practical count of the forces of the Left" and demonstrate "the real will of the masses."

4. *The PCB Decision to Support José Américo* (August 1937)

In his campaign speeches, José Américo became the candidate "of the people" and the Left. "If the politicians abandon me," he asserted, "I will not remain alone; I will go with the people to the polls and forward to the revolution." During an interview in Bahia he said, "they call me a Communist because I spoke about providing sanitary housing for the poor."¹

Noé Gertel and Sebastião Francisco, upon their release from

prison in São Paulo in 1937, resolved to have a "Communist participation in the election campaign at the side of José Américo." Gertel declared later that "all the Communist former prisoners, in a perfect agreement of doctrinary points of view, supported candidate José Américo, and began, some of them to create nuclei and others to expand the ones that were already alive."

Gertel, a 23-year-old former São Paulo law student, had helped direct the antifascist *Vanguarda Estudantil*, along with Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta and Eduardo Maffei, in 1933, 1934, and 1935, and he had been a leader of the Federação da Juventude Comunista before the PCB dissolved it in 1936. He was so well known by the police in São Paulo that he went to Rio after his release. In Rio, Gertel found that Joaquim Câmara Ferreira was much more active in Party work than Osvaldo Costa. Costa, who had built up a good reputation as a journalist in the daily press of São Paulo and Rio, had been freed in Rio on June 23, 1937; but he was subsequently condemned by the TSN to 3½ years in prison and therefore kept well hidden. It was Câmara Ferreira, more active in PCB matters, who told Costa that the PCB National Secretariat was going to move from São Paulo to Rio.²

Interim Secretary Bangú, the planner of the move, was still hiding in São Paulo in July or August 1937 when he decided that the PCB should back José Américo's candidacy. Bangu's idea was warmly shared by Elias Reinaldo da Silva (André), a sailor who had been placed on the National Secretariat in São Paulo in May 1937 along with Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (Abóbora), the recent traveler to Moscow.³ André, whose past voyages had put him in touch with Communists in Spain and Brandão in Moscow, joined Bangú in August 1937 in inviting PCB representatives from other states to attend an "Enlarged Political Bureau" meeting in São Paulo to consider the Party's position with respect to the presidential succession.

The meeting, the so-called *Ampliado de Agosto*, took place at the home of Júlio Barbosa de Oliveira. Among those present, according to a later declaration of Sebastião Francisco, were Sebastião Francisco, Barbosa de Oliveira, Bangú, Abóbora, Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, and Almir de Oliveira Neves (Argeu). Sacchetta (Paulo), also present, came out against PCB support for José Américo, and his opinion was backed by Hílio de Lacerda Manna (Luís), the director of agitation and propaganda of the São Paulo Regional Committee.⁴ Sacchetta and Hílio Manna later complained that Bangú and André achieved a pro-José Américo resolution at the August meeting, by a margin of two votes, by bringing in men who did not really represent their Regional Committees. Some of these "hand-picked" men, according to Sacchetta and Hílio Manna, were Joaquim Câmara Ferreira (Juran-

dir), and Communists known as Lucas, Olvo, and João (“representative” of Rio Grande do Sul).⁵

Sacchetta (Paulo) and Manna (Luís) were active members of the PCB “central directorship” while it existed in São Paulo. In September, shortly before Bangú, André, and Abóbora moved it to Rio, Sacchetta and Manna tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade them to hold another “enlarged meeting” to reverse the decision made in August. The “suicidal” decision, they said, would turn Communist cells into José Américo “electoral centers” and prevent the Party from carrying out its role of “unifier of the democratic forces, above the candidates”—a role that was supposed to help form an “impassable barrier against the advance of fascism.” They found Bangú and André obdurate and Abóbora full of “opportunistic vacillations.”⁶

The Trotskyites, also critical of the position of Bangú and André, marched into Rio’s São Cristóvão industrial district carrying a red banner reading “Vote for Luís Carlos Prestes” and “Long live the new Partido Operário Leninista.” But when policemen shot at them they withdrew, leaving their banner behind. In *A Luta de Classe* they wrote that the PCB had “eliminated all class content” and was turning the masses into a tail dragging at the rear of a bourgeois candidate. They had to admit, however, that José Américo’s “hysteria and demagoguery” were “attracting a good sized popular movement,” including the “remains of the ANL.” This development, the Trotskyites wrote, upset José Américo’s original political backers and terrified many military officers.⁷

5. *The PCB-Sponsored São Paulo Front Opposes Communism* (August–October 1937)

Among the first of the “democratic unions” to appear in 1937 was the antifascist União Democrática Nacional (UDN), established in Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, to advance agrarian reform and the cause of the workers. The most important was the União Democrática Brasileira, launched in Rio on June 10 to give a national character to the candidacy of Armando de Sales Oliveira. The candidate used the occasion to declare that “the masses who make up the largest part of the Brazilian nation are for our cause and are invincible.”¹

In July the São Paulo Regional Committee of the PCB urged the formation of an antifascist front to be called the “National Union in Defense of Republican Spain, the USSR, and Peace,” or the “National Union against Integralismo and Getúlio and for the Presidential Succession and Democracy.” Later that month a simpler name

was chosen: the Frente Nacional Democrática (FND). Spearheaded by Alberto da Rocha Barros, the FND of São Paulo sought to become a popular movement demanding that the presidential election not be called off. At its founding assembly in the Ginásio Minerva, a crowd acclaimed a provisional directorship made up of a banker, a lawyer, a student, two journalists, and two state assemblymen. The Constitutionalist Party affiliation of Assemblyman Mário Pinto Serva was offset by the inclusion of bearded Alfredo Ellis Júnior, a PRP assemblyman who had been demanding an inquiry about the Maria Zélia slaughter. Now these two rival assemblymen and the other FND provisional directors approved a manifesto calling attention to the worldwide steps of totalitarian reactionaries against democracy and liberty. The manifesto attacked the Integralistas, "rounding up converts for turning over our lands and raw materials to reactionaries overseas."²

The FND of São Paulo worked with a new university student group, Ação Universitária Democrática, to organize rallies. At their rally of August 16, Senator Chermont and student orators praised "the common points of the two democratic candidates." Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta, who had been chosen earlier by Sacchetta to head Juventude Comunista in São Paulo, joined *Frente Democrática* as a director, and this monthly, already founded in June as a Communist-leaning publication of a few São Paulo University students, became the organ of the FND. Non-communist law student Wilson Martins, writing for *Frente Democrática's* issue of September 1, decried the inability of older people to understand youth's struggle for something new, something "more human." Student Rio Branco Paranhos attacked the anti-Communist "follies" of Catholic leader Tristão de Athayde, "a perfect gentleman of industry, exploiter of thousands of workers in his factories." *Frente Democrática* discussed the shooting in Campos, Rio State, during an Integralista parade, that had left twelve dead: "The Integralistas prepared the atmosphere for their slaughter against the people, scattering through the city red banners and Communist bulletins made by themselves, as was proved by the police of Rio."³

For the installation ceremony of the FND of São Paulo on the night of August 20, a large crowd gathered at the Celso Garcia Room (of the Associação das Classes Laboriosas). The meeting was conducted by Rocha Barros. Assemblyman Ellis, the first speaker introduced by Rocha Barros, said that Plínio Salgado had called the masses "an unthinking and stupid monster." The audience, by acclamation, demanded price ceilings, the restoration of liberties, and the repression of the Integralistas and Nazis in Brazil. Rio's *O Globo*

reported the meeting under an enormous front-page headline: ALL AGAINST INTERGRALISMO.⁴

Rocha Barros acted as the secretary of the August 30 meeting of Frente Nacional Democrática leaders at which statutes were adopted and councils and commissions set up. The Finance Commission had the most difficult task. It hoped for monthly contributions of 5:700\$000 (including 200\$000 each from the PRP's Ellis and Ademar de Barros and 100\$000 each from Ação Universitária Democrática and Rocha Barros), but in the first month the contributions were only about 1:000\$000. Four Executive Council members had to give their personal guarantees to secure a 1:500\$000 loan to help cover the costs of propaganda, two rallies, an office, and a trip by FND General Secretary Rivadavia de Mendonça to Rio to invite federal legislators to come to São Paulo.⁵

The program of the FND, distributed to the press late in September 1937, described the defense of democracy as "the combat against Communism and fascism." "Communism," the Frente wrote, "looks to a dictatorship of class. And it considers the implantation of that dictatorship as something that should come from an insurrectional process." While the Frente therefore expressed itself as opposing Communism as much as it opposed fascism, it added that it could not agree with the concept of Communism which the fascists had "injected in the government ranks" and which considered any "liberal, radical, socialist, anti-imperialist, or antifascist" to be Communist.⁶

The Bangú-headed PCB National Secretariat (SN), upset with the FND program, wrote harshly on October 9 to the São Paulo PCB "fraction within the Front." The program, it said, was concerned with "mere ideological struggle," instead of "true political struggle," and was guilty of devoting most of its attention to the combat against Communism, giving the reaction a pretext to act "against us." The SN wrote that the worldwide support of the Communist Parties for the popular fronts was sincere and that, although the PCB was still deprived of initiative and popular support due to the 1935 uprisings, nothing should be done "to isolate the Communists from the movement for democracy." Matters of "mere ideological struggle" were to be replaced by the problems of coffee and cotton and the need of an Armando de Sales-José Américo common front for a free election on January 3.

The SN told the PCB fraction of the São Paulo Front that it was mistaken in saying that Communism "is the policy that aims at the collectivization of property through the establishment, by means of insurrection, of the dictatorship of the working class." The insurrec-

tional path, the SN wrote, could be admitted to be one of the paths, and "never the only path," for reaching the long-term objective, which was never to be confused with "the present objective of the Party." "In order to reach collectivity," the SN asked, "how many stages must we not cover? How much time must not pass?"⁷

The São Paulo PCB leadership replied that the mistaken rightist orientation of the National Secretariat had caused the error and that secretariat member André had warmly approved the wording of the FND program. The São Paulo leadership expressed its satisfaction to "see that you retreat from that error, thus attending a great aspiration of all the Party base."

But the Paulistas did not attribute the anti-Communist remarks in the program entirely to the SN's "erroneous" line. They were due also to the fact that "the top elements of the state Constitutionalist Party and the PRP—generally national bourgeoisie types umbilically attached to imperialism or the large-landowning reactionaryism—are much more anti-Communist than antifascist. Of no value against them are the most beautiful arguments coming from the underground of illegality." People won over to the FND had shown signs of abandoning it "if we did not describe ourselves as against Communism. Disaggregation, even before we had begun to live, stared us in the face. We thwarted it with the circular."⁸

Acção, the Integralista daily paper directed by young jurist Miguel Reale, was not fooled. On October 2 it reported on "a meeting of the well-known organization of the Communist vanguard which is called, in order to mislead, the Frente Nacional Democrática." "The communists of the FND," *Acção* said, "succeeded in bringing to their meeting Sra. Chiquinha Rodrigues, of the Armandista membership of the state legislature, who has occupied the attention of her peers about the problem of German schools in Santa Catarina." *Acção* wrote that, after two hours of speeches by "mediocre orators," the promoters of the meeting passed the hat to get contributions for antifascist propaganda. The object of the collection, according to *Acção*, was to give the impression "that the FND has no connection with organizations nourished by Moscow gold."⁹

6. *The "Cohen Plan" and the New State of War* (October 1937)

Late in September a few top army officers conveniently "discovered" what they called a "Comintern plot"—the so-called Cohen Plan for "murdering members of the government," "setting public buildings on fire," and "seizing hostages" who were to be shot "in the event of

defeat." Justice Minister Macedo Soares, who three days earlier had declared that danger from Communism did not exist, now described the situation as "grave, very grave." Despite the opposition of Armando de Sales and Flores da Cunha legislators, Congress authorized another ninety days of a state of war. The vote in the Chamber of Deputies was 120 to 42.¹

On behalf of the PCB, its São Paulo Regional Committee (CR) released a statement which said that the obviously false "Cohen Plan" was written in a style used by Plínio Salgado and had not even been shown, in document form, to Congress. With dismay the CR noted that the PCB, which had most insistently demanded the election, now stood accused of trying to prevent it and of wanting to "violate women" and start fires (a "morbid passion of the authors of the Reichstag fire").

To the "simple minded" who believed that the new state of war was a trick used by the José Américo forces to gain an advantage over Armando de Sales, the CR pointed out that it was an antidemocratic trick carried out by Getúlio, the Integralistas, and the "leather cravat" generals, such as Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, the "drunken" army chief of staff. Some of the blame, the CR added, should fall on Armando de Sales and José Américo for using language that strengthened the belief that "all nonfascist discontent is Communist." The CR concluded that "anti-Communism is incompatible with democracy."²

Otávio Brandão wrote in Moscow about the "despicable forgery," a "falsification much too clumsy to deceive anyone." He maintained that the fascists, as "the whole world" knew, set buildings on fire, murdered members of government, and seized hostages whom they shot in the event of defeat. The Communists, he wrote, condemned such procedures.³

The renewal of the state of war in Brazil, the result of the false "Cohen Plan," was followed by successful moves of the Vargas regime against Flores da Cunha, who went into exile in Uruguay. Another Armando de Sales supporter, Pedro Ernesto, was rearrested; and so was 67-year-old Nicanor do Nascimento, considered guilty of insulting the National Security Tribunal when he welcomed Pedro Ernesto from prison in September. Journalist Barreto Leite Filho, who had finally been acquitted by the Security Tribunal following his freedom, fled from Rio to his native state, Rio Grande do Sul, and eventually made his way to Argentina. Augusto Besouchet continued to hide successfully in the Rio area, but his sister Lídia, like Barreto Leite, went to Argentina, together with her husband, Newton de Freitas (whose ANL work had brought him imprisonment ear-

lier on Ilha Grande). Trifino Correia, less fortunate than these new exiles, was rearrested in Porto Alegre and shipped to Rio.⁴

The Commission to Execute the State of War (Macedo Soares, General Newton Cavalcanti, and Admiral Dario Paes Leme de Castro) drew up a program for combating Communism. It recommended that the "insufflators of the Marxist ideology" be sent to an island prison and that young people who had been "attracted to the falacious demagoguery of Marxism" be "recovered" for Brazil by "moral and civic reeducation" to be administered by the armed forces at military concentration camps. The children of condemned Communists were to receive lessons at a "boy-scout-like" concentration camp. And, in order that Brazil have a "healthy national mentality," committees were to introduce anti-Communist propaganda in schools and factories. The Commission to Execute the State of War found journalists who agreed to cooperate with the anti-Communist newspaper and radio campaign. But, despite Herbert Moses' insistence that censorship be restricted to matters directly related to public order, some journalists found that censors interfered with their work on behalf of the Armando de Sales candidacy.⁵

The TSN, studying some of the 1935 Aviation School uprising cases, handed down prison sentences for David Capistrano da Costa, Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil, and José Gay da Cunha, all three of whom had been set free. The tribunal absolved Pernambuco Governor Lima Cavalcanti and São Paulo student Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes.⁶

7. *The Sacchetta Divergence Becomes a Schism* (October–November 1937)

Sacchetta's São Paulo Regional Committee of the PCB blamed the renewal of the state of war on the "false and opportunistic political positions" sustained by Bangú, André, and their followers. It pointed out that José Américo, favored by the Bangú wing, had supported the renewal of the state of war, and it insisted on the establishment of an antifascist front, a task made difficult for the PCB because the government was closing "fronts" connected with Communism and arresting Communists again.¹

The PCB National Secretariat, now in Rio, consisted of Bangú, André, Abóbora, and Honório de Freitas Guimarães, who was still abroad. Sacchetta went to Rio to try to convince the national leadership that it should discontinue supporting José (Zé) Américo and become less "bureaucratic" and "opportunistic." After Sacchetta re-

fused to back down at two CC meetings, the Rio leaders ordered another "meeting," this one at a house in a wooded area outside Niterói. Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, told to go with Sacchetta and two Bangú men to the wooded area, tried to argue Sacchetta out of his "Trotskyite" position during the drive. Sacchetta stuck to his view but was not liquidated. He attributed his survival to Câmara Ferreira's reluctance to carry out a drastic order. Câmara Ferreira told the CC that he and his companions had been unable to locate the house where they were scheduled to meet.²

In Rio the PCB Political Bureau received a document from São Paulo, dated October 6, 1937, which advocated immediate organizational changes prior to the holding of a national conference intended to bring about badly needed "unity of action." Among the fifteen signers were Jaime (Tito Vézio Batini), Souza, Júlio (Heitor Ferreira Lima, a former PCB secretary general, also known as Barreto), Reinaldo, Brandão (Eugênio Gertel), Cintra (Rocha Barros), Otávio (Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta), Dreifus (Carmo Giaconelli), and Rui (Issa Maluf). The signers proposed the temporary separation from the CC of the four men "principally responsible for the present divergences": Paulo (Sacchetta), Arnaldo (Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha, also known as Bangú), Luís (Hílio de Lacerda Manna), and André (Elias Reinaldo da Silva). Further, it proposed that the National Secretariat, responsible for the party's day-to-day affairs, be replaced by three persons, unconnected with the divergence, who were to be chosen by a commission of five, which would include three of the signers (Cintra, Souza, and Júlio) and Remarque (Domingos Pereira Marques, another Paulista). The Sacchetta wing accepted the suggestions given in the document, whose limited distribution was entrusted to Jaime (Batini) and Abóbora (Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier). But the Political Bureau, dominated by the Bangú wing, rejected the "unspeakably bad fractionist-trotskyist attempt" contained in the "famous 'document of the 15.'"³

Noé Gertel's letters from Rio to São Paulo, addressed to his brother Eugênio ("Brandão") and Sacchetta, advocated that "the national conference be held at once." Gertel described "the confusion" among the Rio Communists. He wrote that the "tired national directorship" continued to favor the candidacy of Zé Américo and that Bangú and André could count on the support of Domingos Braz (released from prison in August) and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira. But, Gertel wrote, the Federal District Regional Committee, in which Gertel was influential, had turned against Zé Américo because he favored the state of war: "From day to night that formidable mass

that supported him disappeared. . . . Therefore to continue to carry out the line of support is pure opportunism; it is to collaborate with the State of War, with Filinto. Who speaks, my old friend, is not I, it is the Regional here. And note that all the Regional was, up to a short while ago, for support. Today it is for the Front. . . . The mass in Rio has begun to ridicule the man [Zé Américo]. . . . You know how the Carioca is."⁴

Gertel maintained that "the support of Zé, applied one hundred percent here in Rio, led the Party to its present situation—*zero*." Such was the situation, he wrote, that he saw no way to give the Front "outward expression, of having it assume a public and organic aspect." As for the PCB, most of its members had fled or been arrested. "There remains . . . a small base, and a few directors." Describing the "terror" as "appalling," he wrote that he, himself, had just escaped from a trap. "Were it not for luck, I would today be without fingernails and with blood running from my nose."

The National Secretariat advised São Paulo that, with the extreme repression, a national conference might result in the imprisonment at once of all the party leaders, and it also cited insufficient funds.⁵ Some members of the Bangú wing referred to the fifteen original proposers of the conference as "simpletons," "Trotskyites," and "police agents," but a more reflective response was given by Joaquim Câmara Ferreira and three others in a letter written to the Political Bureau on October 28: "A conference of the Party cannot be held without the approval and assistance of the Communist International. If those conditions are met, it can and should be held as soon as possible, and this will serve as a basis of overcoming all the difficulties. . . . At the same time the directorship will be elected democratically." The signers forecast that the state of war would be followed by the invention of new "conspiracies" to justify "closing the houses of Congress" and liquidating all constitutional provisions. Contemplating the party's future, the letter writers saw good possibilities, provided "we smash with full force any effort at fraction or division."⁶

Following the refusal of Bangú, André, and Abóbora to agree to a national conference, the São Paulo Regional Committee sought the support of other regional committees for the immediate dismissal of Bangú and André from their posts and for the establishment of a provisional CC, representing all the regions, to take over until a definitive one was chosen at the national conference. Meanwhile Bangú (now often called Arnaldo) set up a new three-man São Paulo Regional Committee that included Sebastião Francisco, who had

headed it before Sacchetta. Noé Gertel gave his adherence to the National Secretariat in a declaration that the Sacchetta wing said was "wrenched" from him by Bangú "fractionalists."⁷

The emissary sent by Sacchetta to Porto Alegre obtained a statement saying that the Rio Grande do Sul Regional Committee, following a discussion of the "very grave opportunistic errors of Arnaldo, André & Cia.," approved unanimously the plans for a national conference and resolved to send a representative to participate in the new provisional CC. Furthermore, the Porto Alegre PCB leaders criticized "the absolute lack of responsibility" shown by one of their "comrades," João, who, they said, had gone to São Paulo "for his own account and risk" when he "pretended" to speak in August in the name of the Rio Grande do Sul Regional Committee on behalf of the José Américo candidacy.⁸

To Curitiba and Belo Horizonte, Sacchetta sent 21-year-old José Stacchini, who had worked well under him for the postal-telegraph strike in 1933. In Curitiba the Paraná Regional Committee, persuaded by Stacchini, wrote on October 29 that "we unanimously agree with the dismissal of Arnaldo and André from all directive posts." It called for Bolshevik firmness in repelling the fractionalist efforts of elements who, "not satisfied with transforming our Party . . . into an electoral party, wish furthermore to launch disaggregation in our ranks, playing openly the game of fascism." As the entire Paraná committee was arrested while Stacchini was in Curitiba, Stacchini set up a new Regional Committee of secondary PCB figures before returning to São Paulo on a trip made largely at night and on foot.⁹ Later he won over the Minas Gerais Regional Committee, which included João Raimondi (Tupi), the former São Paulo militant. The Minas Regional Committee wrote, on November 3, of the need to purge Bangú, André & Cia., who were opportunists, traitors, counterrevolutionaries, and disguised agents of the fascist reaction.

Expressions of support for Sacchetta's view were also received from the Regional Committees of Goiás and Mato Grosso and the Regional Subcommittee of the "Triângulo Mineiro," a coffee-producing part of Minas whose Communists were organizationally affiliated with the São Paulo Regional Committee (CR).¹⁰

On November 2, after some of these expressions had been received, the São Paulo CR issued a circular accusing the "criminal fractionalists" Arnaldo, André & Cia. of having been persuaded, by the November 1935 defeat, to have no faith in the proletariat and to have carried "the struggle against sectarianism" to such an extreme that the party itself had been "negated" or become a tail of the feu-

dal-bourgeois forces. Bangú and André were said to have affirmed that "the State of War was voted not against the People, not against our P., but against Integralismo, Armando de Sales, and Flores da Cunha, and was therefore to be considered 'in a certain form useful to the proletariat and the revolutionary movement!'"

The circular, which claimed the backing of the principal regional committees, declared that Bangú and André, expelled from their directive posts, would be punished at the national conference, to be made up of delegates from the regions. In the meantime the comrades were told to resist the circulars of "lies, confusion, and slanders" of the "false, reformist counterrevolutionaries."¹¹

5. The First Year of the Estado Novo (November 1937–November 1938)

1. *The Establishment of the Estado Novo* (November 10, 1937)

Vargas had the support of the military, many governors, and Plínio Salgado on November 10 when he canceled the presidential election, closed Congress, and promulgated a new constitution. The repression of Communism, intense since early October, was given further impetus by the new constitution, which declared Brazil in a state of emergency and decreed that the police, during the state of emergency, could carry out its work without any interference by the judiciary. Sobral Pinto, writing to the office of the new justice minister, Francisco Campos, deplored that under the new constitution "the judicial authority cannot stem the abuses and arbitrary acts of the agents of the Executive Power."¹

The TSN was given a sixth judge, Pedro Borges da Silva, and its procedures were revised to speed up its work. Furthermore, the appeals from the decisions of the individual TSN judges were to be handled by decisions reached by the full court, which would be final. No longer would appeals go to the Supreme Military Tribunal.²

In Rio the police carried out new censorship orders by visiting bookstores and removing forbidden books, such as novels by Jorge Amado and the translation of Edgar Rice Burroughs' *Tarzan the Invincible*.³ Police Chief Müller lost no time in arresting Casa de Correção Director Carlos Lassance, charged with being "lax" in guarding Prestes, and replaced him with a lieutenant who would respect Müller's every wish, Dois Rios Correctional Colony Director Vítório Canepa. "Among other beauties," a Casa de Correção prisoner wrote in December 1937, "the Estado Novo of Getúlio gave us Lieutenant Canepa. That hangman of the Colônia de Dois Rios brought . . . the bestial system of hunger and terror that he long applied on Ilha Grande." The prisoner complained that Canepa ended sun-

bathing, increased vigilance over visitors, and drastically reduced the ration of food.⁴

Canepa, Prestes has said, tried to bring to the Casa de Correção the methods used on Ilha Grande against soldiers of the Third Infantry Regiment, and therefore "violence after violence" became the rule and "everything was carried out against Berger." The renewed torturing of Berger, who spent whole nights screaming wildly, brought protests from Prestes in the adjoining cell. Therefore, Prestes was punished. "Under the Canepa regime," Prestes testified later, "with successive and repeated punishments, correspondence was completely stopped, for months on end, my mother remaining without any news, for my lawyer was not even permitted to visit me." Sobral Pinto continued to act as Prestes' lawyer despite the view of some of Prestes' followers that the legal staff of the Cavalier of Hope should include an ANL-minded lawyer and a lawyer with political prestige. Prestes' followers dropped their idea when Sobral said he would withdraw if it were carried out.⁵

The establishment of the Estado Novo and Vargas' announced nationalistic measures evoked a wide range of comments in the Communist press. At the outset the political change was seen as a victory for fascist Germany. Otávio Brandão called Vargas' coup d'état "the first fruit of the pact between Germany, Japan, and Italy" and asserted that it seriously threatened the lives of Prestes, Berger, and Ghioldi. A manifesto released by the São Paulo PCB on November 15 ascribed the new developments to the "work of German and United States influence in combination against English imperialism."⁶

By the time the November issue of *A Classe Operária* was written, the victory of United States imperialism seemed to overshadow that of the Axis. The elimination of the 15-shilling tax on coffee was considered a victory for the coffee-consuming United States, which, *A Classe Operária* pointed out, was in a much better position to lend money to Brazil than were any of the Axis powers.⁷

A Classe Operária praised the "magnificent mass movement" of the ANL and said that Vargas sought the benevolent view of that mass when he announced the adoption of two of the ANL's nationalistic aims: suspension of payments on the foreign debt and the creation of heavy national industry. But *A Classe Operária* warned against the "tyrant's" nationalistic "demagoguery," designed to reduce "the combativity of the people." Aranha was reported to be arranging with New York bankers a scheme for making "new and heavier debt interest payments." The payments would be possible,

the Communists wrote, because Getúlio's idea of heavy national industry was simply the large-scale export of ores and other raw materials. *A Classe Operária* recognized that the fascist powers needed these exports but wrote that "Getúlio crawled like a timid dog at the feet of the New York magnates, promising not to turn over our raw materials to any European dictator without their previous authorization."⁸

The interpreters' switch from writing about a German victory was influenced by the setbacks suffered by the Integralistas, who were left out of power in the Estado Novo and whose party, along with all others, was declared illegal early in December. *A Classe Operária* wrote that the economic pressure of the antifascist nations had forced Vargas to close down Integralismo, but that, to the extent that he could free himself from that pressure and the popular anti-imperialist pressure, he would make concessions to the fascist bloc. Vargas was pictured as keeping Integralismo alive, in its newly formed Associação Brasileira de Cultura, in order to have a reserve force to be used if needed.⁹

2. Trotskyites Blame Stalinists for the New Regime (December 1937)

The Vargas coup of November 10, the Trotskyites wrote, had been assisted by the "confusionist" Stalinist formula of the "defense of democracy against the extremes of the Right and Left"—a slogan that had attached the masses to the train of the bourgeoisie. The masses were pictured as contaminated by the Stalinist and Aliancista rotteness and therefore ready to be misled by Estado Novo demagoguery. The PCB leaders, said to have long ago lost belief in the proletariat, "assimilated perfectly the confused ideology of the small bourgeois leaders with whom they allied themselves." The Trotskyites suggested that the resulting lack of resistance to Vargas' coup had allowed him to dispense with the Greenshirt shock troops and thus attract a part of the bourgeoisie, including such ANL elements as Cascardo, who had "disgracefully" telegraphed his adherence to Vargas.¹

The Trotskyites were quicker than the Stalinists to warn that Getúlio still had "a certain interest in conserving the green bands for use in case great difficulties arise in his consolidation."² And they were also ahead of the Stalinists in expressing belief that a new debt funding was being worked out with foreign creditors. They considered the "temporary" suspension a Brazilian maneuver in the face of

disagreements between the British and the Americans as to what payment scheme should be adopted. "In order not to be hanged by the British," the Trotskyites wrote, "Getúlio put his neck under the foot of the Yankees when he perceived that to turn himself over to Hitler and Mussolini was no business, not only because it would bring the English and Americans against him but also because Hitler and Mussolini, if they have cannons, have no money." The Trotskyites added that Vargas had cynically discovered the beauties of "American democracy" and agreed to chant the praises of Roosevelt in return for Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles' certification that Brazil was "democratic."³

According to the Trotskyites, the world crisis of capitalism left the bourgeoisie unable to defend even its own type of democracy, and the only alternatives were fascism and Communism. Unfortunately, the Trotskyites felt, the Stalinist policy of class collaboration and betrayal of the revolution was opening the gates to fascism in Spain and elsewhere. To prevent that catastrophe, the Trotskyites called for an "implacable struggle against Stalinism, opportunism, and nationalism" and the creation of the true party of the proletariat, "armed with the immortal principles of Marxism and the revolutionary methodology of Bolshevism-Leninism."⁴

With these thoughts *A Luta de Classe*, long silent, began on December 10, 1937, what it called a new phase, this time as the organ of the Provisional Central Committee of the Partido Operário Leninista (POL). Expressing the hope of starting as a fortnightly and becoming a weekly, it attributed its mimeographed form to extreme technical difficulties, small financial resources, and the "fierce illegality."⁵ On December 25 it appeared again (pretending, as before, to be published in Belo Horizonte), this time with a lead article about Vargas' need of working-class backing. Vargas, the article said, had abandoned the mass base of Integralismo, due principally to United States pressure, and had gained, in compensation, the support of the "Aliancista small bourgeoisie." But this support, the Trotskyites said, was not sufficient, and Vargas needed to win the working masses to have a stable regime. In the struggle for the masses, *A Luta de Classe* wrote, Vargas was quite right in not taking "the Communist danger" very seriously, because "there remains today, of the Communist Party, only a group of republicans clinging to *16 de Julho* [a publication bearing the date of the promulgation of the 1934 constitution], who cry over the past and make the campaign for iron and petroleum." Therefore, the article concluded, it was up to the revolutionaries of the POL to organize the proletariat for the overthrow of the Vargas regime and the bourgeois order.⁶

Some of *A Luta de Classe's* criticisms of the PCB leadership were echoed in *A Classe Operária*, published in São Paulo by the PCB's Sacchetta wing. But *A Classe Operária* was an anti-Trotskyite publication which adhered to the Third International and quoted Stalin to make its points against opportunism. It announced that veteran Hungarian revolutionary Bela Kun, a recent victim of the Stalin purges, was another Trotskyite "counterrevolutionary." *A Luta de Classe*, on the other hand, called the Moscow trials a "monstrous crime perpetrated by Stalin" and reported the assassination by the GPU (State Political Directorate) of Communists who would not go along with "Stalin and his band."⁷

The revival of *A Luta de Classe* on December 10 took place after Hilcar Leite, who had received Mário Pedrosa's key to the Rio apartment containing the mimeograph, was given a stencil by Pedrosa. Pedrosa, who was finding the repression intolerable, also introduced Hilcar Leite to comrade Edgard and said that future stencils would come from him. Then Pedrosa sailed for Europe. He disembarked on January 1, 1938, in France and joined friends who were working to establish the Fourth International.⁸

3. Arrest of the Rio Trotskyites (January and April 1938)

The Rio and Niterói police had had their eyes on Mário Pedrosa, his friends, his wife, Mary Houston Pedrosa, and her family. On January 4 a roundup of Trotskyites began at a shed on a Niterói property of the Houston family. There the police arrested Luís Hermenegildo Lobato, a 19-year-old worker who had been living in the shed, and Álvaro Paes Leme, who was making a call on Lobato. At Paes Leme's home and at the shed the police collected subversive documents, among them the December issues of *A Luta de Classe*. Mary Houston Pedrosa, found at her mother's home in Rio, was arrested.¹ As she recalls it, "they took everybody, including the cook; they left only the four children" (the Pedrosas' two-year-old daughter, Vera, and Mary's niece and nephews). The police arrested Mary's mother, Arinda, Mary's sister Celina, and Celina's husband, Campos sugar mill owner Nelson Veloso Borges; and they interrogated Mary's sister Elsie, whose interest in a singing career far overshadowed her interest in leftist ideas. Arinda told the police that old papers found in the shed were perhaps leftovers from the student days of Mário Pedrosa and Elsie's husband, Benjamin Péret. (Péret, a French surrealist poet, had been expelled from Brazil for Trotskyite activity in 1931 and was separated from Elsie.)²

The police advised the press that the shed in Niterói was the "general barracks" of the Rio de Janeiro State "extremists." But they emphasized that their most important accomplishment was the discovery that the Athena publishing firm, run by Pasquale Petracconi in downtown Rio, was the center that radiated Red propaganda to parts of Brazil and sent "Moscow's orders" on behalf of the Fourth International to Aristides Lobo in São Paulo. The police arrested Petracconi, who was described as a friend of Pedrosa and a leader of the Socorro Vermelho Internacional, and they seized his correspondence with Aristides Lobo, who was doing editorial and translation work for the firm. They also arrested employees of the firm, such as bookkeeper Felipe Ferri and book salesman Elias Lobo, brother of Aristides. Elias was jailed for inciting "communist ideas in dozens and hundreds of uneducated individuals, unable to defend themselves against the ravenous tentacles that corrode the organism of those who are weak in spirit."³

On January 10 Sobral Pinto wrote to Justice Minister Francisco Campos to complain that the arrests had left Arinda's grandchildren alone and to point out that Nelson Veloso Borges had nothing to do with Marxist ideas and that Mary had dedicated her time to raising Vera and taking care of a husband whose need to hide made employment impossible. Sobral did not consider Celina and Arinda, regardless of their ideas, to be capable of disturbing public order. Citing his own experience of repressing conspirators in the 1920's, and his current role of "militant lawyer," Sobral told the justice minister that in 80 percent of the cases the arrests provided no advantage to public order but, on the contrary, created "an environment of general ill will toward the government." As for Petracconi and his employees, TSN Judge Alberto Lemos Bastos criticized the reports of the police investigators for reaching all sorts of conclusions. He said that the conclusions were not substantiated by the facts and that it was up to the judge, not the investigators, to reach conclusions. In June and July the TSN absolved Petracconi and his employees along with Mary Houston Pedrosa and Elias Lobo, both of whom had been kept in prison. Aristides Lobo, who had been arrested in Rio, was also absolved, and he went to São Paulo.⁴

With Mário Pedrosa's departure in December, Febus Gikovate became head of the Brazilian Trotskyite movement. Gikovate remained in Rio until February 1938, when he made what he thought would be a temporary move to São Paulo for the purpose of extolling the virtues of the POL to the Sacchetta group. But Gikovate settled in São Paulo and ran the movement from there with some help from Plínio Mello. On a trip to Rio in March, Gikovate told Hilcar Leite

and Leite's 18-year-old helper in POL work, Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso, that the discussions with the Sacchetta people were going well. Furthermore, he advised that Patrícia Galvão (Pagu), at last released from prison, had come to Rio as representative of the São Paulo PCB dissidents, and that, while he might have some reservations about her qualifications for organizing the PCB schism in Rio, it would be well for the Rio Trotskyites to sound her out about working for them. Pagu, using the name of Maria, took over the directorship of the tiny PCB schism in Rio. According to Lúcio Fragoso, she revealed "lots of revolutionary animation, in order to be considered a militant in the Fourth International," and met with a group that included journalist Eneida Costa de Moraes, who had been expelled from the PCB but resisted the Trotskyite line. Pagu composed two manifestos, only one of which was distributed.⁵

In April, before the second manifesto could be released, the police broke into Pagu's residence and arrested her despite two shots she fired from her mother-of-pearl-handled pistol. Her arrest and that of "Nigro" (Odila Silva Jardim), a young woman who had also moved from São Paulo, were followed by the arrests of Hilcar Leite, Lúcio Fragoso, and others and the seizure of the POL's mimeograph.⁶ But this did not prevent the circulation of the April 23 issue of *A Luta de Classe*, which had already been largely prepared. A few lines were added to tell of the arrest of Hilcar Leite, "our comrade," and Pagu, "the well-known *revolucionária*."⁷

Leite told the police that he had had no contact in Rio with Pagu, the "militant of the Third International," and Pagu declared herself a Third International "enemy" of the Fourth International who had never known Nigro or Lúcio Fragoso. Faced with the testimonies of Nigro and Fragoso, which did not support her story, she stood by her original statement and sought to explain Fragoso's testimony by saying that he must be either a paranoiac or a police agent. After she was forced into personal confrontations with Nigro and Fragoso, TSN Judge Pedro Borges da Silva concluded that neither Pagu nor Hilcar Leite had been truthful. He condemned them both to three years of imprisonment and condemned Fragoso to two years.⁸

4. The São Paulo PCB Regional Conference (November 1937)

In November 1937 the National Political Bureau of the PCB in Rio expelled Sacchetta, Hílio Manna, and Heitor Ferreira Lima from the Party. But the disclosure of this news in the official organ was delayed until March 1938, which was as soon as the National Secre-

tariat could arrange to publish a mimeographed *A Classe Operária* to compete with the printed numbers of the same organ being issued monthly in São Paulo by the Sacchetta wing.¹

Also in November, the National Political Bureau in Rio added three to its membership: Domingos Braz (Mauro), Joaquim Câmara Ferreira (Alberto, also known as Jurandir), and the Communist from Rio Grande do Sul (João). It addressed letters to regional and local committees and sent representatives, to persuade them that the recently expelled Paulistas were fractionalists and Trotskyites. An effective representative was Carlos Marighella, who had been freed in Rio on July 15, 1937, and went to live in São Paulo. He changed his name to Orlando José dos Rios and was careful not to reveal his true identity, especially after the TSN condemned him to 2½ years of imprisonment, a longer period than he had served. Marighella became a leader of the pro-Bangú São Paulo Regional Committee. Rocha Barros, sent by Sacchetta to persuade the Communists in Campinas to remain faithful to the Sacchetta faction, returned to the state capital with the feeling that Marighella's arguments had been better received than his.²

In the printed November 1937 issue of *A Classe Operária* (misleadingly showing Rio as the publication place), the Sacchetta faction warned its readers to contribute no money to two São Paulo Bangú supporters, who, it said, "have been expelled from our ranks." One of them was student leader Maxim Tolstoi Carone, but the notice was considerate enough to mention only his code name, Camilo. The other Bangú backer, known as Andrade, was described as "probably being used by the police" because he had been "inexplicably" released quickly after two arrests.³

Citing the expressions of support received from six regional committees, the Sacchetta faction set up in São Paulo a national Provisional Central Committee (CCP), of the PCB, and placed two Paulistas on it: Sacchetta and journalist Tito Vézio Batini (Jaime). Among those who helped Manna, Ferreira Lima, and Rocha Barros on the São Paulo Regional Committee were Faud de Melo, Issa Maluf (a past PCB organizer outside the state capital), metalworker Carmo Giacomelli (Dreifus), and law students Antônio Costa Corrêa and José Zacarias Sá Carvalho (Sumaré).⁴

The Sacchetta Communists, critical of bureaucratic rule and eager to emphasize the democratic aspect of "democratic centralism," scheduled a São Paulo Regional Conference for November. Shortly before it took place, "Brandão" (Eugênio Gertel) and "Reinaldo," signers of the "document of the 15," decided to support the Bangú group. Their meeting with the new CCP's National Secretariat and

São Paulo Regional Secretariat was dramatic because they heard Rocha Barros (Cintra) deliver a paper in which he said that Eugênio Gertel was tired, monotonous, and unable to forgive Sacchetta's revolutionary enthusiasm, nervous temperament, and tough insistence on the fulfillment of missions.

"Let them go to the devil, let them pass to the bureaucracy," Rocha Barros said of those who, in his opinion, could not understand "the fierce satisfaction with which, after so many errors and defeats, some of us discovered with clarity the cause of the morass of repulsiveness in which we found ourselves." Rocha Barros expressed contempt for the "dull-witted" André and Bangú's "catlike, instinctive, practical but unreasoning, ability." He lashed out against the "bastards" who had called him "a Gestapo agent" and Noé Gertel, who had called him "a Trotskyite and shameless stooge of" Sacchetta. On the occasion of the revolution, Rocha Barros said it would be "an enormous pleasure to see them on the side of the bourgeoisie" and to be able to express in fighting "the repugnance we feel for them."⁵

The São Paulo Regional Conference was attended by "almost twenty" representatives, from the Triângulo Mineiro, Sorocaba, and other geographic sectors and from labor and youth groups.⁶ According to the theses adopted, the illegal action of the ANL had "contributed greatly" to the suspension of the state of war in June 1937 and thus proved the falsity of the "liquidationist theory," which considered the ANL's role closed and which turned to the so-called oppressed national bourgeoisie as the driving force of the revolution. Bangú, André, and other "opportunists" were said to have converted the Party into a nonrevolutionary "trailing mass" by their unconditional backing of a presidential candidate without a program, and to have "put vigilance to sleep, thus opening the road for the advance of fascism!"

The conference adopted resolutions that listed the Vargas dictatorship's "germs of its own overthrow": popular discontent, interstate antagonisms, and interimperialistic antagonisms, "particularly the struggle between the fascist bloc and the English and American imperialisms, for the possession of the economic-political hegemony of our nation." Declaring that the role of the Party was to "deepen this combination of contradictions" and lead the proletariat and people in the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship, the conference resolved that the Party could not realize firmly these "great historic tasks" unless it purged the "false Communists," such as Bangú, André & Co.⁷

The Sacchetta group attributed the sparse propaganda about the

schism to its hope for a rapid solution at a national conference.⁸ But in the face of what it called a "stinking campaign" by the "so-called National Directorship," the Sacchetta group released a series of anti-Bangú mimeographed booklets. The campaign began in November with the publication of the 44-page *Da Convenção do Monroe ao Golpe Getulista-Integralista*, written by Sacchetta, and a translation of Chapter VI of Lenin's *Two Tactics*, with a preface by Hílio Manna.⁹ *Lenine e a Disciplina do Partido* (50 pages) and *Por Uma Linha Marxista-Leninista* (25 pages) appeared in December and were quickly followed by *Téses de Stalin sobre a Revolução Nacional Libertadora* (10 pages) and *O Partido Comunista do Brasil e os Renegados da Revolução Brasileira* (34 pages). In these booklets, *A Classe Operária* articles, and leaflets, the Sacchetta group hammered away against the "false, reformist counterrevolutionaries."¹⁰

A point frequently made was that the so-called central directorship had been improperly and personally formed by Bangú, who had been "dismissed from the directorship early in 1935 for incapacity" but had returned because of the arrests of other directors. His addition of André and Abóbora to the directorship in May 1937 was said to have been carried out without the necessary approval of the Comintern and for the purpose of "taking advantage of the profound political incompetence of those elements." Subsequently, the Sacchetta group said, Bangú, André, and Abóbora, in violation of Comintern statutes, had improvised a new national "directorship" which they sometimes called the National Secretariat and sometimes the Political Bureau, by inviting Domingos Braz, Câmara Ferreira, and "João" to serve on it.¹¹

5. *Exchanging Accusations of Trotskyite Behavior* (December 1937–February 1938)

In *Da Convenção do Monroe ao Golpe Getulista-Integralista*, Sacchetta (Paulo) quoted Bangú and André as affirming that a revolution in which the proletariat would "fulfill its revolutionary role" would be possible after the occurrence of a democratic revolution by the progressive bourgeoisie. But, Sacchetta wrote, the democratic revolution, in accordance with the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, had to be headed by the proletariat, for otherwise it would not advance. Hílio Manna (Luís) made the same point in his preface to what the Bangú group called "a disfigured translation" of Chapter VI of Lenin's *Two Tactics*. Manna wrote that the national bourgeoisie was presented by its apologists as the driving force against imperialism

but that a proper description of it would be "a possible ally, irrelevant, timid, and vacillating."¹

In reply to the Sacchetta group, the CC of the PCB issued, in January 1938, *Autopsia de uma Traição*, a booklet that gave considerable attention to world events.² The "renegade group," it wrote, had analyzed the Brazilian situation "with total disregard of the international situation," where "new and serious problems confronted the proletariat and the masses." The "renegades" were described as ignoring the antagonisms which now divided the world and sprang from fascism's provocative war policy and the opposition to it by the peace-loving USSR, "creator of the idea of forming a powerful bloc of democratic nations against the totalitarian states."

Turning to what it called "the true root of the 'divergencies,'" the CC wrote that a period of great difficulties affected the spirits of the "least firm and least combative," leading some to discouragement and others to treason. The CC spoke of the November 1935 defeat, the aggressive war policy of fascism, the tales of Franco "victories" given in the reactionary press, and the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism. Under such difficult circumstances, it said, the Trotskyite pestilence afflicted people whose antiproletarian mentality and small bourgeois individualism had not allowed an assimilation of the principles of historic perspective. The CC added that "the weakness and rottenness of such elements come to the surface in those decisive hours in which the true revolutionary is put to the test." It called Sacchetta and his supporters "revolutionaries on the outside and Trotskyites on the inside."

Sacchetta answered by releasing a "personal explanation" in an open letter to all Party members.³ Examining Bangú's "violent zig-zags," Sacchetta wrote that Bangú, in the Brazilian northeast early in 1936, had tried to stimulate guerrilla bands, frenzied and removed from reality, and thus furnished arguments that Vargas had needed for getting Congress to agree to a state of war. Under fire from the CR's of São Paulo and elsewhere, Bangú was described as having made a "180° turn" to the "most typical rightism." At the August 1937 meeting, Sacchetta wrote, Bangú spoke "in the wings" to companions "who did not know me personally" and told them "with a Jesuitic air" that any thesis of Sacchetta was "Trotskyite." "Where," Sacchetta asked, "is Trotskyism in all the revolutionary work developed with my participation?" His so-called Trotskyism, he replied, consisted of denouncing, in August, the imminence of a fascist coup and of objecting to turning Party cells into electoral bureaus.

In the mimeographed material published by the Comitê Central Provisório (CCP) and its São Paulo CR early in 1938, the Sacchetta fac-

tion accused Bangú and André of "playing the game of Trotskyism" because, in claiming to be the only ones authorized to speak in the name of the Comintern, they were "compromising the prestige of the glorious" International of Lenin and Stalin. As for itself, the CCP declared: "No, comrades, we are not Trotskyites, we never were Trotskyites, because we know perfectly well that Trotskyism is a counterrevolutionary wing in the worker movement, a group of agents of fascism, a band of criminals." The CCP asked whether Otávio Brandão, who had criticized the José Américo candidacy, was to be considered a Trotskyite.⁴

By this time Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta, Sacchetta's former worker in student circles, was directing *Problemas*. Among the contributors to this "monthly cultural magazine," which began circulating in August 1937, were Rocha Barros and Tito Vézio Batini. The connection that they and Pedroso d'Horta had with Sacchetta led the Bangú PCB to declare that *Problemas* was dominated by Trotskyites.⁵

Problemas was a successful antifascist monthly whose first issue contained an article by João Mangabeira and an article praising Sobral Pinto. Affonso Schmidt, Alfredo Tomé, Nabor Caires de Brito, Oswald de Andrade, and Rubem Braga formed the original board of directors to work with Pedroso d'Horta. Early contributors were Péricles do Amaral, who later joined the board, and Moacir Werneck de Castro.⁶

6. Setbacks for Sacchetta (December 1937–April 1938)

Sebastião Francisco, after being set free in São Paulo on July 14, 1937, looked up Sacchetta. Sacchetta put him in touch with Bangú and Abóbora, then hiding in São Paulo, but Sebastião Francisco never learned Bangú's real name until it was revealed in the bourgeois press, thanks to the police, years later. After Bangú and Abóbora went to Rio, Sebastião Francisco assisted them in their clash with Sacchetta, but he was not deeply involved in Party work in São Paulo because he needed to support his family and because the police did not let him "out of their sight." During an incident, when police agents surrounded him on Rua Liberdade, he gave one of them a shove and ran away. After that he advised the Bangú leadership that he expected to be arrested if he remained in São Paulo. Arrangements were therefore made for Sebastião Francisco to become secretary of the Party's Regional Committee in the Federal District and for Carlos Marighella to replace him as head of the Bangú Regional Committee in São Paulo.¹

Before Sebastiao Francisco definitely settled down in Rio in April 1938, he did a good deal to persuade the São Paulo Comissão Regional Militar of the PCB to break with the Sacchetta group. In a letter to the Bangú Political Bureau, dated December 31, 1937, the Military Commission wrote that, after experiencing two months of internal Party struggle and considering documents published by both sides, it recognized the error of becoming connected with "the Trotskyite fractionalism of Paulo, Luís, and Barreto" (Sacchetta, Manna, and Ferreira Lima). It pointed out that it had let itself become separated from Sebastião Francisco because Carmo Giaconelli (Dreifus), misleading it, had said that the principal regions had deposed "rotten elements of the national directorship." But, the Comissão Militar added, it had discovered that "the elements who had rebelled" had succeeded in convincing only "some of the weakest elements of a few regional committees long connected with the São Paulo Region: Paraná, the Triângulo Mineiro, and Mato Grosso." The Comissão observed that to have remained "above the presidential candidacies" would have "condemned us to a criminal passiveness" and that "the mass of soldiers and officers participated actively in the presidential contest and thus became politicized and gained experience."²

As the Bangú leadership wrote later, the Rio de Janeiro and Bahia regions gave it immediate allegiance and then Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and even the Triângulo Mineiro deserted Sacchetta's new CCP. Within São Paulo state, the Santos local committee parted from the Sacchetta fraction, but the latter had the support of some unions and youth groups in the state capital as well as committees in Sorocaba and elsewhere in the state. Campinas, despite Marighella's eloquence, refused in the end to support Bangú. As for Paraná, three Communists from that state arrived in São Paulo to help the Sacchetta group, and one of them served on the CCP. But they did not represent the Paraná Communist leadership, which had become inactive due to imprisonments.³

A Goiás Communist known as Nogueira wrote to Giaconelli and another Paulista ("Souza") on January 23 to express polite regret that the Goiás group had to place itself against its "friends in São Paulo" and to express hope that those friends would "free themselves of sectarianism" and work for Party unity. At the same time Nogueira joined nine other Goiás Communists in drawing up a declaration which condemned the "vile fractionalist maneuver headed by Paulo, Luís, and Barreto," and described the idea of a national conference as a "banner of the fractionalist struggle." The signers attributed their original support of the CCP to "dishonest information"

imparted by "a Trotskyite faction" that took advantage of their "little experience."⁴

The Triângulo Mineiro, after listening to a CC delegate, wrote that it had been poorly advised by its representative to the "pseudo Regional Conference of São Paulo," and that a careful study of the "theses elaborated by the fractionalists" showed them to have a Trotskyite point of view that denied "the importance of allies of the proletariat."⁵

The printed March issue (no. 210) of *A Classe Operária*, the "central organ of the PCB" published in São Paulo, advised that the "LEGITIMATE São Paulo CR" had expelled "opportunists" Castro (Sebastião Francisco), Hermes (Domingos Pereira Marques), and Andrade. The issue asked regional Party directors to abandon the Banguzian path leading to the quagmire of Menshevism. And it discussed democratic centralism. The CCP liked to quote Stalin as demanding "a rigorous application of democratic centralism, the absolutely elective character of the organisms of the Party, secret balloting, and the liberty of criticism."⁶

The CC's mimeographed March 15 issue of *A Classe Operária* (no. 214, published in "Brasil") advised that the "fractionalist Trotskyites" had made off with the printing press in São Paulo but that the Rio Political Bureau was launching a national campaign that would allow the true Party organ to appear in printed form within four months. It also advised that Sacchetta, Hílio Manna, and Heitor Ferreira Lima had been expelled from the PCB as "counterrevolutionary Trotskyite elements."⁷

This notice infuriated the CCP leaders because it identified the expelled members by giving their legal names as well as code names and occupations. Late in June, after Sacchetta and Heitor Ferreira Lima were arrested, the São Paulo CR (of the CCP) accused the rightist wing of having thus used its "pseudo *A Classe Operária*" to give information to the police. The CR wrote that it had always been careful not to raise the issue of "police agents" unless it had proof, but it suggested that the charge should now be made against the group of "social democrats" headed by Bangú, André, and Jurandir (Joaquim Câmara Ferreira), whose legal names it did not reveal.⁸

The Trotskyite POL, watching the struggle between the "pseudodissidence" of Stalinism and the "official faction," wrote that the "progressive character which at first appeared to motivate" the dissidents had degenerated, leading to a struggle characterized by the aggressiveness with which the two wings castigated each other about matters of secondary importance. A reading of the CCP's *A Classe Operária*, with its quotations of Stalin and support of the Moscow

trials, left the POL feeling that both wings of the PCB were fundamentally in agreement. *A Luta de Classe* expressed no surprise that the "imbeciles and gangsters" of the official faction wanted to smash the POL, using murderous methods such as Moscow's agents had used in Spain against leaders of the anti-Stalinist revolutionary POUM. What did surprise the Brazilian Trotskyites was a similar stand by a so-called oppositionist fraction that claimed to represent a "movement of regeneration." The Trotskyites wrote that the CCP's effort to please Stalin would mean that in Brazil, as in Spain, the revolutionary movement would be killed by Stalinism. "It is time," *A Luta de Classe* wrote, "for the dissident faction to define itself."⁹

7. *International Questions Shake the CCP* (April–July 1938)

"The extension of democratic centralism to the international discussion provoked" what one participant called "a trauma" in the Communist group that adhered to the CCP.¹ The trauma accompanied the adoption in April 1938 of nineteen conclusions about the national and international situation when the CCP National Secretariat met with the secretariat of the CCP's São Paulo CR.

The conclusions about Trotskyism were worded to try to please both the anti-Trotskyites and those who found some truth in Trotskyite criticisms of the Party. Trotskyism was declared to have been strengthened by the excessive rightism in the Party. The "necessary" struggle against Trotskyism, it was resolved, would take the form of fighting rightism, thus not leaving it to the Trotskyites to report "our errors."

United States imperialism was said to be seeking to unify Latin America under its hegemony in order to conquer markets and have a source of troops and supplies in the next imperialist war. Both the United States and England were reported to have demonstrated, by their "hostility" to Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, that the democratic imperialist states opposed any national-liberating steps by dependent nations. From England's negotiations with Italy, and French pronouncements on the subject, the conclusion was reached that no insuperable ideological incompatibilities separated the imperialist bourgeois democratic states from the bourgeois fascist states.

Criticisms of the roles of the Communist parties in the French and Spanish Popular Fronts stirred a heated debate between those who opposed criticism and those who felt that it was too cautiously presented. The conclusions stated that the French and Spanish Communist parties "should reconquer their full autonomy" within the

fronts and, while attacking fascism jointly with other antifascists, should "march separately" for a revolutionary policy independent of the mass that conducted the parties to power.

Two "conclusions" proposed by Rocha Barros were omitted from the final document with the observation that they required more study and debate. One called for the Soviet Union and the French Popular Front to terminate the international policy of "non-intervention" in the Spanish Civil War, and the other stated that the French Communist Party should make such a step a condition, "in an intransigent form," of its continuing within the Popular Front.²

The conclusion that was accepted about Trotskyism could hardly have satisfied "Portela," who was busy typing propaganda against the Bangú "bureaucratization." In reading Trotsky he had found some "constructive" criticisms, and he went so far as to suggest publishing a short article ("Read Trotsky") containing a list of Trotsky's works. "You will say," he wrote, "that they can reach only intellectuals. That objection will be strange, coming from a group that is 90%, at least, intellectuals."³

"Celso," the secretary of the São Paulo City local committee, led a group that had "the intention of preserving the Party from deviating toward Trotskyism." Another purpose of his group was to block the proposal of those who wanted the CCP to send directly to the "Spanish and French sections" the criticisms made of them. Celso maintained, with some success, that criticisms of Communist international practice contributed to disaggregating and weakening the movement.⁴

Rocha Barros (Cintra), on the other hand, welcomed the debate, "which," he said, "has shown that even we, the supporters of the revolutionary line in Brazil, are unfortunately separated from Leninism." To combat the fears of Celso, the "reformist, Banguist agent," he quoted Lenin about the value of setbacks, experience, and frank discussion in finding the way to a correct policy.

Rocha Barros chided those who would refrain from criticizing Communist international practice because of "a lack of data." That "capricious argument," he said, simply allowed a top elite to establish undemocratic policies that not infrequently resulted in disaster. Revealing no insufficiency of information, he listed examples of the ineffectiveness of the French Popular Front, in which, he said, the petty bourgeois Radical Party had captured the hegemony. While he attributed the setbacks in Spain principally to the French Communist Party, he criticized the Spanish Communist Party for "the same lack of independence within the antifascist united front." The Spanish Party, he said, had not called for the liberation of Morocco, had

destroyed "worker conquests" achieved early in the Spanish revolution, and had refused to assume a "leftist position on the agrarian question."⁵

The Brazilian Party of Bangú, Rocha Barros wrote, was guilty of similar faults because its view was reflected in the prodemocracy, pro-United States *16 de Julho*. Rocha Barros also expressed his contempt for the Bangú Political Bureau's patriotic manifesto of March 28, 1938, calling for a prodemocracy, propeace national union. The manifesto gave unrestricted support to the antifascist policy of Aranha, the new foreign minister, and offered to struggle shoulder to shoulder with all national forces, including Vargas, to defend the nation.⁶

The CCP's São Paulo secretariat appointed a commission to investigate the "conspiratorial" attitude of "Pílula" of the CR, and "Celso," "Geraldo," and "Aparecida" of the Local Committee. It found that the "conspiratorial comrades" had turned "an honest repulsion" of Trotskyism "into a morbid terror" and had opposed those who dared suggest "deviations or errors in one sector or another of the world struggle by Communism." The investigators wrote that "not even the Communist International or any of its sections is infallible." They found Celso guilty of directing a plot to sabotage the CR and therefore dismissed him from his position. They criticized Pílula for not fully understanding the work being undertaken to "cleanse the Party," and they ruled that Geraldo and Aparecida should hold no posts in the Party organs.⁷

In June and July the discussion about the French and Spanish Communist parties continued to occupy the Sacchetta Communists. Some argued that the Communists should not try to disrupt political unity in France while the Nazis were advancing in Central Europe and that, if the French and Spanish parties were in error, the Comintern would make that known. Others, such as Rocha Barros, maintained that the "sacred French union" had no interest in a proletarian war of revolution and that the Bolsheviks in 1917 had overthrown Alexander Kerensky despite advances made by Germany into Russia. They quoted the Communist Manifesto to dismiss the sentiment of patriotism.⁸

8. *Moscow Supports Bangú* (May 1938)

On May 11 an uprising against Vargas was carried out unsuccessfully by Integralistas with the support of some Armando de Sales backers. While the police rounded up hundreds considered to have

been involved in this new plot, the Communists issued pronouncements. One of them, carefully handwritten in the Casa de Detenção on May 14 by Agildo Barata, was respectfully addressed to Vargas. Signed by twelve Rio military rebels of 1935, it congratulated the nation, in the person of the president, on the defeat of the new plotters, at a time when the nation was "threatened by armed assault and conquest by certain expansionist and aggressive" foreign powers. The signers expressed their agreement with Vargas' statement about the need for "a new order" and declared themselves at the side of his government in the struggle against Integralismo and its foreign directors and helpers.¹

The CCP, less friendly to Vargas, proclaimed on May 16 that "the panorama of fire and blood that covers heroic China and martyred Spain threatens to extend itself to Brazil." The Estado Novo, this manifesto said, was "completely incapable" of eliminating the danger because government ministries and the police were headed by fascists, and the key army command posts were in fascist hands.²

The government reformed the security law to allow, in accordance with the 1937 constitution, the application of the death penalty in the case of future plots against the president's life or liberty. This prompted the CCP's São Paulo Regional Secretariat to declare that the Bangú "bureaucrats," supporters of Vargas, had led the masses to demand that the president take this step. But, the Sacchetta Communists warned, the death penalty would be used against Communists, not Integralistas. Besides, they wrote, Communists should apply the death penalty "in the streets" to Integralistas and not rely on a government "that carries the fascist colors."³

Otávio Brandão, more optimistic than the São Paulo dissidents, considered the partial defeat of fascism in Brazil very important. The partial defeat, as he saw it, was not limited to the failure of the May 11 putsch. Writing about "a new development of the democratic movement in Brazil," he mentioned Vargas' turn toward the United States to the accompaniment of anti-Vargas screams of protest in the German press. Like the Bangú PCB, Brandão praised Aranha, who, he wrote, had supported Roosevelt "against the aggressors" and promised to rectify undemocratic clauses in the 1937 constitution. Brandão noted the support given to Aranha by "influential bourgeois newspapers" and the decision of the Vargas government to acquit twenty-one officers who had earlier been expelled from the army for displaying "insufficient energy" in resisting the 1935 uprisings.⁴

On May 23, before Brandão's opinions appeared in *International Press Correspondence*, a radio broadcast from Moscow transmitted

an article in *Izvestia* about the Integralista putsch. The broadcast mentioned "an attempted Trotskyite fraction headed by three or four elements who rose in São Paulo against the Party and the Communist International."⁵ As the Bangú PCB made the most of this remark, the CCP criticized "the scattered elements of the Menshevik opportunist wing" for "bragging thoughtlessly that the fraction to which the broadcast referred is the CR of São Paulo." The CCP tried to sustain its position and spirit by pointing to similarities between *Izvestia's* article and its own manifesto of May 16 about the May 11 putsch.

But Otávio and Laura Brandão, in their broadcasts, soon made it clear that the reference in the May 23 "Moscow Hour" program was to the Sacchetta group. Laura attacked the group nightly. The South American Bureau of the Comintern, which had remained silent in the face of appeals for support made by Heitor Ferreira Lima and Tito Vézio Batini, now assumed the same position as did Moscow.⁶

In June the pro-Sacchetta São Paulo Regional Secretariat (SR) accused the "Banguzista wing" of probably having sent slanders and false information abroad. It admitted that Moscow had "temporarily" put itself "at the side of the bureaucracy." Lamenting that "our appeals to the masses have no echo," that the bureaucracy had "reconquered its national positions," and that some labor and petty bourgeois groups, influenced by Moscow, had chosen "opportunism," the Sacchetta group recalled that Lenin, "in obscurity and destitution" in Switzerland in 1915, had read a program to only a dozen Bolshevik friends. "If we are correct, it does not matter that we are few, for it is we who shall be heard tomorrow." "As never before," the SR told its commissions and organs, "it is necessary to work. Only it is also necessary to be stoic, tenacious, impermeable to dispiritedness, to slander, to failure, to a lack of understanding."⁷

Plans were made for Sacchetta to go to Moscow, possibly with a comrade, to explain his group's position. However, soon after Moscow condemned that position, Sacchetta was arrested by Luís Apolônio, a leading investigator of the São Paulo DOPS. Heitor Ferreira Lima, who had already been arrested on May 15, identified Sacchetta as "Paulo—Professor Hermínio Sacchetta." But later Ferreira Lima wrote to TSN Judge Raul Machado to deny the juridical value of declarations he had made, because, he said, his health had previously been impaired by ill treatment, such as being forced to stand without moving, eating, or smoking for twenty-four hours. In the letter he claimed that he had never known Sacchetta before his imprisonment.⁸

Luís Apolônio did not make use of torture but some of his subordinates did. Although one of them almost broke Sacchetta's arm, Sacchetta refused to declare anything beyond being a Communist who had been expelled from the PCB.⁹

Due to the arrest of "our great companions" Sacchetta and Ferreira Lima, the São Paulo SR told the CCP, it would be well if the CCP would appoint two new CCP members ("Rossi" and "Edgard") to work with the Paraná representative and Batini. The SR also suggested that the CCP designate one of the four to organize its work in Rio, and that the Moscow trip be made by a non-CCP member, thus avoiding a CCP election (for a replacement) that might end the secrecy of the proposed trip. The most pressing tasks were felt to be printing *A Classe Operária* and raising money for publications and for the trips to Rio and Moscow. The SR, pessimistic about finances, looked for ways to reduce expenses.¹⁰

Guided by Rocha Barros and the view expressed by Sacchetta before his arrest, the São Paulo Regional Committee (CR) proposed changing its "word of order." Noting that the old call, for a return to the 1934 constitution, left the proletariat apathetic, the CR decided that Vargas had consolidated his position, thanks to the unsuccessful Integralista putsch and Moscow's attitude. In the future, the CR concluded, the 1934 constitution would be even less of a popular aspiration than it already was. Besides, it felt dissatisfied with a constitution that had permitted the expulsion of foreigners and the formulation of harsh security laws. Rejecting a call for a Sovietic constitution, as inappropriate for the "stage of the revolution" that Brazil had reached, it adopted, as the new word of order: "For a Democratic Constitutional Assembly elected by direct and secret universal suffrage!"¹¹

In June, while this matter was discussed, Sacchetta was in the Paraíso jail, pretending to have tuberculosis. After he arranged to have a prison nurse send for a doctor who was a Party member, he was transferred to his mother's home. Despite the guards assigned to watch the residence, Sacchetta escaped. His return to freedom about a month after his arrest was attributed by the Bangú leadership to police connections. Therefore, in August 1938 the anti-Bangú CR of São Paulo issued a statement comparing his feat to those of Trifino Correia, Mário de Souza, and others who had made escapes. The statement praised Sacchetta's refusal to give information to the police, and it condemned the "vile slander" used against him by the "degenerate bums" of the "bureaucratic directorship" who supported "a government of the adversary class."¹²

9. *Sacchetta and Rocha Barros Embrace Trotskyism* (late 1938)

Before the establishment of the Estado Novo, Plínio Mello had been warned by a fellow journalist at Rio's *Diário de Notícias* that he might soon be arrested. He had therefore hidden at Arinda Houston's Rio State property and later moved to São Paulo to work at *Folha de São Paulo*. He joined Febus Gikovate, biology lecturer at the Colégio Paulistano, in seeking to persuade the PCB dissidents to become Trotskyites.¹

Gikovate and Plínio Mello made headway during the two or three months that Sacchetta retained the freedom he had won in July 1938. The memorandums written by Rocha Barros expressed repulsion for what the intellectual PCB dissident considered to be baseless and "ignorant" attacks on Trotskyism appearing in publications of the CCP's São Paulo Regional Committee (CR).²

This attitude, shared by Sacchetta, resulted in a schism within the schism. In September 1938 Jaime (journalist Tito Vézio Batini) and Sumaré (law student José Zacarias Sá Carvalho) issued a resolution declaring Paulo (Sacchetta) and Cintra (Rocha Barros) to be Trotskyites, "agents of the enemy of the class," and traitors to the Comintern. The resolution, which expelled Paulo and Cintra from their Party posts, tasks, and "connections," bore the signatures of the CCP, its São Paulo CR, and other organizations, such as the Federation of Communist Youths, the Central Labor Union Bureau, the Committee to Assist Prisoners, and the Committee of Feminine Work. Paulo was accused of sabotaging the divulgence of Comintern literature, and Cintra was accused of "taking advantage of the little intellectual preparation of many of our comrades" and "making a game of phrases" in order to find acceptance for the theses that he and Paulo advanced. The two men were said to be "utilizing the struggle against the Right to play a purely Trotskyite game."³

A booklet published by the CCP called for "a new direction in all our work." It analyzed the errors of both the Right and the Left, condemned Trotskyism, and opposed the kind of "internal 'democracy' that allows half a dozen intellectuals to have a press and eternally make false statements about the proletarian revolution." The booklet confirmed the dismissal of Paulo and Cintra.⁴

In September Sacchetta wrote a reply in which the São Paulo CR expressed surprise at the resolution apparently issued by itself, the CCP, and other groups. This reply expelled Jaime from the Party for being a Bangú agent and dismissed Sumaré and another Paulista "from all organic work" pending an investigation. It closed down the CCP, which it described as a Bangú-supporting "appendage of the Re-

gional," and it argued that some of the organizations signing the resolution of Jaime and Sumaré were nonexistent. The "treasonable" action against Paulo and Cintra, it said, had never been discussed by the Regional Committee or its secretariat.⁵

Sacchetta, rearrested at this time, adhered to the Fourth International, which had finally been declared in existence at an organizing conference in Paris early in September.⁶ Rocha Barros, also adhering, wrote a letter to the comrades who had dismissed him from his work. He said that the Bangú wing was the legitimate PCB not only because Moscow's radio broadcasts made that clear but also because the Bangú wing and the great majority of the Party in Brazil supported the Comintern's line of "better and worse imperialisms"—a line which the dissidents had repudiated and which supported North American imperialism and recognized the existence of progressive sectors in the large bourgeoisie of Brazil. Rocha Barros thanked his former comrades for having helped him find out that his place was not in the Comintern, and he expressed the conviction that new defeats and the workers' class instinct would lead "the best of you to cross the valley that I am now crossing."

While Rocha Barros believed that the social bases of production in the Soviet Union allowed it still to be considered a worker state, he felt that the norms of distribution, the oppressive state, and the "criminal killing" of the world revolution introduced elements of degradation that would liquidate the social bases of production if the world revolution did not come to help the Soviet Union. He rejected the "idiocy of socialism in a single country" and the "stupid national-communist, social-patriotic concept" and wrote that "we are international Communists and not employees of the Commissariat of the People for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union."⁷

Following the arrest in mid-October of Jaime, Sumaré, and several of their helpers, documents supporting the views of Sacchetta and Rocha Barros were issued by the "PCB's São Paulo Regional Committee, which used to be subordinated to the extinct Comitê Central Provisório." One of these, a resolution, condemned the position of the Comintern "as revealed in the radio broadcasts from Moscow, which descend to vile collaboration with the police of Getúlio."⁸

Also in November, the now-Trotskyite "CR of the PCB" issued a manifesto to serve as the basis of a new movement "to regroup the vanguard around the revival of Marxism-Leninism, . . . abandoned by the Comintern." The manifesto, containing expressions from Rocha Barros's recent letter of adherence to Trotskyism, was the idea of Sacchetta and proposed a new national conference. It led to

the formation of the Comitê Pró-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda Revolucionária, made up of Gikovate's *POB* (publisher of occasional issues of *A Luta de Classe*) and Rocha Barros's Comitê Regional de São Paulo do PCB (Dissidência Pró-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda). The Comitê Pró-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda Revolucionária issued statements attacking Roosevelt and blaming the Spanish setbacks on Stalinist, anarchist, and *POUM* errors. It emerged in August 1939 as a new party, the Partido Socialista Revolucionário (Secção Brasileira da Quarta Internacional). When Sacchetta was released from prison late in 1939 (thanks to lawyer Carlos Castilho Cabral being replaced by someone more efficient and less expensive), he directed the new party. Gikovate withdrew from Brazil's small Trotskyite movement. Mário Pedrosa remained abroad.⁹

The Bangú Communists, who had long ago expelled Sacchetta, Manna, and Ferreira Lima, issued a booklet in March 1939 announcing the expulsion of Rocha Barros and all others who in 1938 had given them trouble in São Paulo and Campinas. The booklet, which provided the legal names of the "Trotskyite fractionalists," attacked Rocha Barros for his *Problemas* articles and said that his job in the government's Labor Department was to break up unions. Batini (Jaime) and Sá Carvalho (Sumaré), who had rejected the Trotskyism of Sacchetta and Rocha Barros, were expelled for Trotskyism; Batini was called a *Problemas* collaborator and brother-in-law of the "degenerate executioner Luís Apolônio." *Problemas* director Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta, the Bangú Communists wrote, was brother of a lawyer who defended the murderers of Maria Zélia political prisoners. The list of expelled "Trotskyites" included Issa Maluf, Patrícia Galvão ("known for her scandalous attitudes of sexual degeneration"), Júlio Abreu (Sacchetta's father-in-law, accused of "diverting 800 milreis from a sector of the Party"), José Stacchini, and many in Campinas.

The imagination of the Bangú Communists led them to explain that the struggle of Batini and Sá Carvalho against Sacchetta and Rocha Barros was directed by the São Paulo *DOPS*. Sacchetta, Manna, and Ferreira Lima were said to have done such a poor police job of destroying the Party that they were arrested in mid-1938 by "their own police directors." The others (Batini, Sá Carvalho, etc.) were said to have been seized later with the purpose of filling the press with stories about "Communists" so that Plínio Salgado would appear "inoffensive" just at the moment when the PCB was denouncing his presence in São Paulo.¹⁰ Publicity about the arrest of Batini and Sá Carvalho appeared in the press in January 1939 when Salgado was arrested.¹¹

In May 1939, *Revista Proletária*, the Rio monthly organ of the PCB's Central Committee, accused the "Trotskyite group of São Paulo" of opposing its proposed Brazilian front, the União Nacional Democrática, and the Popular Fronts in other countries. "The work of these traitors at the service of fascism," *Revista Proletária* said, was "completely unmasked in the insolent defense they made of the Trotskyite-Bukharinistas-Zinovievistas, condemned and executed in the USSR as proved agents of the spying services of Germany, Japan, and other imperialist powers."¹²

To reduce the influence of *Problemas*, the São Paulo Bangú-line Communists in 1939 helped launch a rival popular monthly, *Cultura: Mensário Democrático*. It was run by Nabor Caires de Brito, whose brother Milton, in Bahia, had brought Diógenes de Arruda Câmara and other students into the PCB. Like *Problemas*, *Cultura* attracted antifascist writers from all over Brazil (although it paid nothing for articles). Only a few of the writers were Communists; but, as Nabor Caires de Brito points out, *Cultura* was influenced by the PCB. One of the members of its directing board was Graciliano Ramos, who had been jailed, with little if any reason, after the 1935 uprisings (and who joined the PCB in 1945).¹³

Few of the 1937–1938 São Paulo PCB dissidents adhered to the new line of Sacchetta and Rocha Barros. Heitor Ferreira Lima and Issa Maluf refused to embrace Trotskyism. Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta abandoned politics. Sacchetta has observed that the Fourth International in Brazil which he headed "did not represent anything that could be called a power. But it had the virtue of valid criticism of other leftists, even though as militants we were no good."¹⁴

10. *Prestes' Letters to Fournier* (November–December 1938)

The most recent front, which the Bangú Communists accused the São Paulo dissidents of rejecting, was born after Integralismo became dissatisfied with the Estado Novo. It was the subject of an article, written in Rio, that appeared early in August 1938 in *World News and Views*, the successor to the Comintern's *International Press Correspondence*. The article hailed the "cancellation" of the Brazil-German "compensation mark" agreement and praised the policy of peace, freedom, and justice advocated by Roosevelt and Brazil's pro-United States foreign minister. It declared that in Brazil "the democrats—above all the Communists—are calling upon the people to support the government with weapons in hand, against any Integralista putsch, and for the integrity and independence of the country."

The PCB, described in the article as "leading the whole struggle of the nation for democracy and independence," advocated a "great democratic front" for "abolishing the totalitarian constitution" and promoting heavy industry and effective minimum wages. Other aims were amnesty for antifascists and the elimination of fascists from the government.¹

The idea of a great democratic front was expounded by Prestes late in 1938 in his clandestine correspondence with Lieutenant Severo Fournier, who had been locked up for having tried to lead an attack of Integralistas against Vargas at Guanabara Palace on May 11, 1938. That Prestes was fully cognizant of the PCB position is not surprising because for almost a year, starting in the first half of 1938, he exchanged letters with Bangú and the PCB National Secretariat. The complicated Bangú-Prestes system of correspondence was carried out with the connivance of prisoners and Casa de Correção employees. Useful go-betweens were "Gilda," who had connections with people at the prison, and Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (Abóbora), who had connections with her and Bangú. Prestes, signing as "Bento," referred to Bangú as "Silva."²

Prestes signed as "Vila" when he wrote four long letters to Fournier in the hope of converting the sick prisoner to "our national liberation movement."³ He told Fournier that the question of individual leaders was less important than the need of a union of all Brazilians to support democracy, nationalism, and the well-being of the people. Arguing that even Vargas should be supported if he would turn to such a program, Prestes said that the path to follow was not one of conspiracy, for that could result in civil war or a coup, with the replacement of one dictator by another. The correct path, he wrote, was one that would force Vargas, by popular pressure, to grant amnesty, free expression, and the election of a truly representative constitutional assembly.

Prestes tried to dispel the effect on Fournier of "the infamous slanders" against Communists. The Comintern, he wrote, was not "a band of assassins, thieves, and traitors." Referring to the "so-called assistance which some foreigners gave" to the 1935 uprisings, Prestes declared that "we cannot fail to accept and seek the aid of all who honestly want to struggle at our side." He wrote that during the march of the revolutionary column in the 1920's, "while some foreigners struggled courageously to the end, the illustrious Brazilian Filinto Müller cowardly deserted at the most delicate moment."⁴

As for Berger, Prestes wrote that he had not participated in the 1935 movement. "Berger's role with the Brazilian proletariat," Prestes explained, "was similar to that of those foreign professors whom

the dominant classes invite to lecture at their universities." Fournier was told that Berger had come to instruct the Brazilian revolutionary proletariat just as the French Military Mission had come to instruct Brazilian army officers.

In a reference to Fournier's fear that Communists wanted to implant a dictatorship of the proletariat, Prestes wrote that the ANL had no such idea but was struggling for a bourgeois, or capitalist, democracy, much needed in Brazil, at the moment, to provide "national emancipation" and better living conditions for the people. Communists who had studied Marx, he said, were convinced that capitalism would sometime lead to socialism, whose first phase would be the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lest this prospect frighten Fournier, Prestes wrote that "everything that is published in our press about Russia is completely untrue," and he added that a study of Lenin's works revealed that situations differed from country to country and therefore "the Brazilian case calls for a Brazilian solution."

6. On the Eve of World War II (1936–1939)

1. *Brazilians in the Spanish Republican Forces (1936–1939)*

In the latter part of 1936 the Comintern called on Communist parties to furnish militarily trained volunteers to participate in the Spanish Republican forces. The PCB had a good opportunity to comply after the so-called *macedada*—the liberation of prisoners when Macedo Soares became justice minister in June 1937, approximately a year after the Spanish Civil War broke out.¹

Before the *macedada*, some civilians from Brazil joined the Spanish Republican forces. Most of them were foreigners who had come to consider themselves Brazilians. Quite a few had been born in Spain. Several were Italians, as was the case of Bruno Giorgio, who went from Brazil to Spain as early as 1936 and accompanied troops as a political commissar. Among the other foreigners were three who were expelled from Brazil during the pre-*macedada* repression: Jorge Cetl, a tall ANL enthusiast born in Czechoslovakia; Wolf Reutemberg, a young and cheerful Jew born in Rumania; and Hernesto Yosk, a Jew born in Germany in 1900. Yosk was fortunate to escape at Le Havre from the *Bagé*, which was supposed to take him back to Germany early in 1937.²

One of the Italians who left Brazil during the repression was the writer Libero Battistelli, who had arranged to hide Carlos Lacerda at a country place in Jacarepaguá, near Rio, after the 1935 uprisings. Battistelli, a non-Communist antifascist, played an important role during the Spanish Civil War in the “Guistizia e Libertá” Column, was mortally wounded in the fighting in the Huesca zone, and died in a Catalonia hospital.³

Francesco Leone, a native of São Paulo, was another early participant in the Spanish Republican forces. He had received military training in the USSR and had been jailed in Italy before he returned in 1934 to Brazil. In Rio, where he worked in the construction of the

railroad to the Corcovado Peak, he wrote articles (with Battistelli's help) which Pedro Mota Lima published in *A Manhã*. After the 1935 insurrections failed, he decided to leave Brazil. Wounded in Spain late in 1936, he went to France and carried out Communist work there until his arrest in October 1939.⁴

Benjamin Péret, the French surrealist poet who had been married to singer Elsie Houston, went from France to Barcelona in August 1936 to participate there in the anti-Stalinist POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), a part of the anti-Franco coalition. The POUM, strong in Catalonia, was sometimes considered Trotskyite because its leader, Andrés Nin, had long been associated with Trotsky. In view of the Stalinists' barbarous treatment of the POUM, starting in May 1937, it was perhaps fortunate for Péret that he became disappointed in the POUM and was back in France in May 1937.⁵

One Brazilian Military Academy graduate, ex-Lieutenant Alberto Bomilcar Besouchet, was able to reach Spain before the *macedada* because, after taking part in the 1935 uprising in Recife, he avoided imprisonment by hiding, some of the time with his brother Augusto, who had opposed the uprisings. His role in Spain, which he reached in February 1937 via Argentina and France, is not clear. According to a report published in the Brazilian press in June 1937, he was wounded in the leg on the Guadalajara front and was so heroic that he was promoted to colonel "by the acclaim of his trench-mates" and was given a post on the staff of General José Miaja Menant. Nothing has turned up to confirm this report.

Besouchet came to Spain with a letter to POUM leader Andrés Nin, signed by Mário Pedrosa. Nin was seized by the Stalinists in Barcelona in June 1937 and murdered by them soon after. Hugh Thomas, in his history of the Spanish Civil War, writes that a number of international sympathizers with the POUM died at about the same time as Nin, under mysterious circumstances, and that "during the latter part of 1937, a number of POUM rank and file were also quite ruthlessly and illegally shot, after summary courts-martial manned by the communists." When the Brazilian military men, released by the *macedada*, first reached Spain, during the latter half of 1937, the only thing they heard about Besouchet was the persistent rumor of his having been shot, a rumor that was confirmed around November 1938. According to Carlos da Costa Leite, a Spanish Civil War participant, Besouchet was shot by the Stalinists, along with anarchists and Trotskyites (who had been jailed in Barcelona), at the time of the final withdrawal of the International Brigades from Barcelona late in 1938. He may have been liquidated by the Stalinists at an earlier date.⁶

Roberto Morena, a civilian PCB leader who was freed by the *macedada*, went to the Party headquarters in São Paulo and became active in arranging to send to Spain military men who had revolted in November 1935. The trip to Spain was made via Paris, which was usually reached from Uruguay or Argentina with the help of passages paid for by the worldwide Communist-dominated Comité International de l'Aide au Peuple Espagnol. Davino Francisco dos Santos, who had military connections, served in São Paulo on a PCB committee for fostering the movement of militarily trained Brazilians to Spain. Sacchetta was also instrumental in this work. He sent too many civilians and two of them were returned to Brazil by the Comintern agents in Uruguay.⁷

As Morena recalled later, the PCB goal of sending one hundred military men to Spain could not be achieved.⁸ Fourteen Brazilians with military training are known to have gone from Brazil and participated in the Spanish Republican effort. The total number of Brazilian participants, far fewer than those from Cuba, Argentina, or Mexico, is believed to have exceeded thirty with the inclusion of Brazilian civilians who went from Brazil, and Brazilians who were living in Spain or Portugal at the start of the Civil War. Almost half of the fourteen Brazilian military men joined the Popular Army of the Republic as officers, and the remainder started out as soldiers in the International Brigades, said to have been made up of forty or fifty thousand (never more than twenty thousand at one time) from over fifty nations.⁹ They joined the Garibaldi Battalion of Italians in the 12th International Brigade.

Four military participants in the 1935 ANL movement made the trip to Europe without realizing their intention to play a part in the Spanish action. One of them was ex-aviation Lieutenant Carlos Brunswick França, who reached Spain after the Republicans ceased accepting foreign aviators. The other three, who got as far as France, were ex-Lieutenants Celso Tovar Bicudo de Castro and Paulo Machado Carrión and ex-Major Alcedo Batista Cavalcanti. In Paris early in March 1938, Alcedo Cavalcanti argued that the Brazilians could do nothing for the Spanish Republican cause because it was already lost.¹⁰ Carrión agreed. But the PCB so disliked Alcedo Cavalcanti's attitude that it published an article in *A Classe Operária* describing him as a traitor: "Unlike almost all the national-liberation military men who managed to leave Brazil, Major Alcedo Cavalcanti was unable to hear the call of the Spanish people. . . . Returning to the la Plata River after a round trip and long stay in Paris, financed by the Volunteer Service for Republican Spain, Alcedo Cavalcanti increased the campaign of slanders against the democrats and Com-

munists already begun in Paris, to try to hide his cowardly attitude—in shocking contrast with the self-abnegation of the other national-liberator military men, such as Major Costa Leite, Captains Gay, Nemo Canabarro, and Dinarco, Captain Apolônio, and so many others.”¹¹

In the last half of 1937 the Atlantic crossing was made by ex-artillery Lieutenant Apolônio Pinto de Carvalho, ex-infantry Lieutenant Joaquim Silveira dos Santos, ex-aviation Sergeant José Homem Correia de Sá, ex-aviation Sergeant David Capistrano da Costa, ex-aviation Corporal Eneas Jorge de Andrade, and Roberto Morena. Apolônio de Carvalho's trip to France, made on the *Bagé* in July 1937, was exceptional in that he sailed from Bahia, after receiving the necessary passport and some money from the head of the *casa militar* of Governor Juraci Magalhães. Apolônio became a “Spanish citizen” in France whereas most of the others took care of this detail in the La Plata River region. In Spain he reported to the reception center at Almansa, in the province of Albacete, where the Republicans had training camps for new arrivals; he started out as a lieutenant in the Popular Army of the Republic.¹² Like Apolônio, Joaquim Silveira dos Santos had been a lieutenant in Brazil and became a Popular Army lieutenant upon his arrival in Spain.

When Eneas Jorge de Andrade reached Spain he managed to join the Republican Air Force. Except for this case, and a little instruction in shooting from planes given by Correia de Sá, no use was made of the Brazilians' considerable training in military aviation. Correia de Sá, like David Capistrano da Costa, joined the ground forces as a soldier in the Garibaldi Battalion. Roberto Morena was a political commissar in the Garibaldi Battalion before the Spanish Communist Party, recognizing his administrative ability, sent him to work with its provincial committee at Alicante, on the Mediterranean, where supplies were received for the Republican zone.¹³

About half of the Brazilian military men who went to Spain were so deeply involved earlier in anti-Vargas plots at the side of Flores da Cunha in Uruguay that they did not sail for France until February or March 1938. The letters that reached Vargas from Uruguay, written by Ambassador João Batista Luzardo and others, told of the conspiratorial work of exiles Alcedo Cavalcanti, Carlos da Costa Leite, both ex-majors, and ex-Captain Nemo Canabarro Lucas.¹⁴ Canabarro, who had become a major in the Paraguayan army while fighting in the Chaco war from late 1932 until early 1934, finally concluded early in 1938 that the overthrow of Vargas by a movement from Uruguay was not possible, and he sailed for France with Alcedo Cavalcanti.¹⁵ Costa Leite made the journey at about the same time.

They were quickly followed by seven other La Plata region exiles: ex-aviation Lieutenant Dinarco Reis, ex-aviation Corporal Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil, ex-aviation Lieutenant José Gay da Cunha (cousin of Flores da Cunha), Nelson de Souza Alves (formerly a lieutenant in the police of Espírito Santo state, where he was a PCB leader), Homero de Castro Jobim (expelled from the army after completing his Military Academy course), ex-infantry officer candidate Delcy Silveira, and Delcy's younger brother, 20-year-old Eny Antônio, who had been a student and was required to pay his own fare to Europe because of his civilian status. Of these seven, the five last mentioned had gone from Uruguay to Argentina in a small boat in January 1938 after the climate for Brazilian conspirators in Uruguay had worsened.¹⁶ Most of the seven were Gaúchos. Assis Brasil and the Silveira brothers belonged to prominent landowning Gaúcho families.

Dinarco Reis, Nelson Alves, and the Silveira brothers reached France in a Polish ship together with two Uruguayans, who died later in the Spanish Civil War, and with Ramón Prieto Bernié, a Spanish civilian who had lived in Brazil. Gay da Cunha and Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil traveled on the *Belle Ile* and crossed into Spain with "little old" Costa Leite. Artillery specialist Costa Leite, a Military Academy classmate of Luís Carlos Prestes and a veteran revolutionary, was 43 years old. He impressed Gay with his "air of a dreamer" and because his attitude was that of a father who loved his Brazilian companions, mostly in their twenties, as though they were his sons.¹⁷ With the rank of major in the Popular Army of the Republic, Costa Leite became an artillery instructor and then commanded a large artillery unit during a part of the Ebro River Campaign. Gay da Cunha and Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil, who reported in Spain at the side of the much respected Costa Leite, were named lieutenants in the Popular Army of the Republic at the outset and sent to engage in rugged fighting in the Pyrenees in northeast Spain. Assis Brasil, who had been a corporal in Brazil, was startled to receive a commission so soon.¹⁸

Nemo Canabarro Lucas, the only non-Communist among the Brazilian military men in the Republican forces, started out, like Gay da Cunha and Assis Brasil, as a lieutenant in the Popular Army of the Republic. The others who crossed the Atlantic early in 1938, including ex-aviation Lieutenant Dinarco Reis, began as infantry soldiers in the Garibaldi Battalion.¹⁹

"From July 1937 to January 1939," researcher Pedro Rodrigues writes, "the Brazilians were represented on all the combat fronts—from Belchite to Teruel, from Lérida to the Ebro, in Huesca and the

Aragon and Asturias campaigns, and finally in the Catalonia campaign—in . . . artillery, infantry, tanks, and military aviation—and also as political commissars." Eny Antônio Silveira, the youngest, began as a political delegate of a platoon but became a lieutenant. Others who sooner or later achieved that rank were José Homem Correia de Sá, David Capistrano da Costa, Deley Silveira, Homero de Castro Jobim, and Eneas Jorge de Andrade. Gay da Cunha, Dinarco Reis, Apolônio de Carvalho, Joaquim Silveira dos Santos, and Nemo Canabarro Lucas reached the rank of captain in Spain.²⁰ Canabarro Lucas was the only foreigner in a Spanish Brigade of about four thousand (composed of four infantry battalions) and eventually became its chief of staff. He spoke Spanish fluently, having been born in Santana do Livramento, on the Rio Grande do Sul–Uruguay border, and showed an interest in warfare.²¹

It is clear from Gay da Cunha's *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola*, and from the recollections of other participants, that much courage and initiative were displayed by the Brazilians in the face of extremely difficult conditions. In speaking of Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil, Canabarro Lucas recalls: "In the battle of Piedras de Aolo, in Catalonia, in the Sort sector, he repelled four consecutive assaults of the Franco units, equal to a company or battalion, in an operation which began at nightfall and ended at daybreak. In this combat Hermenegildo fought as a plain soldier while he commanded his company. One fact is characteristic of his action. He personally threw more than one hundred hand grenades. With some of his men seriously wounded, he carried them on his back to the first aid station."²²

Praise has often been expressed for the artillery work of Apolônio de Carvalho, who distinguished himself in Extremadura, Andalusia, and Córdoba, in the battle of Teruel, and in the final Republican offensive in Catalonia. During most of the action he held the rank of lieutenant (being paid accordingly) and, like some others, was promoted to captain only at the end of the civil war; however, the need for trained military men was so great that Apolônio not infrequently carried out assignments appropriate for majors or colonels.²³

Eneas Jorge de Andrade, who had succeeded in joining the air force, lost his life "in combat above Saragossa, returning from a mission against German and Italian planes."²⁴ Joaquim Silveira dos Santos, who joined the Spanish Republican Army of the Center as a lieutenant, was twice wounded in one engagement. Lieutenant David Capistrano da Costa was wounded in the south-central area of Spain, and Ramón Prieto Bernié, the Spanish civilian from Brazil who commanded a machine gun company late in the war, was wounded three times in one battle. Gay da Cunha, Nelson de Souza

Alves, Homero de Castro Jobim, Delcy Silveira, and Eny Silveira were wounded during the long-drawn-out Ebro River engagements of the second half of 1938, which ended as a disaster for the Republicans.²⁵

In September 1938, when the long battle of the Ebro River was reaching its close, Roberto Morena sent a letter to all the Brazilians fighting in Spain to suggest their withdrawal from the civil war and to remind them to retain the knowledge they had gained for use in future struggles in Brazil.²⁶ Around that time, or a little later, it became known that Stalin had reached the decision that the International Brigades should be withdrawn. In Barcelona on November 15, after the appropriate international agreements about the withdrawal had been concluded, Spanish Republican Prime Minister Juan Negrín and the Stalinist heroine "La Pasionaria" (Dolores Ibarruri) spoke in Barcelona during an emotional farewell parade of the International Brigades. Many of the Brazilians, some of them recently released from hospitals, participated. Delcy Silveira was still in a hospital. Apolônio de Carvalho, Joaquim Silveira, and Morena were not in Catalonia.²⁷

The Brazilians were among those who were unwelcome in their homeland and for whom exit via France was prevented at the last minute by the French government. Turned away at the eastern part of the French border like six thousand others, the Brazilians returned to demobilization camps a little south of the frontier.

Following the fall of Barcelona late in January 1939, André Marty, the French Communist in command of the International Brigades, tried to reorganize the 15th International Brigade. Gay da Cunha, receiving an unexpected visit from Marty, was asked by the commander how many men in his area would voluntarily return to the front. Gay spoke of 684 men and was asked by Marty to organize a company. The Brazilian placed Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil in its command and gave platoon commands to Nelson de Souza Alves and David Capistrano.²⁸

After Dinarco Reis, Canabarro Lucas, Homero Jobim, and the Silveira brothers helped the still-wounded Gay organize the rear-guard, the company retreated with the 15th Brigade to the fishing town of San Pedro de los Pescadores. There Marty held a meeting at which he called all the men of the brigade cowards and unexpectedly assigned the brigade's command to Gay. When the men were invited by Marty to comment on the situation, the Brazilians criticized the manner in which the soldiers had recently been abandoned by their leaders. Marty, using notes he had taken during the meeting, limited his praise to Brazilians. Canabarro Lucas, Dinarco Reis, Homero

Jobim, Delcy Silveira, Eny Silveira, and José Homem Correia de Sá, he said, were the only men with the courage to be truthful: "For me these men have valor because they are not intimidated by the commander of the International Brigades or by his titles of French congressman and hero of the Black Sea. I congratulate you."²⁹

The fall of Catalonia to the "nationalist" troops of Franco early in February 1939 was accompanied by the flight to the French frontier of over 200,000 civilians and almost as many men of the Republican military forces. The Brazilians crossed into France on February 9 and were placed in large concentration camps at Argelès and St. Cyprien, which, historian Hugh Thomas explains, "were simply open spaces of sand dunes near the sea, enclosed by barbed-wire, from which the inmates were prevented from leaving by force. Men dug holes for themselves like animals, to find some shelter."³⁰ Morena, the only surviving Brazilian not to reach France in 1939, remained until March 30 in Alicante while bombs fell on the refugees who poured into that Spanish port and while the surrender of Madrid took place. Using a rope, Morena pulled himself aboard the last departing ship and thus was taken to French Algeria with thousands of other refugees. After months in a concentration camp there, he made his way to the Soviet Union.³¹

Meanwhile, in April 1939, Carlos da Silveira Martins Ramos, Brazil's chargé d'affaires to the Spanish Republic, obtained release from the French camps of Brazilians willing to return to their homeland: Canabarro Lucas, Nelson Alves, Homero Jobim, Delcy Silveira, and Eny Silveira. After waiting a month in Marseilles, they departed on the *Mendoza*. On debarkation in Rio, Nelson Alves and Eny Silveira eluded the police, and the other three were held for questioning by the DOPS, but for no more than three days. Delcy Silveira was ordered to leave Rio within a month.³²

Those who remained in France, because they had prison sentences to serve in Brazil, were transferred to the large sheds making up the concentration camp of Gurs in the western Pyrenees. Costa Leite, writing from Gurs to Roberto Sissón, Pedro Mota Lima, and other friends in Uruguay, said that Andrés Ewert, in the camp, was eager for news about his brother Arthur Ernest Ewert (Harry Berger). The intellectuals in the camp gave lessons, and the Brazilians promoted interest in Brazilian history, sports, and music. Food was scarce and the weather was sometimes bitterly cold.³³

In 1940 and 1941, after the war broke out in Europe, the Brazilians who remained in French concentration camps were able to escape. Some of them, having been sent to labor on the Maginot Line, were moved from the front with the German breakthrough of

May 1940 and they made their escape soon after the collapse of France in June. Thus Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil and Wolf Reutemberg managed to get to Paris, as did Dinarco Reis and Joaquim Silveira dos Santos. Apolônio de Carvalho escaped from Gurs in December 1940 and went to Marseilles where he taught Portuguese and became a temporary employee at the Brazilian consulate. Late in 1940 or early in 1941 the trip across the Atlantic to the Americas was made by Costa Leite (after reaching Marseilles), Correia de Sá (after reaching Portugal), and Gay da Cunha.

In June 1941, Dinarco Reis and Joaquim Silveira dos Santos fled from German-occupied France but Hermenegildo died of an infection while trying to get out. David Capistrano, who had been arrested by the Germans and freed a year later, joined Dinarco Reis and Joaquim Silveira dos Santos in Marseilles, and at the end of 1941 the three went to Portugal, from where they returned to Latin America.³⁴

Apolônio de Carvalho remained in France and became a hero of the Resistance. By the time France was liberated from the Germans he held the rank of colonel, commanded two thousand men, and was on the national directorship of the Communist-run FTP-MOI, formed to organize foreign workers in France to fight in the French Resistance along with the French FTPF (Franc-Tireurs Partisans Français). One of the FTP-MOI combattants in Paris was young Wolf Reutemberg, whose Escola da Samba songs, sung in a rich baritone, had been popular in the Gurs concentration camp.

Reutemberg was jailed by the Germans and shot by them in Paris in 1944. Hernesto Yosk, a Jew like Reutemberg, was shipped by the Germans from France to Germany in 1943 or 1944, and he died in a German concentration camp. Jorge Cetyl, who had spent most of his life in Brazil and then served as a political commissar in Spain, was more fortunate. He joined fellow Czechoslovakians in an army unit and participated in the Allied campaign under Mark Clark in Italy.³⁵

2. *The Buenos Aires and Lima Pan American Conferences* (1936 and 1938)

In 1936 the PCB was still attacking Yankee imperialism. In October of that year, two months before the Buenos Aires Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, the PCB argued that Pan Americanism was the banner of Yankee imperialism. The Yankees,

A Classe Operária wrote, would use the Buenos Aires conference to try to organize a sort of League of Nations of America, a political instrument for Yankee penetration and domination.¹

At the conference the United States pleased the Latin American delegations by accepting a resolution which declared that the intervention of any of the parties into the internal affairs of another was "inadmissible." Although Argentina successfully opposed the kind of collective security pact that the United States had in mind, the nations did agree that any threat to the peace of the Americas would call for their representatives to consult.²

The nonintervention resolution, *A Classe Operária* wrote in February 1937, was a joke because, on the very day it was adopted, the Yankee imperialist agent Fulgencio Batista overthrew the constitutional president of Cuba. Discussions at the Buenos Aires conference for ending the Chaco dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia were described by *A Classe Operária* as a struggle between British and United States imperialism, each eager to control petroleum in the Chaco area. As for Brazil, its participation in the conference for peace was ridiculed by the Communists because the country was in "a state of war." *A Classe Operária* also condemned the Brazilian delegation for having proposed a resolution which would have outlawed all "extremist manifestations" (which, *A Classe Operária* said, were really manifestations on behalf of democracy).³

Otávio Brandão wrote in Moscow in February 1937 that the "Pact against 'Communism,'" submitted at the conference by Vargas' representatives, appeared to conflict with Roosevelt's opposition to fascism in Latin American governments. Roosevelt, Brandão noted, was abandoning the "mailed-fist policy" toward Latin America because the United States masses, democratic in sentiment, opposed it and because North Americans, with Latin American interests threatened by Japanese and German imperialist penetration, knew that the mailed-fist policy would "increase the enmity of the Latin American peoples toward United States imperialism."⁴

While Hitler's Germany made its extraordinary advances during the two years following the Buenos Aires conference, the PCB became enthusiastic about the United States. *16 de Julho*, used by the PCB to promote unification of the Brazilian democratic forces "into a single, mighty bloc," wrote in March 1938 that Brazil should follow the path of the "democratic powers, especially the United States." The PCB's Political Bureau issued a manifesto which praised Foreign Minister Aranha and declared that "the Pan Americanists of the heart cannot remain deaf to the appeals" of Litvinov, Roosevelt, and

Cárdenas, "those three personalities outstanding among the most eminent statesmen of the present time." "Why," the Political Bureau asked, "is only the Brazilian president quiet?"⁵

Otávio Brandão found the Vargas government irresolute, contradictory, and vacillating between its fascist and democratic wings. But he noted that, under pressure from the antifascist mass movement, the Aranha sector, and Roosevelt's democratic policy, the Vargas government had released some "antifascist" prisoners, turned against the German settlements in south Brazil, and permitted the publication of articles supporting "the struggles of the peoples of Spain and China."⁶

The Lima conference of December 1938 (Eighth International Conference of American States), held after the Munich Pact, was viewed by the Brazilian Moscow-line Communists in an entirely different light than the Buenos Aires conference of December 1936. They called Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull "great democratic leaders" and they attacked the "anti-American" attitude of Argentina, opponent of the collective security pact that the United States, Vargas, and Aranha thought was needed. The conference, and its declaration that the American republics should help each other in case of foreign threats to their peace and security, were criticized by the PCB for being too timid. Pointing to developments in Europe and Asia and the "conquest of Abyssinia," the Brazilian Stalinists wrote that "it is not enough to refrain from helping any aggressor nation. . . . It is necessary to help those who are attacked. And this is precisely the spirit of the last messages of Roosevelt, and is the principle for which Litvinov always fought as the voice of the Soviet Union, the principal guardian of peace and democracy in the world." The PCB's *Revista Proletária* scoffed at Brazilian delegation chief Afrânio de Melo Franco. His assertion that "the national policy of Brazil is that of peace by peace and not that of peace by means of force," the Brazilian Communists said, was "equivalent to a declaration of passiveness in the face of the threat" and represented a stimulus to aggression. They called for a boycott of the aggressors and expressed pleasure at the Vargas government's decision to have Aranha accept Roosevelt's invitation to discuss important problems in Washington.⁷

The Trotskyites explained the pro-Roosevelt attitude of the Moscow-line Communists by writing, after the Munich Pact, that Stalin had become frightened by the "European panorama." But, the Trotskyites said, the chief threat to the world was United States imperialism, which, they found, was "impeding a closer Anglo-German understanding." They described the European contest as a

"simple old struggle" in which the "young and thirsty" German imperialism found itself forced to fight for its existence against the imperialisms which had used the Versailles Treaty to rob from it. What alarmed the Trotskyites was "the decisive pressure" of the United States "for re-dividing the world."

According to the Trotskyites, the Yankees had taken steps at the Lima conference to control strategic and critical Latin American raw materials and to assure an abundant supply of fighting men, or "cannon fodder." The "good neighbor policy of Wall Street," they said, would transform all the United States' "neighbors in the hemisphere into new Manchurias and Czechoslovakias, controlled by American imperialism." Stalin, "whose supreme hope is Wall Street," was accused by the Trotskyites of collaborating ably with the demagoguery of Roosevelt.⁸

3. *The PCB Expels Carlos Lacerda* (January 1939)

Carlos Lacerda, son of oppositionist politician Maurício and nephew of Communists Fernando and Paulo, was 21 years old at the time of the November 1935 uprisings. Before they occurred, he had been a student leader taking a Rio law school course (which he did not complete); he had belonged to the Federação Vermelha Estudantil, had been the orator who nominated Prestes to be honorary ANL president, and had published articles in the pro-Communist *A Manhã*.¹ After the uprisings he had gone into hiding, spending some of the time at the home of classmate Adalberto João Pinheiro and some at the Lacerda family's country property in Rio State. In an article published in the April 1936 issue of *Unidad* of Buenos Aires, Lacerda wrote that "the true intellectual production of our time is on the side of the revolution," and he quoted Lenin as saying that art should be understood and loved by the masses.²

In 1937, when students organized to work for the election of José Américo, Lacerda joined a "caravan" of students, which included Communist Milton Caires de Brito, to campaign in the interior. The group traveled in an old boat up the São Francisco River from Pirapora, Minas Gerais, as far as Juázeiro in the north of Bahia. "In truth," Lacerda said later, "what was carried out was an antifascist campaign that was slightly Communist."³

Following the enactment of the state of war in October 1937 the student campaigners went into hiding. Students in Bahia arranged for Lacerda to hide on Itaparica Island, off Salvador. Some of them hoped to send Lacerda to France to participate in the Front Populaire,

but after about a month he was arrested and sent by the authorities to Rio, where, like many leftists, he spent the early days of the Estado Novo in the Casa de Correção. He and other leftist students might have been sent to a concentration camp at Vila Militar to receive anti-Communist teaching if General Newton Cavalcanti, Vila Militar commander, had had his way.⁴

Out of prison in 1938, Lacerda was one of a group in Rio that Samuel Wainer has called "the five musketeers who supported Communist ideas." Besides Wainer and Lacerda, it consisted of Jorge Amado, Rubem Braga, and Lacerda's cousin Moacir Werneck de Castro. Along with Otávio Malta (who had been in prison from March 1936 to May 1937) and Eneida Costa de Moraes, they frequented the small apartment of Wainer and his wife in Rio's busy downtown Cinelândia section. There in March 1938 Wainer started publishing the monthly *Diretrizes* with some help from Wainer's brilliant blind friend, World War I correspondent Azevedo Amaral, who persuaded the Light and Power Company to advertise in it. *Diretrizes*, for which Lacerda was a reporter, was so well received that it later became a leading national weekly.⁵

In December 1938 some of the students Lacerda had met in Bahia launched another successful legal antifascist magazine, *Seiva*. Published monthly in Salvador and controlled by young Communists, it was directed by João da Costa Falcão, an 18-year-old law student who had joined the PCB in 1938. At the request of Diógenes de Arruda Câmara, Recife law student Paulo de Figueiredo Cavalcanti became *Seiva's* representative in Pernambuco. Several of the articles in the first issue, such as Carlos Lacerda's account of a slave revolt and articles about philosophy and literature by Leôncio Basbaum and Eduardo Maffei, appeared under pseudonyms; others, by Paulo Cavalcanti, Orlando Gomes, and Afrânio Coutinho, lacked this disguise.⁶ *Seiva* attained a circulation of two or three thousand, distributed over much of Brazil.

In Rio late in 1938 Lacerda advised the other musketeers that Olímpio Guilherme, director of Valentim Bouças' progovernment *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro*, was planning an article on Brazilian Communism and wanted to have it written by Lacerda or Odete de Carvalho e Souza, a dedicated anti-Communist. According to Lacerda's subsequent recollection, some of his friends (including Otávio Malta, whom he had known on *A Manhã*) consulted the Party leadership and then told Lacerda that the PCB's Central Committee preferred an article by Lacerda, which would describe the PCB as weak, rather than an article by a rabid anti-Communist, which

would stress the need of more repression and might lead to a new strong wave of action against the Party.⁷

Lacerda's unsigned article, based on material he obtained from the PCB and police records, appeared in the *Observador* issue of January 1939. It named no Brazilian Communist aside from Prestes and emphasized that the PCB, unlike the Trotskyites, had abandoned insurrectional activities and adopted the Popular Front tactic. It concluded that "in the present regime, . . . with the prestige of the president, and the national union of all the forces for a work of progress and peace, it is improbable that Communism can evolve again." A remark about "the genius" of Lenin appeared in print as "the degenerate genius" due to editing by *O Observador*.⁸

Eneida Costa de Moraes, who did not like Lacerda, spoke against him and his article when she met with intellectuals in José Olympio's bookstore (then in downtown Rio). In far leftist circles she argued that the author of such an article should not "continue in the PCB." About a week after the article was published, Wainer and Moacir Werneck de Castro were surprised by a shower of PCB mimeographed leaflets, in downtown Rio, announcing the expulsion of Carlos Lacerda from the Party. With this news about the Party's reaction to the article, they went to the unpretentious apartment over the Roxy Theater in Copacabana where Lacerda resided with his wife and baby son, Sérgio. Lacerda greeted the news with silence.⁹

Some have claimed that Lacerda was once a Communist Youth (JC) member and therefore automatically became a PCB member when the Party disbanded the JC. But others, including Sacchetta and Lacerda himself, have denied that he ever belonged to the JC, and Prestes has stated that Lacerda was never a PCB member.¹⁰ Nevertheless it is clear from Lacerda's attitude, in Wainer's apartment on the evening of the "expulsion" notice, that he was deeply grieved by the PCB's reaction to his article. On the following day, when Wainer and Moacir Werneck de Castro sought to comfort their friend, Wainer made Lacerda the director of the literary section of *Diretrizes*.¹¹

The PCB spread the word that Lacerda was a Trotskyite collaborator with fascism and imperialism who should be cold-shouldered by true friends of the proletariat. Lacerda received the impression that former friends, interested in maintaining good relations with the PCB, denounced him to Party leaders and that the Party denounced him to the police. Two police agents invaded his apartment, where they found Communist books containing notations by his uncles.¹²

Lacerda spent about a week in prison. Upon being released he asked Serafim Braga why he had been jailed. "We received," Braga said, "A denouncement that you were distributing Trotskyite pamphlets in Floriano Square." "I have," Lacerda said, "passed the age of distributing pamphlets and am now at the age of writing them, and you know very well that I have never been a Trotskyite."¹³

Some of Lacerda's *Diretrizes* articles were considered critical of artists favored by Communists and resulted in pressure on Wainer for Lacerda's dismissal, and Wainer yielded to it. In São Paulo in 1941 Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta presented Lacerda to Sacchetta, who had become chief editor and secretary of *Folha da Manhã* and *Folha da Noite*. Lacerda, given a job at the *Folhas* by Sacchetta, lived for a few years in São Paulo, where he saw a good deal of Pedroso d'Horta and other intellectual foes of Vargas.¹⁴

4. *The Communist Schism on Fernando de Noronha Island*

In 1937 Fernando de Noronha Island, about three hundred miles from Recife, was taken over from Pernambuco by the federal government. The old island prison already housed common criminals with long sentences and therefore in 1938 the Justice Ministry built new installations to serve as an agricultural penal colony for political prisoners. The construction, under the direction of Lieutenant Vitorio Canepa, was nearing completion late in September 1938, when the TSN began handing down sentences for those it found guilty of involvement in the Integralista putsch of May 1938.¹

Far more Integralistas than Communists were among the 208 political prisoners who made up the first shipment to the new penal colony. Leaving Rio on the 58-year-old *Manaus* on October 26, 1938, they reached their destination on November 2 and were taken ashore in *jangadas* (catamarans). They were forced to walk twenty kilometers, without clothing, to the distribution point of striped uniforms bearing numbers. The first number assigned to a political prisoner, 290, went to Hilcar Leite, who was awaiting a ruling of the TSN on the appeal of his sentence. The ruling, coming a month later, reduced his sentence from three to two years; at the same time Pagu, whose sister Sidéria had been absolved, received a similar reduction, and Lúcio Carlos Aires Fragoso's sentence was cut to six months.²

Hilcar Leite remained in the uncomfortable position of being the only Trotskyite on the island despite subsequent shipments which, by 1940, brought the number of political prisoners on the island up to approximately six hundred. These new shipments, which

were made from Recife, Rio, and São Paulo, gave the Communists a numerical edge over the Integralistas. The contingent from the Recife jail, sent to the island in the first part of 1939, included ex-Sergeant Gregório Bezerra, veteran coal loader José Francisco de Oliveira, and the large, combative baker, José Caetano Machado. Quite a few of the Pernambuco Communists, such as Caetano Machado and the missing Alberto Besouchet, had been sentenced by the TSN to 8 years of imprisonment. Bezerra had received a 26½-year sentence.³

In 1939, while political prisoners were shipped to Fernando de Noronha, the Rio and São Paulo authorities worked industriously to save Brazil from Communism. In Rio in October they obtained the conviction of more than twenty sailors, said to have organized a Communist cell. At about the same time they left the top PCB leaders with a seriously reduced base in Rio because they arrested over one hundred Communists who formed the Regional Committee and its most important cells in labor unions and the military. Among those arrested with the metalworkers was Luís Cupello Calônio, brother of Elza Fernandes.⁴

In São Paulo the PCB leadership was practically eliminated in May 1939 thanks to the sleuthing of Luís Apolônio and other investigators. After the investigators spied Bangú when he visited São Paulo early in 1939, they held off making arrests but made notes about the people he met. Although they lost sight of Bangú, they added to their lists of suspects and kept the men under observation. Thus late in May they were able to dismantle the Bangú-line Regional Committee of São Paulo. They seized a mimeograph, stencils, two typewriters, and a vast collection of documents together with twenty-two participants in the work of the Regional Committee. Among them were Marighella (described as the director), ex-Corporal Clóvis de Oliveira Neto (the treasurer), Agostinho José de Carvalho, Antônio Rodrigues de Gouveia, Armando Rodrigues Coutinho, Fernando de Oliveira, Aluísio do Amaral, Brivaldo Leão de Almeida, and three women. Marighella, Clóvis de Oliveira Neto, Antônio Rodrigues de Gouveia, and Fernando de Oliveira were sent to Fernando de Noronha.⁵

The Communists on the island lived apart from the Integralistas and devoted themselves to an active outdoor life of fishing, producing vegetables, loading and unloading vessels, raising chickens and eggs, participating in sports, and even manufacturing salt in a primitive way. In all of this they had the cooperation of the penal colony director, Colonel Nestor Veríssimo da Fonseca, a Prestes Column veteran, who, they sensed, was an antifascist. They enjoyed

swimming and sunbathing. Despite heat, bad water, and mosquitoes, they regained their health, which in many cases had been impaired by months behind bars. Forty-eight Communists, certified by Ilvo Meireles and another Communist doctor as unable to work, received special consideration when the Communist leaders reached decisions about the distribution of food.⁶

The Communists' lives were regulated by the leaders of their *coletivo*, usually former army officers, chosen twice monthly by the members. Most of the power was in the hands of Agildo Barata, who Ilvo Meireles and others have described as the dictator of the *coletivo*, cordial but set in his military ways. He was a stronger personality than the less accessible Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo. These two and their fellow former army officers had the support of former army sergeants and corporals and dominated, not without disagreeable struggles, the ex-sailors, the ex-state police officers, and the civilian prisoners.⁷

Agildo Barata, helping the prisoners make what he called the choice between himself and PCB Secretary General Antônio Maciel Bomfim (Miranda), "disclosed Miranda's duplicity" by arguing that Miranda had used Elza Fernandes to provide the police with information about the PCB. The campaign stripped the remaining prestige from Miranda, who was suspicious that Communists had murdered Elza Fernandes. As for Hilcar Leite, he was shunned. He recalls that the only "prototalitarians" who would speak with him were those busy directing the Communists' lives: Barata, Agliberto, Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, and Francisco Antônio Leivas Otero (ex-lieutenant of the Third Infantry Regiment).⁸

After the Communists helped repair an old baroque colonial church, Penal Colony Director Nestor Veríssimo offered to pay them to work at constructing a new prison. As the leaders of the Communists opposed this work, the *coletivo* turned down Veríssimo's offer. However, about one hundred Communists resolved to ignore the *coletivo's* decision. They pointed out that they needed the income for their families, whereas Barata and other former army officers were in a different situation because legislation, enacted before Congress was closed, defined the ex-officers, the men expelled from the federal armed forces, as dead men whose families therefore received a handsome pension (*montepio*). (The legislation gave rise to an intriguing remark: "I am living off the *montepio* received by my widow.")⁹

Bezerra was disgusted to find that many of the forty-eight Communists certified by doctors as too ill for work joined those who decided to earn the wages they felt they needed. He became so irate at

Miranda for joining this group that he threatened to kill him. After arranging to be transferred from vegetable garden work to kitchen work (with Marighella and Benedito de Carvalho), Bezerra refused to feed Communists who were constructing the new prison, and he told them to eat with the Integralistas who participated in the construction. The "opportunists," as the prison-building Communists were called, used a part of their wages to buy canned foods from the prison directorship. They maintained that with or without their help the prison would be built and they added that the military were better at commanding than creating. The *coletivo* insulted and expelled the "opportunist traitors" and persuaded the prison directorship to move them to separate quarters. After that, Bezerra writes, "the Communists recuperated their fraternal life."¹⁰

7. The War's First Two Years (1939–1941)

1. *The Soviet-German Pact and the Soviet-Finnish War* (August 1939–March 1940)

Stacchini and some friends, hiding from the police in São Paulo late in August 1939, heard a Portuguese-language broadcast from Moscow announce that Stalin and von Ribbentrop had agreed to a nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union and were celebrating the occasion with a fraternal drink. There was, Stacchini felt, something ironical about the old charge made on the same radio program that Sacchetta, Stacchini, and their allies were traitors to the Communist cause.¹

The signing of the nonaggression pact inspired heated reactions. An early, indignant outcry came from the few Communists in São Paulo who remained opposed to Bangú without having turned to Trotskyism. In their shrill, brief, mimeographed manifesto they proclaimed their break with the Comintern, which, they said, had betrayed democracy and the workers of the world and was playing the game of the Trotskyites by allying itself with the Nazis. While admitting the alarming possibility of “a fascist Russia tomorrow,” the São Paulo “Regional Committee” which signed the manifesto took comfort in the conviction that “the glorious Russian army will know how to strike back at the rude blow unleashed by the Comintern.” The manifesto expressed the resolve to carry on with pro-democracy Communism.²

On the same day, September 1, the CC of the recently formed Trotskyite Partido Socialista Revolucionário (PSR) used the latest development to renew its attack on the “Stalinist International.” It accused it of being responsible for the outbreak of a second world war, which, it predicted, would follow Hitler’s hostilities against Poland, and it added that the “Stalinist International” represented no current of the Soviet Union or world proletariat, but simply a conservative

caste which nourished imperialist appetites. The PSR ("Brazilian Section of the Fourth International") called on the Brazilian workers to join their "brothers" in turning the imperialist war into a "civil revolutionary war" that would serve as the grave of capitalism.³

Despite "technical difficulties," the Bangú PCB managed to include, in the September 7 issue of *A Classe Operária*, the first paragraphs of an article written to dispel the "great alarm" and "confusion intentionally established" in the press about the pact. England and France, the article said, had offered "the greatest concessions" and had done everything else possible to get Germany to initiate war against the Soviet Union, the leading defender of peace and weak countries.⁴

During September, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, and the Soviet Union was reported to have begun its invasion of Poland. The PCB's Political Bureau hastened to deny "false" newspaper accounts about a "supposed German-Soviet Alliance and supposed understandings for the partition of Poland." The nonaggression pact, it explained, "has nothing to do with an alliance" and "there is no partition of Poland by the Red Army." The mission of the Soviets was described as that of defending the Belorussian and Ukrainian populations and "removing the Polish people from the criminal war to which they were dragged by their inept statesmen."⁵

The PCB had sympathized with the purpose of the Lima conference, but it assumed a different position when the American nations met in Panama late in September 1939 to declare a neutral zone extending three hundred miles from the shores of the continent. The scheme, the PCB's Political Bureau wrote, was devised by the United States to extend its imperialistic influence and favor England and France, which, like the United States, were becoming fascist at an alarming speed. That Roosevelt, the PCB's recent hero, was returning to "the embrace of the fascist and prowar cliques" became clear to the PCB with his campaign to have Congress raise the embargo on the sale of arms and thus "assist Anglo-French imperialism."

In a drastic about-face, the PCB declared that the war for the "annihilation of Hitlerism" was "senseless and even criminal." The true purpose of that war, the PCB explained, was not to promote democracy but to strengthen the material interests of "the great colonial powers." This being the case, the PCB not only reversed its former position on the United States embargo question but it also revised its description of what was happening in Brazil. It wrote that the "elements of the present Brazilian government" which were connected with Roosevelt and Anglo-French imperialism had, "up to a short

time ago," worked to prevent the influence of German fascism in Brazil, but "now those same elements seize for themselves the fascist and anti-Soviet banner."⁶

Hilcar Leite recalls Stalinists on Fernando de Noronha defending Hitler "like the Integralistas," and Alberto da Rocha Barros has pointed out that the Brazilian Stalinists began calling the Trotskyites "members of the British Intelligence Service" instead of "members of the Gestapo." According to Leôncio Basbaum, "many Brazilian Communists and their supporters . . . carried out propaganda against the allies and in favor of Germany. . . . Some intellectuals even went to work for the German propaganda press and received payments from the Embassy."⁷

This was when the Soviet foreign minister declared that "a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for a durable peace in Europe" and when the British Communists accused their government of trying to break up the Soviet-German understanding.⁸ In England and France the Communist Parties opposed their governments and the war. The anti-Communist reactions were especially severe in France.

The Brazilian Trotskyites published a manifesto of "the Eastern American Bureau, Sub-Secretariat of the IV International," that told the workers not to listen to Hitler and Mussolini "if they join arm-in-arm with Stalin to incite you to revolt against the Anglo-French imperialism." The anti-imperialistic and anticapitalistic demagoguery of the Hitler-Stalin bloc, the Trotskyites said, was simply a cover for hiding "the horrendous face of bestial fascism." But the Trotskyites agreed with a part of the new Stalinist position: the British, French, and American governments were bandits and oppressors. Roosevelt, according to the Trotskyites, was working to dominate Latin America and the world and was no more worthy of confidence than the Hitler-Stalin bloc. Pacifists too, such as Gandhi, "that senile saint of the Hindu capitalists," were "dangerous venom" for the masses. The course to follow, the Trotskyites said, was that of Lenin in World War I and of the Partido Socialista Revolucionário in World War II: struggle against all imperialisms and their wars.⁹

An article in *Seiva*, the Bahia monthly of young Stalinists, spoke of the need "to emphasize that many governments of Europe represent the past in a state of saturation." "The past," according to the article, "always feared the great forces of the future. It is organized deception and legalized tyranny that are feeling poorly with the march of the world to forms of life that are more just and closer to nature."¹⁰

Seiva's article was published when the "march of the world"

took the form of Soviet demands on Finland. Late in November 1939, following an unfriendly exchange of letters between Roosevelt and Soviet Presidium Chairman Mikhail Kalinin about the "threat" to Finland, Russia invaded Finland. While the British Communists unsuccessfully called on British workers to refuse to load munitions for the "Finnish reaction," the PCB was distressed because Aranha, adopting the prevalent view in the Americas, expressed Brazil's support for the Finnish nation, "victim of the assault."¹¹ When Argentina assumed the same position as Aranha, Paulo Duarte, who was in exile in Buenos Aires, found that the Brazilian Communists there would not sign a congratulatory telegram that he had prepared to send to the Argentine foreign minister. Duarte, who considered Eliezer Magalhães a Communist, writes that "Eliezer, although a Communist," was the exception and signed.¹²

The Political Bureau (BP) of the PCB expressed its view in an open letter to the members of the Interamerican Neutrality Council, who met in Rio in January 1940. Nothing, the BP wrote, was neutral about the Vargas government, which "arranged to ship 50,000 sacks of coffee . . . to aid Finland and which allows reactionary elements to lure volunteers for the anti-Soviet crusade." The PCB told the Neutrality Council members that they had not come to Rio to deal with neutrality, which "is not in the interest of Yankee imperialism."¹³

"In no epoch of history," *A Classe Operária* said on March 1, 1940, "have lies and slanders been voiced with such fury and cynicism as is now being done by the telegraphic agencies and the press, both financed by imperialism, about the struggle in Finland." States opposed to the Soviet Union were accused of imagining Finnish victories and thus impairing "the prestige and confidence that the masses place in the Socialist Fatherland."¹⁴

On March 12, Finland, bled white, and the Soviet Union, which had been in a tough war and may have feared an Anglo-French intervention, signed a peace treaty that Louis Fischer describes as humiliating for the Finns but not annihilating. "The glorious Soviet armed forces," the PCB's PB wrote, had not penetrated the territory to pillage or oppress its class brothers, but "to help them liquidate the power of their internal and foreign exploiters and oppressors: the large landowners, the capitalists, and imperialists."¹⁵

2. *Capture of the Bangú Secretariat* (March–May 1940)

1939 was a bad year for the PCB. In March the authorities discovered and ended the clandestine correspondence between Prestes and

Bangú,¹ and in May the entire São Paulo leadership was arrested. The Rio regional leadership was badly hurt and its labor union base dismantled by the arrests of September–October.

To help revive the Party in São Paulo, Domingos Braz (Mauro) was sent there from Rio in November 1939. A former textile worker, Braz had been heading the Party's Labor Union Sector in Rio and writing articles for *Revista Proletária* and *A Classe Operária*, together with Osvaldo Costa, Noé Gertel, Bangú, and Honório de Freitas Guimarães, who became known as Gaspar after returning from Europe in 1938. Braz belonged to the Central Committee, as did Bangú, Freitas Guimarães, Elias Reinaldo da Silva (André), Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (Abóbora), Walduvino Loureiro (of Niterói), and Sebastião Francisco, who had come from São Paulo in April 1938.²

The departure of Braz left the Rio Communists without a Labor Union Commission head, and the September–October arrests caused other problems. The substitute for Heliodoro Carrera ("Paulo Hespagnol"), able head of the Organization Commission, was ineffective. Almir de Oliveira Neves, the arrested head of the Military Commission, was not replaced, but the continuation of financial contributions from the military sector was assured by the assignment of their collection to Joaquim Câmara Ferreira.

Contributions, and payments for copies of *A Classe Operária*, reached PCB Finance Director Jorge Silveira Martins Ramos, often through Abóbora, Youth Sector Head Noé Gertel, and Sebastião Francisco, chief of the PCB in the Federal District. The contributions of Freitas Guimarães averaged one conto (1:000\$000) per month. Some revenue came from the regions of Rio State, Pará, Bahia, and Goiás.

According to Abóbora, "the dismantlement of all the base at the end of September 1939 made it necessary to intensify propaganda" and this required the purchase of a printing press to replace the publication equipment taken by the police. A press, advertised for sale by a salt company, was bought by Bangú and Abóbora for 4½ contos and used by the PCB in the Tomaz Coelho Station section of Rio until mid-March 1940, when it, too, was seized by the police. After that, Sebastião Francisco (Mathias) arranged in April for a Communist printer, an acquaintance of his, to sell a press to the PCB for three contos. It was installed in the state of Rio, near the São Mateus Station.³ Its first publication, a bulletin by Noé Gertel and Sebastião Francisco calling for a "national union against imperialism and the war," was among its last, because the arrests in Rio between March and May 1940 destroyed the Party's national leadership and its re-

maining supportive apparatus in Rio. The press that had been installed in Rio State fell to the police early in May.

The new arrests, carried out mostly in March and April, were the most significant since the capture of Prestes four years earlier. They were a long time in preparation. Several months before they began, inspectors reporting to DOPS Chief Felisberto Batista Teixeira learned from a Party member that Bangú was in touch with a "former condemned woman who had come from Rio Grande do Norte." They located the suspected woman easily because only two women had disembarked from Rio Grande do Norte during the interval under consideration. After the woman had been under observation for two months, an inspector, pretending to be a painter's assistant from Rio Grande do Norte, told her that he had a letter for Bangú from their home state. As she agreed to accept the nonexistent letter, she was arrested. Her confession that she met regularly with Bangú at the home of Rita Alves de Souza, led to the discovery of a Communist distribution center at Rita's home and the arrest of Rita. Although Rita did not cooperate with the police, a note in her purse about a forthcoming meeting with Abóbora (Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier) led to the arrest of Abóbora when he stepped off a bus to meet her. In the meantime André (Elias Reinaldo da Silva) was arrested at Rita's residence.⁴

During police torturing, André lost all his fingernails and toenails, and parts of his body were burned with a blowtorch; but he would not talk.⁵ His resistance, Abóbora's initial silence, and the vagueness of Rita's information delayed the location of Abóbora's home. As Abóbora explained later, his home, on Bernardo Guimarães Street, "was like the headquarters of the directorship" of the Party. It contained a mimeograph, the secret file of the organization, and the storage place of propaganda ready for distribution. There Abóbora's wife, Antônia da Silva, the mother of a young son by a previous marriage and a young daughter by her marriage to Abóbora, worked herself to exhaustion to take care of the needs of Party members. Thus she became known as the "Mother of the Party." The household also included Sebastião Francisco, his wife, Ida D'amico (from São Paulo), and their little daughter.⁶

From Rita the police learned the name of the street on which the home of Abóbora was located. After searching over forty homes on the street, they finally invaded the right building on a night late in March. Sebastião Francisco escaped in his pajamas. His daughter was elsewhere, with friends of her parents. But the police caught Antônia and Ida, the wives of Abóbora and Sebastião Francisco, and

the children of Antônia. So roughly were the women treated that Ida went out of her mind, twice tried to commit suicide in the Rio prison, and eventually did kill herself, in São Paulo, after her release. According to Davino Francisco dos Santos, Abóbora and his wife were willing to undergo torture, but, when the police started to torture their young daughter, Abóbora broke down and talked, leading at last to the solution of the Elza Fernandes case.⁷

From Abóbora the police learned of the location of the printing press that had been bought from the salt company. They arrested the two printers they found at the press and then placed their men in the building and in hiding places around it. Bangú, making a visit to the press, looked into the building through a window, saw policemen there, and ran down the street. The police opened fire and caught the lively little PCB boss when he stumbled.⁸

At the Polícia Central, Bangú was submitted to the "halo of angels," a device for twisting a cord tighter and tighter around the victim's head. Like André, he lost all his fingernails and toenails. They were preserved in a matchbox. Savage beatings and the use of the blowtorch left his body so battered and burned that he could not recline on a bed when he was put in a cell, and he wailed ceaselessly.⁹ But he refused to talk to the police, leading the police to complain, almost a month later, that Bangú "has not opened his mouth even to confess that his name is Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha." Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, described by the police as head of the PCB's Military Sector, was also reported as saying "not a solitary word, obliging the authorities to investigate countless times to get a result that could have been reached by a single indication." But, as Osvaldo Costa found out after his arrest, the police had already learned much from some of the new prisoners—enough to leave Costa disgusted with former companions.¹⁰

The testimony of Abóbora was invaluable to the police.¹¹ He revealed the location of the home of Honório de Freitas Guimarães, in the Inhaúma district, whereupon police agents surrounded it. After Freitas Guimarães shot at them, the agents shot back, wounding him twice, and then they arrested him.¹² Recovering in a hospital, he made a full confession about the Elza Fernandes case.¹³

Sebastião Francisco, having escaped from Abóbora's home, found lodging in the home of Noé Gertel, with whom he had resided before. In a letter that a Communist's wife took to São Paulo, Sebastião Francisco advised Domingos Braz of the arrests of Bangú, Abóbora, and the others. Braz, whose work was going well in São Paulo, replied that the comrades would have to redouble their efforts.¹⁴

With the arrest of Sebastião Francisco early in May, Braz re-

mained the only Central Committee member at liberty. The announcement of the arrest of Sebastião Francisco, Noé Gertel, and more than fifty other Communists taken at about the same time was pictured as a triumph over those who had wanted to "use the May 1 date to carry out a coup against the institutions."¹⁵ But the announcement came as an anticlimax because the newspapers in the preceding month had been filled with sensational publicity about the Elza Fernandes case, the result of the arrests made in March and April.

3. *Jail Sentences for the Murderers of Elza Fernandes* (November 7, 1940)

"Never has the Communist Danger in Brazil Been Greater than at Present." These words from the report of DOPS Director Felisberto Batista Teixeira to Police Chief Filinto Müller were used as *Jornal do Brasil's* headlines on April 14 and 16 when it published passages from the report, thus furnishing the details about the arrests of Freitas Guimarães, Bangú, and other PCB leaders.

The press devoted much space to Freitas Guimarães, who was described as the "true chief" of the Brazilian Communists. It suggested that he had probably ordered the assassination of young Tobias Warschawski in 1934—and the suggestion seems to have been close to the mark, for Freitas Guimarães had apparently presided over this execution, ordered by PCB leaders who considered Warschawski a police spy in 1934 and who later blamed the police for the killing. Furthermore, the press in April 1936 published Freitas Guimarães' confession of having taken charge of murdering Elza Fernandes after the receipt of Prestes' letter on the subject.¹

The publication of Freitas Guimarães' autobiography, dated March 1939, revealed that he was the descendant of Brazilian aristocrats and the son of wealthy parents who had taken him to Paris in his youth and sent him, with a brother, to Eton School in England. After returning to Brazil, he had complained of "injustices" suffered at home because "his brothers received better treatment and better presents" than he did. Seeking to make money in mining and other ventures financed by his parents, he had failed, leading him to observe that he was not a person who could make money "under the existing conditions of the capitalist system." By the time Freitas Guimarães reached this conclusion, he was being drawn to Communism by his first wife, Maria, daughter of the Countess of Figueiredo. Supplementing information given in the autobiography, the press

pointed out that the girl with whom Freitas Guimarães lived after Maria's death was a textile worker "of low class," who knew him only as Gaspar and was astonished at the news of his Communist activities. The *milionário* was pictured as "cruel, violent, vengeful, and implacable."²

The publication of the autobiography coincided with the exhumation of the remains of Elza Fernandes following several days of digging. Abóbora and Elza's brother Luís, taken to the burial spot, identified the remains. They consisted of little more than bones and so the authorities turned also to Elza's dentist and he identified her dental arch.³

Luís Cupello Calônio sent a note to Miranda, who had been transferred from Fernando de Noronha to Rio's Polícia Central, where Elza's assassins were also held. Luís wrote that he had recognized his sister's teeth and hair, had learned of the confessions, and was renouncing his revolutionary past and terminating his Communist activities. In a long reply, Miranda addressed Luís as his "friend and brother-in-law," and said that he was not writing as PCB secretary general. He explained that he had "separated" from the party a month before going to Fernando de Noronha, a fact that had not been evident because of those who had "an interest in preserving appearances." Although he attributed the separation to his "better understanding of problems and processes," obtained from reading and conversing, he admitted that the "barbarous and cowardly crime practiced against our unforgettable Elvira" had "deepened even more" his "definite separation" from the party. He attributed the justification of her assassination to myths and lies, such as a newspaper report that she had informed against Ghioldi. "The very authors of the crime could not give one fact against her innocence and acted on the basis of suppositions, half-suspicions, profound cowardice, and a lack of morality. This best describes the character of the assassins." It was, Miranda wrote, known to everyone "here at the Polícia" that the assassins had confessed "coldly and cynically, without the Police torturing them for this purpose." In conclusion, Miranda said that he had never expected "to suffer so much" and hoped, upon his release, to go to Bahia and see his old mother and his brothers and sisters.⁴

Oswaldo Costa also left the PCB. In his testimony to the police he said: "Having been denounced by my own companions, persons of responsibility, in whom I deposited, in good faith, the maximum confidence, from this moment on I consider myself completely disconnected with the Partido Comunista do Brasil." Bangú's belated testimony followed Costa's declaration and followed so much torture that Davino Francisco dos Santos later wrote that Bangú's re-

sistance was astounding. Giving no information about the Elza Fernandes case, Bangú explained that he had been traveling in the north when she was said to have been murdered, but he assumed responsibility, as the Party's interim secretary general, for "everything" done during his absence. Abóbora, he admitted, had been correct when he had revealed the clandestine correspondence between Bangú and the imprisoned Prestes, but Bangú claimed to have no idea of the "process" used by Abóbora to transmit the letters.⁵

Expressions of praise for the police and concern about the "red virus" were widespread. *O Estado de S. Paulo* wrote that Major Filinto Müller and Captain Batista Teixeira "live today in the hearts of the Brazilians." *Jornal do Brasil* told of the nation's indebtedness to the police for defending "the nationality and the Christian civilization founded by our forefathers," and condemned the "extremist activities" for their "incomparable and diabolic aptitude to corrupt and poison." Commenting on those who had "hideously and coldly" murdered Elza Fernandes and others, it wrote that it was difficult to believe that they were Brazilians. It added: "Contrast the cruelty of those scenes of inquisition with the generosity of the armed forces which in 1935 repelled the Communist coup, and one will have a clear impression of the fate reserved for Brazil in the case of the triumph of those elements of terror and massacre."⁶

The arrest in Belém, Pará, of Cabeção (Francisco Natividade Lyra), "executioner" of the "death penalties" decreed by the "Red Tribunal," was followed by the news that he was being flown to Rio. The press sought to satisfy the public curiosity about the "large-headed monster," "the hideous assassin of Elza," and "the bloody individual who also murdered young Tobias Warschawski." "I never thought I would be photographed so much; I am becoming famous," Cabeção said in Rio. At the Polícia Central he was put face to face with Abóbora and Freitas Guimarães and listened to a reading of their confessions. "That's how it was," he admitted, and he claimed credit for the idea of strangulation by a cord. He praised Communism and lashed out at newspaper reporters and photographers. "If Communism is victorious," he was quoted as saying, "one of the first bonfires will be for burning the men of the press."⁷

Late at night on May 13, Prestes was taken from the Casa de Correção to the Polícia Central to face Bangú, Freitas Guimarães, Cabeção, and others involved in the case and to hear a reading of their testimonies and of the letters exchanged early in 1936 between the secretariat and Prestes about Elza. Prestes, refusing to sign any document or say anything about the case, acted as though he were unconcerned with the matter. Asked by Captain Batista Teixeira if

he had written the letters attributed to him, he remained silent. But he lost his temper when Freitas Guimarães and Cabeção, who had confessed everything, tried to put the principal blame of Elza's murder on him. "Traitors! Traitors!" he exclaimed in front of Freitas Guimarães, Cabeção, and Bangú, who were being interrogated in his company.⁸

If Prestes was furious at Freitas Guimarães for having confirmed their correspondence of February 1936 about Elza, Miranda was hardly less furious at the *milionário*. Speaking somewhat later, he said that Freitas Guimarães, eager to remove him from his post, carried on a campaign about Elza's danger to the Party and practically forced Prestes to write as he did. Nothing is known about the role of Vallée, who was advising Prestes in February 1936, except that he believed Freitas Guimarães' accusation. Sobral Pinto, discussing the case recently, objected to the prosecution's use of only "a part" of Prestes' letter to the secretariat.⁹

At the hearing before TSN Judge Maynard Gomes on November 7, Bangú's lawyer asked that his tortured client make an appearance. But the request was denied, which is hardly surprising because, after the most severe torturing, such as that inflicted by a blowtorch, the victims were usually denied visitors for a six-month period.¹⁰ Prestes, rather than Bangú, was brought in at the hearing. The Cavalier of Hope observed that the date was the "twenty-third anniversary of the liberation of the Russian people," and he launched into a long and violent protest against the "inhuman" isolation he had suffered. Asked whether he had written his letter of February 19, 1936, he said that he could not have done so because he was "rigorously incommunicado." (Jorge Amado, using the same argument later, maintained that the "announced release" of Elza Fernandes by the police occurred after Prestes was arrested and that Prestes could not have written the letter about her when the police had him "totally incommunicado.")¹¹

On November 7 Judge Maynard Gomes handed down thirty-year prison sentences to Prestes, Cabeção, Freitas Guimarães, Abóbora, and Adelino Deicola dos Santos (who had disappeared). Manoel Severiano Cavalcante, accused of having helped strangle the girl, and Bangú received twenty-year sentences.¹² Later Freitas Guimarães was condemned to serve an additional thirty years for the assassination of Tobias Warschawski and a further twenty years for instigating an attempt to murder Dino Padeiro, considered a traitor to the PCB. Freitas Guimarães was expelled from the Party for having talked too freely about the Elza Fernandes case.¹³

The entire correspondence leading up to the murder of Elza Fer-

nandes would seem to have had a bearing on the case, especially as Prestes had written on February 19, 1936, "Fully conscious of my responsibility, from the first moments I have given you my opinion as to what to do with her." But the police, according to Prestes' recent remarks about his trial, linked Elza's murder to a single letter, written by him before his arrest, "recommending punishment for traitors." Prestes states that he learned from Sobral Pinto, before the sentencing, that Judge Maynard Gomes, a *tenente* of 1922, planned to absolve him and condemn the others. Prestes goes on to say that he was unwilling to accept such an outcome and that in the courtroom he denounced the treatment of Berger and caused a stir with his remark about the "glorious Russian Revolution" (leading someone to shout "Viva Prestes!"). Prestes adds that after this incident the judge at the last moment changed the verdict about Prestes and sentenced him to thirty years instead of absolving him.

Following the verdict of Judge Maynard Gomes, Prestes wrote to his mother, who had gone to Mexico with the fall of France. "This sentence," he said, "frees me of the last remains of pride or vanity that I still possessed, and throws me into the immense sea of the most humble and wretched. And this, sincerely, does not displease me."¹⁴

In São Paulo in December 1940 the PCB issued a bulletin condemning the Trotskyites for "exploiting the farce" of the sentences handed down in the case of Elza Fernandes, "murdered, like many others, by the police itself." The "fascist tribunal," the bulletin said, had "condemned Prestes and six other Communists . . . for a crime they did not commit."¹⁵

At this time hundreds of Communists were in Rio's Casa de Detenção. Many had been transferred there from the states but others had been arrested during the recent round-ups in the Federal District. Among those seized in these round-ups was Sebastião Otávio Mascarenhas, whose arrest by Serafim Braga in October 1939 had disappointed the police because the Party's mimeograph had no longer been in his possession. As a political prisoner, Mascarenhas was put in the "military section" of the prison. The guards, he discovered, were very friendly to the prisoners and brought them newspapers, in violation of the rules of the prison administration, established by Vitório Canepa.

Mascarenhas, a metalworker, participated in the work of making belts and purses and helped issue copies of the prisoners' handwritten monthly publication, *A Grade* (The Prison Bars). The *coletivo*, on which he served, sent a request for cigarettes to the Souza Cruz tobacco company, and, after Mascarenhas' wife, a Souza Cruz

employee, forwarded the request to the company management, a large supply of cigarettes arrived. The prison directorship, on the other hand, gave the *coletivo* a bad time. Refusing to recognize the *coletivo*, it rejected its complaints, presented on behalf of the prisoners, and ruled that all complaints should come from individuals.

With the minister of justice scheduled to inspect prison conditions, the prison directorship warned the inmates against presenting complaints to him. But the warning was not heeded by the head of the *coletivo*, Francisco Gomes, a construction worker who had been arrested and tortured in 1936 and rearrested in 1940 for Communist activity in the state of Rio. After showing the minister the bathroom facilities, Gomes told him that the Russian authorities, prior to the 1917 Revolution, had chosen to ignore prisoners' complaints on that score and therefore, not much later, had themselves endured those same atrocious conditions.¹⁶

At least for Patrícia Galvão the long ordeal was over in June 1940. Having been tortured in jail in Rio and hurt by so much PCB "intimidation" that she called Agildo Barata "the chief executioner," she had been transferred to São Paulo's Casa de Detenção. There she spent her last months of imprisonment with common criminals: thieves, prostitutes, and murderers. The author Geraldo Ferraz wrote that she left prison weighing forty-four kilos. He added: "I grabbed her and took care of her . . . She was alone and I thought she would either go abroad or go on living with me. And she went on living with me." The couple set to work writing a book attacking the hierarchy of the Communist Party.¹⁷

4. *Reactions to United States Rearmament* (September 1940–January 1941)

The revival of the Bangú-line PCB in São Paulo, after the arrest of its Regional Committee (CR) in May 1939, was begun by Domingos Pereira Marques before Domingos Braz went to São Paulo in November 1939. Marques ("Hermes"), a blond, red-complexioned Portuguese furniture polisher in his late twenties, had been expelled by the Sacchetta group in March 1938 and had worked with the Bangú-line CR, run by Marighella and former Corporal Clóvis de Oliveira Neto. However, in December 1938 he had learned that he had tuberculosis and had retired to São José dos Campos, and thus he was not arrested in May along with Marighella, Clóvis de Oliveira Neto, and the other São Paulo Communist leaders. Returning, despite illness, to

the state capital, Marques was assisted, in what he called the "difficult undertaking" of CR reorganization, by Frederico Bonimani, a 25-year-old metalworker, and Mário Barbati, a young construction worker who had only recently joined the PCB. Marques, elected secretary of the new CR, was assisted also by José Maria Crispim, a former sergeant who had sought to stimulate interest in the Bangú party among the workers of Sorocaba.¹

Domingos Braz, after reaching São Paulo in November 1939, was soon joined by his companion, a sister of Rita Alves de Souza (whose arrest in Rio led to the capture of Abóbora). Assuming the name of José, Braz collaborated with the Marques CR in a PCB rebuilding program that went well, especially among the construction workers. Interest was also shown by students, thanks mainly to the efforts of 23-year-old Maxim Tolstói Carone (Camilo), a well-to-do secondary schoolteacher of Arab background. Construction workers, students, metalworkers, textile workers, and "the Jewish section" (in touch with Barbati) made financial contributions. So did Quirino Puca, a medical doctor whose wife, Leonor, had spoken out in the gallery of the state legislature against the Maria Zélia assassinations.

The CR's income more than covered expenses, which included monthly salaries of 400 milréis to Braz and 350 each to the CR members. It allowed the installation of a press in mid-1940 in the area of the São Miguel Station. "Geraldo," a printer, was called from Rio to take charge of it.²

After some leaflets had been issued, a program of publishing major bulletins was undertaken. The first, a neatly printed ten-page study, *A Luta contra a Guerra Imperialista e o Fascismo*, was written by Braz. It was signed "the Political Bureau" of the Party, a liberty that Braz later admitted was excessive because no such bureau existed following the debacle in Rio earlier in 1940.³ Thus the views of the CC's only unarrested member provided clues about the party's position following a wave of domestic social legislation and stirring international events. While Vargas had issued decrees about minimum wages, worker accidents, retirement pensions, and working conditions for women and children, in Europe Soviet troops had taken over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and then occupied parts of Rumania. After the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk, France had fallen to Nazi troops, and Italy had declared war against England and France.

According to *A Luta contra a Guerra Imperialista e o Fascismo*, "the USSR shows . . . the true face of its policy of peace and progress

in the example of its acts in the parts of Poland, Finland, and Rumania already taken from the imperialist yoke, as well as in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The glorious Soviet armed forces did not penetrate these territories to pillage or oppress their class brothers but to help them liquidate the power of their internal and foreign exploiters and oppressors."

The French bourgeoisie was accused of breaking up the Popular Front, declaring the Communist Party illegal, and "preferring foreign domination, fascism, and misery to the union of the people with liberty and progress." British imperialism and its agents, Braz wrote, worked to chain the proletariat and people to their own fascist dictatorship.

Pan Americanism and the so-called defense of democracy and civilization were described as concealing the moves of Yankee imperialism to dominate the American continent. Readers of *A Luta contra a Guerra Imperialista e o Fascismo* learned that a resolution for the "defense of continental democracy," adopted at the Havana inter-American conference of July 1940, would be "one more weapon in the hands of reactionary governments—principally the fascist governments such as that of Brazil—to strangle the worker movement, in particular, and the national liberation movement, in general." Although the PCB's "Political Bureau" praised one measure adopted in Havana, which was to prevent the transfer of European possessions in the continent to non-American countries on account of the war, the "Political Bureau's" article felt that further steps were necessary. It called for the nationalization of concessions, companies, and public services "presently in the hands of European magnates."

Braz attributed the "truly colossal" armament program of "the Yankee imperialists" to their desire to end the domestic "economic crisis," face the Axis threat, and rule the continent. He warned that the United States, by pursuing its imperialist interests in the world and assisting England and her allies, would "drag" the American continent into the war.⁴

The words of Braz reflected the view of the Comintern's writers that "Roosevelt's 50,000 planes for 'defense'" were for the "open seizure of all Latin America," and that United States imperialism, with dreams of inheriting the British Empire, had virtually entered the war. The Comintern's writers, asserting that "the tide of Communism is sweeping forward" in Latin America, were perhaps more optimistic than the battered PCB. They believed that "in Brazil the National Liberation Alliance continues to gain support."⁵

The assassination of Trotsky, which occurred in Mexico after Braz had prepared his manuscript, was reported by *Pravda* and the

Comintern as the deed of a Trotsky associate who could be thanked for having done away with a faithful servant of the capitalists—a despicable individual who had “organized the villainous murders of Kirov, Kuibyshev, and Maxim Gorky.”⁶

The Sacchetta Trotskyites described the assassination of Trotsky as a “cowardly and wretched” act carried out by Stalin.⁷ But they agreed in January 1941 with the Stalinist analysis of the rearmament by the United States. They wrote that Roosevelt, “with his demagoguery about ‘democracy,’ ‘continental defense,’ and ‘struggle against fascism,’” was preparing “the entrance of the North American people in the imperialist carnage.” Roosevelt, the Partido Socialista Revolucionário (PSR) went on to say, was more dangerous to the Brazilian workers than “the other ‘fascist’ or ‘democratic’ bands because with the United States in the war, Brazil will be in the war.” The PSR told the workers that true continental defense consisted of struggling against internal fascism, Getúlio and his clique, and against fifth columns of the Nazi-fascist variety, represented by Justice Minister Francisco Campos, and of the so-called democratic variety, represented by Foreign Minister Aranha. “We cannot and should not support England or the Rome-Berlin axis,” the PSR wrote.⁸

The Sacchetta Trotskyites and their PSR were regarded by Mário Pedrosa and other earlier Brazilian Trotskyites as splitters of the Brazilian Trotskyite movement.⁹ But if Sacchetta caused a split, he did so by adhering closely to the view of Trotsky. Unlike Mário Pedrosa and Edmundo Moniz, he accepted the position taken by Trotsky, before his death, that unconditional support should be given to the defense of the Soviet Union. Pedrosa and Moniz were among those who felt that the bureaucracy running the Soviet Union might be on the way to becoming a governing class which would prevent the realization of a worker, or socialist, state and which might cause the Soviet Union to dismantle labor unions and labor parties in the states invaded by it. Their support of the Soviet Union, they declared, was conditional on its assuming the characteristics of a true worker state, not a “managerial state.” Did public ownership of important production make Russia a worker state, although an imperfect one, as the Sacchetta Trotskyites maintained, or was Russia a long way from being such a state, as Pedrosa maintained?¹⁰

Pedrosa, who went from France to the United States just before the war broke out in Europe, left the Trotskyite movement on the occasion of the large split over this issue which occurred in the United States.¹¹ He was the only non-U.S. member of the Executive of the Fourth International who went along with Max Schachtman in his split with Trotsky in late 1939 and early 1940. James Burn-

ham, an American sociologist who also broke with Trotsky, wrote his well-known *The Managerial Revolution* at this time.

5. *The Arrest of the São Paulo Communist Leaders* (March 1941)

In the last months of 1940, Braz wrote manuscripts about the high cost of meat and the "ten years of misery" under Vargas and delivered them in pencil to Bonimani. Geraldo, who printed them (after receiving the typed copies from Barbati), suggested that the press was not in a safe place. Therefore, in December a house for the press was rented in a distant and deserted area, in the Santa Maria district, and a three-month down payment (at 150 milréis per month) was made.¹

In February 1941 the house was furnished and Davino Francisco dos Santos came from Mato Grosso to live in it with his wife and four young children. He brought the São Paulo Communist leaders 1,000 milreís (one conto) from the PCB Regional Committee of Mato Grosso, which he had recently headed.

The São Paulo leaders were building up a special fund in order to revive *A Classe Operária*. The conto from Mato Grosso, together with the sale of lottery tickets and the doubling, for one month, of the quotas from regular contributors, brought the receipts in February up to 8:362\$500, of which almost half went into the special fund.²

Unfortunately for the plans, the distribution of printed Communist propaganda that began in São Paulo in the middle of 1940 alerted the authorities. Late in June 1940 police detectives began their secret watch over the activities of individuals who, they reported to the Seção de Ordem Social, "were not arrested in May 1939 and have begun to articulate." The detectives' observations of these individuals, and of the people the suspects met in suspicious circumstances, led the detectives to conclude that Communism was strong among the construction workers. For some of the men, such as Domingos Braz, contractor Virgílio Grili, and painter Manoel Gomes, the detectives had the correct names; for others they used, in their reports, such appellations as "the mulatto with the mole on his face," "the umbrella man" (who turned out to be José Maria Crispim), and "the young man with the sideburns" (Barbati, in charge of organization for the CR). When, as late as mid-March 1941, a detective found a bricklayer passing out subversive propaganda and soliciting donations for a fund for "liberating the political prisoners,"

the directors of the investigation concluded that his arrest would alert the Communist leaders and should be postponed.³

However, by late March 1941, after a ten-month study in which detectives submitted about forty reports, the authorities had all the information they needed and had located the printing press. They then spent thirty-six hours preparing the police for action, and on March 28 and 29 they arrested thirty-one individuals. São Paulo's *Folha da Manhã* was able to report that "our police, always vigilant and zealous," completely destroyed the São Paulo Regional Committee, whose activities, the newspaper said, had been considered important by the Party following the sensational suppression of Communism in Rio in 1940.

The caravan that went to the Communist printing press consisted of a truck and several cars, bringing Colonel Scarcela Portela of the *Ordem Política e Social*, *delegados* Paulo da Silva Mota and Elpídio Reali, assistant *delegados*, investigation chiefs Carlos Marques and Luís Apolônio, police technicians, and newspaper reporters. The printing equipment and "about 10,000" Communist leaflets were loaded into the truck while reporters spoke with the wife of Davino Francisco dos Santos and learned that she had become accustomed to police investigations.⁴

The plan to revive *A Classe Operária*, foiled by the police, was part of a program of Domingos Braz to reorganize the Party nationally. The Party chiefs would have been Braz, Bonimani, and Crispim.⁵

The Communists arrested in March 1941 found other Communists in the São Paulo jail cells, among them Clóvis de Oliveira Neto, João Raimondi, and Issa Maluf. Maluf, who had organized the Party in the "Northwest Sector" of São Paulo state in 1934–1935, was shunned and scorned by the Communist prisoners, for he had been described by the Party's March 1939 expulsion booklet as associated with the Sacchetta faction and was called a "traitor, Trotskyite, and police agent." Prisoners Clóvis de Oliveira Neto and Raimondi, on the other hand, joined the more recently jailed Domingos Marques ("Red Domingos") in forming a ruling *troika* (threesome). The *troika* dominated the *coletivo*, "a miniature dictatorship of the proletariat," that ran the prisoners' lives, sometimes with help from Crispim, Bonimani, and Davino. Braz, "playing cards with João Raimondi . . . or singing sambas of the Carioca hills," remained indifferent to the power struggles among the Communist prisoners.⁶

The *coletivo* directed Carone and Crispim to draw up a manifesto demanding amnesty, the return of the exiles, and freedom of

the press. As the manifesto achieved nothing, Davino was assigned to draft a petition for amnesty, to be addressed to Vargas' wife and signed by the prisoners' wives, mothers, and sisters.⁷

A more serious matter was the decision of the *troika* (Marques, Clóvis, and Raimondi) to determine the causes of "the disaster" of March 1941. The jailed Communist leaders accused each other of having neglected security measures and of having been too free with information when testifying before the authorities. Barbati, in trouble for having made declarations considered especially helpful to the police, wrote a statement in August 1941 in which he advised the police that his declarations of April had been forced from him "in accordance with the wishes of the police" by torture and beatings. Among his misstatements, he wrote, was one in which he had declared that he had known Maxim Tolstoi Carone prior to meeting him in prison.⁸

More ill will was generated among the jailed Communists when the inquiry, begun by the *troika*, led to discussions about the arrests of the CR leaders in 1939 and the alleged errors in running the CR. The private lives of some of the leaders became a topic of conversation.

Domingos Marques, suffering from tuberculosis, called a meeting to announce that the *troika* was tired. Clóvis de Oliveira Neto, said to have been trying to "free himself" from Marques, was the only member of the old *troika* who participated in the new one. Crispim and Virgílio Grili were chosen to serve with him.⁹

The Communists arrested in March 1941 received stiff jail sentences from navy Captain Alfredo Miranda Rodrigues, a TSN judge, on October 22. Braz, Crispim, Bonimani, and Barbati were condemned to sixteen years each, and Marques, Davino, and José Duarte (a former collaborator of Maluf in the "Northwest Sector") were given fourteen-year sentences. The shortest sentences, two years, were assigned to Dr. Puca, Carone, and some students. Appeals to the full TSN resulted in the longer sentences being cut in half. Carone and two students were freed by Vargas after serving for a little over a year.¹⁰

On December 13, 1941, sixteen of the Communists (among them Marques, Bonimani, Crispim, Davino, Raimondi, Grili, and Duarte) were shipped from São Paulo to Fernando de Noronha. Upon their arrival on December 26, they were put with the common prisoners, but quickly the Communist *coletivo* on the island arranged their transfer to the quarters occupied by the Communists. Davino Francisco dos Santos, who was known to believe that João Raimondi, Mário Barbati, and Orlando Borges de Carvalho had de-

nounced him to the police, looked up Marighella. Giving Marighella an account of the squabbles in the São Paulo jail, Davino complained of an unjust attitude against himself by Communist leaders on the island.

"You know," Marighella said, "it is not possible to resolve certain questions in jail. These things always come up in prison."

"I am not agreeable" Davino replied, "that they make accusations against me in whispers and that other comrades therefore look at me with contempt."

Marighella, formerly indifferent to Davino, now took to avoiding him.¹¹

6. *Germany Attacks the Soviet Union* (June 1941)

In June 1941, Tass, the official Soviet news agency, insisted that the "nonsensical" rumors of war between Russia and Germany "constitute clumsily concocted propaganda by forces hostile to USSR and to Germany." When Bonimani, in jail in São Paulo, heard a rumor that Germany would attack the USSR, he dismissed the idea as impossible. "Imperialist contradictions," he explained, "would not allow such an attack."¹

After Germany commenced its invasion of the USSR on June 21, the Communist prisoners in São Paulo assumed an optimistic attitude. Crispim observed that "with the Soviet Union in the war, the world revolution has begun." But the optimism about the future course of events was feigned. The only thing that genuinely cheered the São Paulo Communist prisoners at this time was the receipt of a newspaper article, sent by author and PCB *simpatizante* José Bento Monteiro Lobato, that predicted the fall of the Estado Novo.²

The Estado Novo gained no Communist support from the German invasion of the USSR. Quite the contrary, the end of the Stalin-Hitler pact was a stimulus to Communist attacks against the pro-German tendencies they saw in Vargas and the generals around him. After June 21, 1941, Communists in São Paulo gave strong encouragement, which they had not given before, to the anti-Vargas, anti-fascist campaign of students attracted to Roosevelt's ideas and the war against Hitler.³

In England the immediate Communist reaction to the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union was to link it to Rudolf Hess' "anti-Bolshevik mission" to England and to express concern lest reactionaries and the government reach an understanding with Hitler. But this fear was put to rest in July by the British-Soviet agreement for

joint warfare against Hitler.⁴ The agreement was followed in August by a message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin with proposals for a conference to promote the defeat of Hitler.

Latin American Communism expressed its view of the new world situation in Mexico City in November 1941 at the "first full Congress" of the Stalinist-front CTAL (Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina). Brazil was not represented, but it was not forgotten by the congress, which demanded the release of Pres-tes, "the Brazilian labor leader." The congress called on the Latin American countries to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and declared that "the war against the totalitarian regimes is the war of the Latin American peoples and is a war vital to the defence of Latin American interests." The congress also "pledged the support of Latin American labour to the United States in its drive to increase defence production."⁵ Thus the opposition of Latin American Stalinists to the United States rearmament program was reversed, as were their views about Roosevelt and the war waged by England.

According to João Amazonas Pedroso, a 29-year-old prisoner in Belém, Pará, in 1941, the news of the German invasion of the USSR impelled him and his comrades to make an escape "in order to continue the life and death struggle against Nazism, and also against the fascist Estado Novo, which oppressed the Brazilians."⁶ The Communist prisoners who reached this decision were those considered the most dangerous by the Belém police chief. In addition to Amazonas they were Henrique Santiago, a 35-year-old local Party leader; Pedro de Araújo Pomar, a 28-year-old former medical student; and Agostinho Dias de Oliveira, a railroad worker and veteran Communist from Pernambuco. For Henrique Santiago, João Amazonas, and Pedro Pomar, the pattern of post-1935 life bore a familiar ring, for they were members of the PCB Regional Committee of Pará. They had been seized in 1936 after an arrested founder of the Party in Belém (Estevam de Jesus Filho) had given helpful information to the police. They had been released in June 1937, thanks to an order by the TSN, but had gone into hiding with the enactment of a "state of war" in October 1937. An upsurge of repression in 1940 had resulted in their rearrest in September of that year.

Because they objected to being jailed with common prisoners, they and Agostinho de Oliveira found themselves, at the time of the invasion of the USSR, under guard in a large old house, together with two other prisoners: a sailor and a student. The first escape plan, made in June 1941, had to be abandoned, but the Communists got away in August. On an Amazon river boat, Agostinho de Oliveira

went to the river town of Monte Alegre, where a comrade gave him lodging; Henrique Santiago and the student went further, reaching Manaus, but there they were jailed. Amazonas and Pomar fled up the Tocantins River in small motorboats. They were in Minas in September 1941 and went on to Rio.⁷

On Fernando de Noronha Island the first Communist to learn of the Nazi invasion of the USSR was Gregório Bezerra, who was listening to a radio late at night. He notified his friends at once. Soon they took to using a map to follow the advances of the German armies into the Soviet Union. They recalled, with more appreciation than before, the words of Ghioldi, who had maintained that Stalin had made his 1939 pact with Hitler in order that the Soviet Union gain time to prepare itself for just such an invasion as occurred in 1941.⁸

By the time Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Ghioldi had been released from Fernando de Noronha and was in Montevideo stirring up public opinion against the Estado Novo. The Brazilian authorities, having crushed the Communist organizations in Rio and São Paulo, considered the threat of Brazilian Communism most serious in Uruguay and Argentina, where Ghioldi was said to be adhering to "a diabolical plan . . . drawn up in the guarded liberty of Fernando de Noronha." It seemed to the Brazilian authorities that the Argentine Communist was showing little gratitude for the "kindness" they had shown him in prison and for the guided tour of Rio that police officers had provided him, at his request, prior to his return to Argentina.⁹

7. *Montevideo and Buenos Aires (1940–1941)*

The arrival of Ghioldi in Buenos Aires in November 1940 and the rallies honoring him there and in Montevideo were reported by diplomats in their letters to Vargas. While keeping watch over "Flores da Cunha and his Communist-Integralista-UDB [Armando de Sales party] accomplices," the diplomats in Montevideo had been reporting to Vargas and Filinto Müller about the activities of Eliezer Magalhães, Dinarte da Silveira, Delcy Silveira (back from Spain), Pedro Mota Lima, Alcedo Cavalcanti (back from France), and ex-Lieutenant Paulo Machado Carrión (back from France and described to Vargas as "certainly a representative of the Brazilians at the Communist Congress being held behind closed doors").¹

The first rally for Ghioldi, held in Buenos Aires, was said to have attracted ten thousand. At it and at the subsequent rallies for

him, orators inflamed the crowds with the news that Prestes had been sentenced to serve for thirty years beyond his original prison term. Pictures of Prestes' daughter were distributed together with messages from Prestes' mother. The Brazilian diplomats responded by publishing facsimiles of the letter written by Prestes in 1936 which was said to have determined the fate of Elza Fernandes.²

In Buenos Aires in March 1941 a large crowd was on hand to greet José Gay da Cunha. Vargas was informed that Gay da Cunha had become "the central figure" at almost all the meetings of the "propaganda centers" and that "Communist propaganda, increasing in intensity" in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, "continues its violent attacks on Your Excellency's government." The Montevideo police, Vargas learned, did nothing to stop the series of "shameless Communist broadcasts" that the Montevideo station FENIX beamed toward Rio Grande do Sul.³

After Ambassador Batista Luzardo spoke to the Uruguayan authorities, he was able to advise Vargas and Filinto Müller that a pro-Prestes rally, planned by Alcedo Cavalcanti, had been "reduced to nothing" and that Ghioldi, before addressing another rally, had been forbidden to mention Brazil. However, the Communist radio broadcasts continued. In July 1941 a FENIX program mentioned the "sores that cover the face of Prestes, due to the savagery of the Brazilian police."⁴

Brazilian newspapers, under the control of the DIP (Department of Press and Propaganda), criticized the police of Uruguay. *O Estado de S. Paulo* wrote that "the assassins of Elza Fernandes and Warschawski" were "extolled during street riots in Montevideo. . . . It is not the Uruguayan people who assault us. . . . It is bandits who join with other bandits in public manifestations that a complacent police permits."⁵

Montevideo's *Marcha* wrote on July 18, 1941, that Rio's *Imparcial* held the Uruguayan government responsible for a pro-Prestes rally which the Rio daily called "an act of war, or almost that." According to *La Hora* of Buenos Aires, "one of the most condemnable organs of the controlled press of Rio was furious at the prevalence of democratic customs in Uruguay." Montevideo's *Justicia*, official newspaper of the Communist Party of Uruguay, published a declaration in response to "the campaign of the Brazilian fascists." All the intellectuals who signed *Justicia's* declaration, Vargas was told, were Communists.⁶

Carlos da Costa Leite arrived in Montevideo in September 1941 and settled down a few days later in Buenos Aires, where he was regarded, according to a report that reached Vargas, as "the substitute

of Prestes in South America."⁷ The unpretentious major, following his year in French concentration camps, had traveled to Africa and the United States and then come south via the Pacific coast. In November his wife, Rosa Meireles, and their two children went from Rio to Buenos Aires to join him. At their home Jorge Amado, another exile, wrote some of the last passages of his book about Prestes. Published in Spanish in Buenos Aires in 1942, under the title of *Vida de Luiz Carlos Prestes*, and dedicated to Rodolfo Ghioldi and Pedro Mota Lima, it quickly became Latin America's best seller.⁸

Another whom the Costa Leites came to know in Buenos Aires was Fernando de Lacerda. Together with Roberto Morena, Fernando left Moscow before Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The two Brazilian Communists took a ship from Vladivostok, landed in Manzanillo, Mexico, and went to Mexico City. After visiting Chile, they reached Buenos Aires. Morena went on to Brazil, where he was arrested.⁹

8. *Communism in Bahia* (1941)

Communist students from the northeast contributed significantly to the establishment of the UNE (National Union of Students) in Rio in 1938 and to building it up during its first years. The most outstanding role was that of 25-year-old Antônio Franca, who was to become a member of the PCB Regional Committee of Pernambuco in 1941. Son of a pharmacy owner in Recife, he was studying law in Rio when he launched the idea of forming the UNE. He served as its general secretary during its first three years. In 1940, when the UNE paid tribute to its early "battlers," its list included Franca, Alagoas Communist Bercelino Maia, and Bahia Communists João da Costa Falcão and Armênio Guedes. (Another early "battler" was Communist Wagner Cavalcanti, the outstanding orator of the UNE).¹

The strength of Communism among the organized students of Bahia in 1940 is clear. Falcão served as general secretary of the Association of Students of Bahia. Milton Caires de Brito and *Seiva* collaborator Armênio Guedes were the principal representatives of the University of Bahia at the First Congress and Council of Bahian Students, held late in 1939. (Mário Alves de Souza Vieira was one of the two principal representatives of younger students attending the Ginásio da Bahia.) Among the other Communists, mentioned by Caires de Brito as influential in Bahian student circles, were Rui Facó, who married a sister of Guedes, and state Labor Department employee Diógenes de Arruda Câmara. (Arruda Câmara, when vis-

ited by Joaquim Câmara Ferreira late in 1939, was using the code name of *Piancó*.)²

In Salvador, Bahia, Milton Caires de Brito received his medical degree in December 1940. Early in April 1941, after the São Paulo CR fell to the police, he resolved to transfer from Bahia to São Paulo much of what remained of the PCB leadership in Brazil. With him went Armênio Guedes and 25-year-old Diógenes de Arruda Câmara, who had spent eight months in prison in Bahia in 1940 and felt threatened with a new imprisonment. Their purpose was to build a National Party in São Paulo and they therefore set up the *Comissão Executiva Provisória do PCB*, of which Arruda Câmara became secretary. Seeking to make their organization "absolutely" new, they resolved to work principally among the proletariat, shunning São Paulo groups that appeared to be characterized by divisionism and by an *intelligencia* chiefly intent on overthrowing Vargas. As for the remnant of the old PCB of São Paulo, it was believed to be infiltrated by police agents, although not as badly as the Party's remains in Rio.³

The Bahia group's work in São Paulo went slowly, attracting no more than a handful of converts. Arruda Câmara visited several states. Milton Caires de Brito, remaining secretive about his Party affiliation, practiced medicine in São Paulo's industrial suburbs, often charging little if anything for his services.⁴

While Caires de Brito, Arruda Câmara, and Armênio Guedes made their move to São Paulo, Salvador law student João da Costa Falcão, the driving force behind *Seiva*, was in Argentina. During his exile, which began in August 1940, he saw a good deal of Pedro Mota Lima, whom he admired as a great journalist. Falcão returned to Bahia in August 1941.⁵

In the meantime in Pernambuco, where the interventorship of Agamenon Magalhães was determined to crush Communism, the local Party's disorganization was discussed by CR members Lauro Alves de Campos Góis, Antônio de Oliveira Silva, José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, and Walter Waisberg. Talk about "better propaganda and orientation" and a larger Party income turned in October 1941 to talk about the possibility of holding a meeting of the representatives of as many CR's as possible in order to organize the Party nationally and select a national directorship.⁶

To carry out this idea, student leader Antônio Franca, a new Pernambuco CR member, suggested that José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, a 32-year-old worker in commerce, travel to Salvador and Rio. In Salvador, between November 11 and 14, 1941, José Albino confer-

red with João Falcão and "Jordão" (João Severiano Tôres), an intelligent construction worker who, as the Bahia CR secretary of organization, was the only laborer of importance in the Bahia Party leadership. Falcão and Jordão agreed that a national conference be held in Salvador on December 8, and they said that they would get in touch with the CR's of Alagoas and Sergipe. José Albino proceeded to Rio.⁷

Contributing to the suspicion about police infiltration among Communists in Rio was an open letter to Vargas, signed by "the PCB" on September 8, 1941, which gave the Party's full support to the Estado Novo and quoted passages from a recent Vargas speech about the need of national unity. In October 1941, however, Vargas received a second communication which declared that the open letter had been "false" and not representative of "the true orientation of the Partido Comunista do Brasil." The second communication was signed in the Federal District by three workers who claimed to speak for the "national Secretariat of the P.C.B.—Section of the Third Communist International" (an unusual way of referring to the Comintern). It pointed out that the national union should be a democratic national union, with a return to the 1934 constitution, parliamentary government, the right to strike, and freedom of expression. The new message to Vargas called for the liberty of Prestes and the other political prisoners and asked that Brazil, "regarded as the only fascist country in America, . . . follow the examples of Mexico, Cuba, the United States, Argentina, etc." by exterminating the fifth column. Integralistas, it said, should be expelled from their public posts and jailed.⁸

If the PCB had a National Secretariat functioning in the Federal District it seemed to be unknown to Jonas Wasinchock, whom José Albino had been asked to look up there, or to the man to whom Wasinchock introduced the visitor from Recife. José Albino was advised that the party in Rio was "in complete destruction" and could do little.⁹

Rio, like most of the regions of Brazil, sent no representative to Salvador, and so the Bahia conference became one to create the Party's Secretariat of the Northeast. Outside of José Albino, representing Pernambuco, the only non-Bahian was Bercelino Maia, the former student leader from Alagoas, and the conference had to be postponed until December 14 to allow Maia to attend. Sergipe failed to participate, José Albino was told, because the Party there was "connected with a Comitê Central said to exist in Rio." The Bahians were Falcão, Jordão, and Izaías Nascimento Santos. (According to

Falcão's recollection, the conference was also attended by Giocondo Dias, who was in hiding, having been sentenced by the TSN to 14½ years of imprisonment for his role in the 1935 uprising in Natal.)¹⁰

The conference, held secretly in a house on an eroded river bank, chose a Secretariat of the Northeast, made up of representatives of Bahia, Pernambuco, and Alagoas, and resolved that the national reorganization of the Party and the "definite election of the national directorship" would be handled at another conference to be held in the following year, 1942.¹¹ Most of the discussion, during the twenty-hour meeting, concerned resolutions that had already been written by Falcão and that were adopted. One of them emphasized the need to warn the people of the dangers of Nazi and fascist infiltration. The representative from Alagoas ventured the opinion that such warnings, and the campaigns about petroleum (recently discovered in Bahia) and a national steel works, could be carried out in a legal manner; but Jordão argued that these matters should be advanced as coming from the PCB to give the Party prestige among the people. Falcão pointed out that, while the Party should stir up the people about questions of national interest, it should keep away from "revolutionary sectarianism," rejecting conspiracies. Such ideas, he said, were useless.¹²

The representative from Pernambuco, arrested and tortured on his return to Recife, supplied enough information to cause the arrest in Maceió of Maia, the Alagoas representative, and Maia, in turn, gave the police additional information. João Falcão, the only Bahia representative whose legal name was known to the Pernambuco and Alagoas representatives, left Salvador on Christmas night. After reaching Rio by ship, he went south by car, picking up Arruda Câmara on the way.

Former student leaders, friends of Falcão who were now connected with the Rio Grande do Sul interventorship of Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, helped Falcão (who had no papers) and Arruda cross into Argentina.¹³ Falcão and Arruda discussed, with Brazilian and Argentine Communists in Buenos Aires, the future of the PCB. In contrast to Arruda Câmara, Falcão, with his pleasant manners, made a favorable personal impression on Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Fernando de Lacerda.¹⁴

8. The Americas in the War (1941–1945)

1. *Consequences of Pearl Harbor* (December 1941–August 1942)

The Stalinists' unfavorable expressions about Vargas were curbed as the result of the direct involvement of the United States in the war in December 1941 and Brazil's diplomatic break with the Axis in January 1942. Even before Aranha announced the diplomatic break at the Rio Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers, the jailed Stalinist chiefs in São Paulo decided to send the Vargas government a motion assuring it of their support in "the defense of the American continent." The motion was drawn up and signed immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.¹

Unlike the Trotskyites, the Stalinists insisted that the defense of Brazil required national unity at the side of the government. This feeling became especially strong starting in March 1942, when news was received about the first sinkings of Brazilian ships by the Germans.

In Buenos Aires in April 1942 the world situation and PCB reorganization were discussed at conferences which Fernando de Lacerda, Carlos da Costa Leite, Pedro Mota Lima, Diógenes de Arruda Câmara, João da Costa Falcão, and other Brazilians held with Argentines Rodolfo Ghioldi and Victorio Codovilla. Ghioldi and Codovilla, the director of international Communism in South America, spoke convincingly about the need of the PCB to eradicate sectarianism. Despite the fact that Prestes had had no opportunity to express his view about the line to be adopted by the Party, the decision was reached that the PCB should favor national unity with Vargas for the defense of Brazil.²

As for PCB reorganization, Arruda Câmara set out to accomplish this. Leôncio Basbaum, who had been jailed for a month during the Rio repression of March–April 1940, received a visit in Rio from Ar-

ruda in the first half of 1942. Arruda spoke of the "authorization and moral force" he had been given by the Comintern's South American Bureau "to put the Party together again." Basbaum was surprised because he considered Arruda "almost unknown in the Party, even in Bahia." Arruda, who spoke in mysterious, low tones to Basbaum, said that he had been able to reorganize the Party in São Paulo, a statement that Basbaum later found "to be untrue, because the Communists of São Paulo did not want to accept Arruda's leadership, not knowing who he was."³

João da Costa Falcão returned to Bahia in June 1942. *Seiva's* principal article that month, "National Unity for the Country's Defense," said that "at Pearl Harbor fascism wounded the heart of all America." The task of mobilization and production, *Seiva* argued, was not the exclusive task of the government but a task for all the people. European experience, it added, demonstrated that the enemy could be resisted only by "people who are united, united solidly."⁴

Falcão, in a signed article for young people in the same issue, wrote that the war, originally "a dispute of big interests and capital," had reached America with the "cowardly and treacherous" act of Japan and had become a war between liberty and civilization, on one side, and oppression and barbarousness, on the other. He described the Rio Inter-American Conference as "one of the major historical events of humanity" and hailed the patriotic street demonstrations of "hate and indignation" occasioned by the news of "the sinking of Latin American ships by the Axis." But, Falcão wrote, such demonstrations should be accompanied by the methodically organized work of young people. He advocated a campaign to increase enlistments in the armed services, aviation clubs, and shooting associations and the formation of commissions to provide food and clothing "to our brothers of America and England and to other people who struggle for liberty."⁵

Luís Carlos Prestes, writing to Agildo Barata on June 22, 1942, said that he was no longer bothered by his former fear that the imperialists wished to use the Brazilian people as cannon fodder. "Today, on the contrary, I believe that only by the voluntary sacrifice of the blood of our people, by active participation in the struggle of the antifascist peoples, wherever necessary, in any part of the world, shall we save our cities from destruction and avoid the massacre of women and children, not to mention the ignominy that it would be to permit, by omission, the organization of Nazi bases in our country for the attack on the American people." Prestes advised Barata that it was urgent to convince the Brazilian people of the need to make the sacrifice. The letter, which revealed that Prestes was quite

well supplied with reading matter, quoted Chinese Marshal Yen-Hsi-Shan as saying that "Japan, our enemy, obliged us to educate the people. Japan forced us to unite."⁶

While Brazilian Communists called for unity under the Vargas government, the Brazilian press showed some signs of coming to grips with the fact that the June 1942 accord between the United States, England, and the Soviet Union included a Communist state. *O Estado de S. Paulo* explained that the Soviet form of government could be understood as a reaction to Tzarism and that it was confined to the borders of the old empire of the Tzars. "All peoples will have the government which they prefer and which is naturally indicated for them," *O Estado de S. Paulo* said.⁷

War Minister Dutra was suspicious of what he called the "Communist propaganda" made under "the excellent pretext of the war."⁸ Some of the "antitotalitarian" manifestos seemed to him to be inspired by a dislike of Brazil's autocratic government. In particular he singled out a "Declaration of Principles" signed by approximately one hundred intellectuals, which appeared in Rio on June 11, 1942, and which described the war as nothing more than "the historic clash" between regimes of oppression and the progressive forces favoring democratic liberties.⁹ Among the signers were Samuel Wainer, Maurício Goulart (who had joined Wainer in publishing *Diretrizes*), Hermes Lima, Rubem Braga, Graciliano Ramos, Astrojildo Pereira, Rachel de Queiroz, Moacir Werneck de Castro, and Carlos Lacerda.

The signers, Dutra pointed out in an emotional letter to Vargas, included Communists who had been released from prison, and the expressions were simply those common to leftist literature. He complained that the Communists, while appearing to support the government in its international position, were sneakily infiltrating journalistic, cultural, educational, and even military circles by making use of the good faith of the Brazilian people and by "exploiting the morbid Brazilian propensity for verbosity and the outpouring of pompous literature, scandalous and sterile." The Communists, Dutra wrote, worked on the collective soul of the nation, persuading it that abdication to the international Left was required of patriotism and Pan American solidarity. As Dutra considered "the threat" better organized and more fully prepared than it had been "on the eve of 1935," he asked the president to prohibit the appearance of Communist propaganda, hidden or overt, in any publication.¹⁰

The international press, but not the Brazilian press, carried a message that Prestes gave in July 1942 to Cuban Communist Blas Roca, whose visit to the prisoner had been arranged by Aranha. Blas Roca reported that the Cavalier of Hope, despite personal suffering,

"considered it his duty, as well as the duty of all true Brazilian patriots, to cease all disputes of internal character and to join the efforts throughout the nation to help hasten the route of the Axis powers." Prestes told Blas Roca of the need to "subordinate everything to the interest of victory in war against Nazism." The fifth column, Prestes added, was stronger in Brazil than elsewhere in the Americas but could be paralyzed if the masses would acquire faith in the anti-Axis program "being carried out by the leaders."¹¹

At about the same time that Prestes spoke to Blas Roca, the Brazilian Communists were cheered by the news that Filinto Müller was stepping aside as police chief. Müller, on good terms with Dutra and poor terms with Aranha, tried to prohibit a pro-United States Fourth of July parade by Rio students but was overruled by Acting Justice Minister Vasco Leitão da Cunha. Müller's dislike of taking orders from Leitão da Cunha on this and other matters resulted in an incident which Leitão handled by putting the police chief under house arrest for forty-eight hours. In settling the ensuing dispute, Vargas accepted the resignations of Müller, Leitão da Cunha, Justice Minister Francisco Campos, and DIP Director Lourival Fontes. When Müller's replacement, antifascist Colonel Alcides Etechegoyen, arrived at the police headquarters, he found that Müller's men had burned papers and wrecked the place. A radio broadcast from Germany lamented the fall of Müller.¹²

Müller's resignation (to accept a post under Dutra) was followed by the resignation of DOPS Director Felisberto Batista Teixeira, who had headed the investigations that had dismantled the PCB in Rio in 1940. The imprisoned Communists celebrated the resignations on Ilha Grande, where they had been transferred in February 1942 because of the strategic location of Fernando de Noronha. Agildo Barata directed one of the jailed Communist ex-soldiers to collect money for a banquet from a list of prisoners.¹³

Meanwhile, demonstrations of support for the Allies became more frequent all over Brazil. They delighted Falcão, who was responding in an uncooperative way to the questions of the Bahia police about his Communist activities.¹⁴ "The patriotic and democratic demonstrations," *Seiva* wrote in early August, were "against the aggressors, against the fifth column," and revealed "decided support for President Getúlio Vargas and the democratic authorities of our government."

Seiva wrote that the "victorious and crushing counteroffensive of the Soviet forces" led to the belief that Hitler might be defeated before the end of 1942. In discussing the approaching end of "the enemies of Civilization and Humanity," *Seiva* cited the possibility of a

his old home in the Ipanema district of Rio. There he was consulted by his nephew and godson, Carlos Lacerda, who still had friends among the Communists. Carlos decided to write an article calling for immediate and full support of the Vargas government in a show of unity. He hoped to have the article published in *Diretrizes*, but Samuel Wainer, like the Communists connected with *Diretrizes*, favored the views of the National Democratic Front, which was not unconditional in its support of Vargas. When Wainer, after two weeks, told Lacerda that *Diretrizes* could not publish the article, Carlos Lacerda said to his old friend: "I see that you are in the hands of the other group."⁹

In November 1942 Carlos Lacerda's article appeared in *Revista Acadêmica*, which had a small circulation. It advocated backing the government "in acts and words" and defending it against "anyone who might seek to intrigue against it." The call for union, Carlos Lacerda wrote, had been made by Vargas, political prisoners, Hermes Lima, UNE President Hélio de Almeida, and many writers, such as Jorge Amado and Érico Veríssimo.¹⁰

Jorge Amado, Wainer's close friend, was held for about two months at the Ilha Grande prison camp, which was directed by Nestor Veríssimo (uncle of Érico). There Amado came to know and like Gregório Bezerra ("a good man"). Amado, after being released, spent much time in Bahia, cooperating with the war effort by writing articles and giving occasional speeches. The speeches were praised by *Diretrizes*, which had been publishing chapters of Amado's novels.¹¹

Through Sobral Pinto, Amado sent a message to Catholic writers suggesting that "we forget our ideological differences" and work together "against the demonic forces of Nipo-Nazi-fascism." In reply, Catholic writer Alceu Amoroso Lima (Tristão de Athayde) rejected "an impossible alliance between attitudes that are substantially irreconcilable." "A common enemy," Amoroso Lima told Amado, was not enough to surmount the barrier of principles "between true Communism and true Catholicism."¹²

Seiva, in its first number after Brazil's declaration of war, featured a picture of Vargas on the cover, together with the words "Everything Unites Us, Nothing Separates Us." Its lead article quoted Vargas as saying that "the people, by every means available, requested war." And, *Seiva* added, the request had been made not because the people were overexcited but because they understood perfectly that "we are faced by an enemy that is treacherous and strong."¹³

In São Paulo the Comissão Executiva Provisória do PCB, founded a year earlier by Caires de Brito, Arruda Câmara, and Armênio Guedes, had been using, as its word of order, "National Union for

state of war with Germany and Italy. Most of the Communists on Ilha Grande therefore believed that their freedom was at hand. "With rare exceptions," Davino Francisco dos Santos writes, "they packed suitcases, put on new clothes, parted their hair." The *coletivo*, planning to distribute "assistance" money to needy Communist prisoners for transportation and other expenses, prepared a list of names.³

In Porto Alegre, Spanish Civil War veterans Delcy Silveira and Homero Jobim offered to serve as volunteers in the army. The offer was rejected.⁴

In Buenos Aires, Carlos da Costa Leite called on Brazilian Ambassador José de Paula Rodrigues Alves to advise that he and the exiles with him wished to return to Brazil to serve in the army against the fascists. Although the ambassador said that he imagined the Brazilian government would receive this offer with pleasure, he suggested that Costa Leite and his associates await a reply from Rio. But Costa Leite and his exiled companions decided not to wait but to return "unconditionally" to Brazil, leaving it to the government to determine how to make use of their services in the war.⁵

The dozens of exiles who returned to Brazil from the La Plata River area included ex-Lieutenant Antônio Bento Monteiro Tourinho, who had escaped from a hospital after his arrest in Rio in 1935; Spanish Civil War veterans Costa Leite, Gay da Cunha, José Homem Correia de Sá, and David Capistrano da Costa; and civilians Pedro Mota Lima, Jorge Amado, and Fernando de Lacerda. Lacerda, before crossing into Brazil, told the Argentine press that he was a PCB director who was eager to participate in the war against Nazi-fascism and therefore planned to place himself at the service of his government. He advised the Brazilian consulate and embassy in Montevideo of his wish to fulfill his "duty as a soldier of the people and workers of our country."⁶

After the new Rio police chief, Colonel Etchegoyen, asked Vargas what was to be done with the returned exiles, it was decided that all those with incompleting prison sentences should be sent to Ilha Grande.⁷ The decision, which no doubt pleased War Minister Dutra, left the Barata group with the certainty that amnesty was not close at hand.

In Rio, at the headquarters of the Brazilian Press Association (ABI), Pedro Mota Lima was surrounded by admirers, including ABI President Herbert Moses, when he dramatically turned himself over to the authorities, letting them decide how he could best serve his country. He was sent to Ilha Grande and spent over a year there.⁸

Fernando de Lacerda was not arrested and took up residence in

his old home in the Ipanema district of Rio. There he was consulted by his nephew and godson, Carlos Lacerda, who still had friends among the Communists. Carlos decided to write an article calling for immediate and full support of the Vargas government in a show of unity. He hoped to have the article published in *Diretrizes*, but Samuel Wainer, like the Communists connected with *Diretrizes*, favored the views of the National Democratic Front, which was not unconditional in its support of Vargas. When Wainer, after two weeks, told Lacerda that *Diretrizes* could not publish the article, Carlos Lacerda said to his old friend: "I see that you are in the hands of the other group."⁹

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War and Peace with Vargas." But, despite the nationwide support for Vargas reported in the press after Brazil's declaration of a state of war, the word of order was resisted by most of the leftists in São Paulo because it seemed too unconditional.¹⁴ Many of them were attracted to the recently formed *Campanha Nacionalista* of the anti-Vargas São Paulo law students, who were mobilizing public opinion in favor of the war in order "to condemn fascism and other forms of dictatorship and to extol democracy."¹⁵ Like the students, these leftists applauded speeches, calling for free expression in Brazil, delivered by General Manoel Rabelo, a Supreme Military Tribunal judge whose attitude worried Dutra.¹⁶

The Trotskyites in São Paulo agreed with those who complained of Brazil's lack of democracy, but they opposed the war effort and called on the Brazilian labor force, "the only true enemy of fascism," to annihilate fascism in Brazil. "The Brazilian government," the Trotskyite PSR wrote, "did not enter the war to defend democracy, because it is not democratic, or to fight fascism, because it is fascist. The Brazilian government entered the war as henchman of American imperialism." While the PSR praised the war of the USSR against Germany as a war "to defend the worker state against an imperialism," it described the war between the German and Anglo-American governments as a "war of bandits, . . . , a war between thieves who dispute the booty."¹⁷

3. *Divergences on Ilha Grande* (1942–1943)

By February 1942, when the *Comandante Ripper* took the prisoners from Fernando de Noronha to Ilha Grande, many Communists and Integralistas had already been set free. The approximately 150 Communists aboard the ship remained apart from the approximately 100 Integralistas, thus abiding by an order of Agildo Barata that Barata himself did not observe. The travelers sunbathed, watched porpoises, and enjoyed the music of their jazz band, the "Devils of Fernando." Upon reaching Vila de Abraão on Ilha Grande, they were taken by trucks across hills to the far side of the island. There, near a beach, they were deposited in front of an imposing structure of cement, the Dois Rios Correctional Colony for political prisoners.¹

Conditions differed from those on Fernando de Noronha, where, Davino Francisco dos Santos writes, "we could lead our own lives" and "did not have the impression of being prisoners." The prisoners on Ilha Grande were assigned to barred cells and were aware of the vigilance exercised by the guards of correctional colony Director

Nestor Veríssimo. Nevertheless, Gregório Bezerra points out, the change was a vast improvement because of the unpolluted water, the absence of swarms of mosquitoes, the liberal arrangements about visitors, and the better opportunities for correspondence. Besides, the correctional colony directorship was reasonable in cooperating with prisoners' requests. The rules governing sunbathing were gradually relaxed until finally this pastime was enjoyed without guards and for as long as the prisoners wished.²

"The solidarity of our Aliancista companions," Bezerra writes, was greater on Ilha Grande than on Fernando de Noronha. At meetings held every other month the Communists approved automatically the "official slates" of the officers of their *coletivo*. Sebastião Francisco, who points out that *coletivos* were organized in prisons even when only four or five Communists were present, emphasizes that the *coletivo* on Ilha Grande was very strong. The Communists put all their money in the *coletivo*. Besides acting as a center for disseminating information received from outside, it organized a shop where the Communists, some of them showing artistic talent, made ornaments, belts, handbags, brooches, jewel cases, and even terrestrial globes. The income from sales, together with contributions from friends outside, helped with the purchase of medicines, cigarettes, stamps, paper, and food for improving meals. And it made it possible to provide small sums to the neediest families of the prisoners.³

Some non-Communists chose to contribute their money to the *coletivo*. But, according to Sebastião Francisco, the Communists made no effort to convert non-Communist prisoners to Communism. The reason for this policy was "the poor mental state" of people in prison.

The Communists on Ilha Grande lost fewer members than the Integralistas to a gallery of cells known as Switzerland, where the lives of prisoners were run not by *coletivos* but by the prison authorities alone. The loss of about fifteen Communists resulted largely from the "boycotting" of "companions" who were referred to as renegades, quitters, imitators of Miranda, or traitors.⁴ Davino Francisco dos Santos was boycotted (for "breaking with Party discipline") and began writing a book about Brazilian Communism. In September 1942, after the Communist leaders arranged the theft of his 434-page manuscript, he moved to "Switzerland" to recommence his writing. There he watched the arrival of the last group of Communist prisoners from Rio. They included Sebastião Francisco and Honório de Freitas Guimarães.⁵

Honório de Freitas Guimarães found himself scorned by fellow Communists and blamed by them for crimes. In January 1943, when

he was being transferred by boat from Ilha Grande back to Rio, thanks to the influence of his family, he jumped into the sea and swam to freedom on the mainland. But his freedom was brief. Captured and returned to Ilha Grande, he was visited in "Switzerland" by a *coletivo* delegation headed by Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo. It reproved him for violating a pledge, which the imprisoned Communist leaders had given to the Dois Rios directorship, that no attempts to escape would be made by political prisoners.⁶ (After Integralista Belmiro Valverde, a medical doctor who had taken care of sick Communists on Fernando de Noronha and Ilha Grande, made an unsuccessful escape attempt, the PCB leaders on Ilha Grande broke off the fairly cordial relations they had had with him.)⁷

The new arrivals from Buenos Aires and Montevideo, the so-called Costa Leite group, were given separate quarters which were better than those of the others. Perhaps this was because they had submitted themselves voluntarily to the government, or perhaps it was because Costa Leite was a friend of prison Director Nestor Veríssimo, a fellow revolutionary of the 1920's.⁸

The group of ex-Major Costa Leite, which included veterans of the Spanish Civil War, was felt by many to have more prestige than the group of ex-Captain Barata. In any event, it would not submit to the dictates of those who had been on the island longer. Costa Leite, unlike Barata, had no objection to prisoners working for the prison management for pay, and, in the case of this divergence, Costa Leite was joined by some prisoners recently transferred from Rio's Casa de Detenção, such as Sebastião Otávio Mascarenhas. Costa Leite himself did engineering work for road-building projects on the island. Not a few members of the Costa Leite group, finding faults in Barata, said that the war effort required the rejection of the tactic of Barata, which was to express backing for the government in the war "but undermine the government from below."⁹

The clash between the two Communist groups on Ilha Grande became so serious that Communists who were at liberty sent two representatives, Fernando de Lacerda and a Bahiano, to seek a reconciliation.¹⁰ Interest in this unsuccessful effort was shown by the small group in São Paulo's Santo André district, in which Arruda Câmara was influential, and a small group that was trying to resurrect the Party in Rio. The latter included Pedro Pomar, João Amazonas, Maurício Grabois, and Amarílio Vasconcelos.

Pomar and Amazonas, having reached Rio from their native state of Pará late in 1941, had joined Vasconcelos, a journalist, and Grabois, who had been in jail in 1941 for carrying out PCB work in Minas Gerais.¹¹ During the reimprisonment of Grabois in the first

part of 1942, Amazonas did some work for the Party in Minas. Pomar, joined by his family from Pará in July 1942, was earning an income by painting walls.¹²

4. *Dissolution of the Comintern* (May 1943)

Stalin's decision to disband the Comintern, Isaac Deutscher has written, "was his political contribution to the coherence of the Grand Alliance." The announcement of the Comintern's dissolution, signed by the Presidium of its Executive Committee and published in *Pravda* on May 22, stressed the complications caused by conditions that differed among countries and said that ever since the Comintern's Seventh Congress of 1935 the Executive Committee had avoided "interference in the internal organizational affairs of the Communist Parties." The Presidium now called on all the supporters of the Comintern to concentrate their energies on the defeat of the enemy of the working class—German fascism and its associates and vassals. Stalin, explaining the dissolution of the Comintern, said that this step would answer the slanders of the Hitlerites, who asserted that Moscow sought to intervene in the internal lives of other nations.¹

The Brazilian press was quick to report the favorable reactions of some of the Communist Parties outside Brazil, but it was handicapped in quoting PCB leaders because the government prohibited the publication of their views about Communism. However, Samuel Wainer decided that the ban might not extend to having a Communist explain the Comintern's dissolution, and therefore he arranged, through Jorge Amado, to speak with Fernando de Lacerda, who had been a member of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Lacerda, looking over Wainer's questions, said that he would have to consult. A few days later Wainer was able to interview Lacerda, and thus *Diretrizes* published what it called "the first and only interview in the Brazilian press with an authorized and legitimate director of Brazilian Communists." Fernando de Lacerda, *Diretrizes* said, was "the most authorized person to speak in the name of the extinct Partido Comunista do Brasil."²

Fernando de Lacerda gave a message to *Diretrizes* that was a blow to the groups that had set their sights on reorganizing the PCB. He said that the Brazilian Communists should not try to reestablish any sort of illegal organization but should close ranks on the side of the people and the Vargas government. To try to reorganize an illegal body, Lacerda maintained, would only create difficulties for the peo-

ple and the government and thus help Axis agents. Asked whether his comrades shared these thoughts, Lacerda replied that when he had reached the La Plata River region and Brazil he had "had the immense pleasure of finding his opinion shared by a majority of the antifascist patriots and a majority of his old comrades, whether in exile, in prison, or in liberty." In conclusion, he stated that the only path to follow was that of working with the Vargas government for achieving national union.³

The publication was a commercial success. *Diretrizes* sold twenty thousand copies. But on the day after the magazine reached the newsstands, Wainer and Fernando de Lacerda were arrested and put in a cell with two sailors accused of sabotage, a Nazi spy, and an Integralista. "I am a patriot; I fight for liberty," Lacerda told his cell mates. Wainer, who had expected that the sensational interview would cost him a few days in jail ("well worth it"), was disappointed to have to spend three weeks in a cell with Fernando de Lacerda. The prison sentence might have been a long one, lasting for a year or more, if the case had gone to the National Security Tribunal, as some authorities wished. But antifascist Police Chief Etchegoyen was appreciative of articles in *Diretrizes* that seemed designed to force the tribunal to overcome what he considered its reluctance to put fascist fifth columnists on trial. Etchegoyen intervened with Vargas to prevent the case of the Lacerda interview from coming before the tribunal.⁴

The dissolution of the Comintern, a great propaganda victory for Stalin within the United Nations, was greeted with scorn in a mimeographed bulletin issued by the Sacchetta "orthodox" wing of Brazilian Trotskyism.⁵ Stalin, "the coarse jester," was described as having paid the price demanded by the world bourgeoisie so that he could become an equal of the heads of the so-called democracies and join with them in deciding the destinies of the world.

The Trotskyite bulletin declared that the latest step concluded the sinister work of the hangman who had liquidated the Chinese proletarian youth and their revolution, turned the Austrian proletariat over to its executioners, assisted the ascension of Hitler, smashed the revolution in France, liquidated the Spanish revolution, and assassinated all the old Bolsheviks. "The dissolution of the Third International," the Trotskyites wrote, "is no surprise to us, for we have been proclaiming its death for a long time and picturing Stalin, today the great marshal worshipped by the bourgeoisie, as . . . the greatest renegade of Marxism."

The Trotskyites took exception to the Comintern's recent remark that Marx had dissolved the First International after it "had

fulfilled its historic task." The First International, they wrote, had been transferred to New York in the early 1870's and dissolved in Philadelphia several years later, not through a proposal of Marx, but because the unexpected development of capitalism made its existence unviable. "Today," the Trotskyites argued, "the situation is different. . . . Capitalism is in the final phase of decadence." At such a time, the Trotskyites found it absurd that the Stalinists considered the dissolution of the Comintern "opportune."

Trotskyism was at a low ebb in Brazil due to repression, dissension, and a lack of interest. "The Brazilian 'Fourth International movement,'" a Brazilian Trotskyite wrote to an Argentine Trotskyite, "is now entirely anemic, and no pardons are given to those who escape or those who succeed in returning from somber prisons, nor are they given a chance to begin their lives again. We are thus entirely fragmented and struggling with even more difficulty since the frightful resistance of the Russians to Hitler has brought about a rebirth of a certain confidence in Stalinism."⁶

Botanist Fúlvio Abramo, one of the older Trotskyites, avoided the Estado Novo by remaining in Bolivia. Mário Pedrosa, the former Brazilian representative to the Fourth International, was in the United States. In 1941, after Mário's wife, Mary, had returned to Brazil from her Pan American Union work in Washington, Mário had sought to follow her but had been jailed upon reaching Rio. With the intervention of his father, a former senator, and the receipt of a letter from the Pan American Union, written on behalf of Cordell Hull, arrangements had been made with Filinto Müller and others for Mário to return to Washington.⁷

Sacchetta, while devoting most of his time to *Folha da Manhã* and *Folha da Noite*, tried to keep the flag of the Fourth International aloft in Brazil. It seemed to him that the old Brazilian Trotskyites, such as Pedrosa, Aristides Lobo, Edmundo Moniz, Fúlvio Abramo, and Lívio Xavier, had become supporters of democratic socialism. Aristides Lobo, he found, believed that the epoch of Internationals had passed. According to Hilcar Leite, some members of the old Brazilian Trotskyite group, arguing that the Soviet Union was not a classless society, carried on a "translation center" of the "heretical Trotskyites," who were even weaker in Brazil than the "orthodox wing" of Trotskyism. Leite himself joined the "heretical wing."⁸

The "orthodox" Trotskyites received a lift in 1943 when Plínio Mello was elected president of the São Paulo journalists' union in a victory over the candidate of the PCB. Mello had continued to support Sacchetta's "orthodox wing," even after it had begun to decline in 1940. The victory, hailed by non-Trotskyite Arnaldo Pedroso

d'Horta, was a tribute to Mello's popularity and may also have reflected the journalists' hatred of Vargas. Mello became the only labor union president in São Paulo who refused to render the union reports demanded by the Labor Ministry.⁹

5. *The Deaths of Laura Brandão and Leocádia Prestes*
(1942 and 1943)

With the German attack on Moscow in 1941, the children of those associated with the Comintern headquarters were evacuated from the Lux Hotel. The two older daughters of Otávio and Laura Brandão were assigned harvesting work and the two younger ones were sent to the Volga region. Otávio dug trenches and cut fir trees on the outskirts of Moscow until late in 1941 when it became necessary to move Laura, apparently ill with cancer, to the only hospital with room for her. It was in Ufa, in the Urals, 1,600 kilometers from Moscow. After she died there early in 1942, perhaps from leukemia, the funeral procession in the main street was led by La Pasionaria (Dolores Ibarruri). The weather was so cold, and the ground so frozen, that Otávio had to wait until spring to dig a grave.¹

Upon returning to Moscow, Otávio found that his books and papers at the library had been destroyed by bombings and that his other papers, along with Laura's poems, had been removed from their Lux Hotel room and destroyed by the authorities. Brandão's third daughter, 18-year-old Dionísia, was put to work building trenches east of Moscow, and Otávio was given the task of recommencing the radio broadcasts in Portuguese, which had been ended, without explanation, when the war had broken out. He repeatedly assured his listeners that Stalingrad would not fall.

Now that the Brazilian government had declared a state of war with Germany and Italy, the radio programs called Vargas the president of Brazil instead of the fascist bandit. Nevertheless, Brandão disagreed with what he has called Fernando de Lacerda's "false doctrine of support of Vargas in war and peace." Fernando, he felt, had an unjustified tendency to claim that he alone spoke for the PCB. As for the Comintern, Brandão considered it in no condition to operate. Its headquarters had been suffering such intense bombing that most of its personnel had been evacuated from Moscow.²

In Moscow in 1943, Brandão married Prestes' sister Lúcia, whose first husband, a Russian military officer, had been killed in the war. Of the other three Prestes sisters, all unmarried, Clotilde and Heloisa also remained in Russia. Lygia had gone from Paris to Mexico City in

1940 with her mother, Leocádia, and her little niece, Anita, daughter of Luís Carlos Prestes and Olga.

Olga was reportedly "languishing in some concentration camp in Germany."³ The last letter that Prestes had received from her had been written in November 1941, after she had been moved from the Berlin prison to the Ravensbrück concentration camp, north of Berlin.⁴ The letter was part of the family correspondence that Prestes was allowed to carry on. From time to time, when the authorities chose to impose "total incommunicability," even this was forbidden along with visits from the five individuals who had permission to call on him. The five included three relatives: Antônio Justino Prestes de Menezes of Rio, Alfredo Felizardo of Porto Alegre, and Paulo Felizardo of São Paulo. Another visitor was Sobral Pinto, who dropped in each week when conditions allowed and who arranged for the prisoner to receive quite a few books (many about mathematics) and subscriptions to *Jornal do Commercio* and *Correio da Manhã*. The fifth authorized visitor was Foreign Ministry official Orlando Leite Ribeiro, whose occasional calls on Prestes, beginning in 1942, were permitted by Vargas. Leite Ribeiro, a close companion of the Cavalier of Hope in the 1920's and 1930, had become an admirer and friend of Vargas.⁵

In 1942 and 1943 the Mexican Foreign Office proposed to Brazil's ambassador to Mexico, Carlos de Lima Cavalcanti, that the Cavalier of Hope be freed so that he could live in Mexico with his relatives. Lima Cavalcanti maintained that he could hardly forward the proposal to the Brazilian government because Prestes was in jail for the murder of Elza Fernandes and because he, Lima Cavalcanti, had been tried by the TSN for being a Communist and was an enemy of the Estado Novo, living in a kind of exile.⁶

In mid-1943, when Leocádia was dying, Mexico's defense minister and recent president, Lázaro Cárdenas, asked Lima Cavalcanti to transmit his request to Vargas that Prestes be allowed to visit her. At Lima Cavalcanti's suggestion, Cárdenas sent a cable directly to Vargas, but Vargas did not reply. For the occasion of the funeral of "La Madre Heróica," a demonstration against Brazil's embassy in Mexico was planned and was only called off after one of Cárdenas' generals declared that Lima Cavalcanti was not responsible for Vargas' failure to respond to Cárdenas' request. But criticisms of Lima Cavalcanti were made by Lygia Prestes and Jorge Amado and, later, by Prestes himself.⁷

In Brazil, Sobral Pinto arranged to have *Journal do Commercio* publish a small note about the death of Leocádia. It did not mention her son, because the DIP prohibited the publication of his name.⁸

6. *The CNOP Participates in Mass Demonstrations (1942–1943)*

When Arruda Câmara spoke with Leôncio Basbaum in Rio in the first half of 1942, he asked Basbaum to put him in touch with the CNOP, which a few Communists in Rio had formed to give the PCB a provisional organization. The CNOP (Comissão Nacional de Organização Provisória) was headed by journalist-economist Amarílio Vasconcelos and Maurício Grabois, a former Juventude Comunista leader who had left Bahia at an early age to do Party work not only in Minas Gerais but also in São Paulo, Rio, and elsewhere. The Communists from Pará, João Amazonas and Pedro Pomar, helped Vasconcelos and Grabois build up the CNOP.

Basbaum found a comrade who agreed to introduce Arruda Câmara to Vasconcelos and Grabois, neither of whose names Basbaum had ever heard mentioned. At a time when the fear of police spies among Communists was acute, Basbaum gave the two CNOP founders assurances about Arruda, who was not known to them and hardly known by Basbaum. In the months that followed Arruda's first meeting with Vasconcelos and Grabois, the CNOP leaders and the small São Paulo group of Caires de Brito and Arruda were cautious in negotiating a union because of concern about police infiltration and because each group hoped to achieve top posts when the PCB was reorganized. Nevertheless, Arruda, on a trip from São Paulo, was finally able to advise Basbaum that the two groups had decided to cooperate. Both groups agreed that it would be advantageous to name the imprisoned Prestes chief of any new national Brazilian Communist organization.¹

The plan of Arruda and the CNOP to reorganize the Party was opposed by Communists, in and out of jail, who felt that the time was not ripe or that the sponsors of the plan were not the right men for the task. But the would-be organizers made steady headway by working hard. They helped promote mass demonstrations of students and workers on behalf of a meaningful Brazilian participation in the war and the eradication of profascist currents remaining in Brazil.²

CNOP-affiliated students were active in the attack against the German Club in Rio by the UNE (National Union of Students) in August 1942. And they played an important role in the election of Hélio de Almeida to the UNE presidency in September 1942, despite his not belonging to the CNOP. The success of the Hélio de Almeida slate over the slate supported by War Minister Dutra was a victory for Foreign Minister Aranha and was due in part to the position taken by the anti-Vargas São Paulo university students. The election

brought CNOP members Tarnier Teixeira and Paulo Silveira to the posts of UNE secretary-general and treasurer.³

Of particular interest to the CNOP was the revival of the old Liga de Defesa Nacional. Milton Caires de Brito, sometimes called "the great agglutinator" of the PCB in this period, recalls that "we made the Liga de Defesa Nacional dynamic without controlling it." It became, Basbaum writes, "a center of irradiation, of democratic propaganda and action, in which students and workers participated." Grabois, Pomar, and Amazonas contributed to the movement.⁴

Students were at the forefront in the founding, in December 1942, of the Sociedade Amigos da América and in the selection of General Manoel Rabelo as its president. The general was installed in Rio on January 1, 1943, one day after Vargas announced plans to have the Brazilian military participate in the warfare overseas. In São Paulo, Rabelo reminded his many admirers of his own earlier call for such an "Expeditionary Corps." He also declared that "São Paulo never was, never will be, at the service of tyranny, oppression, deceit. Let us march together, struggling for liberty."⁵

On January 12, 1943, Dutra wrote a "personal and secret" letter to Vargas complaining of Rabelo's criticism of the War Ministry and pointing out that Rabelo, in one of his São Paulo speeches, had called the Communist danger an "imaginary bugaboo and hobgoblin, designed to distract attention and leave us unprepared for the real enemy." Again, as in June 1942, Dutra told Vargas that Communist activities made the situation similar to that faced in 1935, and he suggested that Rabelo's conduct, during the insurrections of that year, had been so strange as to elicit "severe comments in all the army." Pointing out that Rabelo, during his São Paulo visit, had been "always surrounded by elements believed to be Communist," Dutra wrote that Rabelo's conduct was harmful to preparing the army for its duties, was demoralizing for the government, and could become an "alarming cause of subversion."⁶

When Rabelo was in Salvador, Bahia, in June 1943, organizing a branch of the Sociedade Amigos da América, he was interviewed by Jacob Gorender, a newspaper reporter and student who had joined the PCB in 1942 and was secretary of *Seiva*. In the interview, which was published by *Seiva* only after Rabelo approved the text, the general strongly criticized the Brazilian government. He stated that Brazil had declared war but had taken no steps to do anything about it. Brazil, he said, had left its coasts unprotected and was making no effective contribution to the Allied effort.⁷

Rabelo's message to *Seiva* was echoed by the UNE, which had been led by CNOP members Tarnier Teixeira and Paulo Silveira fol-

lowing the resignation of President Hélió de Almeida and which met in Rio in July 1943 to elect new officers. Although Rabelo, back in Rio, said that *Seiva's* reporting of the interview was correct and the sentiments were his own, the publication of Rabelo's views resulted in the imprisonment of Gorender, João Falcão, and Wilson Falcão, João's brother, for three months. The interview, which may have been the first strongly antigovernment article to appear during the Estado Novo in a publication of general circulation, would never have made an appearance if *Seiva* had been subject to the prior censorship imposed on all newspapers.⁸

Rabelo wrote Vargas that Dutra, in his instructions to army officers, "always speaks of the Communist danger, without one word of warning against Nazism or fascism, with which we are at war." Criticizing the war minister's "obstinate and morbid preoccupation with perceiving the Communist danger everywhere," the president of the Sociedade Amigos da América argued that "no one any longer feels the imminence of this peril, above all since Russia joined the United Nations in the struggle against the totalitarian countries, and principally since the Comintern's extinction and Russia's adherence to the Atlantic Charter." "Brazil," he added, "also belongs to that alliance."⁹

Similar observations were made late in 1943 in a *New York Times* article that suggested diplomatic relations might be established between Brazil and the Soviet Union.¹⁰

7. *The Mantiqueira Conference* (August 1943)

Diógenes de Arruda Câmara was 26 years old in 1942, handsome in a masculine way, persuasive, astute, and not without a sense of humor. During his days as a student and Labor Ministry employee in Bahia, he was, Osvaldo Peralva writes, "always high spirited and ready for a fight" and "had a burning desire to lead."¹¹ He gained the reputation of being the director of the PCB nucleus in Bahia. But in 1942, when he negotiated the union of the CNOP with the small group assembled in São Paulo by Bahians, in preparation for the national reorganization of the PCB, he alienated most of the PCB militants who remained in Bahia. Giocondo Alves Dias, who had become the PCB's principal leader in Bahia, opposed the CNOP's reorganization plans for the Party and so did João Falcão. They had been led to understand, by the Comintern's South American Bureau, that the Bahia Regional Committee was the "most authorized" to speak for the Party, and they felt that the reorganization plans should come

from Bahia. Furthermore, the South American Bureau had directed the Bahia Regional Committee to avoid association with other PCB organizations because police infiltration was common. Thus in Bahia the CNOP's plans were supported by only about fifteen militants, including journalists Mário Alves de Souza Vieira, Rui Facó, and Jacob Gorender.²

Arruda Câmara, who had gone to Buenos Aires with Falcão early in 1942, was ready in 1943 to carry out the PCB reorganization in accordance with the authorization he felt he had received from the South American Bureau. With the help of Milton Caires de Brito and CNOP leaders he arranged a conference that would give Brazilian Communism a provisional party organization and a political policy (inspired by conversations in Buenos Aires). The positions of Brazilian Stalinists stretched all the way from unconditional support of the Vargas government to the affiliation with groups that used demonstrations to stimulate the idea of ridding Brazil of the Vargas dictatorship before combating foreign dictatorships.

Thanks to the organizing work of the CNOP, the conference was held at Barra do Piraí, in Rio de Janeiro state, on August 27, 28, and 29, 1943. It became known as the Second National Conference of the PCB (because the 1934 conference, which selected some CC members notable in the mid-1930's, was considered the first).³ More informally it was called the Mantiqueira Conference because of the nearby Mantiqueira Mountains.

Many, if not all, of the fourteen men attending the Mantiqueira Conference became members of the National Committee of the provisional Party organization.⁴ At least two were elected in absentia: Agostinho Dias de Oliveira, because he arrived from the northeast too late for the conference, and Carlos Marighella, because he was on Ilha Grande. Besides these two, those chosen to serve on the National Committee included Pedro Pomar and Maurício Grabois (two of the organizers of the conference) and also Arruda, João Amazonas, Milton Caires de Brito, Lindolfo Hill (a 26-year-old construction worker from Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais), Francisco Gomes (a construction worker from Rio de Janeiro state), Jorge Herlein (a railroad worker from Paraná, well known for his recent Liga de Defesa Nacional work in Rio), Claudino José da Silva (a 41-year-old carpenter and railroad worker from Rio de Janeiro state), Abílio Fernandes (a metalworker from Rio Grande do Sul), and José Medina Filho (the Rio de Janeiro shipyard worker who had served on the CC in 1935).⁵

The conference was also attended by Mário Alves de Souza Vieira from Bahia, but the Bahia Regional Committee, when it learned later about the conference, insisted that Mário Alves did not represent it.

Two of the CNOP's outstanding organizers may have been present: Amarílio Vasconcelos and Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, the former army officer who had spent over five years in prison for having participated in the Aviation School revolt of 1935.⁶

Luís Carlos Prestes was named a National Committee member and secretary general of the provisional Party organization. As acting secretary general (due to Prestes' imprisonment) the conference selected José Medina Filho, whose letters, written late in 1935 regretting his inability to lead a maritime strike, had resulted in his resignation from the CC and arrest in 1936. He remained in his new post but briefly. Accused of making personal use of the new organization's funds, he was replaced by Álvaro Ventura, the Santa Catarina stevedore who had been a working-class representative to Brazil's 1933–1934 Constitutional Assembly.⁷

The Mantiqueira Conference set up an Executive Commission of the National Committee and chose committee heads. The Executive Commission included Medina, Arruda, Caires de Brito, Grabois, Amazonas, Pomar, and Hill. Arruda became head of National Organization, while Amazonas became secretary of Labor Union and Mass Work. Grabois, named secretary of National Propaganda at Mantiqueira, took an interest in the CNOP's recently established monthly magazine *Continental*, which reached a circulation of eight thousand under the directorship of *Seiva* veteran Armênio Guedes. Jorge Herlein and Francisco Gomes were chosen to head the CNOP work of organization in the Federal District. Claudino José da Silva, familiar with the northeast, was assigned to handle affairs in the north. Pedro Pomar spent nine months on Arruda's National Organization committee and then was assigned the task of reorganizing the PCB in São Paulo. In São Paulo he and his family lived with the family of Arruda in a boardinghouse on Augusta Street before finding a home in the Pinheiros district.⁸

The Mantiqueira Conference approved a report that described the war as one "for liberating peoples nationally oppressed by fascism." Considering what it called the change in the Brazilian government's foreign policy made in 1942 "under the powerful pressure of the masses," the conference adopted a Party position of national union with the government for the fight against Nazi-fascism. At the same time it recognized the need to struggle for amnesty for the political prisoners.

The "liquidationists," who opposed building an illegal party, were condemned. According to the conference, liquidationism was a radically antiworker tendency that wished to deprive the proletariat of its general staff and leave the workers trailing behind the bour-

geoisie. To build up the PCB, which the conference recognized could later become legal, the Mantiqueira leaders stressed the importance of working within industrial companies. They rejected Party organization based on profession or trade and called for the creation of cells in companies. They also resolved that the government control of labor unions was no reason not to work in them, and they emphasized that such work was essential.⁹

From the large sector of Brazilian Communism that rejected the Mantiqueira Conference decisions, three complaints were heard. One stemmed from the decision to support Vargas fully, evident in *Continental's* calls for "National Union" at the president's side; Brazilian Communists wondered whether the CNOP and its new offspring, the National Committee established at Mantiqueira, were government sponsored.¹⁰ A second complaint sprang from the belief that the time was not right for illegal Communist work. Third, many Brazilian Communists, whether motivated or not by the other reasons, believed that the "Mantiqueira people" did not represent a strong Party tradition. Some felt that the group remaining in prison contained better representatives. But that was not to say that they all believed that Prestes should be secretary general; Basbaum writes of a group of old São Paulo militants who lacked confidence in Prestes.¹¹

A large number of students, strongly anti-Vargas, left the CNOP, whose pro-Vargas tendencies, even before the Mantiqueira Conference, weakened the Communist wing in the UNE. These students reflected the view of most of the Communist prisoners, among them Agildo Barata, when they argued that the CNOP had no right to turn itself into the PCB. Like Rosa Meireles Costa Leite, some of them suspected that the Mantiqueira Conference was merely an arrangement whereby "Grabois and others organized the PCB for themselves."¹² So many Communist intellectuals and Paulistas disliked what went on at the Mantiqueira Conference that it is not surprising to find among them the names of Caio Prado Júnior, young scientist Mário Schemberg, and journalist Tito Batini (who, as "Jaime," had accused Sacchetta of Trotskyism in September 1938).¹³

Marighella, opposing clandestine work by an illegal organization, refused to accept the National Committee post to which he had been named by the Mantiqueira Conference.¹⁴ Carlos da Costa Leite, like some members of the Meireles family, adhered to a similar view, but his dislike of the Mantiqueira Conference did not bring him any closer to Agildo Barata, who has written reprovingly that "the Costa Leite group preached the most absolute organic nihilism."¹⁵ According to Basbaum's memoirs, Pedro Mota Lima and his

brother Paulo shared the opinion of Fernando de Lacerda that no illegal Party organization should be established. Roberto Morena, also mentioned by Basbaum as having this view, did not at this time back the Party reorganization work that interested the Mantiqueira Conference participants; after his release from prison in the middle of 1943, Morena devoted himself to carpentry and labor union work.¹⁶

"Liquidationists," Agostinho Dias de Oliveira has written, "advocated the creation of a party which would include all the elements of 'the Left.'" He attributes their defeat, at least in part, to the activity of the post-Mantiqueira CNOP within the proletariat. The commissions set up at the Mantiqueira Conference, he says, gave careful attention to encouraging the regular functioning of Party cells in industrial establishments. As the CNOP leaders themselves assisted in this cell work and sent dedicated comrades "to regions where difficulties existed in Party organization," Agostinho Dias de Oliveira concludes that the new PCB provisional directorship had the merit of being close to the Party bases. Gorender, who estimates that the PCB membership was less than one thousand at this time, points out that the CNOP had better penetration throughout the states than did rival Communist groups.¹⁷

8. *Prestes' Opinions* (March–June 1944)

One reply to the Mantiqueira Conference was the establishment, in the last part of 1943, of the Comitê de Ação by Communists who disliked cooperating with Vargas and opposed having the CNOP become the PCB. A leading organizer of the Comitê de Ação was Glauco Pinheiro Menezes, who had participated in the 1935 uprising in Pernambuco, fled to Paraguay, and been arrested in mid-1936 with Sócrates Gonçalves da Silva near the Paraguayan border. Campaigning for democracy and the overthrow of Vargas, the Comitê de Ação attracted a large following among students and journalists, some of whom were not Communists.¹

UNE student leaders, such as Paulo Silveira, who had broken with the CNOP, joined the Comitê de Ação and played a prominent role in its most popular campaign, which called for amnesty. Hoping to obtain for this campaign a strong backing from labor unions, where the CNOP was gaining strength, the Comitê de Ação approached the CNOP. But the CNOP, which had resolved at the Mantiqueira Conference to "struggle for amnesty," was unwilling to participate in a campaign led by Vargas haters.²

The view of Prestes, awaited with interest by Communists with

conflicting ideas, did not appear quickly. When at last the Communists received it, it was contained in a message that Prestes wrote on March 14, 1944, without any knowledge of the decisions reached at Mantiqueira. Prestes has recalled that he was "completely unaware of what was happening in the Party" and did not read Fernando de Lacerda's "degrading" *Diretrizes* interview until May 1944, a year after its publication.³

Prestes's message of March 1944, Bezerra writes, was discussed by the Ilha Grande prisoners and helped them understand the political situation. Its position resembled, in many respects, that assumed at the Mantiqueira Conference. Future PCB leaders, looking back on 1943 and 1944, attributed the similarity to the application, carried out independently by Prestes and the Mantiqueira Conference, of "the same scientific method, the method of Marxism-Leninism." The similarity has been acclaimed as a demonstration of "the force of Marxism-Leninism, the exact social science, the only exact one and therefore all powerful."⁴

Like the Mantiqueira Conference, Prestes called for a true national union at the side of the government. He criticized the "leftist and sectarian" language of a fairly recent ANL document, which, he said, had made unfair and unspecific attacks on the government. "If," he said, "we have not yet achieved national unity, this is not due principally to the government, and much less to its chief, . . . but is fundamentally due to the incapacity of the Aliancistas to unite and mobilize the masses for the support of the government's war policy and for the demand of the practice of democracy." Turning then to the "error of the Right," Prestes condemned the "liquidationist" attitude of "capitulation" assumed by those who passively declared their backing of the government and did nothing to help it free itself of reactionaries and fifth columnists. Prestes, in short, called for "open, frank, and decided support of the government war policy" combined with a struggle for liberties and amnesty that would, he felt, strengthen national unity. But he warned that the struggle for liberties "does not mean at this moment a doctrinary combat against the Estado Novo and the present constitution and, much less, generalized insults" of government men facing complex problems.⁵

Within this framework, Prestes gave more attention than had been given at the Mantiqueira Conference to the struggle for democratic liberties. Drawing up, in April 1944, a proposed "Declaration of the ANL and PCB," Prestes included a request to the government for legal steps that would assure immediate liberty of expression and freedom to organize political parties and associations, including the ANL and PCB.⁶

Prestes was indignant, about a month later, when he read Fernando de Lacerda's year-old interview. Commenting in May 1944 on a document that supported Fernando de Lacerda's position, Prestes wrote that the position was "an opportunistic and liquidationist one of members of the petty bourgeoisie" who were "in panic and without perspective." Observing that the Trotskyites could wish nothing better, Prestes wanted to know who had authorized Lacerda to speak in the name of jailed Communists. "Do not the jailed Communists deserve at least some respect?" he asked. The Cavalier of Hope called on all the antifascists to act with the greatest boldness and initiative, certain that in this way it would later be possible to unify organically the principal antifascist groups. "But now, at the start, the work must be illegal, just as illegal as this exchange of our letters. Let those who oppose illegal work crawl under their beds and hope—or let them feel despair, because perhaps . . . the government will not give them the jobs they solicit."⁷

In June 1944, when much of the prodemocracy movement in Brazil was inspired by foes of Vargas, Prestes received a letter from a friend which enlightened him about "the divergencies that today separate the old combatants of 1935." In his reply, which he asked his friend to circulate widely, Prestes wrote that in general he subscribed to the thesis of attacking the democratic forces that did not defend the government. "If," he wrote, "those so-called democratic forces do not support the government at war with Nazism, they are in fact on the side of Nazism and want Vargas replaced by some adventurer. Could anything be worse for our people?" Commenting also on Dutra's recent letter congratulating a church dignitary who had spoken against Communism and Integralismo, Prestes suggested distributing Dutra's letter under a heading reading: "Against national union with the government: Minister Dutra, instead of fighting Hitler, wants to 'destroy' the Communists because they back the government." In closing, Prestes wrote that "we must not forget that the big enemy, the only enemy, at this time, is Nazism."⁸

The great hope of most of the Brazilian Communists, Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes has said, was to participate in the wide democratic anti-Estado Novo movement that was developing with fervor.⁹ The Mantiqueira Conference discouraged that participation. While doubt existed as to whether much importance should be given to the conference, the policy it adopted was considerably strengthened by the views of Prestes, made known in mid-1944. What, Brazilian Communists now asked themselves, would be Prestes' position about the future of the National Committee set up at Mantiqueira as the organ for directing the Party?

9. *Repression in Rio by Coriolano de Góes* (last half of 1944)

When the Liga de Defesa Nacional observed May Day 1944 at Rio's National Institute of Music, the workers were addressed by a Communist militant—Armando Coutinho, who had been arrested several times since joining the Party in 1932. His message praised the democratic principles of the Atlantic Charter and called for "the pacification of the Brazilian family." At another Liga de Defesa Nacional rally in Rio, this one held on June 6 to hail the news of the Allied invasion of Europe, the speakers included representatives of the UNE as well as the Liga. Ivan Ramos Ribeiro spoke openly in the name of the PCB. This unusual occurrence, cited by Jorge Amado as a blow to the liquidationists, indicated a more liberal atmosphere in Brazil.¹

However, hopes for a more liberal atmosphere were quickly dashed. Early in July, Vargas replaced Rio Police Chief Nelson de Melo with Coriolano de Góes, who had been secretary of Segurança of São Paulo state and was often accused of responsibility for the unfortunate shooting there of students and others during an antigovernment demonstration in November 1943. Journalist José Soares Maciel Filho, writing to Vargas' brother Benjamim, said that the appointment of Coriolano to the Rio post had caused "panic among the leftists." "The Communists," he added, "have infiltrated the liberal classes, principally the judicial power and the lawyers."²

Under Coriolano, the Rio police instituted a "program of regimentation of Communists for the sake of public order." Between July 5 and July 17, during the first phase of the program, many Communists were brought to the Delegacia de Segurança Social for questioning. Among them were Armando Coutinho, Roberto Morena, Maurício Grabois, Amarílio Vasconcelos, and Iguatemi Ramos.³

On July 25, most of these Communists joined a crowd at the headquarters of the Liga de Defesa Nacional to hear Chilean Communist Salvador Ocampo. Because they "enthusiastically applauded the leftist concepts expressed by that Chilean extremist," the Communists (including José Medina Filho) were arrested and held for about ten days.⁴

The authorities fined *Correio da Manhã* for an unfavorable comment on the Coriolano appointment. Engaging in what *Time* magazine called a "meticulous censorship," they closed down several publications that were considered unfriendly to the Vargas regime. Two of the victims, forced to suspend publication on July 5, 1944, were *Ilustração*, published by Paulo Zingg in São Paulo, and *Diretrizes*, published in Rio. Samuel Wainer sought to rescue *Diretrizes*, which,

like most publications, depended on the government for its supply of paper. He obtained support from the UNE and Aranha, but that was not enough, and he went, by way of Argentina, to the United States, where he could continue publishing articles. In Brazil, Zingg was prohibited from publishing articles.⁵

In the meantime Aranha himself ran into trouble. In August 1944, when he prepared to assume the vice-presidency of the Sociedade Amigos da América at the Automobile Club in Rio, the police took over the building, preventing the ceremony. After Aranha, learning that Vargas supported the police, left his Foreign Ministry post, Rodolfo Ghioldi issued a statement in Montevideo. The Argentine Communist declared that the resignation of Aranha was an example of the prevalence of reactionary politics in Brazil. Giving other examples, he said that *Brazil-Portugal*, "inspired by dictator Antônio Salazar," had replaced *Diretrizes* and *Ilustração* and that "newspaper reporter Jader de Carvalho was condemned to seven years in jail for having given a speech favoring the Soviet Union and amnesty." The appointment of Coriolano de Góes, Ghioldi said, had followed a birthday party for "antidemocratic politician Olímpio de Melo, during which the reactionaries . . . denounced an imminent Communist threat against the Brazilian family."⁶

In a confidential bulletin written late in September, the Delegacia de Segurança Social of the Rio police concluded that "the Communist apparatus seems to want to return to the way things were before July of this year, when this *delegacia* jailed some of those elements." Agents of the *delegacia*, the bulletin disclosed, had been busy reporting the presence of enemies of the regime at meetings. At a talk given by a French priest, Joseph Ducatillon, "more or less a Communist," they found "the following Communists: Armênio Guedes (neo-Communist), Roberto Sissón, Francisco Mangabeira, . . . , and Marino Bomilcar Besouchet."⁷ Police agents also wrote that Marxist army Major Henrique Cordeiro Oest, former secretary of the Federal District ANL, was among about thirty officers who listened to a speech, critical of the government, made by Colonel Juarez Távara, new head of the Military Department of the Liga de Defesa Nacional. The police agents further reported that João Mangabeira was pleased with the growing discontent in political and military sectors and that Rio journalist Carlos Lacerda believed that Russia's increasing influence spelled the end of the Vargas dictatorship.⁸

Striking against enemies of the regime early in October, the Rio police invaded a residence, where they arrested sixteen individuals,

mostly members of the Sociedade Amigos da América who were found with anti-Estado Novo literature and a mimeograph. Later in the month Coriolano de Góes visited São Paulo, leading the students there to remark that the Gestapo had come to town. The sentiment in São Paulo was reflected in the praise heaped upon Monteiro Lobato for declaring that he would not agree to be elected to the Brazilian Academy of Letters because Vargas was a member.⁹

In Rio in December, Coriolano's police arrested eighteen of the approximately one hundred listed enemies of the regime who had been under surveillance in Rio. Thirteen of the eighteen were classified as Communists and their arrest did not cause nearly as much comment as the arrest of the other five, who were quite well known: oppositionist politician Virgílio de Melo Franco, lawyers Adauto Lúcio Cardoso and Dario de Almeida Magalhães, and journalists Austregésilo de Athayde and Rafael Correia de Oliveira. Virgílio de Melo Franco, son of former Foreign Minister Afrânio de Melo Franco, had just returned from São Paulo, where he had obtained signatures on a prodemocracy manifesto which was to be used to launch the presidential candidacy of Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes. Brazil's leading lawyers signed a habeas corpus petition in favor of the five prominent prisoners, and they were released after spending ten days at the barracks of the First Cavalry Regiment of the Police.¹⁰

The arrest of the thirteen Communists on December 22 followed an earlier roundup of "adepts of the red creed," of whom ten were still awaiting judgment on the charge of "publishing and distributing subversive bulletins." In the words of the Delegacia de Segurança Social, the new roundup of thirteen adepts was made "as a consequence of the connections they have maintained in frequent meetings." Under questioning, the police reported, a few of the newly arrested Communists "pretended" to be supporters of the government. The thirteen included Armando Coutinho, Roberto Morena, Maurício Grabois, Amarílio Vasconcelos, Antônio Rollemberg, Raul Pedroso, David Medeiros Filho, and Iguatemi Ramos.¹¹

10. *The Writers' Conference* (January 1945)

While the police of Coriolano de Góes carried out the last wave of Estado Novo political arrests, the winds of democracy blew strongly in the world and in Brazil. The Brazilian army leaders most responsible for establishing the Estado Novo became convinced that the dictatorship should be ended. Former Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro,

traveling late in October 1944 from Montevideo to Rio and conferring with army officers on the way, was struck by the general craving for "a legitimate constitutional regime," and when he reached Rio he spoke to Vargas about "doing away with the Estado Novo." War Minister Dutra, who had returned from visiting the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy, studied confidential reports about the Brazilian situation, and in December he urged Vargas to take steps to return the country to "constitutional modernization" even before the war ended. Vargas, on December 31, promised a gradual political evolution based on a "full and free consultation of opinion," but he warned against "premature agitation" and "demagogic disturbances."¹

The Communist intellectuals, overwhelmingly anti-Vargas, had no objection to what Vargas called "premature agitation." It was the Communists, Carolina Nabuco maintains, who "inspired" the plan for the state sections of the Brazilian Association of Writers (ABDE) to send delegations to São Paulo to constitute the First Brazilian Writers' Congress. Weeks before the five-day congress began on January 22, the proposed "theses" of Communist intellectuals were among the several that received newspaper publicity. Thus readers learned of Aguinaldo Costa's study advocating the redistribution of rural landholdings and of Elias Chaves Neto's antifascist political study.² ABDE Treasurer Marques Rebelo, who had been opposing ideas of Jorge Amado and other Communists, has explained that the Communists, although in control of the congress, could not prevent his attendance because of the post he held; but, he has added, they assigned him to a minor commission (copyrights) instead of an important one (political matters).³

Despite their influence, the Communists were numerically very much in the minority among the approximately 250 writers at the congress. But their hatred of the Estado Novo was shared by the others. Liberals and Communists advocated resolutions calling for democracy and freedom of expression everywhere, and favorable to the restoration of the Republic in Spain. They adopted the proposal, made by Paulo Zingg, that directly attacked the government's DIP (Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda). Pedro Mota Lima, Astrojildo Pereira, Antônio Franca, Carlos Lacerda, and Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza were among those who signed a lengthy proposal with suggestions, such as free education at all levels, that were designed to make education more democratic. The crowning Declaration of Principles of the Congress, which censors would not allow the press to publish, stated that it was urgent for Brazil to adjust its

political organization to allow complete liberty of expression and to provide a government elected by the people through direct and secret universal suffrage.⁴

A congenial atmosphere prevailed at the congress, which was studded with famous names. "There was no difference between Communists and non-Communists; we were all allies," non-Communist leftist Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza has said. In the highly acclaimed speech of Jorge Amado at the imposing closing session, Antônio Cândido heard for the first time an expression which would come to be much used: "*o genial Stalin*" (Stalin, man of genius).⁵

Typical of the anti-Vargas sentiment of the Communist intellectuals was that felt by the two Writers' Congress delegates who had been among the nine PCB founders in 1922: Astrojildo Pereira and Cristiano Cordeiro.

Astrojildo Pereira, opponent of the CNOP, presided at the first plenary session of the Writers' Congress and was chosen secretary of the commission on political matters. He wrote the first draft of the Declaration of Principles, which, before being adopted by acclamation, was revised by two of the political commission members, non-Communist José Eduardo do Prado Kelly (commission president) and Communist Caio Prado Júnior.⁶ Among the other twelve members of the commission were Jorge Amado, Carlos Lacerda, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Moacir Werneck de Castro, Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, and Raul Riff. (Riff, like Spanish Civil War veteran Homero de Castro Jobim, was a Communist delegate from Rio Grande do Sul.)

Christiano Cordeiro, who had helped Astrojildo Pereira found the PCB in 1922, came to the Writers' Congress from Goiás, whose interventor, Pedro Ludovico, did not molest Communists. Cordeiro, deported from Pernambuco in 1939, had earned a living as a teacher and journalist in Santos for two years before becoming director of the public library in Goiânia. Serving more recently as president of the Goiânia Amnesty League, he was critical of what he called the "infiltration of elements of the Vargas government in the National Commission of Reorganization of the PCB."⁷

11. *Communist Labor Leaders Establish the MUT (April 1945)*

Soon after the close of the Writers' Congress, Vargas took steps in quick succession that spelled the demise of the Estado Novo. Press

ensorship came to an end on February 22, with the failure of the DIP to punish *Correio da Manhã* for publishing Carlos Lacerda's interview with José Américo. A constitutional amendment, signed by Vargas on February 28, helped to open the way for the election of congressmen and a new president late in the year. In a press interview at the beginning of March, Vargas spoke of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and said that he would study possible amnesty decrees, case by case.¹

Also, as Cristiano Cordeiro was aware, Vargas was making other moves, and they did not bode well for the anti-Vargas Communists of the Comitê de Ação. They may have been observable around the time that Dutra advised Vargas to end the Estado Novo. Luiz Werneck Vianna writes that Vargas, finding himself deserted by the upper-class groups that had upheld the regime, turned to the labor movement. The labor movement he turned to was the one being developed by the CNOP people. As Leandro Konder points out, "the evolution of the political position of Vargas in 1944-45 encouraged the political line adopted at the Mantiqueira Conference."²

The link between Prestes and Vargas, at this time, was Foreign Ministry official Orlando Leite Ribeiro. Prestes, speaking later to Agildo Barata about Leite Ribeiro's visits, said that "Orlando has all the qualities of a cavalry patrol: he goes to the enemy territory, obtains information, and, without allowing himself to become involved, returns to his lines with the information collected." Barata believed that Leite Ribeiro's "patrol work" was "much more in favor of his new commander—Getúlio—under whose fascination he fell, than in favor of the old 'Cavalier of Hope,' reduced to the condition of a prisoner eager to obtain liberty at any price." For Vargas at this time, Barata wrote, it would be of great "moral and political significance" to receive the support of the person most featured in the "clamorous democratic movement for amnesty," the person who had been the focal point of hatred shown by the Estado Novo. Depending on Prestes' decision, Barata felt, either the anti-Vargas Comitê de Ação or the pro-Vargas CNOP would become the PCB and receive the international Communist support that Prestes was in a position to secure for it.³

Prestes, explaining at a later date the political developments of this period, said that "Vargas needed us."⁴ Other observers have argued that the PCB needed the cooperation of Vargas, who had considerable mass support (perhaps more than he realized) as a result of propaganda in recent years about the benefits of his social legislation. Besides, the Vargas government would draw up legislation affecting the legality of parties (including the PCB) and was dominant

in the network of labor unions recognized by the labor courts. In short, the Vargas regime and the CNOP each had something to offer the other, which accounts for a close relationship between Vargas and the PCB that would have been unthinkable nine years earlier.

The relationship has been described as becoming a full-fledged alliance by July 1945. Long before that date, the Communists sought a full-fledged alliance, and Vargas was cooperative. Although he adopted his usual policy of keeping his options open and was in no hurry to part company with the armed forces, he permitted the early development of the most important ramification of the alliance, that is, Communist penetration into the labor unions. Thus, starting late in 1944, the CNOP Communists were able to instigate a series of state labor congresses. One of the early ones, the Congresso Sindical dos Trabalhadores de Minas Gerais, attracted the representatives of fifty-two labor unions in November 1944. Before the series was completed, these same Communists formed and dominated a national organization for unifying the labor movement, the Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT). Established in April 1945, it flourished with the permission of the Vargas government although it lay outside of the arrangements prescribed by the labor laws.⁵

The Communists, according to political scientist Francisco C. Weffort, began to bring life to the labor unions, which had been in "a state of paralysis" and which belonged to an official structure designed to subordinate the working class to the government. But, he points out, the Communists did not free the unions from the government. In accepting the official syndical structure, he adds, the Communist Party "declared itself unable to organize the working class in an autonomous manner, or . . . compete with Vargas' prestige among the masses."⁶

Early in March, while the CNOP was hard at work, Vargas named a new Rio police chief, João Alberto Lins e Barros. João Alberto had been close to the Cavalier of Hope during the military revolts of the 1920's. Now João Alberto told the press that amnesty should be granted "without restriction."

Such was the atmosphere that the press felt no hesitancy in giving full coverage to the work of old enemies of the Vargas regime as they busied themselves announcing new organizations and issuing manifestos. In Rio a "Manifesto of the Lefts" was signed on March 15 by Álvaro Ventura, Iguatemi Ramos, Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, Maurício Grabois, Roberto Morena, Amarílio Vasconcelos, Pedro Mota Lima, and others. It advocated national union, democracy, elections, amnesty, and the development of industry and agriculture. In São Paulo, Abguar Bastos associated with a short-lived Organização Na-

cional dos Trabalhadores Unidos. Also in São Paulo, Jorge Amado and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira were among those who issued a manifesto, early in April, to launch a Movimento Unitário Democrático, in which Paulista antifascist workers and intellectuals were to promote "national union."⁷

The MUT was more important. Roberto Morena gave an interview on April 10, in which he emphatically denied that the MUT would become a political party, and later in the month he, José Medina Filho, and others issued the MUT's manifesto. The manifesto, according to social scientist Arnaldo Spindel, revealed clearly the willingness of the Communist Party to collaborate with the *pelegos* (labor "leaders" associated with the government) and to go along with the existing labor union structure and legislation. He adds that the objective of the MUT's early effort was "not only to support the dictator in order to achieve legalization of the Communist Party, but also to place Communists in positions of leadership within the labor union structure."⁸

The MUT manifesto, signed by three hundred labor leaders from thirteen states, was part of the Communists' program for achieving large-scale union membership. This program, Weffort writes, would turn the official syndical structure into a structure that functioned. But, Weffort explains, the MUT's policy of cooperating with the government meant that the role of labor unions became primarily political and not a role for fighting for better economic conditions for the workers. "Actually," he argues, "there was at this time not much difference between the Communists' policy of collaboration of classes and the traditional policy of social peace for which the official labor unions were created during the Estado Novo."⁹

12. Prestes Supports the CNOP and Vargas (April 1945)

João Alberto, soon after his appointment, announced that Prestes would be allowed to receive all the visitors he wanted. The visitors, coming in a steady stream, found the pale prisoner wearing old, ill-fitting clothing, and some of them concluded that little attention had been given to the care of his teeth. Admirers reportedly noted the "nerves of steel" that had allowed him to resist "years of suffering" without weakening.¹

One of the admirers, Pedro Mota Lima, was the first journalist to call on Prestes in 1945. Mota Lima, a friend of Prestes in Buenos Aires in 1930, had been attacked, like João Alberto, by the sectarian Prestes in 1931; but by 1935 Prestes and Mota Lima were fellow sup-

porters of the ANL. Now, ten years later, Mota Lima was thrilled to find himself with Prestes, whom he met in the prison visiting room, together with an *O Globo* photographer, prison Director Caneppe, and Antônio Justino Prestes de Menezes. Prestes expressed his satisfaction with the "great victory that we Brazilian antifascists won for the people and the nation: we obliged the Integralistas to unmask themselves totally . . . and therefore Hitler lost his best base in our hemisphere."²

When Mota Lima asked for a statement for the press, the prisoner said that he preferred to wait a few days. Instead, he gave Mota Lima a paper he had written in May 1944. Published in *O Globo* on March 15, 1945, it recommended that the Communists support the Vargas administration in its struggle against foreign fascism and in its effort to move to democracy at home. Rejecting a soviet, or socialist, system for Brazil, Prestes recommended a capitalist republic: "In an industrially backward country like ours, the working class suffers much less from capitalist exploitation than from an insufficiency of capitalist development." Prestes wrote that the directors of the Matarazzo industrial firm were correct when they argued that the chief problem of Brazil was the establishment of large-scale, cheap production which would stimulate the internal market.³

Several days after receiving this memorandum, Pedro Mota Lima returned to the prison with Jorge Amado, who had never met the subject of his successful new book. In the presence of the Cavalier of Hope, Amado was at first speechless with emotion. But soon he, Prestes, and another visitor, Aristides Correia Leal, were chatting about revolutionary episodes of the 1920's. Prestes, referring to Amado's book, suggested that he was hardly the heroic figure described in it. In a serious tone he added: "Above all, I thank you because your book gave my mother her last great happiness."⁴

When Prestes asked Amado if he had any news of Olga Benário Prestes, Amado spoke of a Jewess who had come to Uruguay from a German concentration camp, where she had become acquainted with Olga and witnessed the death of Berger's wife from pneumonia in January 1939.⁵ By the time that Amado gave Prestes this news, which was several years old, Berger himself was in Rio's Judiciary Insane Asylum, a filthy, repulsive place, lacking in medical attention.

A small group of student leaders, including Paulo Silveira and Vítor Konder, called on Prestes. They sought his backing for the lively amnesty campaign that had been taken over from the Comitê de Ação by the Comissão Nacional pró-Anistia (headed by Paulo Silveira and Hermes Lima). With the student leaders Prestes was friendly and patient. During their four-hour visit, Prestes gave them

a written endorsement of the amnesty campaign, which he said no Communist could oppose. He also agreed that the Comitê de Ação had some theoretical justification for contending that the CNOP ought not to turn itself into the PCB. But Prestes, after reviewing the PCB's activities from its earliest days, told the students that the CNOP had acted in a "faithful manner" and, "under the circumstances," really was the PCB. Prestes expressed his conviction that "small differences of opinion" would disappear.⁶

With help from the authorities Prestes worked at eliminating the "differences of opinion." When Agildo Barata and his prison rival Carlos da Costa Leite, both opposed to the CNOP, were brought from Ilha Grande to see Prestes, Prestes asked them to bury their differences.⁷ But they continued at odds. Barata, unlike Costa Leite, accepted Prestes' decision in favor of the CNOP and Vargas. Attributing his subsequent transfer to the Casa de Correção to the wish of the authorities to have him near Prestes, Barata had to admit that "my unconditional and unlimited admiration for my old leader was much greater than my hatred for the sinister figure of the dictator. I set my watch by that of Prestes and became a supporter of 'the government that had declared war on the Axis.'"⁸

Prestes was not always this successful. He made a poor impression on Carlos Lacerda because he kept repeating, apparently with one fixed idea in mind, that Vargas should be supported.⁹ When Cristiano Cordeiro called on Prestes to complain about the "infiltration" of Vargas government people in the CNOP, the prisoner agreed to look into the matter, but Cordeiro feels that Prestes never did so. Comrades from São Paulo, calling on Prestes, were usually disappointed in his message. Some described the Cavalier of Hope as *gagá* (mentally decrepit or doting). Others concluded, more politely, that "he was not up to date on what was happening in Brazil and the world—and in the Party itself."¹⁰

One of these Paulistas was Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, who had been active since 1943 in two small anti-Vargas clandestine groups, the Grupo Radical de Ação Popular (the far leftist GRAP) and the Frente de Resistência (which included some São Paulo law students). In Rio he spent so many hours with the prisoner that his young friends Germinal Feijó and Cory Porto Fernandes, also on a visit to Rio from São Paulo, believed that he was giving the Cavalier of Hope a complete update on the situation. Later they learned from a disappointed Paulo Emílio that Prestes had not listened at all. Prestes had spoken for hours about the need of a union with Vargas (and had occasionally referred to himself in the third person).¹¹

"Now that you are receiving so many friends and admirers," Ro-

berto Morena wrote Prestes on April 11, "I thought I would send you these lines." Morena, in his warm letter, said that in Moscow he had lived with Prestes' sisters Clotilde, Heloisa, and Lúcia, "as though they were my own sisters," and later, during three months in Mexico City, he had been in touch daily with Leocádia, Lygia, and little Anita. Leocádia, Morena wrote, "suffered a great deal because during weeks and months the censorship did not permit you to correspond with her."¹²

On the afternoon of April 18, Vargas signed a decree that granted amnesty to 148 political prisoners.¹³ In anticipation of the decree, a crowd gathered early in the day at Frei Caneca Street, hoping to see the Cavalier of Hope. But the crowd was disappointed because Prestes, escorted from prison that evening by Trifino Correia and Orlando Leite Ribeiro, used an exit far from the main prison entrance. A delegation, which included Ivan Ramos Ribeiro and Milton Caires de Brito, took the "great martyr" to Leôncio Basbaum's large house in the Lagoa district, where Arruda Câmara had arranged for him to stay "temporarily."¹⁴ The Cavalier of Hope was a polite guest, always serious, who neither drank nor smoked, but the Basbaum household was disrupted by armed guards of the Party, determined to protect Prestes, and throngs of visiting Party leaders. Before Prestes moved from the house ten months later, the Basbaum guests included Prestes' 10-year-old daughter and three unmarried sisters.

A few days after gaining his freedom, Prestes went to the residence of Eduardo Gomes and conferred with the oppositionist presidential candidate in the presence of Colonels Juarez Távora and Tasso Tinoco. Prestes told the *brigadeiro* that the proletariat disliked military candidates. This rejection by Prestes of the two candidates, Gomes and Dutra, was made clear during his press conference of April 26. Thus Prestes alienated a number of old companions, such as Silo Meireles, who joined the anti-Vargas coalition which rallied around Gomes.¹⁵

On the other hand, many admirers of the Cavalier of Hope withdrew their support of Gomes. Astrojildo Pereira published a self-criticism, a "warning to honest intellectuals," in which he said that he was not ashamed to admit that he had erred in backing Gomes. He called attention to "the campaign against Prestes, the PCB, and the Soviet Union carried on by some of the newspapers and journalists supporting the Gomes candidacy." Mário Schemberg, revising his position after Prestes' press conference, concluded that Prestes and the CNOP were correct because "Vargas had changed" and "the political forces around Eduardo Gomes were conservative." The Liga dos Trabalhadores Democráticos, which had been established as an

anti-Vargas labor organization, was dissolved and its members joined the MUT.¹⁶

While Prestes made his first public pronouncements, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force of about 25,000 was concluding its campaign against the Germans in northern Italy. One of its officers, Emygdio Miranda, had tried to visit Prestes, his old revolutionary chief, before going abroad but had been denied permission. Following the German surrender early in May 1945, Major Emygdio Miranda received a letter from his wife asking him to make arrangements for sending Olga Benário Prestes, presumably in Germany, back to Brazil. Therefore, Emygdio Miranda went by jeep from Italy to Paris and spoke with diplomat Josias Carneiro Leão, another revolutionary of the 1920's. Leão got in touch with London and was informed that Olga Prestes had died in a German gas chamber. As Prestes learned later, Olga, after spending time at the Ravensbrück concentration camp, was transferred to another camp where she and many other women perished around Easter 1942.¹⁷

Like Prestes, Harry Berger spent some time as Basbaum's guest after his release. He was, Basbaum has recalled, "completely insane." Minna Ewert, Berger's sister, came to Brazil and took him to East Germany. He never recovered.¹⁸

13. *In the Open*

Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, disappointed in Prestes, organized a radical leftist São Paulo political group with young Frente de Resistência friends, such as Germinal Feijó and Antônio Costa Corrêa. This new group, the União Democrática Socialista (UDS), issued a manifesto drawn up by Paulo Emílio with assistance from Costa Corrêa, Paulo Zingg, Cory Porto Fernandes, and Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza. It called for a socialist regime in Brazil and "democracy without classes." The UDS, formed by the small leftist minority of the Frente de Resistência, attracted Febus Gikovate and Arnaldo Pedrosa d'Horta. In its first internal bulletin, dated July 1945, it wrote that the Communist political line in Brazil and elsewhere, unmindful of the needs of the proletariat and based exclusively on Soviet foreign policy, required the proletariat to renounce the class struggle and adopt a policy of "national union" and domestic "pacification." Even when the Getulista dictatorship was at its peak, the UDS complained, the PCB had collaborated with the bourgeoisie. The UDS added that the PCB policy was a negation of Marxism and would nei-

ther promote the socialist movement nor bring about the emancipation of the workers.¹

Most of the leftists preferred to join the less radical Esquerda Democrática (ED), which was launched in Rio in August 1945 by well-known anti-Vargas leaders, and therefore the UDS collapsed after less than two months of life. Many UDS members joined the ED, whose organizers included João Mangabeira, Herculino Cascardo, Domingos Velasco, Hermes Lima, Edgardo Castro Rebello, Felipe Moreira Lima, Eliezer Magalhães, and Juraci Magalhães.

Like the UDS, the ED supported the presidential candidacy of Eduardo Gomes. Due to the weakness of its electoral base, it joined forces with the larger, more conservative União Democrática Nacional (UDN), which had started out in February 1945 as a broad anti-Vargas front (originally including leftists) and had been formally organized in April. The UDN, in which Virgílio de Melo Franco was influential, contained the liberal (nonleftist) majority of the Frente de Resistência and campaigned energetically for Eduardo Gomes.²

The membership of the Prestes-led PCB soared in 1945 to tens of thousands, thanks to the attainment of a legal status from an apparently friendly government, the widespread enthusiasm for Prestes and the Soviet Union, and the Party's extremely moderate, rightist program. Financial contributions allowed the party to have adequate headquarters in Rio and an excellent press, including the Rio daily, *Tribuna Popular*, directed by Pedro Mota Lima. The Party and its press devoted attention to promoting the campaigns of the numerous PCB candidates for election to Congress in December 1945.

Prestes and the PCB favored restricting the election to one for a constitutional assembly.³ When the slogan "a constitutional assembly with Getúlio" was adopted by workers in mass demonstrations, military leaders grew suspicious that Vargas might arrange to have the presidential election canceled, as he had done in 1937. With the military preparing to depose Vargas on October 29, 1945, Prestes and a couple of his army friends, General Newton Estillac Leal and Colonel Osvino Ferreira Alves, sent Orlando Leite Ribeiro to Catete Palace to learn whether Vargas wanted their assistance and that of workers in order to resist.⁴ But Vargas resolved to leave office without resisting.

In August 1945, before the overthrow of Vargas, the CNOP's dominant position in the PCB was confirmed by the release to the public of the membership lists of the Party's prestigious Executive Commission and the larger National Committee (which would have been called the Central Committee in the 1930's). The lists revealed

that Marighella, despite his past opposition to the CNOP, had joined the new organization, and that Domingos Marques (“o Vermelho”), who had worked despite tuberculosis to keep the Party afloat in São Paulo during the great repression, was awarded a National Committee membership. Fernando de Lacerda was assigned to the last place among the National Committee alternates.⁵

Executive Commission

Luís Carlos Prestes
 Diógenes de Arruda Câmara
 Maurício Grabois
 João Amazonas
 Agostinho Dias de Oliveira
 Pedro de Araújo Pomar
 Francisco Gomes
 Jorge Herlein
 Lindolfo Hill
 Secretary General: L. C. Prestes
 Treasurer: Álvaro Ventura

National Committee

1. Luís Carlos Prestes
2. Álvaro Ventura
3. Diógenes de Arruda Câmara
4. Maurício Grabois
5. João Amazonas
6. Ivan Ramos Ribeiro
7. Pedro de Araújo Pomar
8. Lindolfo Hill
9. Milton Caires de Brito
10. Jorge Herlein
11. Agostinho Dias de Oliveira
12. Simão Alves
13. José Francisco de Oliveira
14. Celso Cabral
15. Carlos Marighella
16. Amarílio Vasconcelos
17. Antônio Soares de Oliveira
18. Francisco Gomes
19. Claudino José da Silva
20. Domingos Marques
21. Mário Scott

National Committee Alternates

1. Abílio Fernandes
2. Vitorino Antunes
3. Francisco Chaves
4. Valdir Duarte
5. Armênio Guedes
6. Iguatemi Ramos
7. Fernando de Lacerda

The lists gave more prestige to workers than to intellectuals. Jorge Herlein, Francisco Gomes, and Lindolfo Hill, Mantiqueira Conference participants who now occupied Executive Commission posts, were railroad and construction workers. Jorge Amado, in a commentary about railroad worker Mário Scott (secretary of the São Paulo state PCB), had this to say: "Nothing is sadder for a Trotskyite than to see a worker heading a mass movement, a party, a committee. The Trotskyites hate the workers."⁶

The PCB, during its revival in 1945, issued Statute 13, which ruled that Party members could have no conversation or relationship with Trotskyites.⁷ The term included, of course, members of the Trotskyites' tiny PSR, whose mimeographed *Luta Proletária*, having told Brazilian soldiers to refuse to go abroad, now called Jorge Amado "the greatest transmitter of slanders against the Marxists." But, as was usual for the PCB, the term "Trotskyite" was given a broad interpretation.⁸ It embraced also former Trotskyites who used the pages of *Vanguarda Socialista* to struggle, along with some other socialists, against the PSR, the PCB, and Vargas.

Vanguarda Socialista, a weekly that began publication late in August 1945, was directed by Mário Pedrosa with the assistance of Edmundo Moniz and Geraldo Ferraz. Its earliest numbers contained articles by these three and Rachel de Queiroz, Aristides Lobo, Azevedo Lima, Patrícia Galvão, Hilcar Leite, and Arnaldo Pedrosa d'Horta. While Patrícia Galvão wrote without enthusiasm about Amado's life of Prestes, Pedrosa d'Horta belatedly praised the União Democrática Socialista. According to Pedrosa d'Horta's article, both the PCB and the Trotskyites' PSR were to be condemned for not supporting the presidential candidacy of Eduardo Gomes. He wrote that the PSR was "completely silly" and had "broken down" precisely because it was Trotskyite.⁹

Hermínio Sacchetta was still a PSR leader but he was no longer general secretary of the *Folhas*, which he had joined in 1939. His break and that of forty-seven other members of the *Folhas* team (in-

cluding Osvaldo Costa) was explained in their message, published on March 14, 1945, objecting to a new *Folhas* ownership, controlled by São Paulo interventor Fernando Costa. The result was the appearance on April 10 of *Jornal de São Paulo*, with Sacchetta as general secretary and a team made up largely of former *Folhas* men. Among those associated with the new daily were José Stacchini, Paulo Zingg, Cláudio and Athos Abramo, Alberto da Rocha Barros, Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Nelson Werneck Sodré, and archivist Odila Silva Jardim (who, as "Nigro," had been arrested in Rio in April 1938 at about the same time as Patrícia Galvão).¹⁰

Sacchetta, while carrying out his newspaper work in 1945, received a reminder of the past when he unexpectedly met Bangú (Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha) on the street. After he greeted Bangú, Bangú asked him how he could bring himself to greet a person who in 1937 and 1938 had attacked him so violently. Sacchetta, willing that they become friends, replied that he respected Bangú for his refusal to reveal anything to the police in 1940 despite terrible torture. Sacchetta felt the same way about André (Elias Reinaldo da Silva).¹¹

14. *Assailing the Party's Behavior during the Repression*

Resistance to torture gained few good marks for Bangú and André. Davino Francisco dos Santos, completing his book on Communism, wrote that Bangú's resistance simply proved that he was "something different from a human being" and was "insensitive to physical and moral pain."¹

The PCB, when it commented in 1953 on the years of repression, was not respectful of the conduct of Bangú and André at the police headquarters. It observed the "joyful commemoration" of the tenth anniversary of the Mantiqueira Conference by writing:

In 1935 the Party directed a popular and national-liberation armed insurrection. The defeat of the insurrection and, a little later, in March 1936, the arrest of Comrade Prestes, had grievous consequences for the Party. In 1936 a group of upstarts, led by Bangú, took possession of the national directorship of the Party, abandoning its revolutionary line of 1935 and adopting an opportunistic line of trailing behind the bourgeoisie. In 1940, at the height of the Getulista Estado Novo, mass imprisonments all over the country brought a serious new blow to the Party. The police of Filinto Müller . . . unleashed a fierce

wave of infamous beatings, tortures, and assassinations. The directorship headed by Bangú revealed what it was, capitulating cowardly.²

It is ironic that Bangú, after his work to keep the Party in existence, should have received a greeting and a good word from Sacchetta and this condemnation from the Party. It is particularly ironic because the chief fault attributed to Bangú and André by the PCB in 1953, an "opportunistic line of trailing behind the bourgeoisie," was exactly the charge that Sacchetta made in 1937-1938, only to be denounced by Moscow for making it.

As early as August 1945, the Party of the late 1930's was condemned publicly by Prestes. His accusations were made not long after he had urged that capitalism be strengthened, and when the Party was far to the Right, and perhaps for these reasons did not include the charge of "opportunism." But Prestes found other faults. Speaking to the new National Committee, he called the post-1935 Party "a small party, little connected with the masses and infiltrated by alien ideologies," and he attacked it for adhering to "the most false methods of organization, thus being unable to resist the brutality of the reaction."³

Arruda Câmara, in his report on the same occasion, explained that these "most false methods" consisted of using a cell structure based on "trade or street sectors, with an unstable character and without deep connection with the proletariat." This error, he said, had been made by "petty bourgeois adventurers who had seized the most responsible posts in our Party" and who allowed "the Trotskyites and fractionalists to have easy entry and even to hold directorship positions." PCB Propaganda Director Maurício Grabois, also presenting a report in August 1945, said that the Party, "during the period of illegality," did not know how to "make use of the bourgeois newspapers." These attacks were part of a campaign, noted by Basbaum at party leadership meetings in 1945, "to disparage the previous activity of the Party."⁴

By 1954, when the PCB held its Fourth Congress, Prestes was able to attribute the police roundup of 1940 to an "opportunistic line" which "sought to strengthen the bourgeoisie." This "false orientation," he said, "facilitated the divisionsary work of Trotskyites and ended up by weakening the national directorship itself, which fell, almost completely, into the hands of the police in 1940."⁵ In 1957, when Agostinho Dias de Oliveira reviewed the events of the 1930's he praised the "combattive" Party of 1935, "associated with the masses and revolutionarily armed," and he found, in contrast,

that the Party of Bangú was characterized by "revisionism" and "a national reformist line." Dias de Oliveira repeated charges made by Prestes in 1954.⁶

If the Party was run by "upstarts" beginning in 1936, it was because the predecessors of the "upstarts" were eliminated as a result of the 1935 uprisings, which the Party, in its résumé of past events, has given itself credit for directing. The abandonment of "the revolutionary line of 1935" was a logical result of the failure of that line and was related to Comintern policy which, Rocha Barros wrote in 1938, was supported by the great majority of the Party in Brazil. Anyway, there is little to indicate that the adoption of a "revolutionary," or even less "opportunitistic," line starting in 1937 would have saved the directorship in Rio from becoming victim of the police there in 1940.

If the Party had little connection with the masses in the late 1930's, as mentioned by Prestes in 1945, it was not due to failure to appreciate the need. Concern for mass support is disclosed in almost every document, including Bangú's letter to Prestes mentioning reasons which he felt were "correct" for "vacillating" in the case of Elza Fernandes. The masses, if not poisoned against the PCB by press and propaganda (and the PCB's earlier "revolutionary line"), had every reason to fear associating with the Party during the reign of terror.

The methods of organization, described by Prestes as "the most false," had to be the limited ones that could be pieced together by men who found it dangerous to communicate with each other and were primarily concerned with whether there was to be any organization at all. After the police seized Prestes' collections of papers at Barão da Torre and Honório Streets, helping pave the way for the government to declare an internal "state of war," the Party leaders had to flee from Rio. Upon returning there they decided to remain, despite the implantation of the Estado Novo. In view of the fall of their predecessors to the Rio police in 1935 and 1936, this decision showed more concern for Party work than for personal safety.

The appeals for attracting recruits, the mimeographing, printing, and distribution of subversive documents, and the steps to hold battered Party groups together were carried out under conditions that were precarious for the participants and their wives. The risk of suffering from "the brutality of the reaction" was clear enough. The risk of future condemnation by the Party was perhaps not so clear.

Notes

In the reference notes showing sources, authors' names are spelled as they appear on the works cited and may differ from spellings in the text (due to a spelling reformation adopted in Brazil).

PREFACE

1. Leôncio Basbaum, *História Sincera da República* (São Paulo: Editôra Edaglit, 1962), III, 96. Social scientist Arnaldo Spindel has written that, because of the "fierce repression," the Communist Party of Brazil "practically ceased to exist" from 1935 to 1942 (*O Partido Comunista na Gênese do Populismo* [São Paulo: Símbolo S.A., 1980], p. 52).

I. A STATE OF SIEGE IN BRAZIL (NOVEMBER 1935—MARCH 1936)

1. *Reaction to the 1935 Revolt*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 6, 13, 1935.
2. Álvaro Paes Leme, interview, São Paulo, July 15, 1979.
3. Raul Karacik, interviews, São Paulo, July 5, 8, 1979. João Batista Barreto Leite Filho, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, June 28, July 19, 1981, and typewritten notes, August 1981.
4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 13, 1935.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, December 7, 12, 15, 1935.
7. *Ibid.*, December 18, 19, 21, 25, 1935. See presidential Decree 532 of December 24, 1939, in *Collecção das Leis da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil de 1935, Actos do Poder Executivo* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1936), III (October–December 1935), 279.

2. *An Explosion at the "Communist Arsenal" (December 1935).*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 28, 1935, January 5, 25, 26, 28, 30, 1936.
2. *Ibid.*, December 15, 1935, January 4, 1936.

3. *Ibid.*, December 24, 25, 27, 1935, January 10, 1936. Carlos Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella nas Prisões do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Vitória, 1948), p. 18.
4. Francisco Romero, declarations at the Third Delegacia Auxiliar, Rio de Janeiro, December 25, 27, 1935 (in the Brazilian National Archives, Rio de Janeiro, henceforth shown as BNA). Honorato Himalaya Vergolino, *Denúncia dos cabeças da revolução de 27 de Novembro de 1935, apresentada ao Tribunal de Segurança Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1936), pp. 47–49. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 28, 1935.

3. *The Arrests of Berger and Miranda (December 1935–January 1936)*

1. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 28, 1981, and typewritten notes, August 1981.
2. For the role of the British Intelligence, see Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981, and Jacob Gorender, "Prestes," *Problemas*, no. 24 (January–February 1950), p. 125. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 7, 1936.
3. Rosa Meireles and Carlos da Costa Leite, Ilvo and Antônio Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, September 6, 1963. Basbaum, *História Sincera da República*, III, 95. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978), pp. 52–53, n. 2 (by Cláudio Lacerda Paiva).
4. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, p. 13.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 11, 1936.
6. Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 26, 1963.
7. Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 12, 1936.
8. Letter to GIN, Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 1935 (copy in Adelino Deicola dos Santos file, BNA).
9. Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (hereafter shown as TSN) file about Pedro Ernesto Batista, Brasília.
10. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 9, 1936. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite, interview, September 6, 1963. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, pp. 55–57.
11. Elza Fernandes files, with year of birth, etc., and a police memorandum of February 18, 1940 (BNA). M [Martins], letter to Companheiro [Prestes], Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1936 (BNA). Eduardo Maffei points out on p. 172 of *A Morte do Sapateiro* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1982) that the real name of Miranda was Américo Maciel Bomfim, although he often called himself Antônio Maciel Bomfim.
12. PCB, "Copia dos informes datados de 3 e 4 de Fev. sobre o resultado das sindicâncias em torno da garota" (Prestes' Honório Street papers, in Elza Fernandes files, BNA).
13. *Ibid.* Police memorandum, February 18, 1940, in Elza Fernandes file (BNA).
14. Adelino Deicola dos Santos, report to Communist leaders on questioning of Elza Fernandes, February 9, 1936 (Prestes' Honório Street papers, in Elza Fernandes files, BNA). José Medina Filho, papers in BNA, and Eu-

rico Bellens Porto, *A Insurreição de 27 de Novembro: Relatório* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1936), p. 63.

15. A. N. de Medeiros, *E Foi Prestes Quem Mandou!* (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), pp. 54–55. Pedro Lafayette, *Os Crimes do Partido Comunista* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Moderna, 1946), p. 48.

4. *The Elza Fernandes Case (February 1936)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 8, 1936.
2. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1936. M [Martins], letter to Companheiro [Prestes], January 26, 1936 (BNA).
3. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 8, 1936. Felisberto Batista Teixeira, declaration about Ghioldi, September 8, 1941, in Medeiros, *E Foi Prestes Quem Mandou!*, pp. 151–154. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, p. 42.
4. Vallée's release from prison and subsequent disappearance have been cited by those who think that Vallée and his wife, Alphonsine, may have been international police agents.
5. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, p. 42. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 6, 1936. Jacob Gorender writes ("Prestes," p. 125) that Marcos Yugman was assassinated by the police and adds (letter to JWFD, São Paulo, February 16, 1981) that Prestes later praised both Yugman and Barron for their "firmness" while tortured.
6. Medeiros, *E Foi Prestes Quem Mandou!*, p. 57. Lafayette, *Os Crimes do Partido Comunista*, p. 52.
7. Declarations of Manoel Severiano Cavalcante, Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, Francisco Natividade Lyra, and Honório de Freitas Guimarães to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 1940 (BNA). *Jornal do Brasil*, April 25, 27, 28, 1940.
8. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 1979, recalling conversation with Antônio Maciel Bomfim [Miranda].
9. Moniz, interview, July 31, 1979. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, December 24, 1979.
10. Correspondence between Honório de Freitas Guimarães [Martins] and Prestes, February 5, 6, 7, 1936 (BNA). See also declarations of Honório de Freitas Guimarães, *Jornal do Brasil*, April 18, 1940.
11. Freitas Guimarães–Prestes correspondence, February 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 1936 (BNA).
12. Freitas Guimarães, letter to Prestes, February 14, 1936. Medeiros, *E Foi Prestes Quem Mandou!*, p. 103, quoting Freitas Guimarães letter to Prestes.

5. *The Assassination of Elza Fernandes (February 1936)*

1. Freitas Guimarães, letter to Prestes, February 14, 1936 (BNA). Prestes, letter to "caro amigo" [Freitas Guimarães], February 16, 1936 (BNA).
2. Antônio Maciel Bomfim [signing Americo and Adalba], undated notes to Chico [Francisco Meireles] and Garota [Elza Fernandes], in BNA. On

another piece of paper, Miranda wrote that Elza could be found at the home of Francisco Meireles, and he gave the address.

3. Freitas Guimarães–Prestes correspondence, February 17, 18, 1936 (BNA). Medeiros, *E Foi Prestes Quem Mandou!*, p. 115. Lafayette, *Os Crimes do Partido Comunista*, p. 53.
4. S. [Prestes], letter to Comps. do S.N., February 19, 1936 (BNA). A long-hand copy was identified for the police on March 30, 1936, by Antônio Maciel Bomfim [Miranda], who also identified initials used in other letters. Barreto Leite Filho, who was arrested early in 1936, has written recently to JWFD about these “letters of Prestes, etc.”: “I also identified the handwriting of the author and advised my companions . . . on the *Pedro I* that the letters were authentic.” Some Communists involved in the Elza Fernandes case verified the correspondence after their arrest in 1940.
5. B. [Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha], letter to G. [Prestes], February 20, 1936 (BNA).
6. Declarations of Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, Manoel Severiano Cavalcante, Francisco Natividade Lyra, and Honório de Freitas Guimarães to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 1940 (BNA).
7. A. [Honório de Freitas Guimarães], note to “Amigo” [Prestes], March 2, 1936 (BNA).

6. *The Arrest of Prestes (March 5, 1936)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 19, 20, March 5, 1936.
2. *Ibid.*, March 6, 8, 1936.
3. *Ibid.* Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, interview, June 26, 1963. According to the recollection of Luís Carlos Prestes, the police orders were to kill him but Olga saved his life by jumping in front of him (Dênis de Moraes and Francisco Viana, *Prestes: Lutas e Autocríticas* [Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1982], p. 24).
4. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 14, 1967. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 6, 1936.
5. Queiroz Filho, interview, June 26, 1963. Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo os Comunistas* (Belo Horizonte: Editora Comunicação, 1979), p. 58. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 11, 1936.
6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 10, 11, 1936.

7. *The PCB in Pernambuco Early in 1936*

1. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, p. 43. 30:000\$000 (30,000 milreis, or 30 contos) was worth approximately \$2,000 U.S. (of the 1936 variety).
2. Letter, January 25, 1936, found at the Honório Street house (copy in TSN files, Brasília).
3. Letter, January 27, 1936, and M, letter to “Companheiro,” Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1936, both found at the Honório Street house (BNA, both with covering letter of April 18, 1936, from Eurico Bellens Porto about the Elza Fernandes case).

4. Pernambuco Regional Committee of the PCB, internal bulletin (typed), December 25, 1935 (BNA).
5. Pernambuco Regional Committee of the PCB, manifesto, "Let us expel from Brazil the Imperialists and their Lackeys! Let us struggle for a Popular Revolutionary Government, with Luís Carlos Prestes at its head! To the People of Pernambuco;" Recife, 1936 (BNA).
6. Pernambuco Regional Committee of the PCB, handbill, "To the People of Pernambuco," Recife, 1936 (BNA).
7. Pernambuco Regional Directorship of the PCB, letter to the PCB National Bureau of Organization (Rio de Janeiro), Recife, February 10, 1936 (BNA).
8. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 10, 1940 (BNA). See also Processo 1362, pp. 1149–1171, sentences handed down by Pedro Borges da Silva, Federal District, December 6, 1940 (BNA). Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 25, 1940 (BNA).
9. Cristiano Cordeiro, interview given to Ricardo Noblat, 1979 (typewritten copy furnished by Augusto Nunes, São Paulo, July 1979).
10. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier and Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha, declarations to the Civil Police, April 1940.

8. *The PCB in São Paulo Early in 1936*

1. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, July 10, 1979. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968, and *A Marcha Vermelha* (São Paulo: Saraiva S.A., 1948), pp. 72–102.
2. Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
3. Sacchetta, interview, July 10, 1979. Sebastião Francisco, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 13, 1940 (BNA). Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 102–106.
4. Antônio Vieira, *Maria Zélia*, 2d ed. (São Paulo: Antônio Vieira, 1957), pp. 79–80. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 14, 1936.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 14, 1936.
6. Victor de Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político," in *Ensaio de Opinião*, vol. 6 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra S.A. for Editora Inúbio, 1978), pp. 13–15. Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, interview, São Paulo, November 16, 1968.
7. Antônio Risério, "Pagu: Vida-Obra, Obravida, Vida," p. 16, and Geraldo Ferraz, "Patrícia Galvão, Militante do Ideal," p. 54; both in *Através* (São Paulo), no. 2 (1978). Flávio Morcira da Costa, "A guerra particular de Patrícia Galvão," *Istoé* (Rio de Janeiro), January 9, 1980. Alfredo Mesquita, "Patrícia Galvão," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 28, 1971. Material on jacket of Patrícia Galvão, *Verdade e Liberdade* (São Paulo: Comitê pró Candidatura Patrícia Galvão, 1950).
8. Ruy Mesquita, interview, São Paulo, July 25, 1981. Nelson, letter to Boa Mamãe (Mamma), São Paulo, May 23, 1936, in article, "Cartas de um detento," *Liberdade*, suppl. 2 (copy in the Sacchetta collection of papers, henceforth shown as SAC). Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político." Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, interview, November 16, 1968.

9. Nelson, letter to Boa Mamãe.
10. Augusto Pinto, document written after nine months of imprisonment (SAC).
11. A Comissão de Organização Regional (PCB, São Paulo), *Problemas de Organização* (SAC), pp. 1, 3, 12, 16, 21.
12. Sacchetti, interview, São Paulo, December 30, 1979. "Faleceu o professor e advogado Alberto Moniz da Rocha Barros," *Folha de S. Paulo*, December 10, 1968.

2. A STATE OF WAR IN BRAZIL: FIRST STAGE
(MARCH 1936–JANUARY 1937)

1. *Declaration of a State of War (March 21, 1936)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 25, 1936.
2. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1936.
3. *Ibid.*, March 27, April 1, 3, 8, 1936.
4. *Ibid.*, April 4, 5, 9, 14, 1936. For Vargas' role in the arrest of Pedro Ernesto Batista, see Michael L. Conniff, "Rio de Janeiro during the Great Depression, 1928–1937: Social Reform and Emergence of Populism in Brazil" (dissertation, Stanford University, 1976), pp. 244–252.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 7, 9, 15, 16, 25, 1936. Bellens Porto, *A Insurreição de 27 de Novembro*, p. 174. Felipe Moreira Lima, "A cassação de minha patente," message in longhand, Buenos Aires, May 1936 (BNA; see Processo 346, Domingos Braz, vol. 1).
6. Felipe Moreira Lima, *Aos Brasileiros e ao Exército* (Rio de Janeiro, April 1936) (printed copy in SAC).
7. Felipe Moreira Lima, message, Buenos Aires, May 1936.

2. *The Trotskyites Attack Prestismo (early 1936)*

1. "Abaixo a Reação," *A Luta de Classe* (Niterói) 6, no. 28 (April 1, 1936).
2. Estatutos da IV Internacional, aprovados pelo Segundo Congresso Mundial da IV Internacional, 1ª edição em língua portuguesa (March 1956), p. 2 (SAC). "Frente Única Stalinista," *O Comunista* (Niterói), no. 5 (August 1934). "O assassinato de Kirov," *A Luta de Classe* 5, no. 22 (April 1935). Mário Pedrosa, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 4, 1967, June 4, 1979. See Robert J. Alexander, *Trotskyism in Latin America* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), pp. 74–75.
3. "A Luta contra o Imperialismo," *A Luta de Classe* 5, no. 22 (April 1935). Mário Pedrosa, interview, December 4, 1967. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1979.
4. Aristides Lobo, declaration to the police, December 1935; declarations of Victor de Azevedo Pinheiro (July 18, 1938), João Matheus, and others; all in BNA (Processo 288, Apelação 62). Fúlvio Abramo, interview, São Paulo, July 11, 1979.
5. Graciliano Ramos writes about the obedience to which Agildo Barata had become accustomed (*Memórias do Cárcere*, 4th ed. [Rio de Janeiro:

- Livraria Martins Editôra, 1960], IV, chap. 21). Ramos' volumes give good descriptions of the prisoners.
6. Raul Karaeik, interviews, São Paulo, July 5, 8, 1979. Plínio Gomes de Mello, interviews, São Paulo, July 17, 24, 1979. Álvaro Paes Leme, interview, São Paulo, July 15, 1979. The full and infrequently used name of Álvaro Paes Leme is Álvaro José de Souza Abreu.
 7. Augusto Besouchet, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1981.
 8. "Expulsões," *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro) 11, no. 196 (December 25, 1935). Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981.
 9. Febus Gikovate, interview, São Paulo, July 13, 1979. Karaeik, interviews, July 5, 8, 1979. Barreto Leite Filho, interviews, June 22, 1979, June 28, 1981. Plínio Mello, interview, July 17, 1979.
 10. Pedrosa, interviews, December 4, 1967, June 24, 1979. Hubert Herring, "Brazil Crushes a Revolt," *Current History*, January 1936, pp. 413–414. "O Desastre de Novembro e o Naufrágio do Stalinismo e do Prestismo," *A Luta de Classe* (Niterói) 6, no. 28 (April 1, 1936).
 11. "O Desastre de Novembro e o Naufrágio do Stalinismo e do Prestismo."
3. *Foreign Attacks Help Extend the State of War (May – June 1936)*
 1. Casa de Detenção prisoners, letter to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, June 29, 1936 (SAC).
 2. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 28, August 14, 1936. For background, see Hélio Silva, 1937: *Todos os Golpes se Parecem* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1970), pp. 179–180.
 3. Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981. Casa de Detenção prisoners, letter to Vargas, June 29, 1936. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 17, 18, August 26, 29, 1936.
 4. Fernando Lacerda, "Getúlio Vargas Pilloried before the Tribunal of World Public Opinion," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 14 (March 14, 1936). Octávio Brandão, interview, Rio de Janeiro, January 3, 1980. Octávio Brandão, "Luiz Carlos Prestes—the Champion of the National Liberation of the Brazilian People," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 15 (March 21, 1936). "The Life of Prestes Is in Danger!," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 16 (March 28, 1936).
 5. Harrison George, "Brazilian Diplomats Damning Admissions of Terror and Tyranny," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 18 (April 11, 1936). Etienne Constant, "Campaign of the World Committee to Save Prestes," and Marini, "The Echo of the International Solidarity Campaign for Prestes in Brazil," *International Press Correspondence* 16, nos. 27, 32 (June 6, July 11, 1936).
 6. "Prestes' Life in Danger," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 21 (May 2, 1936). About Warsehawski's murder, see Eduardo Maffei, letter to JWFD, São Paulo, June 10, 1982; Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981; and Lafayette, *Os Crimes do Partido Comunista*, pp. 21–37. In the 1940's Honório de Freitas Guimarães was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for his role in Warsehawski's assassination (see Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 485–487).

7. "Los Diputados Británicos en Defesa de Prestes," and an article about Ghioldi, both on p. 8 of *Amnistía* (Buenos Aires), no. 2 (May 1936).
 8. Harrison George, "Brazilian Diplomats Damning Admissions of Terror and Tyranny."
 9. Osvaldo Aranha, letter (handwritten) to Vargas, March 20, 1936 (Vargas papers at the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, hereafter shown as CPDOC, at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro).
 10. Vargas, letter to Aranha, May 28, 1936 (Vargas Papers, CPDOC). Richard Freeman, "Arthur Ewert Is Being Tortured" and "Luiz Carlos Prestes: Cavalier of Hope," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 20 (April 25, 1936).
 11. Luiz Carlos Prestes, *Dolores Ibarruri: La Pasionaria* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Horizonte, 1946), p. 7. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 26, 1936. Octavio Brandão, "Telegram from the Deputies of the Spanish People's Front Demanding Release of Prestes," *International Press Correspondence* 16, no. 35 (August 1, 1936). Osvaldo Aranha, cable to Vargas, May 1936, Vargas papers, CPDOC.
 12. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 27, 1936.
 13. *Ibid.*, May 29, 30, 1936.
 14. *Ibid.*, May 29, June 17, 1936. *Jornal do Brasil*, June 21, 1936.
4. *The Arrests of Marighella, Molaes, Morena, and Sócrates* (May–June 1936)
1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 22, 1936.
 2. Alzira Vargas do Amaral Peixoto, *Getúlio Vargas, meu Pai*, paperback ed. (Pôrto Alegre: Editôra Globo, 1960), pp. 139–143. The case of Anísio S. Teixeira, "leading educator of his day," is discussed by Robert M. Levine, *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934–1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 133–135, and by Michael L. Conniff, *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925–1945* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), pp. 118–122, 143–149.
 3. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 26, July 7, 12, 1936.
 4. *Ibid.*, May 24, 1936. Taciano José Fernandes, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 12, 1936 (BNA). Carlos Marighella, "Discriminação, Abril," (BNA).
 5. Marighella, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 12, 1936 (BNA). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 24, 1936.
 6. *O Libertador* (Rio de Janeiro) 1 no. 3 (February 5, 1936). Manifesto in vol. 2, file about 1936 arrest of Marighella (BNA). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 19, May 10, 1936. Hermes Lima, *Travessia: Memórias* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1974), pp. 117–119.
 7. Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella nas Prisões do Estado Novo*, pp. 8–12. Casa de Detenção prisoners, letter to Vargas, June 29, 1936.
 8. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 19, 1936. Agildo Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Melso, n.d.), pp. 310–317.

9. Hermes Lima, *Travessia*, pp. 119–120. Ramos, *Memórias do Cárcere*, part IV, chap. 25. Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, July 18, August 12, 1981. Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário*, p. 309. Barreto Leite, typewritten notes, August 1981, contain the comment on the food. *Jogo do bicho*: a sort of numbers game.
 10. Casa de Detenção prisoners, letter to Vargas, June 29, 1936.
 11. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 10, 11, 12, 1936.
 12. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979.
 13. Seraphim Braga, communication to Snr. Delegado, Rio de Janeiro, July 9, 1936 (BNA, case of José Lago Molares and others, Processo 348, Apelação 11). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 10, 11, 1936.
 14. José Lago Molares and Roberto Moreno, declarations to the Civil Police of the Federal District; résumés, July 28, 1936 (BNA). Roberto Moreno, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, Prague, December 27, 1976.
 15. O Diretório Nacional da Aliança Nacional Libertadora, "Na Luta pela Liberdade e Amnistia Ampla para Todos os Presos Políticos: Honremos a Memória dos Heróis de 5 de Julho!" (1 p., mimeographed, BNA, case of José Lago Molares and others, Processo 348, Apelação 11).
 16. Bellens Porto, *A Insurreição de 27 de Novembro*, p. 110. Sinval Castro e Silva Filho (interview, Rio de Janeiro, September 5, 1963) stated that, while several instructors at the School of Military Aviation called themselves Communists, only one was a "real Communist": Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo.
 17. Vergolino, *Denúncia . . .*, p. 21. Sinval Castro e Silva Filho, interview, September 5, 1963. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 21, 23, 1936. TSN prosecuting attorney, statement about uprisings in Recife and Olinda (BNA). Ramos, *Memórias do Cárcere*, part IV, chap. 7.
5. *Oswaldo Costa and Domingos Braz Are Arrested; Joffre Is Killed (August 1936)*
1. Oswaldo Costa, testimony to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 20, 1940 (BNA).
 2. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, August, 8, 9, 13, 1936.
 3. "Joffre Alonso da Costa: Herói Nacional-Libertador," *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 11, no. 197 (August 1936). "Herói Nacional-Libertador Joffre Alonso da Costa," *O Libertador* (Rio de Janeiro) 1, no. 6 (August 1936). Sinval Castro e Silva Filho, interview, September 5, 1963 (with comments about the Aviation School uprising).
 4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, August 14, 1936. Domingos Braz, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, September 4, 1936 (BNA, Processo 346), and "Summario de 199" (BNA, Processo 346, vol. 1; relator Costa Neto).
 5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, August 16, 1936.
 6. *Ibid.*
 7. *Ibid.*, September 4, 1936.

8. *Ibid.*, September 4, 6, 8, July 4, 8, 1936. For Vargas' speech, see Getúlio Vargas, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio, 1938), IV, 181–187.
6. *Lúcio Meira Represses Communism in the Navy*
 1. Adão Pereira Nunes, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 9, 1979. Benedito Paulo (Adão Pereira Nunes), *A Revolta de João Candido* (n.p., n.d.); see preface by N. Pirajá (Nelson Veloso Borges). Nelson Veloso Borges, medical doctor and sugar mill owner in Rio de Janeiro state, married Celina Houston, whose sister Mary married Mário Pedrosa.
 2. Lúcio Martins Meira, *Relatório*, March 10, 1937, p. 3 (mimeographed).
 3. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–6, 12, 14, 18. Filinto Müller, report to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, June 18, 1937 (in Hélio Silva, *1937: Todos os Golpes se Parecem*, pp. 577–582).
 4. Luiz Carlos Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão de Inquérito sobre atos delituosos da ditadura* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Victória, 1948), pp. 5–6. Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella nas Prisões do Estado Novo*, p. 21.
 7. *The PCB Boycotts the New Tribunal (October 1936)*
 1. *Jornal do Brasil*, July 1, 9, June 21, 1936.
 2. “Fóra os Tribunais Especiais e as Colonias Agrícolas!,” *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 11, no. 196 (July 1936).
 3. *Jornal do Brasil*, August 15, 11, 12, 1936.
 4. *Ibid.*, September 1, 10, 12, 1936.
 5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 15, 19, 1936.
 6. *Ibid.*, September 25, October 2, 3, 1936.
 7. Casa de Correção and Casa de Detenção prisoners, “Ao Povo Brasileiro,” Rio de Janeiro, October 3, 1936 (SAC). Imprisoned Rio lawyers, “Relatório da Comissão de Justiça sobre a Questão de Boicote do Tribunal” (1½ pp., typed, SAC).
 8. Imprisoned Rio lawyers, “Relatório da Comissão de Justiça sobre a Questão de Boicote do Tribunal.”
 9. Casa de Detenção prisoners, “Deliberação sobre a Nossa Posição ante o Tribunal de Segurança Nacional,” September 11, 1936 (2 pp., typed, SAC).
 10. Thirty-five imprisoned army officers, typewritten statement, Casa de Correção, October 1936 (SAC).
 11. Casa de Correção and Casa de Detenção prisoners, “Ao Povo Brasileiro,” October 3, 1936.
 12. “Os Presos Políticos Vão Boicotar o Tribunal Especial!,” *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro) 11, no. 201 (October 1936). Hundreds of prisoners died in the mid-1920's at the Centro Agrícola Clevelândia prison camp in the north of Brazil.
 13. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 10, 14, 1937. Diretório Estadual de S.

- Paulo da ANL, letter to “the imprisoned companions who do not agree with the boycott,” São Paulo, November 20, 1936 (SAC). Barreto Leite Filho, interview, August 12, 1981, and typewritten notes, August 1981.
14. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, August 12, 1981, and typewritten notes, August 1981.
8. *Resistance to the Boycott in São Paulo (October 1936–January 1937)*
 1. O DE da ANL [São Paulo], typed letter to companions of the prisons of S. Paulo, São Paulo, October 24, 1936 (SAC).
 2. Diretório Estadual da ANL, letter to companions of the prisons of S. Paulo, São Paulo, November 5, 1936 (SAC).
 3. Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
 4. Diretório Estadual de S. Paulo da ANL, letter to “the imprisoned companions of S. Paulo who do not agree with the boycott,” São Paulo, November 20, 1936 (SAC).
 5. São Paulo ANL Bureau Politico, communication to “the political bureaus of the prisons of S. Paulo,” São Paulo, January 2, 1937 (SAC). Diretório Estadual de S. Paulo da ANL, letter to Companheiro Presidente do DM de Santos, São Paulo, January 14, 1937 (SAC).
 6. “Não! Não Compareceremos Diante de um Tribunal Dessa Natureza!,” manifesto to the Povo de São Paulo, São Paulo, November 27, 1936 (printed copy, SAC).
 7. “Liberdade e a Democracia,” manifesto to the Povo de São Paulo, São Paulo, December 1936 (printed copy, SAC).
 8. Victor de Azevedo, “Paulo Emílio Preso Político,” pp. 14–15.
 9. Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, interview, São Paulo, November 16, 1968.
 9. *Sobral Pinto's Assignment to Defend Prestes and Berger (January 1937)*
 1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 9, 15, 17, 22, 31, 1936. Ramos, *Memórias do Cárcere*, part IV, chap. 17.
 2. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 3, 6, 7, 1937, December 31, 1936.
 3. Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 31, 1936.
 4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 7, 1937.
 5. Ilvo Meireles, testimony to the police (saying he had never known Elza Fernandes), mentioned in *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 16, 1936. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 7, 1937. Sobral Pinto, interview, August 6, 1979.
 6. Sobral Pinto, interview, August 6, 1979.
 7. Ibid. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, p. 58. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 31, 1937.
 8. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 58–60.
 9. Sobral Pinto, interview, August 6, 1979.
 10. Ibid., Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 45–46.

10. *Manifestations of the Boycott (January 1937)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 7, 1937.
2. *Ibid.*, January 9, 1937.
3. *Ibid.*, January 9, 10, 1937.
4. *Ibid.*, January 12, 1937.
5. *Ibid.*, January 13, 14, 1937.
6. *Ibid.*, January 16, 28, 1937.
7. Diretório Estadual de S. Paulo da ANL, letter to Companheiro Presidente do DM de Santos, São Paulo, January 14, 1937 (SAC).

3. THE ROUGH ROAD TO NORMALCY (AUGUST 1936–OCTOBER 1937)

1. *PCB Views on a New Revolution (last half of 1936)*

1. Testimony to the Civil Police of the Federal District by Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier (April 10, 1940), Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha (April 25, 1940), and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira (May 2, 1940) (BNA).
2. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier testimony, April 10, 1940.
3. O Bureau Nacional de Frações Syndicaes, "Circular aos Comitês Regionaes e Locaes, as Celulas e as Fracções Syndicaes!" (2 pp., mimeographed, SAC).
4. O Bureau Político do PCB, "Appello do Partido Comunista do Brasil para uma ampla frente única pela Democracia," Rio de Janeiro, August 1936 (1 p., mimeographed, SAC).
5. An exception was the October 1936 issue, whose number (11, no. 201) was not well coordinated with the numbering of those of São Paulo.
6. "O Tirano Vargas, Fascista Sem-Camisa, Trama com os Terroristas do Sigma uma Ditadura contra o Povo do Brasil," *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 11, no. 197 (August 1936):1.
7. "O 'Complot' Terrorista na União Soviética," *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 11, no. 197 (August 1936): 5. "'Complot' Terrorista, na U.R.S.S.," *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro) 11, no. 201 (October 1936):6.

2. *The ANL's Tactical Retreat (September 1936–January 1937)*

1. São Paulo ANL State Directorship, "A Todos os Nucleos e a Todos os Aliancistas," approximately July 1936 (mimeographed circular, SAC).
2. São Paulo ANL internal document (SAC). See *Liberdade* (editado pelo Diretório Estadual da ANL) 1, no. 5 (August 31, 1936), and the issue of July 31, 1936, which shows 1, no. 6.
3. O DN da ANL, letter to o DE de São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, November 1, 1936 (4 pp., typed, signed with "Saudações anti-imperialistas," SAC). See *Liberdade* (São Paulo) 1, no. 8 (September 15, 1936) (BNA).
4. O DE de S. Paulo da ANL, letter to o Diretório Nacional, São Paulo, November 11, 1936 (2 pp., typed, signed with "Saudações anti-imperialistas, anti-latifundiarias e anti-fascistas," SAC).
5. *Liberdade*, September 15, 1936, p. 3.

6. Alberto Moniz da Rocha Barros [apparently], typed message to “Companheiros” (4 pp., SAC).
7. Pelo Diretório da ANL em São Paulo, letter to the governor of Goiás (4 pp., typed, signed with “Saudações Democráticas,” SAC).
8. O Diretório Estadual da Aliança Nacional Libertadora, letter to the Diretores da Federação das Indústrias de S. Paulo, São Paulo, January 15, 1937 (4 pp., typed, signed with “nossas saudações repassadas de amor ao Brasil,” SAC).
9. Document addressed to “Companheiros” [apparently early 1937], unsigned (4 pp., typed, SAC).
10. São Paulo ANL budget, January 1937 (part of 3 pp., typed, SAC).

3. *Moscow Recommends a Far Right Position (February–March 1937)*

1. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, testimony to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 10, 1940 (BNA).
2. Otávio Brandão, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, July 1, 1979, January 3, 1980.
3. Ibid.
4. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, testimony, April 10, 1940. Otávio Brandão, interview, January 3, 1980. Brandão, letter to JWFD, Rio de Janeiro, September 1979.
5. Xavier, testimony, April 10, 1940. Brandão, interviews, July 1, 1979, January 3, 1980.
6. Octavio Brandão, “Against Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyism: The Role of the P.O.U.M. as Auxiliaries of Fascism,” *International Press Correspondence* 17, no. 12 (March 13, 1937).
7. CR de Bahia, “Ganhemos as Municipalidades para a Democracia!: Aos Comitês Regionais, C. Locais e Celulas do P.C.B.,” March 1, 1937, reprinted by the SN do PCB, April 10, 1937 (SAC).
8. Xavier, testimony, April 10, 1940.
9. O Bureau Político da CC do Partido Comunista do Brasil (S.I.C.), “Os Fascistas Querem Transformar o Brasil numa Segunda Espanha!,” Brazil, March 1937 (1 p., printed, SAC). SN do PCB, internal document, March 1937 (SAC).
10. Ibid.

4. *The Slaughter at Maria Zélia (April 21, 1937)*

1. Vieira, *Maria Zélia*, pp. 160–162. According to the account in José Stacchini, “A história verídica da chacina do Presídio ‘Maria Zélia,’” *Jornal de São Paulo*, April 1946, 2d section, Abdon Prado Lima made the escape by allowing himself to be mistaken for one of the delivery boys who brought in provisions by way of the patio. Abdon, Stacchini writes, dressed in clothing that misled the guards and walked out with a delivery cart. José Silveira, older brother of author Joel and student leader Paulo, belonged to the *comissão administradora* of the Maria Zélia prisoners. He had once been secretary of the Union of Bankworkers of Santos and, after a strike in Santos, had been transferred to Lins, S.P., where

- he had been arrested on December 3, 1935 (Eduardo Maffei, "Sobre assinaturas em *A Semana*, de Machado de Assis," typewritten [São Paulo, 1979], p. 7. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 20, 1979).
2. Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ." Victor de Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político," p. 15.
 3. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 14, 1967. Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, interview, São Paulo, November 16, 1968. Victor de Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político," pp. 13–16.
 4. Victor de Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político," p. 15.
 5. Vieira, *Maria Zélia*, and Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ."
 6. "O inquérito sobre a evasão de presos ocorrida no presídio Maria Zélia, durante a noite de 21 de Abril do corrente anno," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 10, 1937.
 7. Eduardo Maffei and Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
 8. "O inquérito sobre a evasão de presos . . .," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 10, 1937. Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ." Victor de Azevedo, "Paulo Emílio Preso Político."
 9. The inquiry, concluded in June 1937, revealed that sixty-five of the guards who were involved were native Brazilians (fifty-five being Paulistas) and six were naturalized Brazilians (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 10, 1937). Stacchini ("A história verídica . . .") and Antônio Vieira (*Maria Zélia*) describe Kovalenko as a White Russian. (Stacchini and Vieira were Maria Zélia prisoners who did not participate in the escape attempt.) Davino Francisco dos Santos, Jacob Benjamim Leipzig, Sebastião Francisco, João Raimondi, and twelve others, letter to a state deputado, São Paulo, S.P., April 25, 1937 (SAC).
 10. Ibid. SAC contains letters from João Varlotta, addressed in October 1936 to the ANL State Directorship and a *deputado*, disagreeing with statements his father had made in order to try to get João released. João Varlotta reiterated that the ANL program was the only one capable of saving Brazil.
 11. Vieira, *Maria Zélia*, pp. 175–176. Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ."
 12. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 24, May 18, 1937.
 13. Davino Francisco dos Santos, Jacob Benjamim Leipzig, Sebastião Francisco, João Raimondi, and twelve others, letter, April 25, 1937.
 14. O Secretariado Político do Comité Regional do Partido Comunista, "O Massacre do 'Maria Zélia' e Sua Repercussão sobre a Situação Política," São Paulo, April 1937 (typed, mimeographed circular, SAC). Diretório Nacional da Aliança Nacional Libertadora, "A Chacina do Maria Zélia," São Paulo, April 23, 1937 (handbill, BNA). For further information about *Juventude*, and a carefully researched account of the unsuccessful Maria Zélia escape attempt, see Eduardo Maffei, *A Morte do Sapateiro*, MS pp. 130–139. A facsimile of the first page of the May 1, 1937, number of *Juventude* is given in Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ."
 15. "O inquérito sobre a evasão de presos . . .," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 10, 1937.

16. Stacchini, "A história verídica . . ." Vieira, *Maria Zélia*, p. 206.

5. *Tortures in the Recife and Santos Jails (1936–1937)*

1. Malvino Reis, interview, Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1963. Etelvino Lins, *Um depoimento político: Episódios e observações* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1977), p. 11.
2. Wandenkolk Wanderley, interview, Recife, October 17, 1968. Luís Luna, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 25, 1979, quoting Caetano Machado (who made similar remarks to others about his own "weakness"). Gregório Bezerra, *Memórias (primeira parte: 1900–1945)* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1979), p. 252.
3. Wanderley, interview, October 17, 1968.
4. José Caetano Machado (and lawyer Feliz Pereira Lira), testimony of Caetano Machado to the authorities (BNA).
5. Gregório Lourenço Bezerra, testimony, Casa de Detenção, Recife, March 22, 1938 (BNA). "Honremos o Legado dos Mártires que Tombaram pela Liberdade," *Novos Rumos*, PCB 40th anniversary edition, March 23–29, 1962.
6. Bezerra, testimony, March 22, 1938, and *Memórias*, p. 254.
7. Bezerra, testimony, March 22, 1938.
8. Bezerra, interview, Recife, October 14, 1968.
9. Bezerra, *Memórias*, p. 265. *Diário da Manhã* (Recife), August 19, 1936. *Jornal do Commercio* (Recife), August 19, September 19, 1936.
10. Bezerra, *Memórias*, p. 268.
11. José Stacchini, interview, São Paulo, July 11, 1979.
12. Unsigned handwritten letter to Snr. Redactor do *O Radical*, Santos, February 28, 1937 (SAC).

6. *Levinson and Sobral Try to Save Berger (January–May 1937)*

1. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 48–57.
2. Minna Ewert, letter to David Levinson, London, January 18, 1937 (copy in the Berger case papers, Processo 4,899, vol. 2, TSN, Brasília). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 7, 1937.
3. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1937.
4. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 64–69 (copy in the Berger case papers, TSN, Brasília).
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 11, 13, 1937.
6. *Ibid.*, February 14, 1937.
7. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 70–72. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 17, 1937.
8. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 73–82, 86.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
10. Minna Ewert, letter to Arthur Ewert, London, March 24, 1937 (translation into Portuguese is in the Berger case papers, TSN, Brasília; the quotation used here is a translation from the Portuguese translation).
11. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 95–97, 101–106.

7. *Prestes at the Special Police Barracks (March 1936–July 1937)*

1. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, p. 91. Jorge Amado, "Longos Anos de Prisão," in Antonio J. Osório et al., *Prestes: Estudos E Depoimentos* (Comissão Central do Cinquentenário de Luiz Carlos Prestes, [1948]), p. 56. Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 26, 1963.
2. Queiroz, interview, June 26, 1963. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 9, 1937.
3. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, pp. 4–5.
4. Moraes and Viana, *Prestes*, p. 81. Queiroz, interview, June 26, 1963.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 27, 1937. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, p. 5.
6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, February 27, 1937.
7. Olga Benário Prestes, letter to Leocádia Prestes, Berlin, January 31, 1937. Leocádia Prestes, letter to Luís Carlos Prestes, Paris, March 6, 1937. (See Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 62–63, 83–84.)
8. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 87–93, and interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979.
9. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, p. 16. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 110–115.
10. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 122–140, and interview, August 6, 1979.
11. Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 162–166.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 163, 141–145, 108.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

8. *Sentencing the Red Chieftains (May 1937)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 17, 19, 22, 24, March 13, 17, 18, April 2, 3, 15, May 8, June 30, July 7, 15, 1937.
2. *Ibid.*, March 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 1937.
3. *Ibid.*, February 2, 16, April 16, 1937.
4. *Ibid.*, March 9, 10, 20, 21, 1937. Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário*, pp. 307–308, states that the charge against Maria was false and perhaps trumped up to satisfy the dictator's wish that the boy be turned over to the Judge of Minors.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 5, February 26, April 27, February 2, 1937. Ferraz, "Patrícia Galvão, Militante do Ideal," p. 54.
6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 8, 1937.
7. *Ibid.*, May 9, 11, 1937.
8. *Ibid.*, May 13, 14, 29, 1937.
9. *Ibid.*
10. "Os numeros magicos da reação Gctulista," *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro) 12, no. 305 (June 1937):2. The true place of publication was São Paulo (note in SAC).
11. Levine, *The Vargas Regime*, p. 129.
12. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 23, 1937. Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella . . .*, p. 21.
13. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 4, 1937.

9. *Macedo Soares and the End of the State of War (June 1937)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 5, 6, 8, 9, 1937. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 190.
2. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 9, 14, 15, 19, 1937.
3. *Ibid.*, June 8, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, July 4, 1937.
4. *Ibid.*, June 12, 15, July 1, 1937. Filinto Müller, report to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, June 18, 1937 (in Hélio Silva, 1937: *Todos os Golpes se Parecem*, pp. 577–582).
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 24, 26, 1937. Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella . . .*
6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 30, July 1, 1937.
7. *Ibid.*, July 1, 2, 1937.
8. Heráclito Fontoura Sobral Pinto, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979, and letter to Macedo Soares, June 3, 1937 (in *Por que Defendo . . .*, pp. 146–148).
9. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 19, 1937. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, p. 20. Sobral Pinto, *Por que Defendo . . .*, pp. 189, 160–161, 167.
10. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, p. 20. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 19, 1981.
11. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, August 19, 1937. Sobral Pinto, *Por que Defendo . . .*, p. 186. “O verdugo do povo alemão está assassinando a filha de Prestes!” translation of handbill released in Montevideo (SAC). Otávio Brandão, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 1, 1979.

10. *The Military Tribunal Reviews the TSN Sentences (September 1937)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 9, 1937.
2. Jorge Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança: Vida de Luiz Carlos Prestes*. 10th ed. Coleção Novos Horizontes no. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Vitória, 1956), pp. 307–308.
3. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, p. 19. Euzébio de Queiroz Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 26, 1963.
4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 9, 10, 1937. Hélio Silva, 1937: *Todos os Golpes Se Parecem*, pp. 213–215. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, pp. 309–316.
5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 10–12, 1937. Elyezer Magalhães, letter to Jurandyr Magalhães, May 17, 1936, in TSN, Brasília (STM Apelação 4,899, of 1937, Serie A, vol. 1, pp. 148–187). Eliezer Magalhães explained (interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 15, 1963) that he “assumed all the responsibility in order to help out Pedro Ernesto . . . , a man of frustrated ambitions [who] joined the leftist position; he wanted a popular government and more schools and hospitals.” Abguar Bastos has written: “About the tacit or forthright support by Pedro Ernesto for the November conspiracy there is a question mark. It appears that he was really committed and, at the last moment, stepped back” (*Prestes e a Revolução Social* [Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Calvino Limitada, 1946],

p. 333). Michael L. Conniff maintains that “the principal motive for Pedro Ernesto’s imprisonment was political. Vargas had decided to create an authoritarian state, and anyone opposed to that choice had to be removed” (*Urban Politics in Brazil*, p. 151).

6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 15, 1937.
7. *Ibid.*, September 15, 30, 1937. José Antônio Flores da Cunha, letter to Pedro Ernesto Batista, Porto Alegre, September 16, 1937 (Pedro Ernesto Batista papers, CPDOC). “O Trotskismo—Agente do Fascismo,” *Revista Proletária* (Orgam do Comité Central do PCB), no. 12 [apparently February 1939], pp. 13–15.

4. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN (FEBRUARY 1937–NOVEMBER 1937)

1. *The PCB Negotiates with Armando de Sales (February–May 1937)*

1. São Paulo PCB, *Boletim Interno da Comissão de Agit-Prop*, no. 3, first half of December 1936 (TSN Processo 388, José Cintra Freire, BNA).
2. Paulo Duarte, *Memórias* (São Paulo: Editora de Humanismo Ciência e Tecnologia HUCITEC, 1977), V, 63, 96–97, 104.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 97–105.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–114.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 114–116.
6. *A Classe Operária* (Sao Paulo) 12, no. 200 (March 1937): 1.
7. Two very long typed sheets, without a title, starting with “O problema da posição do P. ante a sucessão presidencial,” with the views of “o Regional de S. Paulo” but apparently written by one person who describes how Armando’s representative “presented to me” the difficulty of converting Armando to socialism (SAC). Another lengthy study that describes Armando de Sales as “fundamentally the candidate of English imperialism” is “A Luta pela Sucessão Presidencial e a Posição do P. Comunista,” Circular do Comité Regional addressed to “todos os organismos e membros do Partido na Região,” São Paulo, March 1937 (SAC).
8. For information about “Dreyfus,” see *Contra o Trotskismo: Resolução do CR de S. Paulo do P.C.B. (Seção da I.C.) Expulsando o Grupo Fracionista—Trotskista*, São Paulo, March 1939 (28 pp., mimeographed, BNA, Processo 827, Apelação 463, Caixa 182, Fls. 720, Marighella).
9. O Diretório Estadual da Aliança Nacional Libertadora, São Paulo, April 25, 1937 (2 pp., untitled internal document, SAC). O Secretariado Político do Comité Regional do Partido Comunista, “O Massacre do ‘Maria Zélia’ e Sua Repercussão sobre a Situação Política,” São Paulo, April 1937 (SAC).
10. Duarte, *Memórias*, V, 146–155.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 155–165.
12. O Burcau Político do CC do Partido Comunista do Brasil, “Os Perigos do Fascismo e a Posição do Partido Comunista deante dos Candidatos

à Sucessão Presidencial," Brasil, May 28, 1937 (SAC copy bears notation that "this material was profusely distributed among intellectuals of the State Capital and interior").

2. *José Américo Becomes a Candidate (May 1937)*

1. O Comitê Regional (São Paulo) do PCB, "A Luta pela Sucessão Presidencial e a Posição do P. Comunista," São Paulo, March 1937 (SAC). O Comitê Regional de S. Paulo do PCB, "Contra uma Manobra de Getulio que Visa Desagregar o Proletariado de S. Paulo" (SAC).
2. O Bureau Político do CC do PCB, "Os Perigos do Fascismo e a Posição do Partido Comunista deante dos Candidatos à Sucessão Presidencial," Brasil, May 28, 1937 (SAC).
3. Ibid.
4. ANL de S. Paulo, *A Sucessão Presidencial: Publicação Extraordinária*, June 10, 1937 (mimeographed booklet, SAC).
5. O Comitê Regional da Bahia do PCB, "Democracia," July 16, 1937 (SAC).
6. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, Salvador, Bahia, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 38.
7. João da Costa Falcão, interview, Salvador, Bahia, July 27, 1979. Giocondo Dias and Felix de Atahyde, "Entrevista: Giocondo Dias, o Substituto de Prestes no PCB," *Pasquim* (Rio de Janeiro) 11, no. 570 (May 30–June 5, 1980). Caires de Brito, interviews, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979.
8. Manifesto, Casa de Detenção de Recife, August 1937, in Heitor Moniz, *Communismo* (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), pp. 89–93.

3. *Prestes, the Trotskyites' Candidate for President (June 1937)*

1. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1979. Febus Gikovate, interview, São Paulo, July 13, 1979. Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 23, 1938 (BNA). Hilcar Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1979. Álvaro Paes Leme, interview, São Paulo, July 15, 1979. Barreto Leite Filho, type-written notes, August 1981, and interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 17, 1967.
2. Edmundo Moniz, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 14, 1967, June 27, 1979.
3. Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso, declaration, April 23, 1938. Moniz, interview, June 27, 1979.
4. *A Situação Nacional, Theses aprovadas pelo Comitê Central Provisório do Partido Operário Leninista, em Junho de 1937* (SAC).

4. *The PCB Decision to Support José Américo (August 1937)*

1. Levine, *The Vargas Regime*, p. 144. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, August 27, 1937.
2. Noé Gertel, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District (Dele-

- gacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social], Rio de Janeiro, May 15, 1940 (BNA). Osvaldo Costa and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, declarations to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 20 and May 2, 1940, respectively (BNA).
3. Sec Processo 1362, pp. 1149–1171, sentences handed down by Pedro Borges da Silva, Federal District, December 6, 1940 (BNA). Comitê Central Provisório do PCB, *Lenine e a Disciplina do Partido: A Obra do Fraccionismo Oportunista nas Nossas Fileiras*, December 1937 (50 pp., mimeographed booklet, SAC).
 4. Sebastião Francisco, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 13, 1940 (BNA). *Contra o Trotskismo*, pp. 1–2. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, July 14, 1979.
 5. Comitê Central Provisório do PCB, *Lenine e a Disciplina . . .*, p. 4. *Teses da Conferência Regional de São Paulo do P.C.B.* (SAC), p. 7. “Em Nome de uma falsa ‘disciplina,’” *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro [really São Paulo]) 12, no. 207 (November 1937).
 6. “Em Nome de uma falsa ‘disciplina,’” *A Classe Operária*, November 1937. O Comitê Regional de S. Paulo do Partido Comunista, “Todo o Partido de Pé, contra as Criminosas Manobras Fraccionistas de Arnaldo, André & Cia!,” São Paulo, November 2, 1937, p. 1 (SAC).
 7. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 11, 1937. “O Golpe de Estado Bonapartista,” *A Luta de Classe* (Bello Horizonte [probably Rio de Janeiro]) 7, no. 34 (December 10, 1937).
5. *The PCB-Sponsored São Paulo Front Opposes Communism* (August–October 1937)
1. União Democrática Nacional, *Manifesto e Programa*, Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, 1937 (SAC). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 11, 12, July 3, 1937.
 2. O Comitê Regional do Partido Comunista do Brasil (São Paulo), “Getúlio quer desencadear sobre o Brasil a guerra com que o fascismo ameaça o mundo!,” manifesto, July 1937 (SAC). “Fundada a Frente Nacional Democrática de São Paulo,” *Folha da Noite*, July 29, 1937. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 18, July 22, 1937. Frente Nacional Democrática de S. Paulo, “Manifesto ao Povo” (2. pp., mimeographed, SAC).
 3. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, July 14, 1979. *Frente Democrática* (São Paulo) 1, no. 4 (September 1, 1937) (4 large printed p., SAC). Unlike this number, *Frente Democrática*'s first number, of June 4, 1937 (in the collection of José Malanga), shows Universidade de S. Paulo with the publication date.
 4. *A Tribuna* (Santos), August 21, 1937, p. 3. *O Globo*, August 21, 1937.
 5. Report for the companions of the Conselho Executivo of the Frente Nacional Democrática de São Paulo, undated (apparently October 1937) (4 pp., typed, SAC). Handwritten and typed papers of the FND de São Paulo, such as “Plano de Trabalho” (SAC).
 6. Frente Nacional Democrática de São Paulo, “A Frente, o Comunismo e o

Fascismo: Circular No. 1 de trabalho político" (SAC). *Diário da Noite* (São Paulo), September 28, 1937.

7. SN, letter to "Prezados Companheiros da Fração," October 9, 1937 (SAC).
 8. Letter to "Companheiros do SN (com cópia para o SR)," n.d. (SAC).
 9. *Acção* (São Paulo) 1, no. 290 (October 2, 1937): 2. A more enthusiastic account of the October 1 "comício contra a infiltração nazista no paiz" is given in *Folha da Manhã* (São Paulo), October 2, 1937.
6. *The "Cohen Plan" and the New State of War (October 1937)*
1. Octavio Brandão, "Hitler's Agents at Work in Brazil," *International Press Correspondence* 17, no. 51 (November 27, 1937). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 2, 1937.
 2. O CR do Partido Comunista do Brasil, statement, São Paulo, October 6, 1937 (3 p., typed, SAC).
 3. Octavio Brandão, "The Fascist Coup d'Etat" and "Hitler's Agents at Work in Brazil," *International Press Correspondence* 17, nos. 50, 51 (November 20, 27, 1937).
 4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 17, July 29, October 5, 7, 1937. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 22, 1979, and typewritten notes, August 1981. Augusto Besouchet, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1981.
 5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 17, 29, 2, 14, 1937.
 6. *Ibid.*, October 8, 16, 28, 1937.
7. *The Sacchetta Divergence Becomes a Schism (October–November 1937)*
1. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo do Partido Comunista, "Todo o Partido de Pé contra as Criminosas Manobras Fraccionistas de Arnaldo, André & Cia!," November 2, 1937 (SAC).
 2. Hermínio Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, August 19, December 24, 1979. José Stacchini, phone conversation, São Paulo, July 1979.
 3. "Documento dos 15," to the BP do PCB, São Paulo, October 6, 1937 (copy furnished by Vladimir Sacchetta). *Contra o Trotskismo*, p. 1.
 4. "Camargo" [Noé Gertel], letters to "Borba" [Sacchetta] and "Brandão" [Eugênio Gertel], Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 14, 1937, and one undated, reproduced on pp. 39–47 of Comité Central Provisório do PCB, *Lenine e a Disciplina . . . Carioca*: pertaining to, or native of, the city of Rio de Janeiro.
 5. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo, "Sob a Bandeira da I.C." [late 1937] (3 pp., mimeographed, SAC).
 6. *Lenine e a Disciplina . . .*, pp. 4–5. Mário, Alberto, Gonçalo, and Viega, letter to "Camaradas do B.P. do P.C.B.," October 28, 1937 (SAC).
 7. *Lenine e a Disciplina . . .*, pp. 5, 39.
 8. "Resolução do Comité Regional do Rio Grande do Sul Repudiando o Oportunismo Podre e Direitista de Arnaldo, André & Cia. e Condem-

- nando sua Atividade de Fraccionista," Porto Alegre, November 2, 1937, signed "Otto" (SAC).
9. José Stacchini, interviews, São Paulo, July 11, 13, 22, 1979, and letters to JWFD, São Paulo, August 25, 26, 1979. "Resolução do Comité Regional do Paraná sobre os Erros Opportunistas de Arnaldo, André & Cia., Aprovando o Seu Afastamento de Todos os Cargos," Curitiba, October 29, 1937 (SAC).
 10. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo, "Sob a Bandeira da I.C." Resolutions of the Matto Grosso and Minas Gerais Regional Committees are given at the end of O CC Provisório do PCB, *Da Convenção do Monroe ao Golpe Getulista-Integralista: A Bancarrota do Opportunismo nas Fileiras do P.C.B. A "Constituição" Getulista de 1937. Material Interno*, November 1937 (44 p., mimeographed booklet, SAC and BNA).
 11. O CR de S. Paulo, "Todo o Partido de Pé contra as Criminosas Manobras Fraccionistas de Arnaldo, André & Cia.!"

5. THE FIRST YEAR OF THE ESTADO NOVO (NOVEMBER 1937–NOVEMBER 1938)

1. *The Establishment of the Estado Novo (November 10, 1937)*

1. Sobral Pinto, letter to Francisco Negrão de Lima, Rio de Janeiro, March 14, 1938, in Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 199–201.
2. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 22, 23, 30, 31, 1937. *Correio da Manhã*, December 22, 28, 1937.
3. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 9, 1937.
4. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, p. 329. "Da Prisão," *A Luta de Classe* 7, no. 35 (December 25, 1937): 8.
5. Prestes, *Depoimento perante a Comissão . . .*, pp. 21–23. Sobral Pinto, letters to Leocádia Prestes, Rio de Janeiro, May 7, 1938, September 25, 1937, in Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 202–204, 182–185.
6. Octavio Brandão, "The Fascist Coup d'État," *International Press Correspondence*, November 20, 1937. O CR do Partido Comunista do Brasil, "Ao Povo de S. Paulo," manifesto, São Paulo, November 15, 1937 (2 p., mimeographed, SAC).
7. "O falso nacionalismo de Getúlio e o problema da indústria pesada nacional," *A Classe Operária* 12, no. 203 (November 1937): 4 (publication place, shown as Rio de Janeiro, was São Paulo).
8. Ibid. "A Ditadura Fascista de Getúlio PÓDE e DEVE ser destruída!," *A Classe Operária*, November 1937. "A farça da suspensão do pagamento das dívidas externas," *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 13, no. 208 (January 1938): 6.
9. "Prosigamos na Luta contra o Integralismo, Disfarçado Agora em Associação Cultural," *A Classe Operária*, January 1938, p. 5.

2. *Trotskyites Blame Stalinists for the New Regime (December 1937)*

1. O Comit  Central Provis rio do Partido Oper rio Leninista, "O Golpe de Estado Bonapartista" [November 20, 1937], *A Luta de Classe* 7, no. 34 (December 10, 1937):1–6.
2. Ibid.
3. "Suspens o das Dividas para Inglez V r," *A Luta de Classe*, December 10, 1937, p. 6. (Excellent title of article.)
4. "O Golpe de Estado Bonapartista," *A Luta de Classe*, December 10, 1937.
5. "A Nova Face da 'A Luta de Classe,'" *A Luta de Classe*, December 10, 1937.
6. "O Bonapartismo Procura uma Base de Massa," *A Luta de Classe*, December 25, 1937. *16 de Julho* was a prodemocracy mimeographed publication issued in Rio de Janeiro.
7. "Atividade contra-revolucion ria do trotskismo na U.R.S.S.," *A Classe Oper ria* 12, no. 207 (November 1937). "A Verdade Abre Caminho," *A Luta de Classe*, December 10, 1937, and "Carta do Camarada Ludwig (Ignaz Reiss) ao Comit  Central do Partido Comunista Russo, Moscou," *A Luta de Classe*, December 25, 1937.
8. Hilcar Leite, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 23, 1938 (BNA). Declaration of Investigator Raul Maia, January 26, 1938 (Processo 495, Apela o 128, fls. 134, 124/5, BNA). M rio Pedrosa, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 4, 1967, June 24, 1979.

3. *Arrest of the Rio Trotskyites (January and April 1938)*

1. Processo 495, Apela o 128 (BNA); see Prontid o 39, of January 17, 1938, about  lvaro Jos  de Souza Abreu ( lvaro Paes Leme); Prontu rio 8,488 about Luiz Hermenegildo Lobato; declaration of Investigator Nicolau Nachman Zimmerman, January 26, 1938; and declaration of Investigator Raul Maia, January 26, 1938.
2. Mary Houston Pedrosa, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 24, 1979. Arinda Galdo Houston, declaration to the police, January 19, 1938 (Processo 495, Apela o 128, BNA).
3. *Di rio da Noite* and *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 14, 1938. Declaration of Investigator Jo o Gonalves Guimar es Machado, February 10, 1938, about Pasquali Petraccuoni (Processo 495, Apela o 128, BNA). Prontid o 9,942, of January 17, 1938, about Elias Mariano da Silva Lobo (Processo 495, Apela o 128, BNA).
4. Sobral Pinto, letter to Francisco Campos, January 10, 1938, in Sobral Pinto, *Por que defendo . . .*, pp. 191–193. See conclusions of TSN Judge Alberto Lemos Bastos following declaration of Investigator Ant nio Alves Filho, February 10, 1938, about Felipe Ferri and others (Processo 495, Apela o 128, BNA). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 28, 1938.  lvaro Paes Leme, interview, July 15, 1979. Mary Houton Pedrosa said of her imprisonment, "It wasn't bad" (interview, June 24, 1979).

5. Febus Gikovate, interview, São Paulo, Jùly 13, 1979. Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 23, 1938 (BNA).
 6. Patrícia Galvão, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District (Processo of Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso and others, BNA). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 23, 1938.
 7. *A Luta de Classe*, April 23, 1938.
 8. Hilcar Leite, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 23, 1938 (BNA). Declarations of Patrícia Galvão and TSN Judge Pedro Borges da Silva (in vols. I and II of Processo of Lúcio Carlos Ayres Fragoso and others, BNA).
4. *The São Paulo PCB Regional Conference (November 1937)*
1. *Contra o Trotskismo*, p. 19. "Expulsos das Fileiras do Partido Comunista," *A Classe Operária*, no. 214 (March 15, 1938), p. 5.
 2. O Comité Central Provisório do PCB, *Lenine e a Disciplina*, p. 5. Material of the Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social, São Paulo, May 26, October 19, 1939, Processo 827, Apelação 463 (BNA). Marighella, *O Estudante Marighella*, p. 22. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, December 30, 1979.
 3. "Andrade (Helio) e Camilo não podem receber nenhuma importancia em nome do Partido," *A Classe Operária* 12, no. 207 (November 1937):1. In a typed "Retificação," the CR of São Paulo later explained that the comment about Andrade had been added by an "unauthorized individual" and that the CR abstained from making "individual attacks" ("Retificação" in SAC).
 4. Sacchetta, letter to JWFD, São Paulo, March 30, 1980. O SR de S. Paulo (probably Rocha Barros), letter to the comrades of the CCP, following the arrest of Sacchetta (SAC). O CR de S. Paulo do PCB, *Contra o Trotskismo*, contains a longer list on pp. 14–24.
 5. "Observação do camarada Cintra, na reunião do Sn. e do Sr. com Brandão e Reinaldo, sobre a passagem destes para a burocracia" (4 long pp., typed, SAC).
 6. Comité Regional de S. Paulo, "Sob a Bandeira da I.C." (SAC). O CR de S. Paulo subordinado as CCP do PCB (secção da IC), letter to comrades of the Santos Comité Local, April 1938 (SAC).
 7. *Téses da Conferencia Regional de São Paulo do PCB*, November 1937 (11 p., booklet, SAC).
 8. "Divergencias entre a Chamada 'Direção Nacional' e a Região" (typed sheet, SAC).
 9. CC do Partido Comunista do Brasil, *Autopsia deluma Traição*, January 1938 (booklet, BNA), gives, at the outset, the authorships of *Da Convenção do Monroe* and of the preface of the Lenin chapter.
 10. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo do Partido Comunista, "Todo o Partido de Pé contra as Criminosas Manobras Fraccionistas de Arnaldo, André & Cia!" (SAC). (Bangú used the name Arnaldo.)
 11. *Lenine e a Disciplina*, pp. 2–5.

5. *Exchanging Accusations of Trotskyite Behavior*
(December 1937–February 1938)

1. *Da Convenção do Monroe ao Golpe Getulista-Integralista*, pp. 14–17. Prefácio do CC Provisório of V.I. Lenine, *Dois Taticas, Capítulo VI*.
2. O CC do Partido Comunista do Brasil (SBIC), *Autopsia de uma Traição* (BNA).
3. Paulo (Leônidas), “Carta Aberta a todos os membros do Partido,” Rio [unlikely], January 1938 (SAC).
4. O Comitê Regional de S. Paulo, “Sob a Bandeira da 1.C.” O CC Provisório do PCB, *O Partido Comunista do Brasil e os Renegados da Revolução Brasileira* (34 p., mimeographed booklet, [1938] erroneously shown as published in April 1937, SAC), see pp. 9, 11, 30.
5. *Contra o Trotskismo*, p. 22.
6. *Problemas*, nos. 1–7 (August 15, 1937, to April 1938).

6. *Setbacks for Sacchetta* (December 1937–April 1938)

1. Sebastião Francisco, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 13, 1940 (BNA), and interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
2. A Comissão Regional Militar do PCB, signed Yedo, Mansão, Tótó, and Yaco, letter to Os camaradas do CR de S. Paulo e do Bureau Político do Partido Comunista do Brasil, São Paulo, December 31, 1937 (SAC).
3. *Contra o Trotskismo*, pp. 6–9. O CR de S. Paulo subordinado ao CCP do PCB, letter to Caros camaradas do Comitê Local de Santos, São Paulo, April 1938 (SAC). O CC prov. do PC do B, letter to CR de S. Paulo, Rio [unlikely], August 9, 1938 (6 p., SAC).
4. Nogueira, letter to Caros camaradas Dreyfus e Souza, Goyaz, January 23, 1938 (SAC). A Sub-região de Goyaz do PCB, declaration, January 23, 1938 (SAC).
5. Sub-região do Triângulo do PCB, signed by seven people, declaration addressed to the CC do PCB (SAC).
6. *A Classe Operária* (São Paulo) 13, no. 210 (March 1938):1. “Centralismo Democrático,” in *ibid.*, pp. 1, 4. O Comitê Central Provisório do PCB, *Lenine e a Disciplina*, p. 36. See also CR de São Paulo subordinado ao CCP do PC do Brasil, Circular no. 2, *Restauramos o Centralismo Democrático no Partido!*, 1938 (4 p., printed, SAC).
7. *A Classe Operária*, March 15, 1938 (8 pp., mimeographed, BNA).
8. O CR de S. Paulo subordin. ao CCP do PCB (sec. 1C), “Policialismo: Aos Comunistas Verdadeiros, Honestos,” June 1938 (typed sheet, SAC).
9. “Ainda a Crise no Stalinismo” [dated April 1, 1938], *A Luta de Classe* (Belo Horizonte [unlikely]) 8, no. 39 (April 23, 1938). See also, in the same number, “Stalin Prepara Novos Crimes” and “Sob a Tação do Imperialismo Ianque.”

7. *International Questions Shake the CCP* (April–July 1938)

1. Fifteen long single-spaced typed pages addressed to “Camaradas” (SAC), p. 1.
2. “Conclusões Aprovadas” (4 pp., typed, SAC). Observations of Cintra (9 pp., typed, SAC).
3. Portela, letter to Companheiros, São Paulo, April 1938 (SAC). See also proposed article, “Leia Trotski” (SAC).
4. “Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito aprovado e apresentado pelo Sr. ao Cr.” (typed, SAC), p. 2. Fifteen long single-spaced typed pages, p. 1.
5. Fifteen long single-spaced typed pages. Cintra, ten typed pages addressed to Presadas camaradas da fração popular (SAC).
6. Cintra’s pages to Presados camaradas, p. 3. *16 de Julho* (Rio de Janeiro) 2, no. 10 (March 10, 1938), contains passages favorable to José Américo and the United States. O Bureau Político do Partido Comunista do Brasil, “União Nacional pela Democracia e pela Paz!,” Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1938 (2 pp., mimeographed, SAC). The copies of *16 de Julho* and the manifesto (both in SAC) are well marked in an apparently critical manner.
7. “Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito aprovado e apresentado pelo Sr. ao Cr.”
8. “Adendo” and “P.C. Frances” (3 pp. each, typed studies, SAC).

8. *Moscow Supports Bangú* (May 1938)

1. Letter to Vargas, May 14, 1938, signed by Agildo Barata Ribeiro, Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo, Álvaro Francisco de Souza, Sócrates Gonçalves da Silva, David Medeiros Filho, Benedito de Carvalho, Francisco Leivas Otero, José Guttmann, Soveral Ferreira de Souza, Raul Pedroso, Humberto Baena de Moraes Rego, and Ivan Ramos Ribeiro (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
2. O Comité Central Provisório do Partido Comunista do Brasil, manifesto to the Povo Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro [?], May 16, 1938 (1 p., SAC and BNA). O CR de S. Paulo subordinado ao CCP, “A todos os comités, celulas e organismos do PCB,” May 1938 (SAC).
3. O SR de S. Paulo do PCB, “Do S.R. ás comissões e fracções de direcção; Trabalho No. 1; Da Situação Nacional,” June 1938 (SAC).
4. Octavio Brandão, “The Integralists’ Attempted Putsch,” *International Press Correspondence* 18, no. 28 (June 4, 1938).
5. Wording from CCP manifesto, “Desmascaremos os Renegados do Anti-Fascismo e da Revolução,” Rio de Janeiro [?], June 1938 (3 pp., mimeographed, SAC).
6. Hermínio Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, August 19, December 24, 1979.
7. “Do S.R. ás comissões e fracções de direcção.” “Desmascaremos os Renegados do Anti-Fascismo e da Revolução.”
8. Hermínio Sacchetta, letter to JWFD, São Paulo, March 30, 1980, and interviews, August 19, December 24, 1979. Heitor Ferreira Lima, letter to

- Raul Machado, São Paulo, January 14, 1939 (Processo 643 of São Paulo, BNA).
9. Sacchetta, interviews, July 14, August 19, 1979. Procurador Adjunto do TSN, statement, September 28, 1938, about Processo 643 of São Paulo (BNA) says, "The accused Hermínio Sacchetta in his testimony . . . refused to give declarations."
 10. O SR de S. Paulo, letter to Caros camaradas do CCP (SAC).
 11. O CR de S. Paulo, Circular a todos os organismos do Partido e Juventude, July 6, 1938 (SAC). See also four typed sheets about the "Sit. Nacional." (SAC).
 12. Sacchetta, interview, July 10, 1979. O CR de S. Paulo, "Abaixo a Calunia Burocratica!" (copy in SAC bears handwritten note "Aug.>").
9. *Sacchetta and Rocha Barros Embrace Trotskyism (late 1938)*
1. Plínio Mello, interview, São Paulo, July 17, 1979. Febus Gikovate, interviews, São Paulo, November 21, 1968, July 13, 1979. Gikovate, after reaching São Paulo from Rio, was for a month a "professional revolutionary, not getting paid for another activity," but the Trotskyite movement, of which he was secretary-general, did not have the funds to allow this to continue.
 2. "Material contra o trotskismo," from a page whose typing corresponds to that of documents known to have been typed by Rocha Barros (SAC).
 3. O CC Prov., O CR de São Paulo, and other organizations, "RESOLUÇÃO tomada pelo Partido de compléto afastamento de todos os seus cargos, taréfas e ligações, dos elementos trotskizantes PAULO (Leonidas) e CINTRA (Hugo, Brito, Buarque)" (1 p., typed, SAC).
 4. *Por uma viragem em todo o nosso trabalho!*, Edição do CCP do PCB (S. da IC), Rio [unlikely], September 1938 (32 pp., SAC).
 5. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo do Partido Comunista do Brasil, "Desmascarando um Golpe Banguzista nas Fileiras Revolucionárias!", São Paulo, September 1938 (2 pp., mimeographed, SAC).
 6. Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, November 5, 1968. Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky, 1929-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 419-420.
 7. Cintra, letter "aos camaradas" (3½ pp., typed, SAC).
 8. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 27, 1939. O Comité Regional do Partido Comunista do Brasil, "Resolução sobre os últimos acontecimentos internacionais e a posição da IC ante os problemas da revolução brasileira," São Paulo, November 1938 (3 pp., typed, SAC).
 9. O Comité Regional do Partido Comunista do Brasil, manifesto, São Paulo, November 1938 (16 pp., SAC). Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, November 5, 1968, August 19, 1979. Gikovate, interviews, São Paulo, November 21, 1968, July 13, 1979. *A Luta de Classe*, after switching its publication place back to São Paulo from Rio de Janeiro, showed Belo Horizonte as the publication place. *Boletim editado pelo Comité Pro-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda Revolucionária do Brasil, constituído pelo Partido Operário Leninista e pelo Comité Regional do P.C.B. da*

Região de São Paulo (Dissidência Pro-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda), Rio de Janeiro [unlikely], August 6, 1939 (17 pp., mimeographed, SAC). Alberto da Rocha Barros, interview, São Paulo, November 22, 1968.

10. *Contra o Trotskismo*.
11. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 27, 1939. Later in 1939 Salgado went to Portugal.
12. *Revista Proletária* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 15, (May 1, 1939).
13. Nabor Caires de Brito, interviews, São Paulo, November 22, 1968, July 24, 1979. Gikovate, interview, July 13, 1979. *Tribuna Popular*, August 18, 1945.
14. Sacchetta, interviews, November 5, 26, 1968, July 14, 1979. Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta, interviews, São Paulo, November 14, 19, 1968.

10. *Prestes' Letters to Fournier (November–December 1938)*

1. P. Monteiro (Rio de Janeiro), "For Nation-Wide Democratic United Front," *World News and Views* 18, no. 38 (August 6, 1938).
2. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 10, 1940 (BNA).
3. Luiz Carlos Prestes, *5 Cartas da prisão* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Horizonte, n.d.). See also Prestes, *Problemas Atuais da Democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Vitória, 1948), pp. 23–27.
4. According to Glauco Carneiro (interview, São Paulo, July 8, 1979), the enmity that resulted from Müller's 1925 desertion of the revolutionary column contributed to his rough handling, as police chief, of former *tenentes* who became leftists.

6. ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II (1936–1939)

1. *Brazilians in the Spanish Republican Forces (1936–1939)*

1. Much of the information in this chapter is based on letters from Pedro Rodrigues; his manuscript, "Brasileiros na Espanha: Um estudo preliminar sobre a participação de brasileiros na guerra civil espanhola" (which was expanded into "Brasileiros na Espanha," *Temas de Ciências Humanas* [São Paulo] 9 [1980]); and copies of documents which he kindly furnished (and which are indicated below by the initials PR).
2. José Homem Corrêa de Sá, letters to Pedro Rodrigues, Rio de Janeiro, February 11, April 13, 1981. Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, July 18, August 12, 1981.
3. Eduardo Maffei, interviews, São Paulo, November 11, 1968, July 8, 1979; letter to Pedro Rodrigues, São Paulo, April 11, 1980; letter to JWFD, March 27, 1981. E. A., "Libero Battistelli: Dalla Colonna Italiana alla Brigata Garibaldi," in *Garibaldini in Spagna e nella Resistenza bolognese*, 5° Quaderno de "La Lotta" (Bologna, 1966) (PR). Pedro Rodrigues, letters to JWFD, October 26, 1980, February 13, 1981.
4. "Leone Francesco," in Centro Studi Piero Gobetti—Associazione itali-

- ana Combattenti volontari antifascisti in Spagna, sezione piemontese, *Antifascisti piemontesi e valdostani nella guerra di Spagna* (Torino, 1975), p. 17 (PR). Pedro Rodrigues, letters to JWFD, March 5, April 3, 1981.
5. Pedro Rodrigues, letter to JWFD, June 16, 1981.
 6. Alberto Besouchet, postcards from Europe, 1937 (PR). Richard Bloch, "Como o Tenente Almicar Besouchet Alcançára a Hespanha," *Diário de Pernambuco*, June 16, 1937 (PR). Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981. Questionnaire of Pedro Rodrigues with answers by Augusto Bomilcar Besouchet about his brother Alberto, Rio de Janeiro, October 26, 1979. "Eduardo" [Augusto Besouchet], letter to his sister Lídia [in Buenos Aires], Rio de Janeiro, July 19, 1939 (PR). Lídia Besouchet de Freitas, circular letter, Madrid, November 1979 (PR), with information about Alberto and giving Carlos da Costa Leite's remarks, made soon after the Civil War, about Alberto's death. Barrcto Leite Filho, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 17, 1967, June 22, 1979. Hermínio Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, July 10, 14, 1979. José Homem Corrêa de Sá, letters to Pedro Rodrigues, June 10, July 14, 1981. Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977) pp. 706, 708. Eduardo Maffei has written (on p. 156 of his copy of José Gay da Cunha, *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola* [Porto Alegre: Globo, 1946]): "Alberto Besouchet was ordered shot by Marti. I was advised of this by a source worthy of belief." Sacchetta said (interview, São Paulo, November 26, 1968) that Besouchet "was assassinated in Spain on the orders of André Marty." Marty, of the French Communist Party, commanded the International Brigades.
 7. Roberto Morena, interview with Leandro Konder and Pedro Scuro Neto, Bonn, June 1975, in the *Archivo Storico del Movimento Operaio Brasiliano*, Milan (PR). Delcy Silveira, letter to PR, Porto Alegre, September 29, 1979. Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 361. Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, August 19, 1979. Davino Francisco dos Santos said (interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968) that "after a while the PCB brought an end to its work of sending men to Spain because it felt that the continuation would leave the Party in Brazil without leaders."
 8. Roberto Morena, interview with Leandro Konder and Scuro Neto. See also Morena, "La solidarité brésilienne avec la lutte des républicains espagnols: Souvenirs d'un combattant," *Etudes Brésiliennes* 1, no. 2 (July 1975) (PR), and Pedro Rodrigues, "Roberto Morena: 60 Anos de Militância Sindical," *Plural* (São Paulo), 1, no. 4 (April–June 1979).
 9. Nemo Canabarro Lucas, telephone conversation, Rio de Janeiro, August 7, 1979. Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979. Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, pp. 982–984, speaks of about 35,000 in the International Brigades. Andreu Castells, *Las Brigadas Internacionales de la Guerra de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1974), mentions (p. 383) over 59,000. On p. 381 Castells cites José Garcia, *Ispania*

- Narodnogo Fronta* (Moscow: Akademiã Nauk SSSR, 1957), to show that there were 41 Brazilian volunteers, of whom 4 were killed and 4 received permanently serious wounds. Carlos da Costa Leite mentions “33 Brazilian” survivors at the French concentration camp of Gurs in his letter from there of June 23, 1939, to “amarradas Sisson, Mota Lima, B. Gerson, B. Melo, Pompeu, Ivan, Mary e Oliveira” (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
10. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, Porto Alegre, November 17, 1979.
 11. “Fora os traidores que rompem a unidade!,” *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 217 (September 7, 1939), p. 2.
 12. Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981.
 13. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979. Roberto Morena, interview with Leandro Konder and Pedro Scuro Neto.
 14. João Batista Luzardo, letter to Getúlio Vargas, February 26, 1938, mentions Alcedo Cavalcanti, Costa Leite, and Canabarro as conspiring with Flores da Cunha, with some of the conspirators planning to go in March “to Madrid, where they will be utilized by their chiefs of Soviet Russia.” Another communication in the Vargas files, this one dated March 13, 1938, says that Costa Leite, traveling up the Uruguay River, should be reaching São Paulo or Paraná. (Documents in the CPDOC.)
 15. Nemo Canabarro Lucas, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, October 30, 1967, June 26, 1979.
 16. Pedro Rodrigues, “Brasileiros na Espanha.” Canabarro Lucas, interview, October 30, 1967. Delcy Silveira, letter to Pedro Rodrigues, September 29, 1979. Clippings from Buenos Aires newspapers (one of them is *Critica* of January 25, 1938) furnished by PR. Some show photographs of Brazilian exiles Nelson de Souza Alves, Gay da Cunha, Dinarte da Silveira, Homero Jobim, Delcy Silveira, and Eny Silveira, together with the also exiled Brazilian journalist Barbosa Melo (who wrote *El Fascismo en el Brasil*).
 17. Ramon Prieto Bernié, author of *Hierro Verde*, was later secretary to Eva Perón (note from PR). Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979. Carlos da Costa Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1966. Gay da Cunha, *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola*, pp. 28, 166.
 18. Gay da Cunha, *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola*, pp. 46–47.
 19. Dinarco Reis, report to Pedro Rodrigues, Rio de Janeiro, April 4, 1981.
 20. Pedro Rodrigues, “Brasileiros na Espanha.”
 21. Canabarro Lucas, interview, October 30, 1967. Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981.
 22. Canabarro Lucas, interview, October 30, 1967.
 23. Pedro Rodrigues, “Brasileiros na Espanha.” Canabarro Lucas, interview, October 30, 1967. Apolônio de Carvalho, interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981.
 24. Pedro Rodrigues, “Brasileiros na Espanha.”
 25. Gay da Cunha, *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola*, p. 156, mentions

- some of those who were hospitalized. Questionnaire of Pedro Rodrigues with answers by Homero de Castro Jobim, Pôrto Alegre, September 18, 1979. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979.
26. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979.
 27. Pedro Rodrigues, "Brasileiros na Espanha," p. 20. The parade is described in Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 852.
 28. Gay da Cunha, *Um Brasileiro na Guerra Espanhola*, pp. 194–195.
 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 200–203.
 30. Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 878.
 31. Roberto Morena, interview with Leandro Konder and Pedro Scuro Neto. Morena, "La solidarit e br silienne avec la lutte des r publicains espagnols." Pedro Rodrigues, "Roberto Morena: 60 anos de Milit ncia Sindical," and "Roberto Morena: O Oper rio, o Militante, o Homem," scheduled for publication in *Mem ria e Hist ria* (S o Paulo), no. 3 (1982).
 32. Canabarro Lucas, interviews, October 30, 1967, June 26, 1979. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, November 17, 1979, and letter to Pedro Rodrigues, Rio de Janeiro, October 27, 1980.
 33. Carlos da Costa Leite, letter to "camaradas Sisson, Mota Lima, B. Gerson, B. Melo, Pompeu, Ivan, Mary e Oliveira," Champ de Gurs, June 23, 1939. Costa Leite, interview, October 13, 1966. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979. Apol nio de Carvalho, interview, *Pasquim* (Rio de Janeiro) 11, no. 532 (September 13, 1979) (PR).
 34. Pedro Rodrigues, "Brasileiros na Espanha," p. 23. Apol nio de Carvalho, interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981. Agildo Barata, "Hermenegildo de Assis Brasil," *Problemas* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 26 (May 1950), pp. 118–128. Dinarco Reis, report to Pedro Rodrigues, Rio de Janeiro, April 4, 1981.
 35. Apol nio de Carvalho, interview, *Pasquim*, September 13, 1979, and interviews, July 18, August 12, 1981. Jos  Corr a de S , letter to Pedro Rodrigues, February 11, 1981.
2. *The Buenos Aires and Lima Pan American Conferences (1936 and 1938)*
 1. *A Classe Oper ria* 11, no. 201 (October 1936); sec "Notas e Coment rios," p. 2.
 2. Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., *The Organization of American States* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 23. Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 8.
 3. "A Conferencia Pan-Americana," *A Classe Oper ria* (S o Paulo) 12, no. 199 (February 1937).
 4. Octavio Brand o, "The Pan-American Conference," *International Press Correspondence* 17, no. 7 (February 13, 1937).
 5. "A Nossa Posi o," *16 de Julho* (Org o de Defesa dos Direitos do Povo

- Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro) 2, no. 10 (March 10, 1938) (SAC). O Bureau Político do Partido Comunista do Brasil, "União Nacional pela Democracia e pela Paz!"
6. Octavio Brandão, "The Fascist Danger," *World News and Views* 18, no. 48 (October 1, 1938).
 7. "A Conferência de Lima" and "Acontecimentos Políticos do Mez de Janeiro," *Revista Proletária* (Órgão do Comité Central do Partido Comunista do Brasil), no. 12 [apparently February 1939] (12 pp., mimeographed, BNA, Marighella Processo 827, Apelação 463). McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 117–122. Thomas and Thomas, *The Organization of American States*, pp. 23–24.
 8. "O Imperialismo Americano em Lima: Declaração do Partido Socialista Operário dos Estados Unidos," *Boletim editado pelo Comité Pro-Reagrupamento da Vanguarda Revolucionária do Brasil*, August 6, 1939 (SAC).
3. *The PCB Expels Carlos Lacerda (January 1939)*
 1. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1979. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979. Evaristo de Moraes Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 8, 1979. Adão Pereira Nunes, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 9, 1979. Otávio Malta, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 9, 1968.
 2. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 36. Moacir Werneck de Castro, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 2, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, "Cultura y revolución," *Unidad: Por la Defensa de la Cultura; Órgano de la Agrupación de Intelectuales, Artistas, Periodistas y Escritores (AIAPE)* (Buenos Aires) 1, no. 3 (April 1936).
 3. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 20, 1979. Arthur José Poerner, *O Poder Jovem*, pp. 126–127. Milton Caires de Brito, interview, Salvador, Bahia, July 25, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 37.
 4. Caires de Brito, interview, July 25, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 39. Paulo Silveira, interview, June 20, 1979.
 5. Samuel Wainer, interviews, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, September 28, 1968, and July 14, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 48.
 6. João da Costa Faleão, interviews, Salvador, Bahia, October 13, 16, 1967, July 26, 27, 1979. Secretaria da Segurança Pública, Estado de Pernambuco, *Aspectos da Atividade do Comunismo em Pernambuco* (Recife, 1958), pp. 140–143. *Seiva* (Bahia) 1, no. 1 (December 1938). Eduardo Maffei (Américo de Albuquerque), "João Falcão e seu tempo," *Jornal da Bahia: Edição histórica de aniversário* (Salvador, Bahia), September 1978. (Carlos Lacerda's article, "O Mato É Maior," in the first number of *Seiva* appears under the name of Marcos Pimenta.)
 7. Carlos Lacerda, in describing the episode in *Depoimento*, p. 48, mentions the anti-Communist writer Heitor Muniz, rather than Odete de Carvalho e Souza. In telling the story to J. B. Barreto Leite Filho, Lacerda spoke of Odete de Carvalho e Souza (who, in 1961, was succeeded as am-

- bassador to Israel by Barreto Leite Filho). See Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981.
8. Wainer, interview, September 28, 1968. Carlos Lacerda, interview, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1968. Carlos Lacerda (unsigned), "A Exposição Anti-Comunista," *O Observador Econômico e Financeiro* 3, no. 36 (January 1939). The article's photographs (one mentioning Otávio Brandão and Minervino de Oliveira) were supplied by the Pavilhão Anti-Comunista of the National Exposition of the Estado Novo (commemorating the Estado Novo's first anniversary).
 9. Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981, and interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1981. Moacir Werneck de Castro, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 2, 1967, July 2, 1979.
 10. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1967. Arnaldo Pedroso d'Horta, interview, São Paulo, November 14, 1968. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1979. Carlos Lacerda, interview, September 17, 1968. Hermínio Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, November 5, 1968. Moraes and Viana, *Prestes*, p. 70.
 11. Wainer, interview, September 28, 1968.
 12. Lacerda, interview, September 17, 1968, and *Depoimento*, pp. 49–50.
 13. Lacerda, *Depoimento*, p. 44.
 14. Wainer, interview, September 28, 1968. Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, November 5, 1968, August 19, 1979. Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza, interviews, São Paulo, July 8, August 7, 1981.
4. *The Communist Schism on Fernando de Noronha Island*
1. Hilcar Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1979. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 24, 29, 1938.
 2. Leite, interview, August 3, 1979. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 27, November 22, August 24, 1938.
 3. Leite, interview, August 3, 1979. Bezerra, *Memórias*, pp. 280–294. Secretaria da Segurança Pública do Estado de Pernambuco, Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social, "Relação dos implicados no movimento extremista de novembro de 1935 em Pernambuco, condenados pelo Tribunal de Segurança Nacional" (typewritten), Recife, December 1938, furnished during interviews with Pedro Vilela Cid, Natal, RGN, October 18, 20, 1968.
 4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 20, 24, 25, December 10, 1939.
 5. Relatório No. 1 to A. P. Pinto Moreira, Delegado Adjunto à Ordem Social, São Paulo, January 7, 1939; José Gomes, Sub-Chefe da Seção de Investigações, Seção de Ordem Social, Relatório No. 70 to A. P. Pinto Moreira, São Paulo, May 27, 1939; "Classificação do Delito" (all three in BNA, Processo 827, Apelação 463). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, October 20, 1939. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968.
 6. Bezerra, interview, Recife, October 14, 1968, and *Memórias*, pp. 281–288, 296. Leite, interview, August 3, 1979.

7. Bezerra, *Memórias*, p. 284. Ilvo Meirelès, interview, Rio de Janeiro, November 1, 1968. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 448.
8. Agildo Barata, interview, Rio de Janeiro, November 2, 1967. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 448. Leite, interview, August 3, 1979.
9. Ilvo Meireles, interview, November 1, 1968. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, November 9, 1968. Barreto Leite, typewritten notes, August 1981.
10. Bezerra, *Memórias*, pp. 287–290. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 449–450. Ilvo Meireles, interview, November 1, 1968. Bezerra, interview, October 14, 1968.

7. THE WAR'S FIRST TWO YEARS (1939–1941)

1. *The Soviet-German Pact and the Soviet-Finnish War (August 1939–March 1940)*

1. José Stacchini, interview, São Paulo, July 22, 1979.
2. O Comité Regional de S. Paulo do Partido Comunista Brasileiro [handwritten correction shows “do Brasil”], “Ao Povo Brasileiro! Soldados e Officiaes do Exercito e Força Publica! Aos Estudantes! Aos Trabalhadores e a Todos os Membros do Partido Comunista!,” São Paulo, September 1, 1939 (SAC).
3. O Comité Central do Partido Socialista Revolucionário (secção brasileira da 4ª Internacional), “Lutemos contra a Guerra Imperialista,” September 1, 1939 (SAC).
4. “Momento Internacional,” *A Classe Operária* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 217 (September 7, 1939), p. 1. Prestes, commenting later on the pact, said that it “was an agreement that defended the democracies of the entire world because North American, English, and French capitalism had been seeking the initiation of a war against Russia” (Prestes speech in Congress, reported in *Tribuna Popular*, March 28, 1946).
5. O Bureau Político do Partido Comunista do Brasil, “A URSS e o Momento Internacional,” Rio de Janeiro, September 18, 1939 (BNA).
6. O BP do Partido Comunista do Brasil, *Tarefas do Partido Comunista do Brasil (S. da I.C.) em face da situação internacional e nacional*, Rio de Janeiro, October 1939 (7 pp., printed, BNA).
7. Hilcar Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1979. Alberto da Rocha Barros, interview, São Paulo, November 22, 1968. Basbaum, *História Sincera da República*, III, 140.
8. *World News and Views* 19, nos. 52, 51 (November 4, October 28, 1939). See “Molotov on the International Situation” and “Britain and the Soviet Union.”
9. “Manifesto do Bureau Americano-Oriental, Sub-Secretariado da IV Internacional,” *Boletim editado pelo Partido Socialista Revolucionário* (Bélo Horizonte [?]), no. 3 (November 18, 1939) (10 pp., mimeographed, SAC).

10. Carlos Garcia, "A Posição dos Estudantes Frente á Guerra," *Seiva* (Bahia) 1, no. 6 (November 1939): 1.
11. J. R. Campbell, "British Imperialism's Finnish War," *World News and Views* 19, no. 60 (December 30, 1939). *O Estado de S. Paulo*, December 5, 1939.
12. Duarte, *Memórias*, VIII, 84–85.
13. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 17, 1940. O BP do Partido Comunista do Brasil, letter to "Exmos. Snrs. da chamada 'Conferencia de Neutralidade,'" Brasil, January 1940 (BNA).
14. "A União Soviética na Vanguarda da luta contra o imperialismo e pela independencia dos povos," *A Classe Operária*, no. 219 (March 1, 1940).
15. Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road from Peace to War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 395–396. O BP do Partido Comunista do Brasil, *A Luta contra a Guerra Imperialista e o Fascismo*, São Paulo, September 1940 (10 pp., printed, BNA).

2. *Capture of the Bangú Secretariat (March–May 1940)*

1. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 10, 1940 (BNA).
2. Ibid. Sebastião Francisco, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 13, 1940 (BNA).
3. Ibid.
4. "Jamais Foi Tão Grande o Perigo Comunista no Brasil," *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940.
5. David Nasser, "Carrascos e Assassinos em Impunidade," *O Cruzeiro*, December 27, 1947. Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, August 19, 1979.
6. Eduardo Ribeiro Xavier, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 10, 1940. Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981. Sebastião Otávio Mascarenhas, interview, Cidade de Deus, Jacarepaguá, August 28, 1981.
7. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940. Sebastião Francisco, declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, May 13, 1940, and interview, August 26, 1981. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968.
8. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 14, 1940. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940.
9. Gerardo Mello Mourão, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 13, 1979. Heron P. Pinto, *Nos Subterrâneos do Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), p. 86, quoting from *O Globo*, March 14, 1945.
10. Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, August 19, December 24, 1979. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 23, 24, 26, 1940.
11. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 480. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940.
12. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 14, 16, 1940.
13. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 17, 1967. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 18, 1940.

14. Sebastião Francisco, declaration, May 13, 1940.
 15. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 31, 1940.
3. *Jail Sentences for the Murderers of Elza Fernandes* (November 7, 1940)
 1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 17, 1940. *Diário da Noite* (São Paulo), April 16, 1940 (last edition). *Jornal do Brasil*, April 16, 1940. Barreto Leite Filho, typewritten notes, August 1981. Lafayette, *Os Crimes do Partido Comunista*, pp. 21–37.
 2. For Freitas Guimarães' autobiography, see the Brazilian daily press of mid-April 1936 and Levine, *The Vargas Regime*, pp. 63–65.
 3. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 18, 1940. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 18, 1940. Dentist Maurício da Gama e Silva, declaration (BNA).
 4. Luiz Cupello Calônio, letter to Bomfim, Rio de Janeiro, April 17, 1940 (BNA). Antônio Maciel Bomfim, letter to Luiz Cupello Calônio, Rio de Janeiro, April 19, 1940 (BNA).
 5. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, April 24, 1940. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 483. Lauro Reginaldo da Rocha [Bangú], declaration to the Civil Police of the Federal District, April 25, 1940 (BNA).
 6. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 9, 1940. *Jornal do Brasil*, editorials, April 18, 20, 1940.
 7. *Jornal do Brasil*, April 25, 26, 27, 28, 1940.
 8. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 15, 1940. See "additional declarations" of Manoel Severiano Cavalcante and Francisco Natividade Lyra (the latter dated May 13, 1940) and statement of TSN Procurador Gilberto Goulart de Andrade, Rio de Janeiro, October 5, 1940 (BNA, Processo 1,381). *Jornal do Brasil*, May 15, 1940.
 9. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 1979, recalling conversation with Antônio Maciel Bomfim. Sobral Pinto, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979.
 10. Heron P. Pinto, *Nos Subterrâneos do Estado Novo*, pp. 85–89, quoting *O Globo*, March 14, 1945. Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
 11. Heron P. Pinto, *Nos Subterrâneos do Estado Novo*, pp. 88–89. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, p. 333.
 12. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, November 8, 1940.
 13. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 487–488. Edmundo Moniz, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1967.
 14. Moraes and Viana, *Prestes*, p. 88. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, p. 346.
 15. O Partido Comunista (SB da IC), bulletin, December 1940 (BNA, Processo 1,750, Apelação 888, Crispim and others).
 16. Sebastião Otávio Mascarenhas, interview, Cidade de Deus, Jacarepaguá, August 28, 1981.
 17. Patrícia Galvão, *Verdade & Liberdade* (São Paulo: Comitê pró candidatura Patrícia Galvão, 1950) pp. [2–3]. Geraldo Ferraz, "Quilômetro final," *Folha de S. Paulo*, September 18, 1979. Patrícia Galvão and Geraldo Fer-

raz, *A Famosa Revista* (Rio de Janeiro: Americ-Edit, 1945). K. David Jackson, conversation, Austin, December 11, 1981.

4. *Reactions to United States Rearmament*
(September 1940–January 1941)

1. Domingos Pereira Marques, Frederico Bonimani, Mário Barbati, and José Maria Crispim, declarations at the Delegacia Especializada de Ordem Política e Social, São Paulo, May 2, April 3, April 4, May 2, 1941 (Processo 1,750, Apelação 888, BNA). See also Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 319–403.
2. Domingos Braz, Maria Alves de Oliveira, Maxim Tolstoi Carone, declarations at the Delegacia Especializada de Ordem Política e Social, São Paulo, April 2, 28, 7, 1941 (BNA) (Carone's declarations reveal a complete lack of cooperation with those who questioned him). Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968. Barbati, declaration, April 4, 1941.
3. Domingos Braz, declaration, April 2, 1941.
4. O BP do Partido Comunista do Brasil, *A Luta contra a Guerra Imperialista e o Fascismo*, pp. 3–6.
5. Bell Keats, "The Growing Strength of the Anti-Imperialist Front," and Richard Goodman, "America Joins the War," *World News and Views* 20, nos. 33, 34 (August 17, 24, 1940).
6. Domingos Braz, declaration, April 2, 1941. "Death of an International Spy," *World News and Views* 20, no. 35 (August 31, 1940).
7. "A Liquidação da 3ª Internacional e as Tarefas do Proletariado Mundial" [1943], unsigned and undated (SAC).
8. Partido Socialista Revolucionário (Seção da Quarta Internacional), "Se Não Temos Ainda a Guerra no Brasil, Já Temos Mais Fome e Maior Opressão!," *Belo Horizonte* [?], January 1941 (2 pp., mimeographed, BNA).
9. Mário Pedrosa, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 24, 1979.
10. Edmundo Moniz, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1967, June 27, 1979. Mário Pedrosa, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 4, 1967. Sacchetta, interview, São Paulo, August 19, 1979. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 1979.
11. Pedrosa, interview, June 24, 1979. Alexander, *Trotskyism in Latin America*, pp. 12–13.

5. *The Arrest of the São Paulo Communist Leaders* (March 1941)

1. Domingos Braz, Mário Barbati, and Frederico Bonimani, declarations to the Delegacia Especializada de Ordem Política e Social, São Paulo, April 2, 4, 3, 1941 (BNA).
2. *Ibid.*
3. Reports from detectives to Elpídio Reali, Delegado Adjunto á Ordem Social, June 27, 1940, to late March 1941 (Processo 1,750, Apelação 888,

- BNA). Elpídio Reali, "Relatório," São Paulo, June 4, 1941 (109 pp., type-written, BNA).
4. *Folha da Manhã* (São Paulo), March 30, 1941. *Jornal da Manhã* (São Paulo), March 30, 1941. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 357–362, transcribing article from *Correio Paulistano*, June 15, 1941, based on Elpídio Reali's "Relatório" of June 4.
 5. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 345.
 6. *Ibid.*, pp. 384, 364, 375, 159, 347, 338. O CR de S. Paulo do PCB, *Contra o Trotskismo*, p. 22.
 7. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 348, 379.
 8. *Ibid.*, pp. 350–357. Barbati, declaration, São Paulo, August 4, 1941 (BNA).
 9. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 350–357, 375–378.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 429. Alfredo Miranda Rodrigues, resolution, Federal District, October 22, 1941 (BNA). Frederico de Barros Barreto, condemnations, Federal District, November 20, 1941 (BNA). Vasco Leitão da Cunha (Chefe do Gabinete, Justice Ministry), memorandum to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, July 15, 1941, and Vargas, resolution, Rio de Janeiro, June 15, 1942 (BNA).
 11. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 428, 438, 516, 444–445.
6. *Germany Attacks the Soviet Union (June 1941)*
1. Tass, quoted in *World News and Views* 21, no. 25 (June 21, 1941). Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 347.
 2. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 347–348.
 3. José Bonifácio Coutinho Nogueira, interview, São Paulo, July 23, 1979.
 4. *World News and Views* 21, nos. 26, 33 (June 28, August 16, 1941).
 5. "Latin America Takes Its Stand," and "C.T.A.L.," *World News and Views* 22, nos. 3, 15 (January 17, April 11, 1942). About CTAL, see Stephen Clissold (ed.), *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918–68: A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 22.
 6. João Amazonas, "Pomar—seu nome e o exemplo de sua vida serão sempre lembrados," in Luis Maklouf, João Amazonas, Clóvis Moura, Arnaldo Mendez, Wladimir Pomar, and Pedro Pomar, *Pedro Pomar* (São Paulo: Editora Brasil Debates, 1980), pp. 67–71.
 7. *Ibid.* Luís Maklouf Carvalho, "Pesquisa biográfica," in Maklouf et al., *Pedro Pomar*, pp. 25–63. Partido Comunista do Brasil, *A Bancada Comunista na Constituinte de 1946* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Horizonte, 1947), pp. 17, 19.
 8. Bezerra, *Memórias*, p. 285.
 9. "Campanha infamante de um agitador vermelho contra o Brasil," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 23, 1941.
7. *Montevideo and Buenos Aires (1940–1941)*
1. João Baptista Luzardo, letter to Vargas, Montevideo, July 31, 1940 (CPDOC). José Bernardino da Câmara Canto, letters to Vargas, Montevideo, February 28, March 17, 1940 (CPDOC).
 2. Canto, letter to Vargas, Montevideo, November 11, 1940 (CPDOC).

3. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1941 (CPDOC).
4. Luzardo, letter to Vargas, Montevideo, July 14, 1941 (CPDOC). Canto, letter to Vargas, Montevideo, July 18, 1941 (CPDOC).
5. J. S. "Notícias do Rio: Comunismo," *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 13, 1941.
6. Newspaper clippings in the Vargas papers, July 1941 (CPDOC). Canto, letters to Vargas, Montevideo, March 17, 1940, July 26, 1941 (CPDOC).
7. Letter from Montevideo, September 17, 1941 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
8. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, p. 351.
9. Pedro Rodrigues, "Roberto Morena: 60 anos de militância sindical," and letter to JWFD, October 5, 1980.

8. *Communism in Bahia (1941)*

1. Bercelino Caraciles Maia, declaration, Maceió, Alagoas Penitentiary, January 14, 1942 (BNA). José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, declaration to the police, Recife, December 26, 1941 (BNA). Poerner, *O Poder Jovem*, pp. 126, 141, 145. "Galeria dos Batalhadores da 'U.N.E.,'" in *Relatorios da União Nacional dos Estudantes, 1939, 1940* (Rio de Janeiro: U.N.E., July 1940), pp. 13–18. José Gomes Talarico, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 17, 1982.
2. *Relatorios da União Nacional dos Estudantes, 1939, 1940*, pp. 18, 75–90 ("Na Baía"). Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, Salvador, Bahia, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979. Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, declaration to the Federal District police, May 2, 1940.
3. Biography of Arruda Câmara in "Os que forjaram o PC para a Etapa da Legalidade," *Tribuna Popular*, September 9, 1945. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979. Police infiltration of the Party outside Bahia was also mentioned by João da Costa Falcão (interview, Salvador, October 16, 1967).
4. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979.
5. João da Costa Falcão, interview, Salvador, July 27, 1979.
6. José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, declaration to the Pernambuco police, Recife, December 26, 1941 (BNA).
7. *Ibid.* Questions of the Bahia police to Izaías Nascimento Santos and declaration of João Severiano Torres in the Bahia State Penitentiary, May 15, 1942 (BNA). The importance of "Jordão" [João Severiano Torres] was mentioned by Falcão (interviews, October 16, 1967, July 27, 1979).
8. Secretariado Nacional do Partido Comunista do Brasil (Secção da Terceira Internacional Comunista)—with signatures of Antônio Paiva, Pedro Nascimento [sic] Vieira, and Rui Lót de Souza—communication to Vargas, Federal District, October 13, 1941 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). Hilcar Leite said (interview, August 3, 1979) that he knew Pedro Nascimento Vieira during a period prior to that of the 1941 communication to Vargas and that he was originally a worker who studied and "became more of an intellectual."
9. José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, declaration, December 26, 1941.

10. Ibid. João da Costa Falcão, interview, July 27, 1979. Pedro Vilela Cid, interviews, October 18, 20, 1968.
11. José Albino Ferreira de Miranda, declaration, December 26, 1941.
12. Bercelino Caraciles Maia, declaration, January 14, 1942.
13. João da Costa Falcão, interview, July 27, 1979.
14. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979.

8. THE AMERICAS IN THE WAR (1941–1945)

1. *Consequences of Pearl Harbor (December 1941–August 1942)*

1. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 428.
2. João da Costa Falcão, interview, Salvador, October 16, 1967.
3. Leôncio Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos (Memórias)* (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1976), p. 178.
4. “União Nacional para a Defesa da Pátria,” *Seiva* 3, no. 12 (June 1942).
5. João da Costa Falcão, “Como A Juventude Deve Lutar Pela Defesa Da Pátria,” *Seiva*, June 1942, pp. 17–19.
6. Luiz Carlos Prestes, letter to Agildo Barata, June 22, 1942, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 39–42.
7. “Notícias do Rio: Maior Confiança no Futuro,” *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 13, 1942.
8. Eurico Gaspar Dutra, letter to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, June 15, 1942 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
9. “Publicação de manifesto anti-totalitário,” *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 12, 1942. “Declaração de Princípios,” *Diretrizes* (Rio de Janeiro), June 11, 1942.
10. Dutra, letter to Vargas, June 15, 1942.
11. “I Talk to Prestes” (based on a letter from Blas Roca), *World News and Views* 22, no. 30 (July 25, 1942).
12. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, interview, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1966, and “Foi o povo que declarou a guerra em 42,” in Lourenço Dantas Mota (coordenador), *A História Vivida (I): Documentos Abertos* (São Paulo: O Estado de S. Paulo, 1981), pp. 36–38. Barreto Leite Filho, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 22, 1979. Jefferson Caffery, cables to the secretary of state, Rio de Janeiro, July 5, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 1942 (in U.S. National Archives). Vargas’ letters of July 17, 1942, to the departing members of his administration are in the CPDOC. For a warning by Etchegoyen against German influences in Brazil, see *Jornal do Brasil*, December 24, 1942.
13. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 451, 499.
14. See Questioning of João da Costa Falcão, Salvador, June 20, 1942 (BNA).
15. “Unidade Nacional, Unidade Nacional,” *Seiva* 3, no. 13 (August 1942).

2. *Reactions to Brazil's Entry into the War (late 1942)*

1. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 499–500. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968. Antônio Rodrigues de Gouveia ["Tatu"] had once captained a merchant ship. Antônio Soares de Oliveira ["Aço"] had been a Central do Brasil railroad worker.
2. Luiz Carlos Prestes, telegram to *La Razón* (Montevideo), Rio de Janeiro, August 21, 1942, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 43–44.
3. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 502.
4. Delcy Silveira, interview with Pedro Rodrigues, Porto Alegre, November 17, 1979.
5. Carlos da Costa Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1966. "PCB: Fernando de Lacerda e sua concepção de União Nacional," *Diretrizes*, May 27, 1943 (in Edgard Carone, *A Terceira República (1937–1945)* [São Paulo: Difel, 1976], pp. 500–507, see esp. p. 503). Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 503.
6. Pedro Rodrigues, "Brasileiros na Espanha," see p. 157. "PCB: Fernando de Lacerda e sua concepção de União Nacional," *Diretrizes* (see Carone, pp. 503, 505).
7. Davino Francisco dos Santos, *Do Rei Utopos ao Cavaleiro da Rússia* (tract published in São Paulo in 1948).
8. *Diretrizes*, April 20, 1944.
9. Samuel Wainer, interviews, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, September 28, 1968, July 14, 1979. Moacir Werneck de Castro, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 2, 1967, July 2, 1979.
10. Carlos Lacerda, "Os Intelectuais e a União Nacional," *Revista Acadêmica* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 62, November 1942.
11. Jorge Amado, interview, Salvador, September 28, 1967. Jacob Gorender, letter to JWFD, São Paulo, January 28, 1980. "A Baía Comemora o Rompimento do Brasil com o Eixo," *Diretrizes*, February 11, 1943.
12. Alceu Amoroso Lima [Tristão de Athayde], letter to Jorge Amado, Rio de Janeiro, November 27, 1942, in *Folha da Manhã*, September 25, 1949.
13. "Vencer a Guerra contra Hitler," *Seiva* 3, no. 14 (October 1942).
14. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, Salvador, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979.
15. Luís Arrobas Martins, "Notas sobre a 'resistência acadêmica' ao 'Estado Novo' (1938–1944)," *depoimento*, November 7, 1973 (10 pp., typed, private collection).
16. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, July 8, September 1, 1942. Eurico Gaspar Dutra and Manoel Rabelo, letters to Vargas, January 12, 1943 (CPDOC).
17. O Comitê Regional do Partido Socialista Revolucionário (Secção da IV Internacional—Partido Socialista da Revolução Mundial), "Aos Trabalhadores," São Paulo, July 31, 1944 (SAC). "Liquidação da 3ª Internacional e as Tarefas do Proletariado Mundial" (2½ pp., mimeographed, unsigned, undated, SAC).

3. *Divergences on Ilha Grande (1942–1943)*
 1. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 451–456.
 2. Ibid. Bezerra, *Memórias*, pp. 296–297.
 3. Bezerra, *Memórias*, pp. 296–297. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 460. Sebastião Francisco, interview, São Paulo, August 26, 1981.
 4. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 504, 462, 502.
 5. Ibid., p. 512.
 6. Gerardo Mello Mourão, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 13, 1979. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, pp. 512–516.
 7. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 514.
 8. Carlos da Costa Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1966. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite and Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979.
 9. Ilvo Meireles, interview, Rio de Janeiro, November 1, 1968. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968. Sebastião Otávio Mascarenhas, interview, Cidade de Deus, Jacarepaguá, August 28, 1981. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 522.
 10. Santos, *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 522.
 11. Jacob Gorender, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1979.
 12. “Os que forjaram o PC para a Etapa da Legalidade,” *Tribuna Popular*, September 9, 1945. Partido Comunista do Brasil, *A Bancada Comunista na Constituinte de 1946*, pp. 14–20. Delegacia de Segurança Social, Report 932, December 23, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). Osvaldo Peralva, *O Retrato* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Globo, 1962), pp. 201–208. Luís Maklouf Carvalho, in Maklouf et al., *Pedro Pomar*, p. 53.
4. *Dissolution of the Comintern (May 1943)*
 1. Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, paperback ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 475. “The Dissolution of the Communist International,” *World News and Views* 23, no. 22 (May 29, 1943). Joseph Stalin, letter to Harold King, *O Estado de S. Paulo*, May 30, 1943.
 2. Samuel Wainer, interviews, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, September 28, 1968, July 14, 1979. *Diretrizes*, May 27, 1943 (article on Fernando de Lacerda, reprinted in Carone, *A Terceira República*, pp. 500–507).
 3. *Diretrizes*, May 27, 1943.
 4. Wainer, interviews, September 28, 1968, July 14, 1979.
 5. “A Liquidação da 3ª Internacional e as Tarefas do Proletariado Mundial” (SAC).
 6. Alexander, *Trotskyism in Latin America*, p. 78, quoting a letter given in Argentine Trotskyite Liborio Justo, *Estrategia Revolucionaria: Lucha por la Unidad y por la Liberación Nacional y Social de la América Latina*, p. 123.
 7. Fúlvio Abramo, interviews, São Paulo, November 13, 1968, July 11, 1979. Mário Pedrosa, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 4, 1967, June 24, 1979.

8. Hermínio Sacchetta, interviews, São Paulo, November 5, 26, 1968, July 14, August 19, December 24, 1979. Hilcar Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1967.
9. Plínio Mello, interview, São Paulo, July 24, 1979.

5. *The Deaths of Laura Brandão and Leocádia Prestes (1942 and 1943)*

1. Otávio Brandão, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, December 9, 1968, July 1, 1979.
2. Ibid.
3. G. Stanley, "Leocadia Prestes," *World News and Views* 23, no. 27 (July 3, 1943).
4. Amado, *O Cavaleiro da Esperança*, p. 305.
5. Jorge Amado and Pedro Mota Lima, articles in Osório et al., *Prestes: Estudos E Depoimentos*, pp. 57, 71, 75–76. Luís Carlos Prestes, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1963. Sobral Pinto, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1979.
6. Carlos de Lima Cavalcanti, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 1, 1963.
7. Ibid. Pedro Mota Lima, "Março de 1945," in Osório et al., *Prestes: Estudos E Depoimentos*, p. 74.
8. Luís Carlos Prestes, speech in congress, reported in *Tribuna Popular*, March 28, 1946.

6. *The CNOP Participates in Mass Demonstrations (1942–1943)*

1. Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos*, pp. 178–179. Leandro Konder, *A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil* (São Paulo: Graal, 1980), p. 50. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, November 28, 1967.
2. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1967.
3. Ibid., October 29, November 28, 1967. Poerner, *O Poder Jovem*, pp. 172–173. José Gomes Talarico, interview, July 17, 1982. Hélio de Almeida, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 20, 1982.
4. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, Salvador, October 14, 1967, July 25, 1979. Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos*, p. 179.
5. Germinal Feijó, interview, São Paulo, August 16, 1979. *Jornal do Brasil* and *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 1, 1943. *A Sociedade Amigos da América em 1943* [20-page pamphlet] (Rio de Janeiro, 1944).
6. Eurico Gaspar Dutra, letter to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, January 12, 1943 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
7. Jacob Gorender, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1979.
8. Paulo Silveira, interview, November 28, 1967. Gorender, interview, December 29, 1979.
9. Manoel Rabelo, "Exposição de Motivos" to Vargas (printed) (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
10. "Brazil-Soviet Tie Reported Pending," *New York Times*, November 25, 1943, p. 1.

7. *The Mantiqueira Conference (August 1943)*

1. Moacir Werneck de Castro, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 2, 1967. João da Costa Falcão, interview, Salvador, October 13, 1967. Peralva, *O Retrato*, p. 203.
2. João da Costa Falcão, interviews, Salvador, July 26, 27, 1979. Jacob Gorender, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1979, and letter to JWFD, São Paulo, January 28, 1980.
3. Milton Caires de Brito, interview, Salvador, October 14, 1967. "A significação histórica da Conferência da Mantiqueira," *Problemas*, no. 49 (September 1953). João Maria Perestrelo Feijó, interviews, CENIMAR, Rio de Janeiro, December 20, 21, 1966.
4. João Maria Perestrelo Feijó, interviews, December 20, 21, 1966.
5. *A Bancada Comunista na Constituinte de 1946*. "Os que forjaram o PC para a Etapa de Legalidade," *Tribuna Popular*, September 9, 1945. Feijó, interviews, December 20, 21, 1966.
6. The importance of the work of Ivan Ramos Ribeiro on behalf of the CNOP has been mentioned by many, including Agildo Barata (interview, November 2, 1967), who said that he would welcome publication of his poor opinion of Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, whom he described as a wartime profiteer in black market gasoline. Agildo Barata praised Ivan Ramos Ribeiro's father, Captain Alfredo Augusto Ribeiro Júnior, "revolutionary governor of Amazonas for almost a month in 1924."
7. Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos*, p. 180.
8. *A Bancada Comunista na Constituinte de 1946*. "Os que forajaram o PC para a Etapa de Legalidade," *Tribuna Popular*, September 9, 1945. Milton Caires de Brito, interviews, Salvador, October 14, 1967, July 25, 26, 1979. Pedro Del Picchia (interviewer), *O PCB no Quadro Atual da Política Brasileira: Entrevistas com seis membros do Comitê Central* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1980), p. 11. Maurício Grabois, *Levemos às Massas Nossa Linha Política* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Horizonte, 1946), p. 11. *Continental* (Rio de Janeiro) 2, no. 10 (June–July 1944). Luís Maklouf Carvalho, in Maklouf et al., *Pedro Pomar*, p. 53.
9. "A significação histórica da Conferência da Mantiqueira," *Problemas*, September 1953.
10. *Continental*, June–July 1944. See also quotations from *Continental*, 2, no. 4 (November 1943), and 2, no. 6 (February 1944), in Carone, *A Terceira República*, pp. 489–494. Paulo Emilio Sales Gomes, interview, São Paulo, November 16, 1968.
11. Jacob Gorender, interview, December 29, 1979. Basbaum, *História Sincera da República*, III, 148.
12. Paulo Silveira, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1967, June 20, 1979. Rosa Meireles Costa Leite, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1979.
13. Gorender, interview, December 29, 1979. Paulo Emilio Sales Gomes, interview, November 16, 1968. Basbaum (interviews, Austin, June 15–17, 1967) said that most of the São Paulo Communists did not approve of the Mantiqueira Conference. Maria Victoria de Mesquita Benevides, *A*

UDN e o Udenismo: Ambigüidades do Liberalismo Brasileiro (1945–1965) (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 1981), p. 38.

14. Konder, *A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil*, p. 50. Gorender, interview, December 29, 1979.
15. Gregório Bezerra, interview, Recife, October 14, 1968. Barata, *Vida de um Revolutionário*, p. 323.
16. Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos*, p. 181. Pedro Rodrigues, letter to JWFD, October 26, 1980.
17. Agostinho Dias de Oliveira, "O Projeto de Resolução e as Causas de Nossos Erros," *Voz Operária*, March 16, 1957. Gorender, letter to JWFD, January 28, 1980.

8. *Prestes' Opinions (March–June 1944)*

1. Ilvo Meireles interviews, Rio de Janeiro, November 1, 1968, July 28, 1979. Paulo Silveira, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, October 29, November 28, 1967, June 20, 1979.
2. Paulo Silveira, interview, October 29, 1967.
3. Luiz Carlos Prestes, "A Situação de Fernando Lacerda perante o Partido," *Problemas*, no. 61 (September 1954), p. 13.
4. Bezerra, *Memórias*, p. 305. "A significação histórica da Conferência da Mantiqueira," *Problemas*, no. 49 (September 1953), p. 7.
5. Prestes, "Comentários a um documento aliancista aparecido nos últimos meses de 1943," Rio de Janeiro, March 14, 1944, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 45–49.
6. "A significação histórica da Conferência da Mantiqueira." Prestes, "Projeto de declaração da ANL e do PCB," Rio de Janeiro, April 1944, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 51–59.
7. Prestes, "A propósito da reorganização de nossas forças," Rio de Janeiro, May 22, 1944, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 61–62.
8. Prestes, "Carta a um amigo," Rio de Janeiro, June 20, 1944, in *Problemas Atuais da Democracia*, pp. 63–67.
9. Paulo Emílio Sales Gomes, interview, São Paulo, November 16, 1968.

9. *Repression in Rio by Coriolano de Góes (last half of 1944)*

1. *Jornal do Commercio*, Rio de Janeiro, May 2, 1944. Armando Coutinho, interview, Salvador, October 17, 1967. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, June 7, 1944. Jacob Gorender, interview, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1979. Jorge Amado, *Homens e Coisas do Partido Comunista* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Horizonte, 1946), p. 59.
2. José Soares Maciel Filho, letter to Benjamim Vargas, July 5, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
3. Delegacia de Segurança Social, Report 932, Rio de Janeiro, December 23, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
4. *Ibid.*
5. "Rough Stuff in Rio," *Time*, August 28, 1944. Samuel Wainer, interview, São Paulo, July 14, 1979. Paulo Zingg, interview, São Paulo, July 9, 1981.

6. Osvaldo Aranha, letter to Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, August 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). Rodolfo Ghioldi, declarations in Montevideo, published in a bulletin of the Partido Popular of Cuba (see Vargas papers, ref. GV 44.08.17, CPDOC).
 7. Delegacia de Segurança Social, Confidential Bulletin 100, September 28, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC).
 8. Delegacia de Segurança Política, Bulletin 97, September 28, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). Henrique Cordeiro Oest, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 3, 1979.
 9. Divisão de Polícia Política e Social, "Caso 'R'" (Vargas papers, ref. GV 44.10.03, CPDOC). Delegacia de Segurança Política, Bulletins 113, 116, October 17, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC); newspaper clipping about Monteiro Lobato is attached to Bulletin 116 (see also Edgard Cavalheiro, *Monteiro Lobato: Vida e Obra* [São Paulo: Companhia Distribuidora de Livros, 1955], pp. 613–623).
 10. Joseph Newman, "5 Vargas Foes Reported Held by Brazilian Army," *New York Herald Tribune*, December 29, 1944 (report from Buenos Aires, December 28). War Ministry, 2nd Military Region, Estado Maior Regional, 2nd Section, Boletim Secreto de Informações 14, December 22, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). Carolina Nabuco, *A Vida de Virgílio de Melo Franco* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editôra, 1962), pp. 159–160.
 11. Delegacia de Segurança Social, Report 932, December 23, 1944 (Vargas papers, CPDOC). The others arrested were Antônio Luciano Bacelar Couto, Olímpio Fernandes Melo, Tulin Furtado de Azevedo Marques, Júlio Shuquiel de Medeiros, and Cícero Carneiro Neiva.
10. *The Writers' Conference (January 1945)*
1. Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe*, 2d ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editôra Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 403–405. Luiz Werneck Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976), p. 244, based on Dutra memorandum to Vargas dated December 27, 1944, in the Vargas papers (CPDOC). Spindel, *O Partido Comunista na Gênese do Populismo*, p. 46. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 3, 1945.
 2. Nabuco, *A Vida de Virgílio de Melo Franco*, p. 165. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 3, 1945. The organization of the ABDE in November 1942 is discussed on p. 94 of Vamireh Chacon, *Estado e Povo no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora em convênio com a Câmara dos Deputados, 1977).
 3. Marques Rebelo, interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 19, 1967.
 4. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, January 28, 1945. Carlos Guilherme Mota, *Ideologia da Cultura Brasileira (1933–1974)* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1980), pp. 137–153. Virgílio A. de Mello Franco, *A Campanha da U.D.N. (1944–1945)* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Editora Zelio Valverde, 1946), p. 133.
 5. Antônio Cândido de Melo e Souza, interview, São Paulo, August 7, 1981.

6. Lima, *Travessia*, pp. 139–140.
7. Cristiano Cordeiro, interview given to Ricardo Noblat, 1979.

11. *Communist Labor Leaders Establish the MUT (April 1945)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 3, 1945.
2. Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil*, pp. 246, 248. Kondcr, *A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil*, p. 51.
3. Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário*, pp. 319–322.
4. Luís Carlos Prestes, interview, Rio de Janeiro, August 6, 1963.
5. Edgard Carone, *O Estado Novo (1937–1945)* (São Paulo: Difel, 1977), p. 247. Jover Telles, *O Movimento Sindical no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editorial Vitória, 1962), p. 39. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, p. 119, and *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 62–63.
6. Francisco C. Weffort, “Origens do Sindicalismo Populista no Brasil (A Conjuntura do Após-Guerra),” *Estudos CEBRAP* (São Paulo), no. 4 (April–May–June 1973), p. 81.
7. Abgvar Bastos, interview, São Paulo, November 22, 1967. Carone, *O Estado Novo*, pp. 242–243, 246, and *A Terceira República*, pp. 522–538.
8. Carone, *A Terceira República*, pp. 526–538. Spindel, *O Partido Comunista na Gênese do Populismo*, p. 56.
9. Telles, *O Movimento Sindical no Brasil*, p. 39. Weffort, “Origens do Sindicalismo Populista no Brasil (A Conjuntura do Após-Guerra),” pp. 86, 82.

12. *Prestes Supports the CNOP and Vargas (April 1945)*

1. *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 14, 1945. Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário*, pp. 324–325. Paulo Silveira, interview, Rio de Janeiro, November 28, 1967. Pedro Mota Lima, “Março de 1945,” in Osório et al., *Prestes: Estudos E Depoimentos*, pp. 68–77, see esp. p. 74.
2. Mota Lima, “Março de 1945,” pp. 72–73.
3. Luiz Carlos Prestes, *A Situação no Brasil e no Mundo* (booklet transcribed from *O Globo*, March 15, 1945; Rio, 1945). See also Prestes, *Problemas Atuais de Democracia*, pp. 69–74, and *O Estado de S. Paulo*, March 21, 1945.
4. Mota Lima, “Março de 1945,” pp. 75–77.
5. Ibid. Luís Carlos Prestes, interview, Rio de Janeiro, September 5, 1963.
6. Paulo Silveira, interviews, Rio de Janeiro, October 29, November 28, 1967, June 20, 1979.
7. Carlos da Costa Leite (interview, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1966) said that Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo was also present at this meeting. Davino Francisco dos Santos, interview, São Paulo, November 9, 1968, and *A Marcha Vermelha*, p. 522.
8. Barata, *Vida de um Revolucionário*, p. 324.
9. Moacir Werneck de Castro, interview, Rio de Janeiro, July 2, 1979.
10. Cristiano Cordeiro, interview given to Ricardo Noblat, 1979. Inter-

- views, São Paulo, 1981. Basbaum, *Uma Vida em Seis Tempos*, p. 184.
11. Paulo Zingg, interview, São Paulo, July 9 1981. Maria Victória Benevides, "Paulo Emílio: O Intelectual e a Política na Redemocratização de 1945," *Revista de Cultura Contemporânea* (São Paulo) 1, no. 2 (January 1979). Cory Porto Fernandes, interview, São Paulo, August 5, 1981. Ruy Mesquita, interview, São Paulo, July 25, 1981.
 12. Roberto Morena, letter to Luís Carlos Prestes, Rio de Janeiro, April 11, 1945 (copy furnished by Pedro Rodrigues).
 13. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, p. 115.
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
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